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The inner history of the Chinese
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The Inner History of
The Chinese Revolution

By the Same Author

CHINA IN REVOLT

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN CHINA

The Inner History of The Chinese Revolution

By

T'ang Leang-Li

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TO THE MEMORY
OF
WANG LOH-P'ING
WHO, IN RESISTING THE BETRAYAL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
NATIONAL REVOLUTION, FELL BY AN ASSASSIN'S HAND
AT SHANGHAI, ON FEBRUARY 18, 1930

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

A GREAT number of the documents relating to the history of the Chinese Revolution are still in private hands, especially those which concern the period of 1923-27, the most important period of China's modern history. The author, the Representative in Great Britain and Correspondent in Europe of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang, has had the opportunity of coming into close contact with the most prominent of the makers of revolutionary China, to several of whom he has acted as political private secretary. In this capacity he has had access to confidential documents, and has become acquainted with secret decisions of the Political Council of the Kuo-Min Tang, the existence of which are revealed and interpreted in this work for the first time.

One difficulty the author has had to face is the traditional modesty and reticence of the Chinese leaders with regard to their rôle in the shaping of events in modern China. Of political memoirs, there are, for instance, only those of Sun Yat-Sen, the Father of the Chinese Revolution, which are fragmentary and incomplete. Few of his chief lieutenants have written in detail on the complicated problems of the National Revolution. The published works on the different aspects of the Revolution are mostly unreliable and inaccurate, while Sun Yat-Sen's own biographical writings are, in many instances, contradictory. In compiling the present work the author has made full use of the few existing authoritative works, but mostly he has been dependent on the material collected from contemporary periodical publi-

cations, and on the information gathered in his association with his political superiors.

This book cannot, therefore, claim to be the comprehensive standard history of the Chinese Revolution and of the Kuo-Min Tang, which a Government Commission alone could compile some fifty years hence. The author, nevertheless, hopes that he has succeeded in narrating and explaining the significant facts of Chinese revolutionary history, giving an insight into the character of the different personalities who influence modern Chinese politics. Throughout the book he has taken the point of view of a revolutionary who is intensely interested in the realisation of the ideals and principles of the Chinese Revolution, as interpreted by Sun Yat-Sen. Therefore, he can lay no claim to being an impartial historian, but he has tried to be strictly accurate with his facts, aiming at producing a handbook on Chinese revolutionary politics, which may be useful both to the student and the general reader.

London, *April* 1930.

T. L. L.

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T. L. L.

NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION

IN the “ romanisation ” of Chinese words the author has, as a rule, followed the Chinese Post Office system for the names of places and the Giles’ system for the names of persons. Readers should, however, accustom themselves to recognise the same name in different spellings : as Waichow for Huichou, Anhwei for Anhui, Chiang Kai-Shek for Chiang K’ai-Shih, Soong for Sung.

PRONOUNCE

Vowels, as in German. *ih* as *e* in *the*.

Diphthongs : *ai* as in *aisle* ; *ei* as *a* in *ate* ; *ao* as *ow* in *now* ; *u* before another vowel as the equivalent of *w*.

Consonants, as in English. But *ch*, *k*, *p*, *t*, *ts*, when not followed by an inverted comma, to be pronounced thus : *ch* as soft *g* ; *k* as hard *g* ; *p* as *b* ; *t* as *d* ; *ts* as *dz*.

THE INNER HISTORY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The Historical Basis of Chinese Nationalism

THE capture of the feudal capital Peking (Peip'ing) by the Chinese Nationalist armies, in June 1928, and the proclamation of Nanking as the new capital of China, marks the beginning of a new stage in the history of the Chinese National Revolution. A noteworthy feature in this revolution was the important rôle played by foreign influences. There was China's ignominious defeat in the Opium Wars of the 'forties and 'fifties, which inaugurated the series of unilateral treaties, the so-called "Unequal Treaties". There were further the encroachments of Great Britain, France, Russia and Japan on China's territorial, administrative, and economic integrity at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. There was also the influence of Western political philosophy: practically all the Chinese revolutionary leaders had studied abroad, and were to a great extent inspired by the revolutionary conceptions contained in such works as the Christian Bible, *L'Esprit des Lois*, *Le Contrat Social*, *Das Kapital*.

While it is undeniable that Western aggression and Western revolutionary thought have played a significant part in the contemporary revolutionary movement in China, it is important to realise that Chinese revolutionary nationalism has its real basis in native revolutionary

thought and institutions. Viewed in proper historical perspective, the Chinese National Revolution was but the logical continuation of the struggle started by adherents of the Ming (the last Chinese) Dynasty (1368-1644) against the (alien) Manchu conquerors of China,—a struggle which was in essence, as it is to-day, of an anti-imperialist nature.

Chinese thought in the middle of the seventeenth century was dominated by a group of philosophers, the most important of whom was Huang Li-Chou. Huang realised that armed opposition to the Manchus was doomed to failure, and so conceived the plan of reorganising the secret societies in China on a revolutionary nationalistic basis. He rejected the Confucian idea of the Emperor as the Son of Heaven and put forward an uncompromising doctrine of the popular sovereignty against the current absolutist theory. In an essay, *On the Monarch*, he stated:—

“ In the primitive stage of human life men were selfish and self-seeking. There were no common interests. There was an absolute chaos in human relations.

“ This state of things ceased, however, when there came a king, who, without regard to his own interests, strove for the benefit of the people as a whole, and aimed at relieving their sufferings. Being burdened with almost superhuman duties, and yet refusing to take advantage of the power he wielded, he occupied a far from enviable position. It was therefore little wonder that many in the Golden Age refused to be King, such as Hsu Yu and Wu Kuang . . .

“ This however is not the case with the later kings who identify their own welfare with the good of the people and look upon the common property as their own . . .

“ In the Golden Age, the people or nation was the sovereign and the ruler the servant. Consequently the monarch devoted his life to the guarding of the people's interests. But nowadays the monarch has become the sovereign and the people the servant. Life now is every-

where insecure and intolerable because of the greed and ambitions of the ruler. Thousands are slaughtered or made homeless in order that he may have the State as his private property, to be handed down to his sons and grandsons. He has no sympathy even with those who fought and died for his sake. 'What do I care for the sacrifices and lives of others if I can be powerful and mighty!'

"The monarch having thus established his House sucks the blood of the people and separates sons and daughters from their parents in order that they may serve him, or that his sexual desires may be satisfied. He takes this to be his natural right, and remarks 'All that I enjoy is the surplus profit of my business'.

"The great enemy of the people, therefore, is their own monarch. And do we want a monarch for the purpose of ruining ourselves? It was natural for the people of old to respect and love their ruler, to look upon him as their father, even to worship him as a God. It is also natural for the people now to hate their monarch, to regard him as an enemy and a robber, and to call him a tyrant. But what causes surprise is the Divine Right theory of the pseudo-scholars who hold that the people owe to their King an absolute and unconditional allegiance. They even condemn Tang and Wu for having killed tyrants Chieh and Chiu, for having delivered the people from their murderous rule. . . . In their opinion, the sacrifice of thousands of people for the sake of the Dynasty is of no greater account than the killing of rats. But is it reasonable to suppose that among the millions of men Providence should only favour one man and one family to the damnation of the rest?"

A doctrine which holds that the political sovereign should be the corporate institution of the nation itself could, of course, find no favour with the Manchu rulers, who proceeded to bribe the Confucian *literati* into high office, and supported the Chinese mandarinates as had no other foreign dynasty in China.

The Significance of the Secret Societies

As the Chinese *literati* could not be depended upon to keep alive the nationalist spirit, Huang Li-Chou and his associates turned to the lower strata of Chinese society, to the poor and homeless whom they gathered together in secret revolutionary societies.

Secret societies have existed in China from time immemorial. The first secret society was said to have been founded by Liu Pei, Kuan Yü and Chang Fei, the three heroes of the period of the Three Kingdoms (A.D. 221-264), who, in response to the call for volunteers by the last Han Emperor, met on a certain day in a peach garden. Having burnt magic incense, they sacrificed a black ox and a white horse, and bound themselves by a special oath of fidelity to be faithful unto death. Liu Pei, the Leader or First Brother, became the Emperor of Shu, and the founder of the Western Han Dynasty. Kuan Yü, less fortunate, was slain by Liu Pei's enemies and the same fate befell Chang Fei, who tried to avenge his death. During the reign of Wan Li (1572-1626) Kuan Yü was deified, under the name of Kuan Kung, as the God of War, being the embodiment of loyalty to a sworn brother; he was also adopted as the tutelary Deity of the secret societies. The latter societies were often of a religious, of Buddhist or Taoist origin, but their main object was to safeguard the common people, during the Manchu régime, against oppression by corrupt officialdom. Under the influence of Huang Li-Chou, and with the example of Chu Hung-Wu (the Buddhist priest who became the first Ming Emperor and after whose name Hung the revolutionary secret societies were named), most of the secret societies became anti-dynastic. Chinese national sentiment as expressed in the slogan "Fan Ch'ing Fu Ming" (Overthrow the Ch'ing, restore the Ming [Dynasties]), originally only current among the adherents of the late Ming Dynasty, soon became widespread among the masses.

Triad or the Hung Societies, which, in different places and at different periods, appear under different names, such as San Ho Hui (Triad Society), Tien Ti Hui (Society of Heaven and Earth), Ko Lao Hui (Society of Brothers and Elders). They consisted mainly of discontented peasants, labourers and vagabonds. Propaganda among the masses was carried on by the oral tradition, in which the open-air theatre played an important rôle. By means of plays discontent was aroused with regard to the political situation and the existing inequality of economic status, as well as the desire for revenge awakened. There was a feeling of solidarity among the members of the secret societies, which was very helpful to the adventurers and vagabonds among them, for assistance was rendered whenever they got into trouble. Among the Chinese emigrants, for instance, the Hung Societies were often reduced to little more than mutual-aid societies, the political anti-dynastic aims being lost sight of. Communistic ideas were also rife among these societies. The following is a ritual formula :

“The Supreme Being charged us to destroy the evil contrast between crushing poverty and excessive luxury. Father Heaven and Mother Earth had never given to the few the right to abuse, for their own satisfaction, the properties of the millions.

“The Supreme Being had never given to the rich and powerful the exclusive use of the wealth which was the product of the labour and sweat of the millions of oppressed brothers.

“The Sun with its radiant face, the Earth with its treasures, the world with its joys, are a common good that must be taken back out of the hands of the few, in order that they may be universally enjoyed by the millions.”

Unfortunately, the secret societies consisted of ignorant and unlettered persons. Their vulgar language and crude manners were repulsive to the polished Chinese scholars, who avoided them in disgust, for none of them was

educated sufficiently to be able to discuss problems of Confucian philosophy. They for their part kept aloof from the *literati* whom they regarded as the eyes and ears of the Manchu rulers, the objects of their hatred. The result was that the upper classes of Chinese society were devoid of any sense of nationality. (The Marquess Tseng Kuo-Fan, for instance, rejected in the 'fifties many offers from the T'ai-P'ing rebels, and rendered great services to the Manchus, not so much because of his loyalty to the Dynasty, as because of his contempt for the uneducated masses.) Being ignorant and not really understanding what their societies stood for, the members, not only did not know how to take advantage of favourable situations, but were frequently made tools to carry out policies which were in direct opposition to the aims the societies originally stood for. There was the historic case of the Boxers, belonging for the greater part to the Ta Tao Hui (Big Knife Society) and the Pai Lien Chiao (White Lily Society). When the Boxer Movement broke out their original war cry was "Blot out the Manchus and all foreign things". They allowed themselves, however, to be persuaded by the Manchu Court and to turn their hatred solely against Westerners. During the T'ai-P'ing Rebellion, many members of the Hung societies participated on the rebel side, but many also were soldiers in the Imperial armies. The Hunan and Huai Valley Divisions, for instance, all belonged to the secret societies, but they all failed to utilise the opportunity to turn against the Manchu régime.

It was related by Sun Yat-Sen that, when the Imperial General Tso Tsung-T'ang went to Sinkiang on a punitive expedition to suppress the rebellion there, he started from Hankow across the Yangtse River in the direction of Hsi-An, with a large number of Hunan and Huai Valley troops. One day he noticed his army suddenly falling in and forming a long line of several miles. Simultaneously he received a communication from the Viceroy of Kiangsu, Anhui and Kiangsi requesting him to arrest a

notorious bandit chief who was fleeing from Hankow in the direction of Hsi-An. He then observed a serious commotion in the long army line and learned that the soldiers were making preparations to welcome "Great Dragon Head." Extremely agitated he asked his secretary for an explanation. "In our army", was the answer, "every one, from the private soldier to the highest officer is a member of the Ko Lao Hui (Society of Brothers and Elders). The Great Dragon Head whose arrest is sought is the leader of our Ko Lao Hui." General Tso asked, "Then how am I to keep my command over the army?" The reply was, "The only way for you to remain in control of the army is to become the Great Dragon Head yourself. Otherwise, you cannot proceed to Sinkiang." Thus Tso Tsung-T'ang called an outdoor council and announced himself as the Great Dragon Head. It is superfluous to state that one of his first acts as Head of the secret society was to smash up its entire organisation.

The breaking-up of the Ko Lao Hui by Tso Tsung-T'ang, however, meant only its re-emergence under different names into other regions. Ignorant and unable without proper guidance to prosecute their original aims, they kept alive among the Chinese masses the nationalist idea. In an age of universal corruption and national humiliation, they reminded the Chinese people of the glories and the prosperity they had enjoyed under former native dynasties. The common slogan of the secret societies remained "Overthrow the Ch'ing, restore the Ming". They were often implicated in anti-foreign outbreaks towards the end of the nineteenth century; their purpose in attacking the foreigners was to involve the Manchu Dynasty in diplomatic complications.

In the second half of the nineteenth century a change took place in the composition of the societies. High Chinese officials recognising the power and influence of these societies, and wishing to be on good terms with them, began to join them as bona-fide members. Even

Governors of provinces, such as Yuan Shih-K'ai, became members. Revolutionary intellectuals also began to work among the secret societies, which proved to be an indispensable factor in organising insurrections. Sun Yat-Sen himself, the Father of the Chinese Republic, before he founded his own revolutionary organisation, was a member of the Ko Lao Hui. His later methods and tactics until the reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang in 1924, were indistinguishable from those of Hung societies.

It must be remembered here that the slogan "Overthrow the Ch'ing, restore the Ming", despite its definiteness, has in the course of centuries become a kind of metaphor which has a different meaning according to the political intelligence of the person. The fact was that there were hardly any descendants of the Ming Emperors left. The majority of Ming princes had emigrated to Japan and turned Japanese, while the one Chinese branch left had since given allegiance to the Manchus and accepted a hereditary ducal title. To the uneducated the restoration of the Ming merely meant the establishment of a Chinese Dynasty, no matter under whom. If no lineal descendant of the last Ming Emperor could be found, anyone with the surname Chu—the original surname of the Ming rulers—was good enough. To the partisans of Sun Yat-Sen it meant the establishment of the Republic, the sovereignty of the people. To them the slogan was a convenient term, as it gave the masses who could not understand an abstraction, something tangible to believe in.

Owing to the fact that these secret societies, as the term implies, carried on their activities in strict secrecy—it is only by chance that the membership of a particular person in a secret society can be known,—and in the absence of reliable records, their part in the Chinese National Revolution is generally overlooked.

It must be realised, however, that in spite of their bad organisation and the low calibre of their membership,

these Societies form the backbone of every revolutionary movement in China, although, left to themselves, they would only have effected a change of dynasty, an exchange of an alien for a native oppressor. Without the activities of the secret societies the Republican Revolution would never have materialised. Sun Yat-Sen and his associates merely provided that enlightened leadership, the lack of which was the cause of failure of the great revolutionary movements in China in the nineteenth and the beginning of the present century. Sun Yat-Sen knew how to utilise the existing revolutionary material as well as to give a new and modern meaning to the anti-dynastic conception.

The Meaning of the National Revolution

In order to appreciate properly the evolution of the Chinese revolutionary conception, it is necessary to analyse the relationship existing between China and the Western Powers. The history of this relationship is comparatively short, less than a century, but owing to the administrative and legal systems and the national economy of China being unsuited to the requirements of modern international intercourse, a series of complications between China and the Powers ensued, which shook the fabric of the Chinese State to its very foundation. There were the cessions of territories, not necessarily as a result of defeat in war, the political and economic dominance of the most important cities by foreigners, the institution of foreign control over the national finances, the introduction of extra-territorial jurisdiction, the interference with the Chinese administration of justice and taxation, and the extortion of other territorial and economic concessions. China, from the middle of the nineteenth century up to the World War, was a centre of the international conflict, caused by the growth of industrial capitalism in the West.

These circumstances forced upon the ruling class, notably after the defeat in the war against Japan in

1894, the conviction that it would be more expedient to fight the Western Powers with Western weapons rather than with the antiquated army and Confucian ethics. Thus, the so-called Model or New Army was organised ; Japanese instructors were engaged and British and German guns bought. The old type of scholar-officialdom gave way to the military-minded officer, and the period of Chinese militarism was inaugurated.

The Nationalist sentiment which throughout the nineteenth century laid dormant in the bosom and formulæ of the secret societies, began to permeate the educated and mercantile classes. Coincident with the talk of partitioning in China, there was the Reform Movement of 1898. There was the misdirected Boxer Movement, with its slogan "Support the Ch'ing, exterminate the Foreigner". Disregarding the circumstances which turned the anti-dynastic societies into supporters of the existing régime, the change of slogan was significant. It meant that nationalist sentiment among the educated people in the North had turned from hatred against the Manchu tyranny to resentment against the Western penetration of China. There was the "Rights' Recovery Movement" of 1908, as a result of which the Belgian Concession for the construction of the Canton-Hankow Railway was cancelled. Popular resentment against both the Manchus and the Westerners became general, and when, through an accident, the Revolution of 1911 broke out, the easy victory of the revolutionary cause astonished revolutionary and reactionary alike.

The 1911 Revolution which established the Republic in China was the first real success of the National Revolutionary Movement in China for three hundred years. It removed from the political arena the alien dynasty which had obscured the real issues in China—native feudalism and foreign domination. The object of the Revolution was the establishment of a democratic republican régime in China and the rehabilitation of China's international status. To the realisation of these

objects the elimination of the Manchu Dynasty was necessary, but over-emphasis on this point made the revolutionary leaders underestimate the rôle played by international capitalism and foreign privilege in the subjugation of the Chinese people. It was not perceived that the democratisation of the Chinese body politic was not possible under the super-imposed international régime, symbolised in such extra-legal institutions as the Diplomatic Corps at Peking.

The revolutionary leaders, belonging for the most part to the possessing classes, paid little attention to the specific needs of the poorer classes. The result was that the great masses of the people, the peasants and labourers, did not participate in the revolution. This made the subsequent return to reactionary feudalism inevitable, when Yuan Shih-K'ai, for reasons of expediency, was given the Presidency of the Republic by Sun Yat-Sen. International capitalism and reactionary feudalism began to work hand in hand for the purpose of subduing the new democratic spirit in China, in which they saw their common enemy. For the consummation of the Republican revolution—the realisation of Sun Yat-Sen's principles of national sovereignty, democracy and Socialism, and the establishment of a strong democratic government—was bound to prejudice the interests of the mandarins, the great proprietors and compradores, and the new militarists. It would, in short, result in the abolition of the feudal privileges. To safeguard their own position of military dictatorship, Yuan Shih-K'ai, and the different war lords after his death, were prepared to accept any terms, however detrimental to national interests, from the Great Powers in return for their assistance. The Great Powers thus obtained a free hand to do practically what they liked in China.

China under the pressure of international capitalism became rapidly transformed, especially after the World War. On the one hand, there is unrestricted import of consumption goods, resulting in the dislocation of the

native industries. On the other hand, there is the exploitation of Chinese labour by foreign capital. The effect is not only the creation of new trades and industries, but also the creation of new social classes in China. A new class of industrial capitalists and an industrial proletariat have come into existence.

In addition, there is the pauperisation of the peasantry, due to the ravages of the private military struggles between the different war lords. The international and feudal régime, expressed, on the one hand, in the extra-territorial jurisdiction and China's tariff restrictions, in the monopoly of the foreign banks in the matter of the Customs and Salt Gabelle deposits, in the preferential treatment of foreigners in the matter of transport, communications and banking, and, on the other hand, in the heavy military taxes and arbitrary requisitions, and in the dislocation of the whole system of national economy, began to weigh more and more heavily on the new classes.

Thus, the new industrial classes in their desire to acquire markets in the interior, and resentful of what they considered to be unfair competition by the foreigner, began to be conscious of the necessity of first overthrowing the existing feudalistic régime at Peking, and, at the same time, working for the emancipation from foreign pressure. The urban proletariat and the oppressed people in the rural districts also realised that, in order to attain their emancipation, it was necessary to co-operate in the common struggle. The spirit of the National Revolution began to spread anew all over China. It found its expression in the "May Fourth" Movement of 1919 against Japan, led by the intellectual and mercantile elements, in the "May Thirtieth" Movement of 1925 against the Shanghai Shootings, led by the student and proletarian elements. Meanwhile, in 1924, the Reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang took place, and, under the direction of Sun Yat-Sen, it adopted an uncompromising anti-militarist and anti-imperialist pro-

democratic Socialistic State. The Northern Expedition took place in the summer of 1926, and within ten months the whole territory south of the Yangtse came under the rule of the Kuo-Min Tang Government. The astonishing success of the national revolutionary cause stunned the imagination of the reactionary elements who forthwith, as in 1912, conspired to divert the revolution from its original course. Twice at least, through foreign intervention, the progress of the revolutionary armies was blocked, and although the capital, Peking (since named Peip'ing), was taken in the summer of 1928, the whole nature of the revolution was changed. The urban proletariat and the peasantry who played a major part in the early period of the National Revolution were deprived of the right of continued action. While it is true that at the present moment the new Government at Nanking is nominally supreme in China, it is doubtful whether the era of peaceful reconstruction is yet at hand. For the recognition of the Nanking Government in 1928 by the Powers must not be taken to mean the recognition of the success of the National Revolution. Feudal militarism and foreign domination are still dominant in China, and even if their death-knell is sounded by the new social consciousness among all classes in China, the realisation of the social and economic emancipation of the masses is still in abeyance. The history of the failure of 1911 is repeating itself, and the problem before the revolutionary leaders is, how to put an end to the renewed period of unrest and civil war, with its inevitable foreign complications, while at the same time leading back the unfinished Revolution of 1926-28 to its original purpose, as defined by Sun Yat-Sen, the Father of the Chinese Republic.

CHAPTER II

THE GENESIS OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION

The Significance of Sun Yat-Sen

IN the light of the unscrupulous corruption and universal ignorance prevailing among the nineteenth-century rulers of China, and the coincident spread of the nationalist sentiment from the Chinese proletarian masses to the educated and mercantile classes, the downfall of the Manchu Dynasty lies in the logic of history. The commonplace saying that the Chinese Revolution is the creation, and the Chinese Republic the child, of Sun Yat-Sen, is, therefore, like all commonplaces, only a partial statement of the truth. The Revolution which, in 1912, culminated in the establishment of the Republic, was in fact the result of the joint efforts of a group of leaders who, while at first working independently of one another, finally combined in a common revolutionary purpose. Many of them were as ready for sacrifice and as devoted to the people's cause as Sun Yat-Sen himself. But Sun surpassed them all in the breadth of his ideas, and in the accuracy of his forecasts. A supreme organiser, a magnetic personality with a dominating will, he soon became the acknowledged leader of the revolutionaries. The incarnate spirit of the Revolution, he gave to it its guiding principles and its plan of action. In spite of his professed idealism, he was far from being a mere abstract thinker, possessing as he did a sense of economic and political realities such as no one before him in China has had. Sun awakened the Chinese people from their age-long sleep ; he gave to them a new sense

reaching programme of reconstruction. The reading of his main work, the *San Min Chu I* (The Three Principles of the People), is part of the civic training of the people. His social and political principles underlie the new institutions which are gradually developing, however imperfectly, in modern revolutionary China. As Confucius is the prophet of Traditional China, Sun Yat-Sen is the creator of Modern China, combining in his political and social philosophy, the best in the ancient Chinese teachings with those of the West which are most suitable to China. The consequences of his teachings are not confined to China. *Sunyatsenism* is a gospel of freedom, not only to the Chinese people, but to all the subject nations of the East. It applies equally well in India, Indo-China, Korea, as in China, and just as the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau was the cult of the last century, so will Sun Yat-Sen's idea of the League of Oppressed Nations be the guide of the next generation.

His Youth and Adolescence

Sun Yat-Sen was born on November 12, 1866, in the village of Tsui-Heng, in the district of Hsiang-Shan of the province of Kwangtung. Two things are to be noted here. When Sun's birth took place, the final collapse of the T'ai-P'ing Rebellion (1850-65) had occurred only the year before, the burning and looting of Peking by a joint French and British Expedition six years before, and memories of these heart-stirring events were still fresh in the minds of the Chinese people. Hsiang-Shan was situated in the south-eastern corner of China which was little subject to the surveillance of Peking, with the result that the anti-Manchu sentiment of the T'ai-P'ing period had never been completely rooted out. It was further close to Macao and Hongkong, and had an easy access to the sea. The outward splendour of these foreign possessions, the wonderful things and tales brought home by the returned emigrants, made the Hsiangshanese in their wretched surroundings only realise their own misery all the more acutely. Dis-

content with the current régime was beginning to show itself again, leading to a demand for reforms and finally developing into a revolutionary movement.

Sun's father, Sun Tao-Ch'uan, was a poor peasant who became a Christian at a period when Christianity did not confer on its professor any material and legal advantages, but meant adherence to the revolutionary cause of the T'ai-P'ing. It should be regarded, however, that this nominal religion did not prevent him from paying reverence to the village gods, like any other villager. Sun Yat-Sen was born a Christian, but as in his father's case, his Christianity was not of the conventional kind. He cared little about church-going and about Christian morality. He saw in Jesus before everything else the supreme Revolutionary who "in preaching the Kingdom of Heaven, attacked Imperialism and Capitalism, propagated and practised Communism, and exhorted all men to love one another, even their enemies." With the Chinese Christian community, who never hesitated to invoke the aid of the foreigners to further their own interests, he had little sympathy, as he considered their conduct contrary to the spirit of Jesus. Sun's proper name was Wen, and his usual signature Sun Wen. At adolescence he adopted, in accordance with custom, the courtesy name of Teh-Ming. This he shortly after changed into I-Hsien—in Cantonese, Yat-Sen—and under the name of Sun Yat-Sen he became known abroad. When in exile in Japan he adopted the name of Nakka-yama. This name and its Chinese equivalent, Chung-Shan, gained so wide a currency in China that it gradually superseded I-Hsien as courtesy name, and under Sun Chung-Shan, he became generally known in China. After his death in 1925 his native district and many Nationalist Universities were given the name of Chung-Shan in honour of his memory.

At the age of seven Sun went to study with an uncle who kept an evening school in the village temple. He was the cleverest boy of the class, but soon got into trouble for asking too many questions and for remonstrating about the

futility of the Chinese classics, the meaning of which was then above his comprehension. It should be noted that in the traditional Chinese school, learning consisted of the mechanical repetition of Classical Chinese texts without any explanation from the teacher. No arguments on the part of the pupil were tolerated, and strokes with the whip were freely distributed to troublesome boys. Little Wen knew what he was in for, when he started arguing with his uncle. But his uncle liked the unruly but brilliant boy, being an old T'ai-P'ing rebel himself. He used to take him out for walks in the country and related to him the different glorious deeds of the T'ai-P'ing in their struggle against the Manchus, especially those of Hung Hsiu-Chuan, the T'ai-P'ing Emperor. Little Wen thus wanted to become a second Rebel Emperor. As became the future revolutionary leader, he started calling himself Hung-Hsiu-Chuan, playing soldiers and sham battles, in which he distinguished himself by his skill in capturing other boys. But Sun's life was not all one of learning and playing. In the daytime he had to help his father, who was too poor to spare him as a farm hand, living as he did from hand to mouth. In these early days their dwelling was a mud hut and their chief nourishment sweet potatoes, as rice was too dear. It was in this atmosphere he conceived of revolutionary ideas, that he dreamt of the future social order, when the lot of the peasant should not be so wretched that little boys like himself could not have shoes to wear and rice to eat.

From the school and rice fields he carried his rebellious ideas to the home, and the village in general. At that time the system of foot binding was universal in China. When it was his younger sister's turn to have her feet bound, he realised her sufferings, and instantly remonstrated about it with his mother, but without success, as he could not meet the argument that small feet were a mark of feminine beauty. His protests against the system of child-selling met with the same fate, as he could not then suggest an alternative.

Wen's elder brother Mei had as a young man emigrated to Honolulu, where by hard work and good fortune, he had built up a promising business and became a well-to-do man. In 1879, at the age of thirteen, Sun also went to Honolulu in order to help his brother, receiving a share in the business in lieu of wages. Thus Sun came into contact with Western civilisation, which brought into sharp contrast the backward conditions prevailing in his own village. Sun, eager to learn, found time to attend the local missionary school, where he learnt English. Later on, he went to a high school, where again he distinguished himself by his cleverness, drawing the attention of the native king of Hawai, who presented him with a prize. In 1884, his brother found that Sun was in danger of being completely Westernised, and sent him back home at the age of eighteen.

On his return to Tsui-Heng, Sun, instead of quietly settling down, began to preach the necessity of reform and of enlightening the people. He started with deliberately damaging the wooden village god, which caused such an outcry among the villagers that his parents saw no alternative than sending him away again, this time to Hongkong, where he visited Queen's College. Sun's ambition, after he finished with Queen's in 1886, was to become a military officer, but at that time there were no military schools in China, and he had no political influence which alone could procure him a place in a foreign military academy. He then thought of a naval training, but China's only naval college at Fuchow had just been destroyed by the French. Thus he decided to study medicine and went to the Po Tsi Medical School at Canton. The following year, in 1887, he learnt that a new medical school with a more advanced course and better organisation than that at Canton had been opened at Hongkong. Attracted also by the idea of getting into a more favourable field for political discussion and propaganda than Canton could give him, he left the Canton college and entered the Hongkong institution where he studied under

Dr. Kerr and Dr. James Cantlie and graduated with distinction in 1892.

Marriage and Re-Marriage

At the age of eighteen, before he entered Queen's College, he was married, according to ancient Chinese tradition, to a young lady of the name of Lu. This marriage was responsible for a great deal of domestic unhappiness, for his young wife did not share his political ideas, and Sun had never been in love with her. In 1912, when Provisional President of China at Nanking, he was introduced to Miss Sung Eh Ling, whose father was a close friend of his. He appointed her as his English private secretary, and when in 1913 Sun went to Japan Miss Sung accompanied him, but only to get married to H. H. K'ung, the present Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labour. Mrs K'ung now recommended her younger sister Sung Ch'ing Ling as her successor, and the young Miss Sung, who had gone to Japan against the wishes of her family, soon grew to care for her illustrious employer, who returned her love deeply and sincerely. They arranged to get married, but there were serious difficulties in the way. His wife had three children, two of whom were still living, namely Sun K'o (or Sun Fo), member of the present Nanking Government, and Sun An, at present living with her mother at Macao. Several of Dr Sun's closest followers raised objections, being afraid that it would adversely affect public opinion, but Sun disregarded their advice. Mrs Sun, however, did not mind a divorce; she only wanted to be allowed to remain with her children, and on this basis a legal separation was effected.

Dr Sun's second marriage, which took place in Japan on October 25, 1915, was an ideal union in every respect. Before he met Miss Sung Ch'ing Ling, Dr Sun confessed, he had never known what true love was. Not only did Miss Sung prove to be the ideal domestic companion, but she also shared his interests, his aims and ideals, and collaborated in many books with him. Of a retiring nature,

she never joined in the discussions between her husband and his close associates like Wang Ching-Wei, Liao Chung-K'ai, Hu Han-Min, but her entire absorption in her husband's ideals, her constant companionship with him, entitled her to be regarded, after Dr Sun's death on March 12, 1925, as Dr Sun's only living representative.

The Foundation of the Hsin Chung Hui

While studying at the Canton Medical School, Dr Sun made the acquaintance of Cheng Shi-Liang, who introduced him to a secret society, the Ko Lao Hui, of which he was a prominent leader. Sun and Cheng spoke freely about revolutionary ideas, and Cheng, who had great faith in Sun, offered him the services of his secret organisation, with its connexions among the Imperial troops, should he care to lead a revolutionary party to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. In 1887 he went to the new Medical College at Hongkong. The freer atmosphere offered him greater opportunities for revolutionary propaganda than at Canton. In Hongkong, he made friends with, and converted to the revolutionary cause, Ch'en Shao-Pei, Yü Shao-Wan and Yang Ho-Lin, as well as Lu Hao-Tung, from Shanghai. The other students, on hearing of his revolutionary ideas, avoided him as they would one stricken with plague. They considered him to be insane for entertaining the very thought of fighting the Chinese Empire.

In Hongkong, Sun lived together with Ch'en, Yü, and Yang, and they spent all their leisure time in discussing revolutionary problems. They devoted also a great deal of their time to the study of the history of revolutions. "Whenever we could not come together and talk about revolution, we felt unhappy. Thus several years went by, and we received from our acquaintances the nick-name of 'the four great desperadoes'. It was a period of revolutionary orientation and preparation," writes Dr Sun in his *Memoirs*.

After Sun had finished his medical studies in 1892 he

went over to Macao, nominally to attend to his medical practice, but in reality to begin revolutionary propaganda and organisation.

With Cheng Shi-Liang at Canton, he began to lay the foundations of the Hsin Chung Hui, the Association for the Regeneration of China. The slogan he used was, "Tien Ming Wu Chang", i.e., Divine Right does not last for ever. While the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty had always been at the back of Dr Sun's mind, on tactical grounds he only put forward the idea of a Constitutional Monarchy which would institute reforms and bring to an end the system of corruption prevailing in the Empire. In view of the despotism of an all-powerful and corrupt bureaucracy, writes Dr Sun in *Kidnapped in London* (1897), "China has no possibility of reform except one which comes from the Throne itself. It was to induce the Throne to modify this pernicious state of things that the Young China Party (i.e., the Hsin Chung Hui) was formed. We hoped that the Peking authorities, by their more extended contact during recent years with foreign diplomats, would have learned something of constitutional government and would be willing to aid the people in throwing off their deplorable ignorance. I ventured with some others in all humility to approach them, with a view of moving them in this direction for the welfare of China. But our petitions only resulted in the infliction of many vigorous punishments."

The avowed aim of the Hsin Chung Hui, which was formally organised in 1894, was the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Superficially considered, this seemed to be a retrograde step in comparison with the programme of the secret societies. But the introduction of constitutional monarchy, in the place of absolute despotism, implies in itself a revolution. For it means, among other things, the abolition of privileges of many centuries' standing : and this, as a rule, cannot be attained without violence and bloodshed of some kind. The programme of the secret societies, radical as it sounded,

was, in fact, a reactionary solution. They wanted to overthrow the alien and corrupt Manchu Dynasty, but only to replace it by another, perhaps a better, dynasty ; about the governmental organisation they were indifferent. Dr Sun, on the other hand, realised that the mere formal change of dynasty would mean very little to the masses of the people. He wanted the State to be infused with a new social purpose and, while his ultimate aim, being a member of a traditional secret society, was the overthrow of the dynasty, he was, as a practical expediency, satisfied with the limitation of despotism. Moreover, he still believed in the possibility of reforms from above, even though he did not shirk from utilising revolutionary methods to achieve his aims.

The Canton Coup of 1895

In 1894, when the Chinese Imperial armies were suffering defeat after defeat at the hands of the Japanese, Dr Sun went to Hawaii for the purpose of establishing connexions with, and enlisting the support of, the Chinese colonists there. The moment, however, was premature ; the result of Sun's propaganda was only ten sympathisers, and of these only two, the brothers Teng Ying-Nan and Teng Teh-Chang, were willing to take an active part. As a result of the humiliation which it brought on China by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Manchu Dynasty fell into utter discredit ; its decay and rottenness became apparent to all thinking Chinese. Early in 1895, Sun, with Teng Ying-Nan and three other comrades, returned to Canton. His first intention was to present a petition embodying a series of reform proposals to the Emperor. Thus with Lu Hao-Tung he set out for the north, on the one hand, to study the situation in the metropolitan key-province of Chihli, and Hupeh, and on the other hand, to see in Tientsin the metropolitan Viceroy, Li Hung-Chang, through whose intermediary the petition had to be presented to the Court.

Li Hung-Chang, however, refused to see him. The

Canton authorities had already started taking savage action against the promoters and signatories of the petition, which they knew was especially directed against them. Sun had, therefore, no alternative but to return to Canton and to plan for the seizure of the city, "if only until our petition had found hearing and the oppressive measures, including the new taxes, repealed", as he explained in his *Reminiscences*.¹

He organised a revolutionary committee in Hongkong under the cover of a trading company, which consisted of Teng Ying-Nan, Yang Ch'ü-Yün, Huang Yung-Shang, Ch'en Shao-Pei, and others. In Canton he founded an agricultural society to disguise the activities of the branch committee, consisting of Lu Hao-Tung, Cheng Shi-Liang and several foreign military experts. While preparations for an attack on the vice-regal Yamen were in full blast, the authorities discovered, on September 9, 1895, the secret consignment of 500 revolvers which Lu Hao-Tung had smuggled in. Lu was executed, together with Ch'iu Hsi and Chu Kiu-Ch'uen, while about seventy others were arrested including the Cantonese admiral, Cheng Kueh-Kuang.

Sun Yat-Sen and a few others escaped arrest and probable execution. Nevertheless, he remained for three more days in Canton waiting until he had liquidated his affairs. He then left for Hongkong and thence, accompanied by Cheng Shi-Liang, and Ch'en Shao-Pei, went to Yokohama.

Sun Yat-Sen's First World Tour

The Manchu Government rightly saw in Sun its most dangerous adversary, and at once put a price of 200,000 taels—a tremendous sum at the time—on his head, dead or alive.² To facilitate his disguise, Sun, therefore, cut his queue on his arrival at Yokohama and henceforth took

¹ *Strand Magazine*, London, January 1912.

² The rewards which the Manchu Government and the different provincial authorities have offered for Sun's head amounted in total to no less than 700,000 taels, or about £100,000.

on European clothes, so that he could more easily be taken for a Japanese. But the repudiation of the queue—the symbol of submission to the Manchu Dynasty—had a deeper significance ; it meant the repudiation of the idea of constitutional monarchy. Henceforth the Chinese Revolution in Sun's mind was identified with the establishment of the Republic.

From Japan he went to Hawai, to take stock of the situation and to continue the propaganda for the Hsin Chung Hui. He was bitterly disappointed, however, for not only did he fail to get any new recruits, but the failure of the Canton insurrection had so destroyed the morale of the members that several of them foreswore their intention of taking part in any revolutionary movement again. He, therefore, decided, in the summer of 1896, to leave Honolulu for America, with a view to establishing connexions with the Chinese emigrants there, the majority of whom he knew belonged to the Hung societies. But he found in America an even more depressing atmosphere than in Hawai. The Hung societies, in the relatively free and easy atmosphere of nineteenth-century America, had lost their political character, and had become mutual benefit societies. The slogan of " Overthrow the Ch'ing, restore the Ming " had lost all meaning to their members and had become a purely ritual formula. It required years of protracted revolutionary propaganda on the part of Sun's later followers, for the Hung members in America to realise their historical mission. During his short stay in America he came into contact with the " Single-Taxers ", who were at that time busily engaged preparing for Henry George's second Mayoral Campaign. As a result he came under the influence of the idea of the " single tax ", an influence which is clearly noticeable in his land programme. From America he proceeded to Europe to take stock of the situation there. In London, however, he nearly lost his life, being kidnapped in the Chinese Legation for deportation as a lunatic to China. He was detained from October 11 to October 21, 1896, illegally, and only the

chance discovery of his former teacher, the late Sir James Cantlie, and the subsequent intervention of the British Foreign Office, secured his release. This kidnapping episode made Sun's name known throughout the English-speaking world and added to his importance both among his followers and his enemies. From London he went to the Continent to get into touch with the leaders of the Opposition Parties, notably with the Labour and Socialist Parties, which were becoming a factor of some importance in the national politics of the different European States. The First International was dead, but a new Socialist International came into existence in 1889, and Sun came into contact with their leading members, such as Longuet and Lafargue, who also introduced him to the study of Marxism.

During his sojourn in America and Europe, Sun came into contact with social contrasts and inequalities which made a deep impression upon him. In Europe especially Sun noticed the active struggle of the working classes to improve the conditions of their existence, and to bring the capitalistic order of society ultimately to an end. It became clear to him that, although the advanced Western countries were politically powerful and the peoples were nominally sovereign, the broad masses were far from happy. The problem of the liberation of the Chinese people, Sun realised, would be a more complicated question than the mere overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a democratic Chinese Republic. The political situation was not enough ; it was the only first step towards the social and economic solution. The French Revolution of 1789 against monarchical autocracy ignored the problem of the distribution of wealth, and as a consequence, the establishment of a capitalist and plutocratic system of society was made possible. On the other extreme, Marxism gave an economic solution to the problem of capitalist exploitation, but ignored the vital principle of nationality. Finding either solution by itself unsatisfactory, Sun thus conceived the idea of the simul-

taneous settlement, by means of the revolution, of the questions of national independence, popular freedom and of the people's livelihood. To the lineal descendant of the T'ai-P'ing and the inheritor of the traditions of the secret societies the idea of a social revolution and of Socialism was nothing novel, far less something dreadful, as some of his Chinese biographers, notably Tai Chi-T'ao, the Nanking politician, suggested. In this connexion it is significant that Sun's Anglo-Saxon biographers, like Cantlie, Jones, and Judge Linebarger, completely ignored his social and political philosophy and portrayed Sun, who was the greatest Chinese political leader and social thinker of modern times, as a romantic political adventurer.

Sun stayed two years in Europe, from 1896-1898, a long time for an active revolutionary, even though the time had been spent on observation, comparison and study. Then he left again for Japan, where being nearer home he could direct the revolutionary movement more successfully. In Yokohama he was met by representatives of the Japanese Popular Party, with whom he went to Tokio. There he was introduced to Okuma, a prominent member of the Popular Party, who has just been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He also met Suzima and other representatives of the Opposition. These leading members of the Japanese political parties promised him their moral support, a circumstance which contributed to his idea of eventually establishing an alliance between the Chinese and Japanese peoples as the nucleus of a Pan-Asiatic Federation.

Sun's revolutionary ideas were, however, still far too advanced for the great majority of his countrymen. In Japan there were at that time over ten thousand Chinese emigrants, but three years of propaganda had only brought in about one hundred partisans. People were afraid of the very idea of revolution, just as they were in other countries. But while the revolutionary propaganda abroad was difficult, it was even more so in China. The difficulty was not in the numbers that joined that Hsin

Chung Hui—the ground for the anti-dynastic idea was well prepared by the Hung societies—but in the low calibre of those who entered. “They lacked a conscious purpose; there was little solidarity amongst them, no sense of discipline; they had no convictions and no deep-rooted beliefs. They could be regarded as passive revolutionary material, but on no account could they serve as a driving force,” stated Sun in his *Memoirs*. Moreover, the majority of the Chinese intellectuals, the traditional leaders of the Chinese people, had no faith in the potential power of the masses, but every confidence in the benevolent action of an enlightened Son of Heaven, as was illustrated by the tragi-comic episode of the “Hundred Days”.

The Hundred Days

The “Hundred Days” refers to the futile Reform Movement which lasted from June 11 to September 20, 1898, when a series of empty decrees and proclamations were issued by Emperor Kuang Hsü, under the guidance of K’ang Yu-Wei, the self-styled “Modern Confucius”, and his disciple Liang Ch’i-Ch’ao, who had great literary talent, but who, unfortunately, lacked a sense of political reality. The following extract of a decree, dated June 11, 1898, is illustrative of the dream psychology of the reformers:

“For a few years past many of our officials in the capital and in the provinces have been dabbling with the subject of keeping up to the times, and strengthening the country and reforming the institutions of the Empire; consequent upon this we issued several edicts granting such measures as special metropolitan examinations for the purpose of advancing men of ability; the eliminating of the present personnel of the Imperial armies and substituting instead modern arms and Western organisation; changing the curriculum and military examinations for the rules governing the selection of military officers according to Western methods of military education; the institution of high and elementary schools and colleges and literary instruc-

tion in accordance with those which obtained in foreign countries, and such-like modern innovations . . . all for the sake of starting our great country on the road to progress. We confess to having gone over and considered these matters, once and once over again, in order to fix upon the best methods of bringing our projects to a triumphal conclusion; but it seems that our officials, scholars and *litterati* have not yet had the knowledge and education necessary to receive such innovations in the way desired, in consequence of which we have been the recipient of all manner of memorials written on behalf of, or against, our new measures. . . .”

In their attempt to transform in a few months the institutions based on thousands of years of settled government, and to correct the abuses engendered by nearly a century of inefficient administration, the Reformers did not realise that fundamental changes could only be brought about by what would amount to a revolution. They naïvely relied on the continued loyalty of the old officials who had a vested interest in the established order. Moreover, they forgot to secure the control of the army, and, without any real power behind them, they attempted to challenge an enemy who was armed to the teeth. On September 20, 1898, the reaction broke out, facilitated by the betrayal of Yuan Shi-K'ai. The Empress Dowager Tz'e Hsi, the Chinese Cleopatra, emerged from her retirement, and succeeded in virtually imprisoning the Emperor. Six of the Reformers were put to death and K'ang Yu-Wei and Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao had to go into exile.

The inglorious end of the episode of the “Hundred Days” brought home to the small but growing number of politically-minded Chinese patriots the lesson, which Sun Yat-Sen had been preaching for the last ten years, that only by revolutionary methods could any real reforms in China be brought about. It also demonstrated that nothing could be expected from the Manchu Dynasty, the dethronement of which was a *sine qua non* to the reconstruction of China.

The Defeat of 1900

With the failure of 1895, however, the revolutionary organisation which Sun had built up ever since his student days in Hongkong was destroyed. Revolutionary propaganda abroad had little success. On the other hand, monarchical organisations advocating the ideas of K'ang Yu-Wei and L'ang Ch'i-Ch'ao were growing up, and in spite of everything, became very active in the political arena. Sun Yat-Sen, far from falling to despair, redoubled his revolutionary efforts. In Hongkong the *Chung Kuo Jih Pao* (Chinese Daily News) was founded under the editorship of Ch'en Shao-Pei, for the spread of revolutionary ideas into China. Shi Chien-Yü headed a secret revolutionary mission to the Yangtse Valley to organise the revolutionary forces there. Cheng Shi-Liang was instructed to establish the revolutionary headquarters in Hongkong, where, in 1899, a conference took place of the leaders of the Hsin Chung Hui and the Hung societies in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien and the Yangtse Valley. The amalgamation of these different societies was decided upon, and Sun Yat-Sen was formally elected as the leader of the revolutionary federation.

About this time the so-called Boxer Movement took place in the North, which, originally directed against the Manchu Dynasty, was exploited by the latter and turned into an anti-foreign movement. In this disastrous adventure, the responsibility for which must be shared by the concession hunting governments of the West and the short-sighted Manchu rulers, the economically more advanced South did not participate. In contrast with the connivance of the Court at the anti-foreign attacks the Governors of the Central and Eastern Yangtse provinces notified the Consular Corps at Shanghai on June 26, 1900, that they took full responsibility for the safety of the lives and properties of foreign merchants and missionaries.

While the provincial authorities of Central and Southern China adopted a negative attitude *vis-à-vis* the Manchu Court, the revolutionaries in the South remained true to

the original war-cry of the secret societies in the North, who were behind the Boxers, "Overthrow the Ch'ing, restore the Ming". Sun Yat-Sen thus instructed Cheng Shi-Liang to proceed to Waichow to organise a rising there, and sent Shi Chien-Yü to Canton for the same purpose.

Sun himself left Japan for Hongkong accompanied by some Japanese military advisers, with the intention of getting across to the mainland to organise a disciplined revolutionary army and to assume personal control of the military operations. But at Hongkong he was recognised by the authorities, who refused him admittance. Sun, therefore, charged Cheng Shi-Liang with the full responsibility of the insurrection, and returned himself to Japan, *en route* for Formosa, from where he hoped to get across to China. At that time the Governor of Formosa was Kodama, who sympathised with the aims of the Revolutionary Party. Kodama sent an emissary to Sun and promised him material support should a serious situation arise.

The immediate object was the capture of Canton, but taking lesson from the 1895 experience, Sun ordered Cheng Shi-Liang not to start the revolt in Canton itself, but to seize the maritime area first, concentrate the revolutionary forces there, and then attack the city. This was carried out in accordance with the traditions, and with the co-operation, of the secret societies. In great secrecy peasant detachments were recruited and equipped with arms and munitions. The Imperial soldiers stationed at Sin-An and Shen-Chi were attacked and disarmed. Lun-Kang, Tan-Shui, Yung-Hui and other places were successfully attacked; the Imperial forces dispersed as soon as they came into contact with the advanced guards of the revolutionary forces. The whole maritime area between Waichow (Huichow) and Sinyang was occupied. Cheng Shi-Liang, whose army had meanwhile grown to ten thousand men, delayed further action until the arrival of Sun with his military supplies and technical advisers.

While Cheng was waiting for reinforcements, Shi Chien-Yü at Canton attempted to organise a revolt there, but he did not receive the necessary support. Thus he decided to throw a bomb into the Viceroy's Yamen, but the bomb did not explode. Shi was apprehended and executed. And so a further disaster befell the revolutionary cause. Ten days after the military operations had started, a change took place in the Japanese Government. The new Japanese Prime Minister, Ito, took up an attitude towards China entirely different from that of his predecessor. The negotiations between Kodama and Sun were interdicted, and the export of arms and the entry of Japanese officers into the Chinese revolutionary army prohibited. This, of course, entirely upset Sun's plans. He at once instructed his Japanese adviser, Yamada, to proceed to Cheng's headquarters to inform him of what had taken place, in order that he could act accordingly. Cheng, on receiving Yamada's information, immediately decided to dissolve the troops; he realised that nothing further could be done for the moment and with a few hundred friends returned to Hongkong. Yamada, however, lost his way, was seized by the Imperial troops and executed, being the first foreigner who sacrificed his life at the altar of the Chinese revolution.

The defeat of 1895 had given Sun the reputation of a highly dangerous criminal; the revolutionaries were regarded as poisonous snakes, and people avoided their acquaintance. In 1900 the same voices which cursed Sun in 1895 were heard as loudly as ever, but a significant change was noticeable in the attitude of enlightened people. For the glamour of the Manchu Dynasty had irrevocably vanished with the entry of the Eight-Power Expeditionary Forces into Peking, the flight of the Imperial Court into the mountains of Shensi, and the subsequent imposition on the Chinese people, through the follies of the Court, of the gigantic indemnity of 450 million taels. Through the terms of the Boxer Protocol, the burden of foreign obligations increased three-fold, and rendered the Chinese

nation completely at the mercy of the foreign diplomats and bankers. The Chinese national economy was dislocated. All politically-minded Chinese began to realise that China was on the brink of complete destruction. A revolutionary wave began to spread all over China and among the Chinese abroad.

CHAPTER III

THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The Impact of the West

THE awakening of the Chinese people and the easy spread of revolutionary ideas at the beginning of the present century were but the inevitable consequences of the profound changes which had been taking place in the structure of Chinese society as a result of the peculiar relationship between China and the Western Powers.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first twenty years of the nineteenth century the balance of trade was in favour of China. Europe and America needed her silk and tea, but China needed very little from the West. Her domestic industries, her large mineral resources and extensive cultivation made her independent of outside trade. The Manchus, and the influential officials around them, realised this, and, from the very commencement of the East India Company, were hostile to British trade. Up to 1830 it was difficult to find articles that China needed to pay for the silk and tea that the West wanted in rapidly increasing quantities. H. B. Morse, formerly of the Chinese Maritime Customs, in his *Trade and Administration of China* (1920), says: "All that is known is that China wanted very little that the West could supply. Cotton manufactures in 1905 constituted 44 per cent of the value (excluding opium) of all foreign imports; but in this industry the West could compete with cheap Asiatic labour only after the development springing from the inventions of Richard Arkwright and Eli Whitney, and in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century the movement of cotton cloth was from China to

the West. . . . Woollens were wanted, but only in small quantities. . . . Quicksilver and lead were wanted, but in no great quantities ; and the goods introduced consisted to a great extent of those articles which were objects of curiosity to the Chinese . . . the trade was on a cash basis " (p. 289).

It was during the period that this situation was growing more acute that the opium troubles commenced. Until the end of the eighteenth century not more than 200 chests of opium were imported and very little opium was grown in China itself. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was an alarming increase in opium smoking which disturbed the government very considerably, so that, from 1796, when opium was entirely prohibited, until 1838, when opium formed 54 per cent of the total imports, constant repressive measures were taken. There were two reasons—the deteriorative effects on the smokers' physique and the draining of the country of sycee silver which was needed to pay for the opium. The British Government in 1838 endorsed the action of the Chinese in searching ships for opium after the issue of proclamations and edicts, but in spite of this attitude the opium trade was supported and financed by the British Government, which put its own stamp on the drug. Through the attempt of the Chinese Government to stamp out the illicit trade (which was often supported by its own Customs officials), it came into conflict with the British traders. The British representative, Elliot, supported his own countrymen and war broke out. On November 5, 1842, the London *Spectator* stated, " It is pure butchery without risk at any time beyond casual incidents . . . and now it would seem without even the idea of risk." As a result of defeat in this way, China was forced not only to cede in some form or other Chinese territory to foreign countries and to give to the foreigner in China extra-territorial status, but she also forfeited her sovereign right of regulating foreign trade as the national interest demanded. The control over the maritime Customs fell into the hands

of foreigners, notably the British, tariffs were kept artificially low, i.e. between 2 per cent and 5 per cent *ad valorem*; and through the so-called treaty ports and areas annexed or "leased" after each aggressive act, the mass products of the industrial West flooded the Chinese markets and practically struck the death-blow at the native industries, which were unable to compete with machine production.

Professor E. H. Parker, in *China, her History and Commerce* (1917), comments: "In view of all this no one will say—however much in matters of detail we may have erred in judgment—that Great Britain has failed to secure for herself, on the whole, a considerable number of miscellaneous commercial and political advantages from the *fâcheuse* situation arising out of the attitude on the part of China so hostile to progress" (p. 96). But it took another Opium War to persuade the Chinese to embrace progress by legalising the opium trade, and by that time the drug was being grown in China, the industry being stimulated by the example of a prosperous foreign trade. The imports of opium rose from 200 chests to 2,000 in 1820, 39,000 in 1845, and to 68,000 in 1865. A gradual decrease occurred then owing to the home growing of opium. During this period cheaply manufactured goods had poured into China owing to the advantages over Chinese merchants which were enjoyed by foreigners, who were relieved of taxes and *likin*. These latter duties were introduced at the time of the T'ai-P'ing Rebellion, as a temporary measure, for the purpose of raising funds to finance the campaign against the rebels. With the re-establishment of peace, however, they became permanent. But while the Chinese merchant had to pay *likin* every time his goods crossed an internal customs frontier, the privileged foreigner was exempted from this vexatious procedure on payment of a small commutation tax at the maritime customs house.

There is a steady rise in the imports from 1830 onwards, the value being doubled in ten year periods, so that the

import trade which was worth $2\frac{1}{2}$ million pounds in 1836, increased to $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1844, $11\frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1855 and $24\frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1879. After this date increase is slower, owing to the fact that China was no longer regarded by the Powers solely as a market, but was herself being developed by capitalistic imperialism. The exports over the same period fluctuate, since they were largely affected by the opium wars and various rebellions, but the export figures, after the forced importation of opium, always lag considerably behind the imports. This accounts for the steady drain of sycee silver from the country. From 1830 onwards the internal economy of China was wrecked by the ruthless search for markets by the Western Powers; the Chinese people further deteriorated in physique by the smoking of opium.

The Rise of Capitalist Industrialism

The defeat in the war against Japan worked as an additional solvent on Chinese society, going far beyond the immediate results of the war. In the first place, China lost all the prestige she once enjoyed as a military Power. The treaties which concluded the Sino-British and Sino-French wars were most unfavourable to China, but the Chinese armies had always put up a good fight, and the feeling was abroad that China's misfortunes were due less to military inefficiency than to diplomatic inexperience. But China's defeat by Japan, hitherto considered a third-rate Power, was beyond expectation; the Powers now realised how much they had over-rated China. With the loss of prestige came additional losses of territory. In order to pay off the Japanese War indemnity, which amounted to 230 million taels (over 30 million pounds), China was forced to have recourse to international loans. This meant the hypothecation of the most important source of revenue to the Central Government, namely the maritime customs, and the Peking Government was henceforth financially at the mercy of the British controlled Inspectorate-General of the Maritime Customs.

More significant than the financial and territorial readjustments were, however, the social and economic consequences arising out of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of April 17, 1895, which concluded the Sino-Japanese War. In article 6 of the Treaty it was stated, among other things, that "Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated duties thereon.

"All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects in China."

This provision, applicable, under the most-favoured-nation clause, to all other Powers in treaty-relationship with China, became the foundation-stone of a modern industrialised China. For although the first modern factory, namely, the cotton mill founded in 1890, was Chinese, it was not until British and Japanese spindles and looms were allowed to operate in the Treaty Ports that the factory method of production was, in fact, introduced into China. Large-scale production on Western lines found ready adherents among the Chinese well-to-do people in the Treaty Ports. The pauperised artisans and peasants who survived the period of starvation consequent on the dislocation of the national economy by the unrestricted imports of cheap foreign manufactures, gradually found employment in the new factories. The Chinese industrial proletariat came into existence.

Foreign capitalism played havoc with the primitive native economy of China, but it also brought into being new and vital forces which, originally co-operating with, and subordinate to, foreign capital, were bound, sooner or later, to challenge the predominant rôle played by the

foreigner in China. The value of China's foreign trade increased from about 314 million taels in 1895 to 674 million taels in 1905 : more marked even is the increase of the import figures, namely, from 171 million taels in 1895 to 447 million taels in 1905. These figures do not merely indicate the tightening of the foreign grip over China ; they are also a certain, if inaccurate, index of the growth of the Chinese capitalistic merchant class, the necessary intermediary between the Chinese masses and the big foreign import and export houses. The development of the industrial bourgeoisie did not, however, keep pace with the accumulation of Chinese capital. The foreign control of the Chinese maritime customs and the artificial lowness of the tariff rates exposed the new and inexperienced Chinese manufacturer to the merciless onslaught of foreign competition. Moreover, foreign business operating in China was favoured by exemption from the local Chinese taxes, a privilege based on an unwarranted interpretation of the system of consular jurisdiction. There was further the *likin*, the full burden of which was only felt by native producers and merchants. The *likin* revenue being pledged for the service of the Anglo-German loan of 1898, its decrease or abolition by the Central Government was prohibited, except by international agreement. At every point the natural development of Chinese industry was, therefore, handicapped by the existence of foreign privileges. About 1895, for instance, Chinese capitalists had enthusiastically taken to the building of silk filatures on modern lines, but already in 1902 about half the silk factories, which were Chinese owned, had to close down owing to the existence of privileged foreign competition.

The Revolt of Chinese Capital

The Imperial Government, corrupt and inefficient, took no interest in the development of Chinese industry ; nor was it in a position, if it wished, to protect it against international capitalism, which grew more and more

insistent as the years went on. It was, therefore, not until the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the outbreak of the European War of 1914 which brought China a temporary relief from foreign pressure that the industrialisation of China by Chinese capital could make real headway. But the very factors which retarded the growth of Chinese industrial bourgeoisie were also responsible for the gradual awakening of the Chinese moneyed classes to the necessity of a fundamental change of régime in China. This feeling was especially strong among the Chinese capitalists living abroad, who, in spite of the fact that practically everywhere they were discriminated against and had to pay high extra taxes, enjoyed a relative security of property. They were able to devote themselves, peacefully and without much interference from arbitrary exactions by corrupt officialdom, to the accumulation of wealth. (A large proportion of the earnings of the emigrants was regularly remitted to their relatives at home, and made up to a considerable extent the continually unfavourable national balance of payments.) Living in the freer atmosphere of the bourgeois States of the West, they learnt to appreciate the institutions which had no place in the arbitrarily governed feudalist Chinese Empire. The more politically minded among them, therefore, lent a ready ear to the revolutionary propaganda of Sun Yat-Sen and his associates, especially after the conduct of the Manchu Dynasty during the Boxer Rebellion had shown to them the utter worthlessness of the contemporary rulers of China. They not only listened to Sun Yat-Sen, but also opened their coffers and contributed liberally towards the revolutionary war chest. The ignominious failure of 1900 was due to the fact that Sun Yat-Sen almost entirely relied on assistance by foreigners which was withdrawn at a critical moment. With the participation of the Chinese bourgeoisie abroad, the Chinese revolution acquired a solid material foundation,

CHAPTER IV

THE SPREAD OF REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS

ABOUT the beginning of the nineteenth century a fierce struggle took place in the minds of the Chinese intelligentsia between the Reformist ideology of the "Hundred Days" and the revolutionary philosophy of Sun Yat-Sen and his associates. Although, with the fall from power of the Emperor Kwang Hsü, the Reformist principle was discredited as a serious political issue, it was still an intellectual force of the greatest importance. This was chiefly due to the literary brilliance of Liang Ch'í-Ch'ao, who, with the retirement into private life of K'ang Yu-Wei, after his banishment from China, became the chief exponent of constitutional monarchism. Liang was a most versatile writer who could discuss questions of government and administration, make dissertations on national independence, on civil and political liberties. He was not only an authority on the Chinese classics, but could also quote Montesquieu and Rousseau whom he had read in Japanese translations. He was the originator of a new literary style which made his writings more easily accessible to the general public not trained in classical scholarship. The hatred of the Empress Dowager, who put a price on his head, further adorned him with the halo of martyrdom. From his place of exile in Japan he issued a propaganda sheet, the *Ts'ing Yi Pao*, which contained articles full of sarcasm and invective addressed to the Conservatives at Peking, and had a wide appeal among the students both in Japan and in China. In a country where the ruling aristocracy was recruited from the intelligentsia, Liang's influence was therefore not to be despised.

Liang's aim was the modernisation of China, but without overthrowing the old order entirely. In Japan he founded, in 1900, the "Pao-Kuo Tang" (Association for the Protection of the Empire), which in 1902 was renamed the "Pao-Huang Tang" (Association for the Protection of the Emperor). After the Russo-Japanese War the Manchu Court was forced to adopt the Reform Programme of 1898; Liang thereupon shifted his ground, started agitating for a Constitution and gave a new name to his organisation which became the "Li-Hsien Tang" (Association for the Establishment of the Constitution).

For a time Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao's publications provided the substance of the intellectual nourishment of the politically minded Chinese students, both in China and in Japan, whither most of them had gone for a modern education. But a great many of the students in Japan were not content with theoretical discussion and dissertations. The solution of the national crisis by the establishment of a constitutional monarchy satisfied them no longer. Their thoughts were centred on the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the reorganisation of the State on a democratic basis. Thus at a meeting of students in Tokio on Chinese New Year's Day in 1902 Liu Cheng-Yü made a public pronouncement to the effect that only a revolutionary dethronement of the dynasty could save the nation. For this speech Liu was expelled from the University at the demand of the Chinese Minister. This action did not, however, deter the revolutionary students in Japan from publishing news sheets for the purpose of advocating the idea of the revolution among the masses and of counteracting Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao's propaganda for a constitutional monarchy. When they returned to China they affiliated themselves to the secret societies, where they found a ready response to their theories of civic liberty and social equality.

Meanwhile, an extraordinary active revolutionary organisation, the "Ai-Kuo Hsüeh-Shih", was operating in the international settlement at Shanghai. This organisa-

tion consisted of former students of the old Chinese academies, who, feeling themselves safe within the boundaries of the foreign controlled territory, gave free vent to their anti-dynastic feelings in their organ, the *Su Pao* (Kiangsu Journal), and in their numerous revolutionary pamphlets. The Empress Dowager, infuriated at their insolence, demanded, through the intermediary of the Nanking Viceroy, from the Consular Body of Shanghai the arrest and extradition of the leaders of the Society. This was refused, but as a compromise the Senior Consul Goodnow consented to their trial before the Mixed Court. While the negotiations were proceeding three of the most important leaders managed to escape; Ch'en Fan, the proprietor of the *Su Pao*, fled to Japan, Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei to the German city of Tsingtao and Wu Chih-Hui to Berlin. Six arrests took place, but the Mixed Court, consisting of a Chinese Judge, a British Assessor and the Sub-Prefect of Shanghai, decided on December 3, 1903, only to try Chang Ping-Lin, the author of *The Refutation of K'ang Yu-Wei*, and Tsou Yung, the author of the celebrated pamphlet *The Army of the Revolution*. Neither defendant made any serious attempt to put up a case; they virtually admitted being guilty of sedition, and the Sub-Prefect thus pronounced the legal sentence of death. But here the British Assessor intervened, and Chang Ping-Lin and Tsou Yung got off with two years' imprisonment. The result of the trial was obviously an insult to the Dynasty, while adding prestige to the revolutionary cause. When, therefore, a few months later the Empress Dowager instructed the Nanking Viceroy to institute proceedings against another revolutionary sheet at Shanghai, the latter refused to take any action, fearing a repetition of the *Su Pao* case.

The revolutionaries, feeling themselves safe in the foreign concessions, intensified the anti-dynastic propaganda, and Shanghai, once the home of the Reformist School, became one of the chief centres of revolutionary activity. The *Shih Wu Pao*, K'ang Yu-Wei's old paper

and, during the "Hundred Days", the official Government organ, reappeared under the editorship of one of Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao's friends. Although it obtained, as in 1898, a large circulation among middle-class intellectuals, it had no effect on the people. The masses preferred the *Kuo-Min Jih Jih Pao*, the successor of the *Su Pao*. The majority of the students, too, came under the influence of the revolutionary idea; they were tired of the Reformist ideology, which doomed them to inaction. The revolutionary anti-dynastic cause began to wield an influence among the younger Chinese intellectuals, which six years ago had been exercised by the Reformist School of K'ang Yu-Wei and Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao.

The new revolutionary spirit was manifest when, in 1904, Sun Yat-Sen undertook his second tour round the world. He visited Hanoi at the invitation of the Governor of Annam, where he was cordially received by the Chinese merchants as well as by the French authorities. Traveling through Japan he made the acquaintance of Liao Chung-K'ai and his wife, Ma Chün-Wu, Hu I-Sheng, Li Chung-Hsi, and other students who offered to serve him for the furtherance of the revolutionary cause. Everywhere in Japan he was well received, even by the lukewarm merchants, who had gradually fallen under the influence of the revolutionary students' propaganda and of the popular movement in China. The moment was ripe to pronounce himself openly in favour of the establishment of the Chinese Republic. In a manifesto, entitled *The True Solution of the Chinese Question*, he gave a concrete meaning and definite shape to the hitherto vague revolutionary conception. The manifesto, first published in Honolulu, is of the greatest historical importance. It is not only a declaration of principle, a description of political reality; it also outlines a method of action calling upon the people of China to prepare themselves for an armed struggle against the Manchus, while appealing to the democratic forces in the West for their material and moral support. "A

new government, enlightened and progressive, must substitute the old one. In this way China will not only be saved, but also relieve the other nations of their task of maintaining her independence and integrity. There are among the masses many people with high culture, capable of forming a new government. Carefully worked out plans for the transformation of the old monarchy into a Chinese Republic have long ago been prepared."

With the publication of the manifesto, Sun Yat-Sen thus left the ranks of the secret societies whose programme and method of action were not calculated to meet the needs of modern times. While maintaining close contact and co-operating with them in the common object of overthrowing the ruling Dynasty, his policy was directed towards the establishment of an independent revolutionary party with its own programme, organisation and discipline. He had gone far from the Reformist conception which underlay the Petition of 1895 and the Monarchical School of Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao. To him there was no longer any question of reforms from above, nor any compromise with the forces of reaction, but a life-and-death struggle for the establishment of a new political order in China.

CHAPTER V

THE TUNG MENG HUI

Its Basis and Nature

The True Solution of the Chinese Question was the first exact definition of the revolutionary purpose. Its publication meant the formal recognition by the Chinese revolutionaries that the new social and political order in China could not be established by reorganising the Manchu Dynasty on constitutional lines, as aimed at by Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao, nor by the enthronement of a new dynasty of native origin, as vaguely desired by the secret societies, but only by the foundation of a democratic Chinese Republic and the reconstruction of the economic life of the people on a socialistic basis. For the realisation of the revolutionary ideal, the organisation and consolidation of the available revolutionary forces in China and abroad was a first necessity. Already during his travels in Europe in 1905, Sun Yat-Sen founded among the few scores of revolutionary students in Brussels, Berlin and Paris, the skeleton of the new organisation which, in September, 1905, on his return from Europe, he formally established at Tokio.

This new organisation was the Chung-Kuo Ko-Ming Tung-Meng Hui (The United Revolutionary Party of China), popularly known as Tung Meng Hui (United League), the term Ko-Ming (Revolutionary) being omitted for tactical reasons. Its ideological basis was the San Min Chu I, or Three Peoples' Principles, which was put forward tentatively for the first time at the students' gathering in Brussels in 1905, and was gradually developed by the Party's periodical. It was formulated in detail in a speech which Sun Yat-Sen delivered in Tokio on

January 16, 1907, on the first anniversary of the *Min Pao*, before a gathering of over 5,000 students. These Three Principles were the Principle of the Racial Struggle, the Principle of the People's Sovereignty, and the Principle of the People's Livelihood. "The Principle of the Racial Struggle must not be confused with the attitude of xenophobia. It is based on the fundamental idea that a people must not permit a foreign race to rob them of their political independence. . . . If the Government of the country is in foreign hands, it is as if we had no country ; for although we Chinese have a country, it is no longer ours. Think, where is our independence ? . . . We constitute one quarter of the human race ; we are the oldest and one of the most civilised people, and to-day we are slaves. Is that not extraordinary ? . . . We must overthrow the power of the Manchus and re-establish our national integrity. . . . But we have no hate against the Manchus as such. We hate no one save our oppressors and enemies. With these we cannot live in the same country . . ." Regarding the second principle, "It is not enough to be actuated by the spirit of narrow patriotism. . . . The political revolution should aim at a constitutional democracy. Therefore, in the present position of the country, even if the Emperor were Chinese, we should not hesitate to make the revolution. . . . In former times political changes resulted only in the substitution for one Emperor of another one. If we revolutionaries had only this aim before our eyes, China would be lost. Our country must not be considered as the property of any private individual. Moreover, at present foreigners are preying on China. More than ever is the establishment of a strong government necessary and this can only be the government of the whole people." In explaining the Third Principle, that of Livelihood, Sun Yat-Sen adopts a frankly socialistic attitude. He began by destroying the common illusion that in America and Europe everyone was happy and rich. "Commensurate with the growth of the economic power of the countries, is the

growth of the misery of the people. In England, for instance, there are a few rich, but many poor, people. This is because the human elements cannot resist the capitalistic forces. . . . One cannot oppose the evolution of society. Industrial civilisation had advantages and inconveniences, but the rich in Europe and America have monopolised the former, leaving to the poor the latter. Such a social condition is tending to develop in China, but if we know how to act preventatively, the struggle against capitalism will be easier than in the West." He went on to explain why the social question had arisen in Europe and found that it was because they had not paid attention to the agrarian problem. "One cannot allow society to develop like trees which grow in isolation." Sun's solution for China was the fixing of the values of land and the appropriation by the State of unearned increments, so as to effect an equitable distribution of land and income. "We want the national revolution of independence because we don't want a handful of Manchus to rule all China for their own advantage. We want the political revolution, because we don't want any one person to monopolise all political power. We want the social revolution because we don't want a handful of rich people to monopolise the whole wealth of the country. Failure in any one of these three aims means the failure of our mission. Only when all three aims are attained can the Chinese be proud of their country." Regarding the future government of the country, he warned his followers not to try to imitate blindly any existing constitution. He proposed the creation of two independent powers of government, control and examination, in addition to the executive, legislative and judiciary, so as to improve on all existing constitutional systems. He realised, however, that a constitutional democracy cannot be established without careful preparation, and thus proposed the three stages, of military government, of educative government, and of constitutional government.

All Sun's ideas, however, were still in the process of

formation. Nor were they, even in their broad outlines, generally accepted, far less understood, by his followers. But while they were struggling against the Manchus this was of little importance. They were all agreed on the First Principle, that of the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over China. The Second and Third Principles and the Quintuple-Power Constitution were merely of academic interest which very few of them understood. The real trouble only started after the success of the Revolution in 1911, intensifying after Sun Yat-Sen's death in 1925, when everyone began to give his own interpretation to those principles, especially the Third, which, unfortunately, was left vague.

In the first manifesto issued by the Tung Meng Hui it proclaimed the following six aims :

1. To overthrow the corrupt Manchu Dynasty.
2. To establish the Chinese Republic.
3. To maintain the peace of the world.
4. To effect the equitable re-distribution of land.
5. To establish an alliance between the peoples of China and Japan.
6. To ask all countries to support the work of reconstruction in China.

There was as yet no definite and detailed programme, as success was then still remote.

As the name implied, the League was a federation of different revolutionary organisations, namely, of the Hsing Chung Hui (the Association for the Regeneration of China—Sun's old Party), the Hua Hsin Hui (the Association for the Modernisation of China) and the Kuan Fu Hui (the Restoration Society). The first two had considerable influence among the secret societies, the Hsin Chung Hui in the two Kwang provinces, the Hua Hsin Hui in Hunan province. They both aimed at the establishment of a democratic Chinese Republic, but whereas the Hua Hsin Hui was only concerned about political problems, the Hsin Chung Hui, under Sun's influence, strove also for the economic emancipation of the masses

on a socialist basis. The Kuan Fu Hui consisted purely of intellectuals, with no mass-affiliations ; it was distinguished from the first two, not so much by the vagueness of its programme, as by the backwardness of its leaders. It was against the Manchu Dynasty whose violent overthrow it desired, but only to restore the Ming Dynasty or create some other national dynasty. It aimed at the restoration of the past rather than the establishment of the new social order in China, and a great deal of the later troubles in the ranks of the revolutionaries was due to the admittance of its leaders into the councils of the League. The Kuan Fu Hui had the same programme as the secret societies, but the latter were merely a passive force obeying the directions of leaders more advanced than themselves. Moreover, being for the greater part ignorant and uneducated, they had great respect for, and confidence in, the revolutionary intellectuals whom they accepted as their leaders. The Kuan Fu Hui, on the other hand, consisted of intellectuals themselves, who dreamt of the glorious days of bygone ages when their class wielded undisputed power in the State.

Its Organisational Structure and Finances

In view of the divergence of ultimate aims among the component societies, the League would have been an unworkable organisation, but for the overpowering personality of Sun Yat-Sen. Sun was also much older than the majority of the members, and he completely dominated the League, seeing his way to impose upon its members the following oath :

“ I swear under Heaven that I will do my utmost to work for the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, the restoration of Chinese sovereignty, the establishment of the Republic and the solution of the agrarian question on the basis of the equitable redistribution of the land. I solemnly undertake to be faithful to these principles. If ever I betray my trust, I am willing to submit to the severest penalties imaginable.”

The oath, which must be taken by every candidate for membership, thus imposes a kind of discipline upon the members. Secrecy is another feature of the League ; the very formula of the oath must be kept secret. The penalties instituted range from simple admonition to capital punishment, in the case of treason and betrayal. Unfortunately, disciplinary action is seldom taken against prominent members with a following of their own, for fear of disintegrating the League, a circumstance which is regrettable but perhaps unavoidable. Moreover, the ideological section of the oath is generally regarded as a mere formula which few people realise the implications of, and the phrase, "if ever I betray my trust," only refers to treason and betrayal.

The headquarters of the League are at Tokio. Branches are to be found in every province of China, except in outlying Kansu, and in every important centre of Chinese colonists abroad. Periodically the Head Office receives from the branches reports, a prominent feature of which is the number and character of the members. The names of these members are known only to the branch organisers ; they are withheld even from the Head Office, except of those on important missions. Members are only known by numbers, the membership cards containing only a number and the seal of the League. There is an important distinction between the Chinese and overseas branches. The former are solely for action and insurrection, and here candidates for membership are very carefully scrutinised. One person is held responsible for communications with other branches and with Head Office. With the overseas branches secrecy is not so important ; they are more in the nature of propaganda and money-collecting centres.

The central organisation of the League is held together and controlled by Sun Yat-Sen, who occupies the office of President (Chung Li). Under him are three councils, the Executive, Legislative and Supervisory. The Executive itself is divided into several departments, the most important of which are the Secretariat and the Treasury. The

function of the Legislative is to criticise executive action, initiate proposals and draft programmes. The Supervisory Council is of little importance ; its sole function is to arbitrate in disputes between party members and give judgment. These Councils meet monthly, but emergency meetings are called whenever necessary. Apart from these three Councils, there are also special *ad hoc* Committees and an editorial board for the official Party Organ.

The League's income may be divided into two categories. There were the regular monthly contributions, which, in the case of government students in Japan, amounted to three dollars per month, or about ten per cent of their income. Private students, being less well off, contributed less. The proletarian members in the foreign countries generally contributed ten silver cents a month. The bulk of the regular income is, however, derived from the rich merchant members overseas, who contributed anything from 100 to 500 dollars a month. Then there were the specially collected lump sum contributions. There was the famous case of Chang Ching-Chiang, the owner of a curiosity shop in Paris, who, when approached by Sun Yat-Sen, promised him off-hand any reasonable sum he might require for the revolution. In 1907 he was telegraphically reminded of his promise ; thus he sold his entire business and gave the proceeds (60,000 dollars) to Sun. A poor bean-seller in Hanoi, Huang Ch'ing-Nan, insisted on giving his entire savings during twenty years, about 4,000 dollars, to the League. " Others are risking and sacrificing their lives. The giving away of my property is nothing compared with what others are doing for the sake of the people." Unfortunately, there are no statistical records available from which the total amount of money, collected and spent by the leaders of the League on the different insurrections under its auspices, could be determined. The greater part of the special contributions passed through the hands of Sun Yat-Sen ; and the present author was informed by one who had for many years been Sun's confidential friend and secretary,

that on the tour round the world which he undertook in 1910-11, the sum of 400,000 dollars was collected, of which 60,000 dollars came from the town of Ipoh alone.

The Social Composition

The most important elements in the League were the Chinese students in Japan, which country received them in ever-increasing numbers after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1904 there were in Japanese schools and universities only some 600 students; in 1905 there were already 2,400; in 1906, 8,600; in 1907, over 10,000. At the inaugural meeting of the League in the autumn of 1905 some 400 revolutionary students attended and enrolled as members. By the end of a year this number already increased to over a thousand. On their return to China, these student members established party nuclei in several of the most important educational institutions which their prestige as "returned students" enabled them to penetrate. The League in this way controlled an important section of China's younger generation. Those who graduated from Military Academies became officers in the Chinese army, which they gradually imbued with revolutionary ideas, a factor of supreme importance in the later stages of the Revolution. On the other hand, these student elements were liable to grave moral casualties. Many of them were not consistent revolutionaries, but would-be bureaucrats and militarists, without any conscious revolutionary philosophy behind their actions. They were merely nationalist, and, with the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1912, many of them went over to the counter-revolutionary side. The second group in the League consisted of the overseas Chinese, consisting chiefly of merchants, but also including many workers. They took little active part in the Revolution, but contributed greatly to its finances. There were, further, the members of the secret societies which were affiliated to the League. Few of them were individual members of the League. They formed the proletarian section. Being

poor and ignorant, they were merely instruments in the hands of the leaders. They were seldom able to realise their own interests, and often fell a prey, especially after the success of the Republican Revolution, to the private ambitions of unscrupulous politicians and militarists.

The "Min Pao" and its Editors

An important factor in the propagation of the revolutionary conception was the official organ of the League, the *Min Pao* (People's Journal), founded in January 1906, and edited by a board, the principal members of which were originally Wang Ching-Wei, Chang T'ai-Yen (Chang Ping-Lin), Chu Chih-Hsin, and Hu Han-Min. Wang Ching-Wei, a Hsiu Ts'ai (Prefectoral Graduate or B.A.), was the Chairman of the Legislative Council of the League, and the principal exponent of the idea of Republican Nationalism; he was also the chief controversialist against the Constitutionals whose paper, the *Hsin Min Tsung Pao*, attacked him bitterly. The issue between reformist constitutionalism and revolutionary republicanism was chiefly decided by duel by Wang Ching-Wei and Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao. The former was victorious in the end, and succeeded in bringing to the revolutionary cause the great majority of the students in Japan. Chang T'ai-Yen was the famous Chinese scholar who, alone among the revolutionary leaders, derived his revolutionary ideas exclusively from a study of the Chinese classics; he had never had any contact with foreign thought, either in the original or in translation, nor had he any knowledge of politics. He joined the League not because he believed in the republican and democratic principles of Sun Yat-Sen, but purely because of his racial hatred against the Manchus, who caused his imprisonment in 1903 in connection with the *Su Pao* case. So great was his hatred against the Manchus that, although the greatest classical and Buddhist scholar of his time, he had never taken the trouble to pass the civil service examinations or accepted any Imperial honour which was his for the taking. His adherence to

the League was of the greatest importance owing to the prestige it acquired among Chinese intelligentsia of the older type. It was he who was chiefly responsible for bringing these into the League by his articles in the *Min Pao* in which he attacked the Manchu Dynasty and its Chinese hand-maids on the basis of historical data. Chu Chih-Hsin, the third of the editors, was responsible for the interpretation and elaboration of Sun Yat-Sen's principle of the People's Livelihood. Chu was the first to introduce the Marxian method into Chinese social thought, and, according to him, the Livelihood principle was akin to State Socialism. Unfortunately, in 1906, he had to leave Tokio for Canton in order to do active revolutionary work. His departure deprived the *Min Pao* of its social articles and was the cause of much confusion in later years in the social principles of the Party, owing to the absence of an authoritative interpretation. Hu Han-Min was a Chü Jen (Provincial Graduate or M.A.) of the old regime, who had failed in the Metropolitan Chin Shih examination. He then became a schoolmaster in Wuchow, and a short time afterwards he became the editor of the Canton paper *Ling Hai Pao*. In 1902 he went to the Tokio High Normal School as a Government student, but for some reason returned after three months. In 1904 he was sent to Tokio again with a group of students, including Wang Ching Wei, and studied law, politics and economics. In October 1905 he was introduced to Sun Yat-Sen, and became head of the secretariat of the League. He subsequently joined the board of the *Min Pao*, for which he wrote a well-known series of articles on International Law.

The *Min Pao* became very popular among the students both in Japan and in China. It had an edition of 3,000 copies, of which 2,000 were for sale in Japan and 1,000 for circulation and republication in China. The demand for it was so great that copies often commanded large premiums; in some places it sold for two dollars instead of for its published price of twenty cents. It was, of

course, banned by the Imperial Authorities, which made its distribution in the interior of China extremely difficult. Soon the watch on it became so strict that it could only be sent over by letter post, which meant that the size of the paper had to be greatly curtailed. Only the most important articles were printed, and then only for republication by the revolutionary broadsheets in the different centres in China and abroad.

Other Notable Members of the League

Among the other notable members of the League were Huang Hsing (Huang K'o-Ch'iang), Liao Chung-K'ai, Wu Chih-Hui, Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Li Shih-Ts'eng (Li Yu-Ying) and Chang Chi (Chang Pu-Chuan). Huang Hsing was a Hunanese (born 1875) who had visited the Lianghu School, one of the model schools founded by the famous Chinese Viceroy Chang Chih-Tung for the purpose of introducing modern knowledge to China. The study of Chinese history and contact with foreign ideas made Huang turn a revolutionary, and with his old fellow-students, Ma Fu-I and Sung Chiao-Jen, he founded the Hua Hsin Hui, and established connections with the secret societies in the two Hu provinces. Early in 1905 he organised an insurrection at Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, but failed. Ma Fu-I was killed by the Imperial troops; Huang himself was captured, but managed to escape, and fled, with a price on his head, to Tokio, where he became active in the revolutionary student circles. When Sun Yat-Sen, in September 1905, arrived in Tokio, Huang joined him in the organisation of the Tung Meng Hui. Sun Yat-Sen was the oldest and most experienced of the revolutionaries, and became automatically the President of the League. Huang came next. He was elected Chief of the Executive Council of the League. Huang's affiliation to the League meant the extension of the basis of the revolution from Kwangtung and Kwangsi to Hunan and Hupeh, where Huang occupied the same position as Sun in the first two provinces.

Sun and Huang were the two most powerful men in the League, who decided on every important affair, political and financial. Sun was the ideologist and organiser of the Revolution—the man of principles and vision. Huang was the practical man of action, the great amateur soldier who commanded by the force of his intrepidity and personal courage. Sun Yat-Sen was the Lenin, Huang the Trotsky of China. The success of the Revolution of 1911 was due to their whole-hearted co-operation; the failure of the Republic was to a great extent due to Huang's later disagreement with Sun.

Liao Chung-K'ai was the financial expert of the League. From the nature of the case, this talent could not be displayed except as a governmental administrator; hence, Liao became prominent only after the establishment of the Republic. He was one of the first Chinese students in Japan, together with his wife, Ho Hsiang Ning. He was studying law, economics and politics. She was an art student. In 1903 he met Dr Sun; and on the foundation of the League, in 1905, he became Chief of Miscellaneous Affairs under Huang Hsing, a department which dealt with the study of political and military affairs.

Wu Chih-Hui is of importance in that he later became the leader of the Chinese anarchists, and the founder of the Scientific School in China. Implicated in the *Su Pao* case, he managed to escape before the order of arrest which he knew was issued could be served on him. He went to Berlin, and later to London and Paris, where he settled until the establishment of the Republic. His influence was especially noticeable after the success of the Revolution, when, as a professor at the National University of Peking, he led the revolt of China's younger generation against Confucian tradition and obscurantism. Witty in his utterances and caustic in his comments, he became for a time in the intellectual world what Sun Yat-Sen was in the political world. Unfortunately, Wu had no sense of political and economic reality, and was responsible for a great deal of mischief when, in 1924, he

entered the arena of active politics. Associated with him was Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, his colleague in the *Su Pao* case, who also managed to escape arrest. Ts'ai was a Hanlin of the old regime who became a revolutionary. Prior to his exile in Germany and France he was active in educational work in Shanghai, and in the first Republican Cabinet he served as Minister of Education. He later became Chancellor of the Peking National University, and for a considerable time wielded great influence as the titular leader of the Chinese Renaissance and Student Movements—an influence which, like Wu Chih-Hui, he did not always exercise in the revolutionary interest. Li Shih-Ts'eng was the son of Li Hung-Chao, a Prime Minister under the Manchu Dynasty who, when an Attaché at the Chinese Legation at Paris, joined the League, gave up his official position and devoted himself to the study of biology and anarchism, being especially influenced by Proudhon. At the same time he was managing a bean-curd factory in one of the suburbs of Paris, which became the centre of the revolutionary students in Paris, whom he provided with free meals. This factory was financed by his friend Chang Chi, a very rich person, whose adherence to the League, however, rather hindered than assisted the revolutionary cause.

The Special Committee and Revolutionary Tactics

The foundation of the Tung Meng Hui marked a new period in the history of the revolution. It meant the consolidation of the revolutionary forces under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen, and the rapid growth of revolutionary opinion in China. Branches were organised in seventeen out of the eighteen provinces of China. The League's membership increased rapidly—in 1907 its total number amounted to over 10,000; by the time the Republic was established it had grown to about 300,000.

At the end of 1906 a spontaneous rising took place at P'ing-Li on the Hunan-Kwangsi border. This rising was not strictly an affair of the League, although some League

members under Liu Tao-I took a leading part in it. It failed dismally, however; the leaders were prematurely forced into action by the discovery of the intrigues which they had been carrying on with several army officers who were stationed there. The failure of this rebellion and the execution of its leaders brought into prominence the question of military organisation. So far the League had concentrated on problems of party organisation and propaganda, but it had no systematic plans dealing with revolutionary action.

When the news of the defeat at P'ing-Li reached Sun Yat-Sen at Tokio, he at once summoned a secret meeting of his followers to consider the situation. This meeting appointed a Special Committee, consisting of Dr Sun, Huang Hsing, Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, in which all power relating to military organisation and co-ordination of Party activities in China and abroad was concentrated.

The Special Committee took as its programme of action the preparation of armed uprisings in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hunan, and the collection of funds among the overseas Chinese for this purpose. With this end in view, they left Japan for Hanoi in Annam, which was a very convenient place from which to direct revolutionary activities in Southern China.

The most important problem confronting the Special Committee was how to get control of the Chinese army, or, at least, of important sections of it. The secret societies as an insurrectionary weapon were inadequate: they were badly organised, their members were ignorant, and there was no co-ordination between the different units. At best they could be utilised as auxiliary instruments. For the successful overthrow of the Dynasty, a more efficient weapon was required, and this was found in the so-called New Army.

Ever since China's defeat against Japan in 1894, the ruling classes in China realised that the existing army, directed by men versed in Chinese literature, but ignorant

of military science, was useless in an external war, and a policy of army reorganisation was decided upon. A beginning was at once made with the troops in the North under Yuan Shih-K'ai. After 1900 the Southern units were also reorganised and put under the command of graduates from the modern military schools.

The Northern army was under the direction of the reactionary Yuan Shih-K'ai, the protégé of Li Hung-Chang. Yuan had it absolutely under his control; it was indeed too far removed from the revolutionary atmosphere of the South to be influenced by subversive anti-dynastic ideas. With the Southern army the position was different. A great many of the soldiers consisted of members of the secret societies which flourished in the South. A large section of the Southern officers had studied in Japan, where they had fallen under the direct influence of the Revolutionary Party. In China, many of the cadets in the military schools had close personal connections with the revolutionary leaders. They were nearly all from the South, and often came from the same districts. Contact with them, in a country where local patriotism meant a great deal, was therefore easy, and in reorganising the Southern Army the Manchu Government were in reality digging their own grave.

The Southern Army was, therefore, easily inoculated with secret revolutionary propaganda. To maintain the contact between the Army and the Party, officers in the different units, who were members of the League, were designated to take charge of military operations, while non-military members attached to the units were to take charge of Party affairs and to act as intermediaries between the Party and the Army units. Being under the nominal control of the Imperial authorities, the revolutionary units were, of course, not at liberty to move at will; they had to find a pretext for advancing towards some strategic point which was to be captured in co-operation with insurrectionists working from within. This was provided by the secret societies under control of the

League. Their function was to create disturbances in some neighbouring locality. Once the troops had moved, the secret societies transferred their activities to some other locality nearer the desired objective. The difficulty, however, was always the proper co-ordination of the activities of the revolutionary troops, the secret societies, and the conspirators inside the stronghold. Generally, there was also a shortage of ammunition and funds, and an insufficient number of organised troops on the side of the revolutionaries. Discipline among the members of the secret societies was further very slack, and the plans of the Special Committee were not always followed. To make things worse, plots were often prematurely disclosed or discovered, thus forcing the insurrectionists into precipitated action. This latter circumstance was responsible for many of the failures of the uprisings prior to the Republican Revolution of 1911.

In order to carry out an armed insurrection, money is needed. An important function of the Special Committee was, therefore, the carrying out of propaganda abroad and the collecting of funds from the overseas Chinese. In this propaganda work Wang Ching-Wei especially distinguished himself. One of the most attractive young men in China, he was also a most gifted writer, and the most persuasive member of the Special Committee. His transparent honesty convinced everyone, with whom he came into contact, of the sincerity of his purpose, and his broad mind and unfailing courtesy made him popular among friends and opponents alike. It was he who was mainly responsible for the bringing of the Chinese colonists in the South Sea Islands into the League, among whom he established branches, the most important of which were those at Singapore and Penang.

CHAPTER VI

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE MANCHU DYNASTY

The Failure of the 1907-9 Uprisings

DURING the years 1907 and 1909 some six insurrections were organised by the Special Committee in the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan. Except Dr Sun, who took charge of the general direction at the Headquarters in Hanoi, all the members of the Special Committee took part personally in the insurrections, with Huang Hsing as local director of operations. At Chen-Nan-Kuan Dr Sun participated himself. All these uprisings—at Ch'ao-Chou, Huichou, Hsin-Lin-Chou in Kwangtung, Chen-Nan-Kuan in Kwangsi, Hok'ou in Yunnan—ended in defeat. From a military point of view they were, therefore, of little importance to the revolutionary cause. They were more in the nature of political demonstrations against the Manchu regime; and regarded as such, they were a great success. The number of active workers grew with every successive revolt, and the influence of the League increased steadily within the country, in spite of all defeat. The effect of these military failures, however, was most unfavourable on the *morale* of the League members in Tokio, who gradually lost confidence in the ultimate victory of the revolutionary cause. The fact that with the departure of Dr Sun, Huang Hsing, Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min from Tokio, no one of sufficient standing was in charge of the Headquarters, made it easy for the enemies of the revolution to utilise the prevailing depression and to create dissensions within the ranks of the revolutionaries. An intrigue developed in the autumn of 1907, under the leadership of Chang

T'ai-Yen and Chang Chi, to oust Dr Sun, who was then in Annan, from the Presidency of the League. In a manifesto published in October 1907, Chang T'ai-Yen and Chang Chi repudiated Sun Yat-Sen's leadership, charging him with unnecessarily and recklessly sacrificing valuable Chinese youths for an impossible aim. They also accused Dr Sun of misappropriating for his private personal use the funds subscribed by the overseas Chinese for revolutionary purposes. To make things worse, Chang Chi invited a member of the Japanese General Staff, Captain Kato, to become an adviser to the League, with the result that all the secrets of the League became known to the Japanese Government, which had begun to look upon the Chinese revolutionaries with disfavour.

Chang's activities had as a consequence a considerable curtailment of the activities of the League. There was first the falling through of the purchase of arms and munitions which Dr Sun had relied on for the uprising in Hsin-Lin-Chou, which but for the failure to receive the expected supplies might have resulted in the capture of Kwangtung province, as two Imperial army divisions under Chao Po-Hsien and Kuo Jen-Chang stationed in the neighbourhood were ready then to join the insurrectionary forces. Seeing dissensions within the League, the Manchu Government redoubled its efforts against the revolutionaries and made negotiations with the Powers so as to restrict the revolutionary activities abroad. They induced, in the beginning of 1908, the Japanese Government to suspend the publication of the *Min Pao*. This resulted in the closing down altogether of the head office of the League in Tokio, as without the *Min Pao* it hardly served any useful purpose. All affairs of the League were thereupon concentrated in Dr Sun's own person. The French Government, who had so far adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the League—it recognised the revolutionaries as belligerents—was induced to expel revolutionaries from the French possessions. Sun Yat-Sen himself was the first to be asked to

leave, after his defeat at Chen-Nan-Kuan. He left for the Straits, leaving the supreme command to Huang Hsing. But even in the Straits he could not move freely; and finding revolutionary work in the countries bordering China impossible, Sun decided in 1910 once more to go on a world tour for the purpose of collecting funds for the Revolution.

Wang Ching-Wei's Attempt on the Prince Regent

The pessimistic spirit prevailing among the Party members also overtook Wang Ching-Wei, who after the defeat at Hok'ou in 1909 had gone back to Japan to take charge of Party affairs. He came to the conclusion that only some sensational action could restore the *morale* in the Party. Some time before, he had written many letters to the comrades in the North complaining about their revolutionary inaction. The replies he usually received was that the revolutionary spirit had not yet caught on in the North. Wu Lu-Chen, a member of the League, for instance, had risen to the rank of a division general, commanding six important towns in the North-West, but owing to the general situation he was condemned to inactivity. Several years ago, on October 15, 1905, at the railway station at Peking, Wu Yueh threw a bomb at the members of a diplomatic mission which was headed by Duke Tsai Tso for the purpose of studying foreign administrative systems. Four persons were killed and many wounded, including the Duke's son. At Anking, on July 6, 1907, Hsü Hsi-Lin, the director of the police school, fired in cold blood three revolver shots at the Governor of Anhui province, who came to inspect the school, accompanied by his bodyguard. Then came the decapitation of Madame Ch'iu Ch'in, the head of a girls' school, who was known to have relations with Hsü Hsi-Lin, and in whose room two revolvers were discovered. These events caused a certain emotion all over China, but they had no far-reaching effects. Their actors were not members of the League, and their acts were also

speedily forgotten. The case with Wang, however, was different. He was a prominent Party leader, the right hand of Sun Yat-Sen, and on his head was a prize of 50,000 dollars if dead, and 100,000 dollars if alive. No one expected him to dare to enter China for the purpose of carrying out the terrorist act which, he calculated, if done by him personally, and on some sufficiently important person, would restore the *morale* in the Party.

At that time a small terrorist group was being organised by some members of the League in Japan, consisting of Fang Chün-Ying, the Chairman of the Department of Assassination ; his wife ; Tseng Hsing ; Miss Ch'en Pi-Ch'ün, the daughter of a rich Penang merchant ; Li Chung-Hsi ; Huang Fu-Sun ; and Yü Yüen-Chi, a student of pharmacy and the writer of a book on explosives. This group had already departed for Canton, where they intended to make an attempt on the Viceroy there, when Wang decided to join them. Nobody knew of his intentions except his colleagues of the Special Committee, who strongly disapproved of his plan. Wang, however, decided to disobey, and wrote to that effect to Sun and Hu who were at that time in Singapore.

The attempted *coup* at Canton was not proceeded with because of the advice of Chu Chih-Hsin, the Party Director of Kwangtung, who told them that although the revolutionary units of Kwangtung had suffered defeat, they still had a sufficient reserve, and the assassination of the Viceroy might upset his original plans. They decided to leave for Hankow, but here came to the conclusion that a *coup* at Hankow would not create the same moral effect as it would at Peking, in the very stronghold of the Manchu Dynasty. Thus, they again left Hankow, leaving their explosive behind in the care of the party members there.¹

During the several months of the journey between

¹ These explosives, some hundred pounds only, were the only explosives possessed and utilised by the revolutionaries at Wuhan at the time of the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution.

Japan and Canton, and between Canton and Hankow, the funds of the conspirators were exhausted. Thus, Miss Ch'en Pi-Chün decided to return to Penang to persuade her mother to sell her valuables to finance the assassination. Wang Ching-Wei returned to Tokio for the purpose of resuming the publication of the *Min Pao*. Only two issues came out. In the first he wrote an article, *The Revolutionary Tide*, in which he attacked the misrule of the Manchu Government and the insincerity of their reform proposals, advising them to restore to the Chinese their national heritage if they wished to avoid a violent revolution. In the second he wrote on *The Case of the Revolution*, pointing out the determination of the Chinese to solve the problem of national regeneration by revolutionary methods.

When everything was arranged, Miss Ch'en, Li Chung-Hsi, Huang Fu-Sun and Yü Yüen-Chi left for Peking in December 1909. Wang, having made sure of their arrival in Peking, left Tokio in January 1910, taking with him explosives and several copies of the *Min Pao*, all hidden inside the lining of his clothes. Tseng and the Fangs were left behind at Tokio.

Having safely arrived at Peking, he immediately went with Miss Ch'en in search of the Prince Regent, at whom he intended to throw the bombs which he carried with him. They had no chance, however, of coming anywhere near to him, as he always left his palace closely guarded, with the streets, through which he passed, closed. They decided to use an electro-bomb for the purpose, and intended to rent a house in Yentai Hu Tung, one of the thoroughfares utilised by the Prince Regent. From that house they could secretly place the bomb in the street, and blow up a considerable part of it. But this street was densely populated and would cause unnecessary bloodshed. Humanitarian considerations made them decide to chose Shih Ch'a Hai, a deserted street passing through a field with a bridge on a lake. They placed the bomb under the bridge, working for three nights to finish

the work. On the third night, i.e. March 28, they waited for the Regent to pass. Unfortunately, at about 3 a.m., one of the comrades touched a sleeping dog, which started barking. This incident caused other dogs who were sleeping in the neighbourhood, to bark too. The bridge was near the Regent's palace, with a police station in the vicinity. The police got alarmed, and inspected the whole neighbourhood with projecting lamps.

The conspirators knew that, owing to the barking of the dogs, the whole plan was frustrated for the moment, and there being no hiding place near by they ran away before it was too late.

The police found traces of digging near the bridge. On closer examination they discovered iron tubes and wires containing suspicious matter. They did not know, however, anything about it, and thus reported the matter to the Civil Department. This Department sent out an expert, who found out the deadly nature of the mechanism, which contained no less than fifty pounds of dynamite. He at once understood that the bomb was intended for the Prince Regent.

For the present, with no more explosives at hand and with the capital closely guarded, there was nothing more for the conspirators to do. Miss Ch'en, Li and Yu thus returned to Tokio to see Tseng and the Fangs about a second dose of explosives. Wang and Huang, however, remained at Peking. Wang did not get away for fear of being recognised by former fellow-students belonging to the reactionary camp. Huang stayed on to keep him company.

In Peking, Wang stayed at a secret address in San Ta Tze Hutung; Huang at a photographer's studio, the Hsiu Chen Studio. The discovery of the plot took place in the early morning of the 28th of March 1910. In the afternoon, Huang, who was of a careless nature, went to Shih Ch'a Hai, to the bridge, to see what had happened with the dynamite, not realising that by doing so he put himself under suspicion and gave the police, who of course

put a watch on the place, some definite clues. As it happened, he was followed on his return to the studio by two police spies who had been waiting there disguised as birdsellers. Nothing happened, however, until the following day, when Miss Ch'en, Yü and Li left Peking for Tokio. On that day Wang went to the railway station to see them off. When the train was leaving, Wang, who was always politeness itself, inadvertently took off his hat to bid farewell, betraying his false *queue* (the sign of a revolutionary) in so doing. He, too, was followed by police spies, and it was not long before the police also discovered his secret lodging place.

On the 16th of April the police decided to raid Huang and Wang's hiding places. In the studio, where they arrested Huang, however, they could not find any incriminating things. They were more fortunate at Wang's place, where they found, besides Wang himself, several revolvers and electric wires and tubes for dynamite. They would also have found an address book, had they made the raid in a more quiet manner, and not put Wang on the danger track by the noise they made in the street previous to entering his house. For Wang, who from the very beginning realised that Peking was full of spies, on hearing uncommon noises in the street, immediately scented danger, and burned the book of secret addresses.

Wang was immediately brought to the Central Police Station, where at the preliminary examination he startled the inspector in charge by disclosing his real name at once. Nobody could believe this, and thus the matter was referred to the Civil Department, which sent about ten of Wang's former schoolmates who were employed there, to him to identify him. Interrogated about the motive which prompted him to attempt at the life of the Prince Regent, he wrote down a brief answer of twenty-one words: "Wang Ching-Wei wants to perform some extraordinary and sensational act for the purpose of arousing, from the most important place (i.e. the Capital)

of the whole world (i.e. China), the people." When further asked why he took with him, concealed in his clothes, copies of the *Min Pao*, he answered (in writing): "These articles were written in ink; I wanted to translate them into blood."

At that time, political and military power at the Manchu Court was in the hands of seven Manchu nobles—the Prince Regent Ch'un; the Prime Minister, I K'uang; the Secretary of Civil Affairs, Shan Ch'i; the Secretary of Finance, Tsai Tseh; the Secretary of the Navy, Tsai T'ao; the Secretary of the Army, Tsai Hsün; the General of the Infantry Yü Liang. These nobles were useless creatures; they were corrupt and inefficient, and could only maintain themselves because of the support they received from the Constitutional Monarchists who wanted to reconstruct China on the Japanese model. They were all afraid of the revolutionaries, especially after the attempt on the Prince Regent. For although the attempt failed, the very fact that Wang, a prominent revolutionary leader, with a price of some 100,000 dollars on his capture, dared to enter Peking, was enough to create something like a panic in Court circles. Regarding the measures to be taken for meeting the situation, there were however some serious difference of opinion among the Manchu princes. One group, led by Tsai Tseh, proposed to close the Capital and make a house-to-house search so as to make a clean sweep of the revolutionaries. The other group, headed by the Secretary of Civil Affairs Shan Ch'i, pleaded for moderation in order to placate the revolutionaries; it aimed at enlisting their sympathy by the offer of concessions. This group predominated, and as a rule revolutionaries who were arrested for no serious offence were only imprisoned and not executed as previously. The question of Wang, however, was different. His crime was one of the most serious, the attempted assassination of the acting Chief of State, and the Civil Department, which generally stood for the conciliatory policy, felt that it could not deal with the matter itself. Thus the question

was referred to the Prime Minister, who was the uncle of the Prince Regent and the *de facto* ruler of China.

It so happened that the Prime Minister was of a cowardly nature. On hearing the news of the attempted assassination, he immediately applied for a short leave of illness, for he dared not leave his residence to attend at the affairs of State at the Prince Regent's palace. Wu Lu-Chen, the member of the League who had risen to the rank of a divisional commander in the Northern Army, got to know about this, and at once left his station for Peking in order to see the Prime Minister. He told him that Wang was a most prominent revolutionary who was beloved by everybody, and advised him to treat him leniently, and not have him condemned to death, as he was sure that Wang's decapitation would be savagely avenged. The Prime Minister became still more frightened, and was persuaded to advise the Prince Regent to condemn Wang and Huang only to life imprisonment.

Before Wang was sent to prison, the Civil Secretary summoned him to his office, for the purpose of enlisting his support for the Dynasty. He first asked Wang whether there was any method by which the revolutionaries could be induced not to harass the Government. Wang's classical reply was, "There is one way, and no other way, and this is to proclaim the Chinese Republic." "You are facing death," pleaded the Civil Secretary; "we will treat you well, if you only leave your Party and help us." Wang, however, was undismayed, and simply repeated his answer.

Thus Wang was to serve his life-sentence. From April 16 to April 25 he was confined at the Central Police Station, where he was treated reasonably well. His guards were people of poor origin, who in their ignorance first looked upon him as a traitor. But soon, by conversation, he converted them to the revolutionary cause, and they began to hail him as their leader. A second

group of guards came to replace the first, with the same result, and were replaced by a third group who were not allowed to come within speaking distance.

On April 25, after the interview with the Civil Secretary, he was removed to the Civil Prison. On that occasion the roads which he had to pass were very closely guarded as if a dangerous civil commotion were going to happen. The Civil Prison was a famous prison, somewhat comparable to the Bastille, where for the past 600 years all famous political prisoners had been confined or executed, such as the anti-Boxer Secretaries in 1900 and the pro-Boxer Secretaries in 1901.

In this prison, treatment was of three kinds: exceptionally good, exceptionally bad, or according to the general regulations. The first treatment was reserved for those rich people who took care liberally to bribe the governors and warders before entering the prison. These people could do what they liked there, even to the extent of bringing in their wives, concubines, and secretaries. They were even allowed to hold gambling parties, with private cooks to attend to them. When, however, one is known to be rich but does not bribe, then one's treatment in prison is abominable. Extortion and blackmail is practised on the relatives to the extent of ruining the family. But when the prison authorities cannot find out whether a prisoner has any money, he is just left on one side. This was the case with Wang and Huang, who were entirely cut off from the outside world. The prison authorities had been instructed by the Civil Department not to allow anyone to have communications with them. This prohibition was in fact superfluous. For his fellow revolutionaries to maintain contact with him would be merely to give gratuitous information to the enemy, and Wang had had no family relations since he became Editor of the *Min Pao*, when he asked his brother, who was the head of his family, to remove him from the family roll. It was not until 1911 that Wang got any news from the outside world when Miss Ch'en and Mrs Fang entered

Peking secretly and by bribing the guards managed to get a communication through to Wang.

Being life prisoners, Wang and Huang were put in iron chains, with locks round their hands, feet and neck. They had no money to bribe the guards to remove these chains and were resigning themselves to meet their death in three years' time, which was the normal period for anyone with those chains on. Not until the outbreak of the Revolution in October 1911 were these chains taken off and removed to the Museum in Peking.

*The Insurrection of March 29 (1911)*¹

In spite of its failure, Wang's attempted assassination of the Prince Regent was an event of supreme importance in Chinese revolutionary history. It had a great moral effect on the revolutionary comrades, reviving their spirit and counteracting the pessimism which had been intensified after the Chang T'ai-Yen and Chang Chi plot in 1907. This was manifest when a year after, in 1911, the memorable insurrection of March 29 took place at Canton.

Upon the receipt of news of Wang's failure, Huang Hsing went to Singapore to see Dr Sun. He arrived there just in time, as Dr Sun was about to leave for Europe, under order of deportation issued by the British Government, in compliance with the request of the Manchu authorities. Huang Hsing was thus given full powers to lead the revolution in China, in Sun's absence, and Hu Han-Min was instructed to obey his orders. Together they then returned to Hongkong, where they established a Central Committee for Southern Affairs, which included besides themselves Chao Po-Hsien, Ni Ying-Ting, Chu Chih-Hsin and Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming. Their plan was to capture Canton, proclaim a Revolutionary Government

¹ Strictly speaking, of April 27, the date corresponding to the lunar 29th day of the 3rd moon in 1911. March 29 in the solar calendar has, however, been adopted as the official anniversary day of the event, and to keep this official chronology, the lunar character of the dates is retained in this section.

there, and, using Kwangtung as the revolutionary base, conquer the rest of China. This was not an impossible plan, as the secret revolutionary propaganda had by that time already taken root all over China. It required only some initial and striking success for the revolutionary flame to break out all over the country and to cause general disaffection among the Imperial troops.

The forces at the disposal of the revolutionary Committee for this purpose consisted of an advance guard of about a hundred Party members, willing to sacrifice themselves for any object; officers of the New Army stationed at different points in the vicinity of Canton, commanding altogether a force equal to that of a brigade, and the secret societies which undertook to equip themselves with 10,000 rifles.

The insurrection was to take place in the autumn of 1910, the sign for this was to be given by a regiment of the New Army stationed at Shaho. This regiment, which had been placed under the command of Ni Ying-Ting, had already moved to Heng-Shi-Kang, when they met the loyal troops, and through an accident Ni Ying-Ting was killed. Left without a leader, the insurgent troops had to disperse, and the attempt again ended in dismal failure.

This was a great blow to the revolutionaries, who had staked everything on the success of this insurrection. The confusion arising out of this defeat was so great that Sun Yat-Sen, who was then in America, decided to return immediately to China. In Yokohama, however, he was recognised by a spy, and so he decided to go to Penang, whither he summoned Huang Hsing, Hu Han-Min, Chao Po-Hsien and the other members of the Hongkong Committee. In view of the constant defeat in Kwangtung, it was decided not to confine revolutionary activity to the South, but also to intensify efforts in the Yang Tse Valley. Propagandists were sent to Hankow, Han-yang and Wuch'ang for the purpose of causing disaffection among the garrisons there, which consisted of

newly recruited soldiers. Meanwhile, however, Huang Hsing and the other members of the Committee were, after raising some 60,000 dollars from the Chinese in the Straits, to return to Hongkong to attempt once more the capture of Canton, while Sun Yat-Sen was to tour the Malay Archipelago and Burma and Siam to collect additional funds. But everywhere he was refused admittance, and so he had no other course open but to leave again for America and Europe.

On his arrival at Hongkong Huang Hsing at once mobilised the revolutionary forces. He had at his disposal in Canton itself some five hundred Party members, the "dare-to-dies", so called because they were determined to sacrifice their lives for the country, following the example of Wang Ching-Wei who was dying a slow death in the Peking prison. These dare-to-dies were intended for the attack on the Viceroy's and Admiral's Yemens, the Arsenal and the Police station. Beside them, there were outside the city the secret societies organised into the People's Army by Li Fu-Lin and regiments of the New Army in secret communication with Chao Po-Hsien. These forces were to attack the different city gates of Canton, as soon as the signal was given; they were placed under the command of Yao Yu-Pin, Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming and Hu I-Sheng, a brother of Hu Han-Min. Meanwhile, munitions were smuggled into Canton from Japan, packed in medicine cases, and transported to the different strategic points in Canton city in the form of wedding presents, by the different members who were holding mock marriages with their sisters-in-law, cousins and even wives. After some delay it was decided to start the attack on March 28. On March 25 Huang Hsing arrived at Canton to take command of the operations.

Reviewing the situation, however, Huang Hsing discovered that all the arrangements had gone wrong; the various routes had not been complied with according to plan. Hu I-Sheng, who was responsible for the communication between the secret societies and New Army,

failed to have his men ready as arranged. Moreover, he committed an indiscretion, with the result that the plot was discovered. Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming on whom the responsibility was placed to have the insurgent forces moved from Huichow to Canton, also failed to keep with the dates. Yao Yu-Pin made the same mistake, but with him the case was not so serious as with the other two. Thus, it was decided to postpone the attack for one day, to give the above three people a chance to complete their arrangements. Moreover, a consignment of ammunition was due from Japan on the morning of the 29th, so in any case it was advisable to wait one more day. On the 26th, however, the situation grew very critical. The authorities, who knew about the plot, had started taking drastic action, and so on the night of the 26th Huang Hsing sent a cable to Hu Han-Min to inform Chao Po-Hsien and all the comrades, some three hundred, who were going to leave Hongkong for Canton on the 27th, not to come over until further instructions. On the 27th Hu I-Sheng reported to Huang Hsing that the authorities had already sent out soldiers to guard the most important streets and proposed to postpone the plot altogether, supported in this by the representatives of Chao Po-Hsien and Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming. Yao Yu-Pin, however, opposed it. Huang Hsing decided to keep to March 29 on the ground that if the plot was postponed, they would be betraying the trust placed in them by the Overseas Chinese, who had been financing the scheme. Huang Hsing, anxious to die for the country, persisted in keeping to the 29th, even after Yao Yu-Pin himself had changed his opinion on the ground that the arms consignment had not arrived and the plot therefore bound to fail. The following day he cabled to Hu Han-Min and Chao Po-Hsien to come at once, but the telegram did not arrive in time for them to catch the night boat, and travelling by day on the 29th was too dangerous, as they were over three hundred men altogether. Chao Po-Hsien did not mind this. He was prepared to start the fighting at

the Customs House should they be searched there, but he was persuaded by Hu Han-Min to ask Huang Hsing to postpone the attack until the 30th, as he did not know at what time the attack was to take place. Hu Han-Min thus sent a representative, Tan Sen-Fung, to Huang Hsing with the morning boat, to try to persuade him as yet to postpone until the 30th. Tan Sen-Fung arrived at Huang Hsing's place just when Huang Hsing was about to leave to lead the attack on the Viceroy's Yamen. Nothing, however, could persuade Huang Hsing to change his mind, for he had already decided to sacrifice himself, and had gathered round him some hundred Party members who were equally determined to die. Thus, with revolvers and hand grenades, they marched from their hiding-place to the Viceroy's Yamen, and carried out one of the most remarkable and memorable events in Chinese revolutionary history. There were only a handful of them, and badly equipped, and yet they managed to drive out the Government troops from the Yamen, which they destroyed, and stood for about five hours in a practically hand-to-hand fight battle against some 2,000 Imperial soldiers, with only the darkness of the night to protect them. The battle ended with forty-three of the revolutionaries being killed and twenty-nine falling into the hands of the Imperial troops, only some thirty being able to escape. Those arrested were summarily tried and executed. They died with the battle-cry of "Down with the Manchu Robbers, Long live the Chinese Republic" on their lips.

Huang Hsing himself managed to escape, with the loss of two fingers of his left hand, to the house of a fellow revolutionary, and was nursed by Miss Hsü Chung Han, a woman comrade who became his wife. The following morning Hu Han-Min and his fellow revolutionaries arrived at Canton, but they found the city gates closed. They now knew that the uprising had already taken place, and had failed; so they returned to Hongkong the very same morning. Huang Hsing was smuggled out to

Hongkong in the evening, and there he had at once to go to hospital to have his wound attended to. While he was lying in hospital he related his experiences to Hu Han-Min, and referred to the unrivalled bravery of those who took part on March 29. But he also referred to the mistakes committed by Hu I-Sheng, Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming and Yao Yu-Pin. It so happened that in the report which Hu Han-Min sent out to the comrades in the Straits, on behalf of Huang Hsing and himself, he put all the blame of the failure on Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, also attacking Yao Yu-Pin, but entirely exonerating his brother Hu I-Sheng. This mis-statement of facts was later discovered by Yao Yu-Pin, who shortly after the event went to the Straits himself and informed Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming about the back-handed attack of Hu Han-Min; the seeds of some grave future trouble were sown thereby, for the bad feeling existing between Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming and Hu Han-Min consequent on this became the cause of Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's revolt against Dr Sun in 1922.

The Wuch'ang Revolt of October 10, 1911

The March 29th Insurrection was the tenth defeat of the Revolutionary Party. Yet it was a glorious failure; the heroic death of the seventy-two revolutionary martyrs started a veritable revolutionary tide in China. The membership of the League increased by leaps and bounds. The work of the revolutionary Committee at Wuhan caused such havoc with the loyalty of the garrisons there, that several regiments had to be transferred to Szechuan, where some trouble had been brewing in connection with the Hukuang Railway Loan and the "nationalisation", for the benefit of the Minister in charge, of a projected railway. In view of the manifest success of the revolutionary propaganda among the troops, it was decided to attempt the seizure of Wuch'ang, the capital of Hupeh province, by the end of the year. Unfortunately, an accident happened which led to the discovery of the plot and prema-

turely forced the Wuhan Committee to act. On the afternoon of October 9, 1911, a bomb exploded in one of the League's secret store-houses in the Russian Concession of Hankow. The Russian police investigated the case and found a bomb plan, revolutionary flags, badges, seals, and many documents belonging to the League. The Mixed Court of the foreign concessions at once communicated the matter to the Viceroy, Jui Cheng, at Wuch'ang and extradited the persons arrested in the house. Jui Cheng immediately closed the city gates of Wuch'ang and raided the local headquarters of the League. Among the papers that fell into Jui Cheng's hands was a register of those soldiers and officers of the New Army that belonged to the League. Knowing what was in store for them, these people at once raised the banner of revolt, and led by Sun Wu, Hsiung Ping-K'un, Ts'ai Tsi-Min, Chang Cheng-Wu, they started, on the night of the 10th of October, the attack on the Viceroy's Yamen, but only to find that the Viceroy and the Garrison Commander, Chang Piao, had fled in panic to Shanghai. Before the dawn of the next day the revolutionaries had already taken possession of the whole city of Wuch'ang. They were, however, leaderless; Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, the most important of the comrades, had gone to Shanghai to take charge of affairs there. Sun Wu, his deputy, was wounded; his colleagues in the Committee had very little military experience, and while waiting for Huang Hsing, who only arrived on October 20, they called a Council for the purpose of electing a temporary leader. Their choice fell upon Li Yuan-Hung, a Colonel in the Imperial Army. Thus, Chang Cheng-Wu, Ts'ai Tsi-Min and a few others went to his headquarters in order to convey the decision of the Council to him. But Li, suspecting an attempt on his life, made desperate attempts to escape, and ran about from one room to another, finally taking refuge under his wife's bed. He was discovered, however, because one of his heels was sticking out, and was taken out of his hiding-place. Prostrate with fear,

Li begged for mercy. To his surprise, Chang Cheng-Wu expressed ceremonially great solicitude for his health, saying, "General Li, we should be greatly honoured if you and your brigade immediately joined our ranks. We strongly urge you to accept our invitation." Li, on recovering his composure, accepted the post of Generalissimo of the Revolutionary Armies, and at once issued a proclamation, under the date of the 19th day of the eighth moon of the 4609th year after Huang Ti, announcing the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a revolutionary military government; declaring arson, rape, wanton slaughter, interference with shops and commerce, concealment of mandarins to be capital offences; offering rewards for the provision of food-stuffs, the propagation of the revolution among the people; and undertaking the protection of foreign lives and property and the maintenance of the existing treaties, provided the foreigners refrained from assisting the Manchus.

The Imperial authorities at Wuhan were utterly demoralised by the sudden outbreak of the Revolution, and on October 12 Hankow and Hanyang, with its important Arsenal, fell to the Revolutionary Army of Li Yuan-Hung. Huang Hsing, who was then in Shanghai, at once instructed the Party members all over China to take action, and on October 20 arrived himself at Wuhan. From Wuhan the revolutionary fever spread all over China. Szechuan province declared its independence, followed by Hunan and Shensi province. In Shansi province, the troops assassinated their Governor and burnt the Manchu city of the capital Taiyuanfu, and established a revolutionary provincial government under Yen Hsi-Shan. In Canton the Manchu garrison commander was assassinated and an independent government established under Hu Han-Min. Tientsin in Chihli and Tsinan in Shangtung also went revolutionary, and with the exception of Tsinan, which returned to its former allegiance on November 30, all these provinces and cities were permanently lost to the Dynasty. The Empress Dowager realised that the

great Manchu nobles would not be equal to the task of meeting the dynastic crisis, and turned for assistance to Yuan Shih-K'ai, whom she had disgraced some three years ago. On October 14, Yuan was appointed Viceroy of the two Hu provinces, with order to suppress the Wuhan revolt, but he refused to take up his post. His authority was then increased to include supreme command over all the forces of the Empire, but he still refused. In desperation the Prime Minister, Prince Ch'ing, resigned, together with all the Manchu Ministers, and on November 1, Yuan Shih-K'ai was charged with the formation of a Cabinet himself. The Throne would abandon all actual authority of government and delegate all power to the Cabinet. The National Assembly, a phantom creation of Prince Ch'ing since October, 1910, attempted to take the lead in popular opinion and demanded the immediate establishment of a Constitutional Government. In this it was backed by Wu Lu-Chen and Chang Chao-Cheng, two divisional generals stationed near Peking, who were threatening to march on the Capital. It drew up a Constitution of nineteen Articles which provided for all political power to be in the hands of Parliament, and even the Succession and the Imperial household budget were to be under Cabinet and Parliamentary control. This Constitution, which left to the Throne only a nominal rule, was accepted by the Empress Dowager. Meanwhile, on November 3, Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, following an understanding with the military and naval authorities of Shanghai, took over that city with its Arsenal, dockyard, and forts, with practically no resistance. On November 9 Yunnan revolted, followed by Kiangsi and Chekiang. On November 13, the Yangtse fleet, under Admiral Sah Chin-Peng, who was sent out to recapture the Wuhan cities, went over to the revolutionary cause. Yuan Shih-K'ai, whose forces under Feng Kuo-Chang and Tuan Ch'i-Jui, had on October 30, after two days' fighting, recaptured Hankow, now made overtures to the Wuhan Committee, but nothing resulted from the negotiations, except the release of

Wang Ching-Wei on November 6, who was given an official welcome by the Peking Ministry of Justice. For once, the revolutionary cause scored a victory, but this after ten defeats and many disappointments.

CHAPTER VII

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Yuan Shih-K'ai's Move

WITHIN a month after the premature outbreak of the Wuhan insurrection the great majority of the provinces of China had declared themselves for the Revolutionary cause. Only Honan and Chihli were still faithful to the Dynasty. The Manchus were at their wits' end as to how to deal with the Revolution. Yuan Shih-K'ai, although appointed Prime Minister was not at all in a hurry to take up his post, and during the first days of November was still in Honan. The 6th Division under Wu Lu-Chen, stationed at Shih-Chia-Chuang, south-west of Peking, and the 20th Division under Chang Chao-Cheng at Luanchow had declared themselves sympathetic to the Revolution and were within a day's distance from the Capital. It was realised that the end of the Dynasty was nearing, and some 250,000 Manchus had already departed from Peking to Manchuria. It is true, the Government had still been able to despatch 24,000 well-equipped troops to Wuhan under Yin Ch'ang, the Manchu Minister of War, and Feng Kuo-Chang and Tuan Ch'i-Jui, and Hankow was recaptured on October 30, but these latter two generals were also expected to join the Revolution at any moment. The Imperial Treasury was empty, the loan negotiations with the foreigners were held up, and without money the Throne could not expect to retain the allegiance of the Army, which consisted for the greater part of Chinese troops.

This was the situation on November 6. On November 7, however, there was a sudden change. Yuan Shih-

K'ai had accepted his command, and the army generals, such as Feng Kuo-Chang and Tuan Ch'i-Jui, who were reluctant to obey the Manchu Yin Ch'ang, were glad to receive orders from him, who was their old teacher. Yuan's first step was to get the absolute control of the Northern Army before dealing with the revolutionaries in the South. He decided to get rid of Wu Lu-Chen and Chang Chao-Cheng. Thus on November 7 he sent two assassins to Wu Lu-Chen, who was murdered at the railway station at Shih-Chia-Chuang. He then promoted Chang Chao-Cheng to a higher sinecure rank so as to make him harmless.

Wang Ching-Wei's Counter Move

To counteract Yuan's move in the North, Wang Ching-Wei, just released from prison, organised the Peking and Tientsin branch of the League, of which he became the Chairman. It was decided to continue the propaganda in the Northern Army. Before Yuan Shih-K'ai took charge of affairs, the military situation in the North was quite favourable to the revolutionaries, who could count on the support of two army divisions. With the assassination of Wu Lu-Chen and the fresh promotion of Chang Chao-Cheng, the revolutionaries were left with practically no armed forces. Part of the troops who were formerly under Wu Lu-Chen went westwards, and took the provinces of Shansi and Shensi on behalf of the revolutionary cause. The greater part of Chang Chao-Cheng's forces decided to obey Yuan, and only a small part went revolutionary and revolted; these were crushingly defeated. Under these circumstances, it was imperative to enlarge the revolutionary nuclei in the Northern Army by propaganda.

With a view to impressing public opinion in the North a terrorist group was organised for the purpose of doing away with the key supporters of the Manchu Dynasty. This group consisted of numerous party members, but for some time they were condemned to inactivity as

they could not get hold of any explosives until after the capture of the Shanghai Arsenal. The first consignment of bombs under Miss Ch'en Pi-Chün did not arrive until the end of the year, and at the beginning of the new year Liang Pi, the most powerful Manchu in the Army and the only Manchu whom the Republicans really feared, was assassinated by Pan Chü-Ying, a former officer under Chang Chao-Cheng, acting under orders of the League. On the 16th January, 1912, four other comrades made an attempt on Yuan Shih-K'ai himself, but they failed, only hurting Yuan's horse and wounding his bodyguards. They were arrested and executed, but although the attempt was unsuccessful, it made a great impression on Yuan, who at last realised the strength of the League in the North, inducing him to make the compromise which will be discussed shortly.

It was also decided to solicit the support of the Constitutional Monarchists who were being influenced by the League's slogan, "Don't help the Manchus to kill the Chinese". Wang discussed the matter with their leaders at Peking and proposed to them two points, the calling of an armistice and the convocation of a popularly elected National Assembly to decide on the form of the Government. This policy was objected to by several party members, but Wang made them realise that Peking and Tientsin were still under the control of the Manchus. As long as this was the case, propaganda for the Republic could only be done in secret, and this by the method of assassination. Whereas in the elections for the National Assembly, which would have the sanction of the Manchus, propaganda could be carried on in the open. Moreover, he was sure of getting a popular majority in favour of the Republic. In view of the contemporary political situation, this plan was not carried out, although it was widely discussed in the Press and in the Provincial Assemblies. An alternative plan was found in entering into negotiations with Yuan Shih-K'ai with a view to inducing him to make a compromise with the Revo-

lutionary Army in the South and to join the Republican movement himself. This policy seemed contradictory with the terrorist policy previously adopted. It was realised, however, that Yuan was essentially a tool of the Manchus. So the League also wanted to use him as their instrument, for should he declare himself, even if nominally, in favour of the Republic, the question of the Dynasty would be *ipso facto* settled. In the light of subsequent events this tactic was a grave mistake. But it seemed to be unavoidable, for the policy of the League at that time was to concentrate on the struggle against the Manchu, to restore national sovereignty to the Chinese people, and anyone who was against the Manchu was considered to work for the same aim.

The Failure of Compromise

When the plan of arriving at a compromise with Yuan was decided upon, Yuan was still in Honan, and it was not until November 15 that he came to Peking and took up his Premiership. All political and military power was then centred in him. Shantung, which had previously declared its independence, revoked its declaration and accepted orders from Peking again. On his assumption of office, Yuan had only three provinces, Chihli, Honan and Shantung, under his absolute control, but his military forces were far superior to those of the revolutionaries. He realised, however, that to attempt to save the Dynasty by armed force would ultimately end in failure. Moreover, he had himself a grudge against the Dynasty, for three years before he was summarily dismissed, in spite of the great services he had rendered to the Dynasty. Incidentally, he had also ambitions of his own. Thus, while still in Honan, he sent emissaries to Wuhan to negotiate for an armistice and for terms of settlement. The Wuhan Committee under Li Yuan-Hung, after consultation with Wang Ching-Wei, insisted on the Republic, and offered him the first Presidency if he would bring over the North to the Republican scheme.

Yuan replied that he had only authority to negotiate on the basis of a Constitutional Monarchy under the Ch'ing Dynasty, wherein the sovereignty of the Chinese people would be recognised and persons of Manchu origin excluded from high office, making, therefore, the Throne "an idol worshipped by monks". Both sides were insistent, and negotiations broke down. For a few days, however, Yuan was hesitant whether to support or to overthrow the Dynasty, but finally he decided on the former. He gave Feng Kuo-Chang the order to capture the other Wuhan cities, Hanyang and Wuch'ang, and proceeded himself to Peking to take up his new post. He was now the sole hope of the Dynasty and was also welcomed by the foreigner who saw in a Dynasty dominated by Yuan "order and treaty observance".

Hanyang, on the north bank of the Han River, was defended by Huang Hsing, the greatest fighter modern China had produced. But Huang Hsing had only some 3,000 troops under him to defend the city, which was assailed by some 20,000 well-equipped soldiers. Fighting against these odds, Huang Hsing was bound to fail, and after holding out for a fortnight, he allowed Hanyang to be captured by the Imperial troops, and fled to Shanghai on November 27, where his presence greatly strengthened the revolutionary forces. These were at that time engaged in the expedition against Nanking, the Southern capital, which was under the control of the former bandit, and now Imperial General, Chang Hsün. Huang Hsing immediately took over the command of the expeditionary forces, and under his leadership Nanking was captured on December 3. In sacrificing Hanyang at the right moment, Huang Hsing thus showed his supreme genius as a military commander. For the conquest of Nanking fully compensated for the loss of Hankow and Hanyang. Nanking was the Southern capital of the Dynasty, the possession of which gave to the Revolutionary Party a capital and a recognised national prestige. It restored the morale of the revolutionary workers, which had been

somewhat shaken by Li Yuan-Hung's intimation, after the Hanyang defeat, that Yuan's proposal of a Constitutional Monarchy might be accepted.

Peace Negotiations

With Nanking under the control of the revolutionaries, and Chang Hsün, the only commander whose loyalty was beyond question, utterly routed, Yuan was reluctant to carry on the campaign in the Wuhan area any longer. Moreover, if the revolutionaries were badly off financially (they had to depend chiefly on voluntary contributions), the Throne was worse, for the Treasury was empty, provincial remittances ceased, a foreign embargo was laid upon customs funds, and all attempts at foreign loans had failed. So on December 11 he again asked for an armistice, and formally appointed T'ang Shao-Yi, the Foreign Minister in his Cabinet, as Chief of the Peace Delegation which was to conduct the negotiations at Shanghai. On his way to Shanghai, T'ang called on Wang Ching-Wei in Tientsin, and to the latter's surprise, T'ang expressed, in plain language, his sympathy for the revolutionary cause. T'ang also gave Wang an introduction to see Yuan Shih-K'ai in Peking. Yuan, however, did not express himself quite so clearly as T'ang. He told Wang that he did not want to carry on the war any longer, but wanted a peaceful settlement. Wang Ching-Wei cabled these conversations to Huang Hsing at Nanking, who instructed him to go immediately to Shanghai, leaving Party affairs in the North to others. He arrived at Shanghai on December 18, but proceeded at once to Nanking, where a National Convention had already been formed, consisting of delegates from the revolutionary provinces. Wang Ching-Wei thereupon was added to the Republican Peace Delegation which had already been formed under the Chairmanship of the Wu T'ing-Fang. This also included Wen Tsung-Yao, Wang Ch'ung-Hui, Niu Yung-Chien, Wang Cheng-T'ing, and Hu Ying.

T'ang Shao-Yi's Delegation arrived at Shanghai on December 17, and three days after the Peace Conference was formally opened. At the opening of the first session Wu T'ing-Fang stipulated that only abdication of the Emperor and the establishment of a Republic would satisfy the people and prevent further bloodshed. T'ang Shao-Yi at once concurred, saying that "the proclamation of the Republic cannot be avoided" (literally, "we must not not-have a Republic"), and sent word to Yuan Shih-K'ai to that effect. T'ang was, however, disowned, and suddenly dismissed as Chief Imperial Delegate, but, curiously enough, remained as Yuan's personal representative in Shanghai.

The reason for T'ang's dismissal was twofold. T'ang was a Cantonese and, by training as well as by blood, was at one with revolutionary China. He headed the Imperial Delegation more in his capacity of Yuan's personal friend and adviser than of a representative of the Monarchy. When in Tientsin he expressed agreement with the Republic, he was speaking for himself and not on behalf of the Imperial Delegation, the members of which he did not consult; they in fact disagreed with him. Yuan's own position regarding the Republic was obscure. In any case, to demand the abdication of the Emperor was, at that particular moment, premature for him. For he had only just assumed his Prime Ministership, and had not yet fully consolidated his own power. He was still liable to dismissal in the event of his putting a too liberal interpretation on his authority. Moreover, although the most sweeping concessions had been made in an effort to placate Chinese opinion to save the Dynasty, including the replacement of practically all Manchu political officers by Chinese, the cutting of the queue (the symbol of submission to the Manchu), and the order that all official petitions be made to the Cabinet instead of to the Throne, a large section of the army was still under the control of Manchu generals, the most powerful of whom was Liang Pi, who had seen through Yuan and

had already mobilised his forces, some 20,000 men strong, round Peking against Yuan.

The dismissal of T'ang broke up the Peace Conference, but the war was practically at an end. For Yuan was concentrating his forces in the three provinces under his control and in Manchuria, in order to suppress any insurrections there. He was also mobilising against Shansi and Shensi. Being busy in the North he had no time to deal with the South; moreover, he had also to watch the movements of his rival, Liang Pi.

Revolution without Leadership

During all this time Sun Yat-Sen was abroad. When the Wuch'ang Revolt of October 1911 took place, Sun was in America. He decided, however, not to return to China for the time being. For in his view, the diplomatic front was more important than military action. He wished to bring the chief Powers interested in China to the side of the Revolution, in the sense, not only of obtaining their moral support, but also of inducing them to put an embargo on the loan negotiations, which the Imperial Government was conducting with the Four-Power Consortium (i.e. the British, German, French and American Banking groups). Of the six main Powers interested in China, America and France were sympathetic with the Revolution. Germany and Russia were in favour of the Dynasty, but in view of the relative insignificance of their interests in China, there was little danger from their side. What mattered was Japan and Great Britain who, if they chose to help the Dynasty, might very seriously embarrass the Revolutionary cause. Public opinion both in England and Japan, however, was favourable to the Revolution, but the attitude of the Governments was dubious. But if the British Government could be induced to withhold their support from the Dynasty, Japan, as its ally, was not likely to act in opposition. Thus, Sun Yat-Sen decided to leave for England where he obtained the assurance that no further

loans would be made to the Dynasty and that all orders prohibiting him from entering British Colonial territory would be cancelled.

Sun's absence abroad at the critical period following the Wuch'ang insurrection was, however, very unfortunate. His deputy, Huang Hsing, had not his prestige and was unable to wield sufficient moral authority to secure the instant obedience to his orders. There was no discipline and co-ordination among the different revolutionary units. Among the party members there was a mistaken belief that everyone of Chinese origin, if sympathetic towards the Revolution, even if only nominally so, would, as a matter of course, co-operate with them in the task of establishing a new political and social order in China. The result was that as soon as the revolutionary movement was on the threshold of victory, a great many reactionary bureaucrats and old Mandarins were able to smuggle themselves into the movement, enjoying thereby the fruits of the victory for which they had done very little. The most notorious instance was, of course, that of the Imperial Colonel Li Yuan-Hung, who, when the October revolution broke out, was taken out from under his wife's bed where he had hidden, and summarily made Generalissimo of the Revolutionary forces at Wuhan by the Party members there, with the approval of Sun Wu, the local Party director. And when subsequently Huang Hsing went to Wuch'ang to take charge of the military operations, the preposterous situation arose that he, the acting leader of the revolutionary movement in China, had to receive orders from someone who but a few days ago had been begging for mercy from his own subordinates. Tradition dies hard, and the revolutionaries, in choosing that line of action, were influenced by the Chinese traditional modesty which considered it bad form to come out oneself to claim what was one's due. The fact that under the Manchu autocracy members of the League could only work in secret, meant that none of the members commanded a

great prestige among the masses, with a few exceptions such as Sun Yat-Sen himself, Huang Hsing and Wang Ching-Wei. They had, therefore, to invite well-known officials and diplomats such as Wu T'ing-Fang, Wang Ch'ung-Hui, Chang Ch'ien, but who did not belong to the party, to take charge of important affairs, so as to give prestige to the revolutionary cause. This was also the reason for Yuan Shih-K'ai being proposed as first President when the Republic became a serious political issue, provided that he agreed to the Party scheme.

It was under these circumstances that the National Convention, which had been formed at Nanking shortly after its capture by the revolutionary forces, attempted to form a Revolutionary Military Government. The revolutionary delegates had already decided to elect Huang Hsing as Generalissimo, and Li Yuan-Hung as Vice-Generalissimo, when the next day, owing to the intrigues by the Hupeh delegates, they suddenly changed their mind and reversed the order. In view of the disunity prevailing among the delegates, neither Li nor Huang took up their posts, and for a long time it looked as if the whole attempt would end in failure. This would have been fatal to the Revolution, especially in view of the critical situation in Wuch'ang, which was being threatened by the Imperial troops.

Sun Yat-Sen Elected President

The return of Sun Yat-Sen saved the situation. On December 21 he arrived at Hongkong, where he was met by Hu Han-Min, who had meanwhile been elected Tutuh (Civil and Military Governor) of Kwangtung by the Provincial Assembly. Accompanied by Hu Han-Min, Sun at once went to Shanghai, where he arrived on Christmas Day. There he was met by a deputation consisting of Huang Hsing, Wang Ching-Wei, Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, the conqueror of Shanghai, and Sung Ch'iao-Jen, who was to become very prominent as a parliamentary politician. The National Convention had previously decided to

settle the deadlock between Li Yuan-Hung and Huang Hsing by the election of Sun Yat-Sen to the Provisional Presidency of the Republic, with Li Yuan-Hung as Vice-President and Huang Hsing as Generalissimo. This decision was conveyed to Sun by the deputation, but it was only after some hesitation and great reluctance that Sun accepted the honour. He was formally elected on December 29, 1911.

Sun Yat-Sen assumed office at Nanking on the 13th day of the eleventh moon, a date corresponding to January 1, 1912, which henceforth was declared to be the first day of the first month of the first year of the Republic. His Cabinet consisted of Huang Hsing, Minister of War; Wu T'ing-Fang, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Wang Ch'ung-Hui, Minister of Justice; Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Minister of Education; Ch'en Chin-Tao, a Peking Banker, Minister of Finance; Chang Ch'ien, formerly president of the Kiangsu Provincial Assembly, Minister of Commerce and Industries; Tang Shou-Ch'ien, an old Mandarin, Minister of the Interior; Hu Han-Min resigned his Tutuh-ship of Kwangtung on the formation of the Provisional Government, and became Chief Secretary to the President. Wang Ching-Wei was offered a post in the Cabinet, but he declined, just as he had previously declined the Tutuh-ship of Kwangtung to which post he had been elected in succession to Hu Han-Min. He was offered the Presidency of the Tung Meng Hui, which Sun Yat-Sen resigned on his assumption of the Presidency of the Republic, but this too he declined out of deference to the Leader. He preferred to remain in a private capacity, concentrating his attention on revolutionary propaganda in the North.

Sun's Offer of Resignation

One of the first official acts of Sun Yat-Sen was to inform Yuan Shih-K'ai that he had assumed the Provisional Presidency of the Chinese Republic, but that he was ready to resign and propose Yuan as his successor,

provided Yuan would agree to the Republic. The motives which led Sun to take this step were rather complicated. The reason was not, as is commonly assumed, that Sun felt himself powerless to oust Yuan from the North. Nanking at that time already controlled, in some way or other, fifteen out of the eighteen provinces of China, and it would not take the revolutionaries much longer to get the remaining three provinces, especially in view of the desperate financial conditions of the Peking Treasury. Yuan in the Republican scheme would shorten the war, but it was not essential for the union between North and South. In their anxiety to achieve the establishment of the Republic in the shortest possible time, the revolutionary leaders had, however, previous to Sun's arrival in China, decided that Yuan would be acceptable as the first President. There was, however, a more fundamental reason why Sun wanted to give up the Presidency. The truth was that Sun, from the very beginning, was not happy as President. In the first place, he felt that the majority of the Party comrades, immediately victory was in sight, had forgotten the implications of their revolutionary oath, and were no longer willing to submit to his guidance unquestioningly. There was no central organisation, no centralised command, no Party Discipline; members also protested against the immediate application of the oath of allegiance. He felt that he was being made use of by careerists, and that it was impossible for him, as President, to carry out his task of revolutionary reconstruction. Already on the very first days of his arrival in Shanghai, there was a serious dispute between him and the members of the deputation who were conveying the offer of the Presidency. Sun intended to maintain the system of a military government until such time as the whole of China was pacified and the reactionary elements rooted out. This was to be followed by a period of educative government during which the Chinese people would first have local autonomy in the districts and subsequently

in the provinces. After the majority of the provinces had attained to the stage of constitutional government, but not before, a Constitution for the whole Republic would be promulgated. Sun's view was that China was not yet ripe to enter the Constitutional period of the Revolution. The Chinese people had been, from the very beginning, under the domination of an autocratic monarchy, which had the effect of creating a slave psychology, and this could not be destroyed without first passing through a period of preparatory training. These ideas Sun derived from a study of the French Revolution of 1789, the failure of which he ascribed to the premature introduction of a democratic regime. He frequently discussed the principle of the Three Stages, but only Wang Ching-Wei seemed to have understood its implications, as he quoted Sun in an article on "Citizenship and the Nation" in the second issue of the *Min Pao*. The members of the deputation, with the sole exception of Wang Ching-Wei, however, wanted the Constitutional Stage to be proclaimed at once, and the Constitution providing for a Parliament promulgated as soon as possible. Sung Ch'iao-Jen, the protégé of Huang Hsing, especially was insistent, and finally carried the day.

Sun had to acknowledge defeat, but nevertheless, he could not let the revolutionary leaders down by refusing the Presidency outright. "The present situation was brought about by you all," he said, and with great reluctance accepted. He was determined, however, to be relieved of his position in some other capacity. That he was right was soon proved by events.

The United Republic

After the formation of the Provisional Government at Nanking, peace negotiations were resumed. They were carried on directly between Wu T'ing-Fang and Yuan Shih-K'ai, and also through T'ang Shao-Yi, who was still at Shanghai as Yuan's personal representative.

Most of the Southern Peace Delegates had meanwhile accepted other posts ; only Wang Ching-Wei was still available to assist Wu. Wu T'ing-Fang was not a Party member, but he had some reputation as a diplomat with the outside public. Wang was pre-eminently the Party representative who, simultaneously with the conduct of peace negotiations, prepared for insurrectionary action in the North upon which he intended to fall back should negotiations break down again, and Yuan remain recalcitrant. To impress the Peking Government Liang Pi, Yuan's rival and the chief military support of the Manchus, was assassinated at the beginning of January. In the middle of the month an attempt was made on Yuan himself, which failed. Yuan took drastic action against the terrorists, but his morale was temporarily shaken. Especially when towards the end of January he was presented with an ultimatum signed by forty-six Imperial commanders, headed by Tuan Ch'í-Jui, and Feng Kuo-Chang, stating that they would no longer oppose the advance of the Republican troops. Thus he accepted, nominally at least, Sun Yat-Sen's offer of the Presidency of the Republic, including the stipulations that Yuan should assume the Presidency at Nanking which would henceforth become the capital of the Republic, and, that the abdication of the Dynasty should be unconditional and without delegation of power.

On February 12, 1912, after endless re-drafting and discussion between the Manchu representatives and Yuan, the abdication edicts were issued. To the surprise of Sun, however, the edicts were not in accordance with the terms agreed to. For it was made to appear as if the Republic of China owed its existence to the grace of the Ta Ch'ing Dynasty by the delegation of its sovereignty to the people. Moreover, having decided in favour of the Republic in China, the Throne ordered Yuan to "organise with full powers a provisional Republican Government and confer with the Republican Army as to the methods of union, thus assuring peace to the

people and tranquillity to the Empire, and forming the one great Republic of China." Sun Yat-Sen immediately cabled to Yuan to the effect that "the Republican Government cannot be organised by any authority conferred by the Ch'ing Emperor. Any such presumption will certainly lead to trouble. You are urged to repudiate the Imperial authority." Yuan realised that he had gone too far, and wired back: "The Republican form of government is the best, as admitted by all the world. The goal at which you gentlemen have been aiming through years of thoughtful labour has now been reached. You should assuredly gain a position of the highest satisfaction, and never permit a monarchical government to regain a foothold in China. As the formation of a union is of great consequence, I earnestly wish to come southward to listen to your advice and to plan with you." On receipt of this telegram, Sun Yat-Sen sent in his resignation to the National Convention, recommending Yuan as his successor. On February 15, Yuan was elected Provisional President with the stipulation that Sun Yat-Sen and his Cabinet should continue in office until Yuan's inauguration, which was to take place at Nanking.

A delegation under Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, accompanied by T'ang Shao-Yi, went to Peking to fetch Yuan Shih-K'ai. They were honoured by a succession of ovations and receptions, but Yuan had not really any intention of leaving his stronghold at Peking. He had to provide himself with an excuse, however. Thus he ordered, on the 29th of February, the picked Third Division, under Ts'ao K'un, a former bandit and a future President of China, to mutiny and loot the Capital, causing damage to property of about ten million dollars. Impressed by this event, Li Yuan-Hung, the Vice-President, wrote from Wuch'ang to Sun Yat-Sen praying him to consent to Yuan remaining at Peking, adding as his personal opinion that Peking was in every respect a much more suitable capital than Nanking. Li was, of

course, entirely ignorant of the purpose of the Revolution, but he managed to get the majority of the Cabinet on his side. The Diplomatic Corps also favoured Yuan remaining where he was. In these circumstances, Sun had no alternative but to sacrifice his better judgment, especially as Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei also advised him to that effect. On March 7 the Nanking Government formally agreed, and on March 10 Yuan took the oath of office as Provisional President of the Republic. On April 1, 1912, Sun Yat-Sen surrendered the Seal of the Republic to T'ang Shao-Yi who, while in Shanghai, had joined the Tung Meng Hui and had since been made Prime Minister by Yuan Shih-K'ai. The National Assembly had on March 10 promulgated the Provisional Constitution of the Republic, and adjourned to meet again in Peking on April 29.

Thus, after a struggle of less than six months, the Republic of China had become a reality, even if only on paper. Subsequent events, however, proved that the policy of compromise of the majority of the Republican leaders, for the purpose of securing the nominal adherence to the Republic of Yuan Shih-K'ai, was a serious mistake. For already in 1913 Yuan declared war on Sun Yat-Sen and his followers, and, with the help of foreign money, defeated them, establishing a reactionary dictatorship as a prelude to proclaiming himself Emperor in 1916. Yuan was not successful and died from heart-failure; but his subordinates formed themselves into military cliques which were responsible for plunging China into the civil war that has lasted, with but few intervals, ever since. The investing of all political power in Yuan resulted in all the corrupt and reactionary politicians and monarchists centring round him. In view, however, of the loose discipline among the members of the League at the threshold of their victory, their misunderstanding of the principles of their Leader, the large number of moral casualties prevailing among them, and other unfortunate circumstances, it is

difficult to see how things could have been otherwise. And it must be admitted that, although the Republic was only nominal, the Republican form of government had definitely come to stay. Yuan failed dismally when in 1916 he tried to establish a Dynasty, and the attempt at the restoration of the Ch'ing Emperor in 1917 by Chang Hsün met with the same fate.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BETRAYAL OF THE REPUBLIC

The Foundation of the Kuo-Min Tang

ON the assumption by Yuan Shih-K'ai of the Provisional Presidency, Sun Yat-Sen issued a manifesto stating his intention to retire from political life. He wanted to devote his attention to the education of the people and the reconstruction of the economic life of the nation on a modern industrial basis ; he aimed at the realisation of his Third Principle (of Livelihood), in order that the Chinese Republic might have a firm and permanent foundation. Sun realised that he had been abroad too long ; he now wanted to get in closer touch with Chinese society by doing some reconstructive work of a character which was not strictly political. He had been forced by his followers to compromise with Yuan Shih-K'ai, whom he distrusted ; he foresaw that if he remained in active politics he would soon get at loggerheads with him, which, he felt, would be a futile waste of energy. Therefore, he decided to leave the fullness of political power to Yuan and urged his chief followers to leave the political arena and assist him in the realisation of his industrial programme, in which railway construction occupied a prominent place.

Among those who joined Sun in his voluntary retirement were Huang Hsing, who gave up his post as Generalissimo, and Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, who resigned the Governorship of Shanghai, refusing a Cabinet post offered by Yuan Shih-K'ai. They retired from political life, however, not because of their belief in the Third Principle, considered Utopian, but out of consideration

for their leader, whose distrust of Yuan they shared. Few of their own followers, however, followed suit, not being bound by a personal tie to Sun. Of Sun's more prominent lieutenants, Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, his right and left hands, remained faithful to him and his ideals. Wang and Hu accompanied Sun on a tour along the Yangtse Valley and in Kwangtung Province. When in Hongkong Wang Ching-Wei learnt from the Kwangtung Government representatives that the Acting Governor of Kwangtung, Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, had decided to resign his post to make way for him. Wang, however, persisted in his determination not to accept any official position, and, to avoid any embarrassment, decided not to proceed to Canton. Instead he recommended that Ch'en's appointment should be made more definite, and went to the Straits Settlements after marrying Miss Ch'en Pi-Ch'ün, his comrade-in-arms. For Wang felt that the last ten years he had spent all his time in doing revolutionary work, and had had no opportunity for study. He desired to see foreign countries, in order to enlarge his perspective, and supported by his friends and relatives, he went to France in August, 1912. Thus, Dr Sun and Hu Han-Min went to Canton without Wang. Previously, however, when Hu was Governor of Kwangtung and Ch'en Vice-Governor, there was a serious discord between the two leaders, the origin of which might be traced to the bad feeling of Ch'en against Hu ever since the latter's report of the March 29 event. Now it was Ch'en's turn to feel uneasy. So after seeing Dr Sun, Ch'en wrote a letter of resignation, and left for Hongkong, whereupon Dr Sun asked the Provincial Assembly to re-elect Hu as Governor.

Dr Sun's advice to the League members to withdraw from active politics was, with few exceptions, disregarded. Many of them had, prior to the Republican Government, led a life full of peril in China, or were abroad in exile, suffering great privation. When the hour of victory came, it was only human to desire a share in the spoils

of office. This they hoped to achieve through their control of the National Convention, of which, by the terms of the Provisional Constitution, the President was but an instrument. The Provisional Constitution was largely the work of Sung Ch'iao-Jen. Sung was nominated by Huang Hsing as Minister of Justice in the Nanking Provisional Government, but for some reason Dr Sun rejected the nomination and made him Chief of the Bureau of Legislation instead. In this capacity Sung found ample scope for his talents, by which the President, as in France, would only be a figure-head in the hands of the Cabinet, which, in turn, would be the creature of Parliament. A Parliamentary system presupposes the existence of political parties. The Tung Meng Hui, however, was a secret revolutionary organisation and as such it was unsuitable for Parliamentary action. Therefore he prevailed on the Party leaders to open the League to the general public. He then induced the leaders of five other political groups, which had meanwhile been formed in the National Assembly, to join the reorganised League, which was given the name of Kuo-Min Tang (National People's Party). Of this new organisation Dr Sun was made "Chief Manager", with Huang Hsing, Wang Ching-Wei, Hu Han-Min and Sung Ch'iao-Jen as "Managers", the latter combining the post of Director of the Peking Branch. With the new Party Headquarters at Peking, and his nominal chief and colleagues either withdrawn from active politics or busy with other things in the provinces, Sung Ch'iao-Jen became the *de facto* Head of the organisation and the Leader of the Party in the National Assembly, which it dominated.

In opposition to the Kuo-Min Tang was the Chin-Pu Tang (Progressive Party), which also was an amalgamation, of which the Li-Hsien Tang (Constitutional Party) of Liang Ch'í-Ch'ao and the Kung-Ho Tang (Republican Party) of Hsiung Hsi-Ling and Chang Ch'ien were the principal components. Of this Party Li Yuan-Hung

became the nominal leader. In Parliamentary politics it was inclined to support Yuan Shih-K'ai, and stood for a Unitarian State in which the Central Government would predominate over the provincial Governments.

In addition to these two political Parties there were the Pei-Yang Military Party and the Chiao Tung Yi, both of which gave their allegiance to Yuan Shih-K'ai. The Pei-Yang Party was originally founded by Li Hung-Chang, and when Yuan became President, he relied chiefly on this Party, the members of which were all his former subordinates when he was in charge of the New Army in the North under the Empire. After his death it split into three groups, the Chihli group under Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-Fu, the Fengtien Party under Chang Tso-Lin and the Anfu Clique under Tuan Ch'i-Jui. The Chiao Tung Yi (Communications Group) was founded by Liang Shih-Yi, Yuan's old secretary, and the most cunning financier-politician of old China.

The Futility of Parliamentarism

Yuan Shih-K'ai's first concern as President was to obtain funds. During the year preceding his accession to office the fiscal arrangements of the country had become thoroughly disorganised. The land was swarming with troops, the majority of which were months in arrears with their pay. For several months at the latter end of 1911 no contributions whatsoever had been paid into the Central Treasury by the provinces. Thus, he resumed the loan negotiations with the Four-Power Banking Consortium which was temporarily suspended by the outbreak of the Wuch'ang Revolution. The foreign bankers were willing to supply the funds, but only on condition that the salt revenue services were reorganised under foreign supervision along the lines of the maritime customs, and on the grant of a monopoly for all future loan issues. This would mean a tightening of the foreign control over China's finances, and, with the example of Egypt before them, it was natural that the

National Assembly, whose consent was essential to the conclusion of any foreign loan, peremptorily rejected the proposed loan agreement. Moreover, they were not satisfied about Yuan's sincerity, and suspected him of having dictatorial, if not imperial, ambitions. They were afraid that any funds Yuan obtained from foreign bankers would be utilised for his own advantage, to consolidate his military power, rather than for the benefit of the country and the Republic. They were apprehensive lest funds went the same way as the Belgian loan of two million pounds which T'ang Shao-Yi obtained from a Russo-Belgium Syndicate in Shanghai soon after his assumption of Premiership, the proceeds of which just disappeared without leaving any traces.

The proposed terms of the so-called Reorganisation Loan which was being negotiated with the Four-Power Syndicate, were of such an obnoxious character that even T'ang Shao-Yi, Yuan's Prime Minister and close personal friend, had scruples about taking the responsibility. Already he felt uneasy regarding the Belgian loan, the accounts of which the National Assembly were clamouring for, but which he was unable to supply. He was warned that in signing the proposed contract, he would be guilty of betraying the Chinese Republic, the punishment for which could only be death, he being a member of the Tung Meng Hui. Thus, to escape the difficult position betwixt his loyalty to his old chief and his own convictions and affiliations, he suddenly disappeared on June 15, 1912, to Tientsin, from which place he suddenly announced his resignation as Prime Minister. With him the whole Cabinet resigned, including the five representatives of the Kuo-Min Tang.

T'ang Shao-Yi's flight put Yuan in an embarrassing position, for it was extremely difficult for him to find a successor who was both acceptable to him and to the Assembly. To make things worse, the Banks refused to grant him any more advances on future loan accounts until a Cabinet had been formed. Yuan wanted his

Ministers to be his willing tools, but this the Assembly refused to allow, and rejected all his nominees, who were mostly former officials of the old regime. The deadlock continued for a whole month, until at last Yuan decided to make use of the army. He announced that, in the absence of the Prime Minister, it was impossible to pay the army, as it was impossible to carry on the loan negotiations until a Cabinet had been formed. Whereupon, the army officers issued a manifesto protesting against the attitude of the Assembly in thus paralysing the services and reducing the troops to starvation.

The Assembly, with the event of February 29 fresh in their mind, gave way and accepted the Ministry formed by Lu Cheng-Hsiang, consisting entirely of bureaucrats of the old school. It was now out of the question to resist him with armed force. The country wanted peace, which it thought Yuan could give. The revolutionaries were without money, whereas Yuan could count on the support of the Banks and of the foreign Diplomatic Corps, whom he completely hoodwinked by the appointment with, for China, huge salaries—between £2,400 and £2,500—of prominent foreigners, such as Dr Morrison of *The Times* and Commander Brissaud-Desmallet, to sinecure posts as political or military Advisers.¹ Yuan had by flattery and intimidation won over the Vice-President Li Yuan-Hung, a weak-minded opportunist of the old school, who was in command of the troops in Central China. Moreover, the National Assembly, in spite of its legal powers, was only of a stop-gap nature. It was felt desirable to postpone rigorous action against Yuan until after the elections for the permanent Parliament, when with the expressed mandate of the people it would exercise a greater moral authority. The Assembly, therefore, accepted the nominees of Yuan and set to work to pass the electoral laws for the new

¹ In this connection it may be of interest to know that at the time these appointments were made, the salaries of all Chinese officials, including Ministers abroad, were reduced to £6 a month.

Parliament, which were promulgated during September, 1912. It persisted, however, in rejecting the loan proposals.

In adopting these tactics the Parliamentary revolutionaries showed themselves to be very poor judges of the political realities in China. They thought by legal formulæ to be able to subdue Yuan, hardly realising that force was the only language he could understand, that Yuan, as his past showed, would not stop at anything to achieve his ends, far less observe the provisions of a paper Constitution. They decried Sun Yat-Sen as a visionary, because in trying to achieve the revolutionary aim, he advocated the direct participation of the masses in the creation of the new social order, by increasing their economic power. They disobeyed his injunction to leave administrative politics alone, but instead disintegrated the only effective revolutionary weapon they had, their secret organisation, the Tung Meng Hui, by admitting opportunist elements and reorganising it, under the name Kuo-Min Tang, as an open political Party.

The Murder of Chang Cheng-Wu

It was not long before Yuan decided to test the real strength of the Kuo-Min Tang. On August 15, 1912, he caused the execution without trial of two well-known revolutionary generals, Chang Cheng-Wu and Fang-Wei. They had been invited by the President to come from Wuch'ang to Peking to discuss matters relating to the province of Hupeh. They came, ignorant of the fact that the invitation was issued at the request of the Vice-President, Li Yuan-Hung, who wanted their death, partly because of their underground revolutionary activities, but chiefly because they were a standing reminder of his undignified posture at the time when he was forced to assume the revolutionary command at Wuch'ang.

This official murder caused a storm of indignation everywhere. Sun Yat-Sen and Huang Hsing demanded

explanations. War seemed to be imminent again, and already Sun sent a cable to Wang Ching-Wei in France to return at once. Yuan at once saw that he had gone too far ; for he was not quite ready to force the issue into an open warfare ; the financial crisis was not yet solved. So Yuan accorded posthumous honours to Chang Cheng-Wu and Fang-Wei, whose bodies were sent back to Wuch'ang, where they were given a solemn military funeral. Meanwhile, Yuan protested loudly the sincerity of his motives and his anxiety to work solely for the welfare of the State. He wanted to repent his past misdeeds, and invited Sun Yat-Sen and Huang Hsing to come to Peking to assist him in his determination.

Sun Yat-Sen and Huang Hsing, of course, realised that Yuan was merely playing with words ; they knew fully well that the Judas of 1898 could not be trusted, and that an armed struggle with him could not in the long run be avoided. But in the eyes of many of their nominal followers Yuan seemed necessary to the welfare of the country, chiefly on account of his reputed influence abroad. They also realised the great propagandist value which such a visit would afford the revolutionary cause in the North, and, chiefly on this account, they accepted Yuan's invitation, after satisfying themselves about their personal safety. In Peking they had a great reception from Yuan, who received them as if they were foreign royalty. To demonstrate his concern for the reconstruction of the country, Yuan further made Sun Yat-Sen Director-General of the Railways with an annual salary of 30,000 dollars.¹ Sun was to have full powers to reorganise and improve the railway system throughout the country, borrowing the necessary funds from foreign sources, Huang Hsing was given general control of the Mines and the task of constructing the Canton-Hankow Railway.

¹ Malicious rumours put Sun's salary at much higher ; some foreign writers put it as high as three million dollars. In actual fact, Sun accepted the post only on condition that he might decline the salary.

In accepting the position offered Sun was genuinely of opinion that he would be able to serve the country in the best possible manner. Ever since he resigned the Provisional Presidency he had always taken the view that the economic reconstruction of the country should be taken on simultaneously with the political reconstruction, and that of the two the former was the more important. For the development of the natural resources of the country would enable China to free herself from the financial and economic yoke of foreign countries and serve as a basis for the realisation of his own cherished principle of the people's livelihood. The majority of his followers, however, disagreed with him. Huang Hsing was influenced by his friend Sung Ch'iao-Jen, who saw in the institution of parliament, on the French model, China's salvation. Sung had been able to persuade the majority of the party members to follow his lead. When they were outlaws, as members of the Tung Meng Hui, they had accepted the Third Principle of Livelihood as part of the oath, but as soon as the Revolution succeeded, they discarded this principle as being inexpedient and impracticable.

Yuan's motive, on the other hand, was to win the personal adherence of the two chief revolutionary leaders. In spite of the huge nominal salaries attached to the posts, they were never intended as anything but sinecures. He fully realised that the international banking consortium would never permit, far less assist, the realisation of Sun's plans, being themselves determined to monopolise the economic exploitation of China. And without foreign assistance of a purely financial and technical nature, Sun's scheme of railway reconstruction, the cost of which was estimated at £640,000,000, was frankly only of a propagandistic nature. What Yuan wanted was therefore a kind of armistice, a breathing space during which he hoped to obtain funds which would enable him to consolidate his power once and for all. He was fully determined to resist the demands of

the Kuo-Min Tang for responsible Cabinet Government, which would make him a mere figure-head. With this in view, he constantly delayed the elections for the new Parliament which, under the terms of the Nanking Provisional Constitution, was to meet not later than January 11, 1913. His attention was concentrated on the problem of destroying all rivals, to which everything else was subordinate. He acquiesced in the recognition, on October 21, 1912, of the independence of Outer Mongolia by Russia, and bargained for British support by the tacit grant of autonomy to Tibet, which thus fell under British predominance. Japan acquired concessions for eleven hundred miles of feeders to her Manchurian railways. A Belgian company, an agent of Russian influence with French money, received authorisation to build two lines cutting clear across China from Yunnan to Kansu and from Kansu across Shensi and Honan to Haichow in Kiangsu. The Standard Oil Company received authority to investigate the oil-fields of Northern Shensi. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation entered into negotiations for the building of a convertible merchant marine and the construction of a naval base in Fukien. Great Britain received concrete encouragements for many projects, few of which, however, were ever carried out. A great philanthropic-commercial conservancy scheme for the Huai River in Anhui, growing out of American Red Cross assistance rendered after the Huai floods, was taken up by the Siems-Carey Co., a subsidiary of the American International Corporation.

The Assassination of Sung Ch'iao-Jen

With the beginning of 1913, forced by popular clamour, Yuan at last allowed elections to be held in the provinces. As anticipated, Yuan was, in spite of all bribery and intimidation, so badly beaten at the polls that his defeat in the new Parliament was assured. Out of 586 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 269 were members of the

Kuo-Min Tang, and of the 274 Senators, 123 belonged to it, giving it an easy ascendancy over all the small blocks composing the remainder of the Assembly. To prevent his authority from being undermined by his being outvoted and outmanœuvred in the new Assembly, a fresh assassination was decided upon, which would create such a terror as would prevent the very meeting of the newly elected Parliament at Peking. Thus, on March 21, 1913, Sung Ch'iao-Jen, the parliamentary leader of the Kuo-Min Tang, who was elected as Prime Minister to take the power out of Yuan's hands, was assassinated in Shanghai as he was about to take the midnight train for Peking. The murderer was promptly arrested in the French concession, and five days later also Ying Kuei-Shing, a police officer, the direct instigator of the crime. Among the papers found in the possession of the latter were letters from Chao Ping-Chiun, the Prime Minister and Yuan's right hand, showing that he had been paid 50,000 dollars for that sinister undertaking. Thus the arrest of the Prime Minister was also ordered by the Mixed Court of Shanghai, but, needless to say, the warrant was merely an empty decree, for, in spite of the evidence, Yuan issued a statement asserting Ying Kuei-Shing's innocence.

The consternation by this official murder was such that for a time it seemed as if Parliament would never be able to meet, and Yuan would have his way. Sun Yat-Sen and Huang Hsing became so outraged by Yuan's foulness that they were thinking of declaring war on Yuan again, and called upon their followers, at a secret meeting, to give up political action and prepare for another revolution. The indignation throughout the country against Yuan was such that his overthrow would be a comparatively easy matter. It is true, the revolutionaries were lacking in funds for a prolonged campaign, but Yuan was in the same position, if not in a still more desperate one. And what counted for success in a revolution was not so much funds, but, as

Sun's own experiences prior to the 1911 Revolution had proved, unity of action and a moral purpose.

Unfortunately, the majority of the party leaders were timid, and many of them were opportunists who had entered the Kuo-Min Tang purely with the prospect of getting into an official position. To them the participation in a military campaign against Yuan would have meant the end of their political career. They therefore counselled peace, and, with a singular lack of political insight, insisted on parliamentary action against Yuan. Sun Yat-Sen, as in December, 1911, was outvoted, and Parliament met in Peking on April 8, 1913.

As anticipated, no sooner had the first formalities been completed and the Speakers been elected to both Houses (Chang Chi and C. T. Wang, of the Kuo-Min Tang, for the Senate; T'ang Hua-Lung, of the Chin-Pu Tang, and Ch'en Kuo-Chiang, of the Kuo-Min Tang, for the Chamber of Deputies) than the futile parliamentary struggle against Yuan began, futile because it wasted a valuable psychological occasion to make real war against Yuan, giving him an opportunity to consolidate his position, while making themselves ridiculous by their petty, even if, from the point of view of constitutional law, correct, proceedings in Parliament. They started by impeaching the Prime Minister for the murder of Sung Ch'iao-Jen. They then charged Yuan with giving away China's vital interests to foreign concession hunters solely for the purpose of creating a favourable atmosphere to himself among the foreigners, with a view to facilitating the loan negotiations. On the other hand, they voted themselves what was for China a somewhat exorbitant salary of 4,000 dollars a year, a proceeding which damaged their moral credit in the country.

*Yuan's Surrender to the Banking Consortium :
The Illegal Reorganisation Loan*

Yuan's answer to all this was the unconditional acceptance of the terms of the Banking Consortium, which

were of such a nature as to impel President Wilson, soon after his assumption of the American Presidency, to issue a declaration of which the following is an extract :

“ The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the Bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go to the length, in some unhappy contingency, of forcible interference in the financial and even political affairs of that great Oriental state just now awakening to a new consciousness of its power and its obligation to its people. The conditions include not only the pledging of particular taxes, some of them antiquated and burdensome, to secure the loan, but also the administration of these taxes by foreign agents. The responsibility on the part of our Government, implied in the encouragement of a loan thus secured and administered, is plain enough, and is obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests . . . ” ¹

In order to be able to sign the loan agreement, it was necessary to circumvent the Nanking Provisional Constitution which, in Article 19, laid down that all measures affecting the National Treasury must receive the explicit assent of Parliament. To submit the proposed agreements to the approval of Parliament was, however, tantamount to securing its rejection. Yuan therefore decided to take law into his own hands, and peremptorily ordered, on April 26, 1913, the signature of the loan contracts, fully realising that in so doing the original object of the loan, the reorganisation of the administrative and financial system of the Republic—hence its name of Reorganisation Loan—was being travestied, and

¹ In consequence of the declaration of President Wilson of March 13, 1913, the American group of bankers withdrew from the Banking Consortium which in June of the previous year was enlarged into a Six-Power group by the inclusion, as a result of diplomatic representations, of Russia and Japan.

that the loan, far from being an instrument of reconstruction, was bound to become the cause of destruction and civil war.

On the very occasion of the signing of the documents relating to the "Reorganisation" Loan, which took place in the utmost secrecy in the premises of the Hong-kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in the Legation Headquarters at Peking in the morning of April 27, 1913, Wang Cheng-T'ing, the Vice-President of the Senate, who had managed to secure admission to the building, declared to the signatories, in the name of the Chinese nation, that since the loan contract had not been submitted to Parliament, in accordance with constitutional provisions, the whole transaction would be regarded as null and void, without any moral or legal obligation on the Chinese people. Two days after, the Senate passed, by 107 to 64 votes, a resolution to the effect that it "regards the action of the Government in signing the contract for a loan, without having previously submitted proposal to Parliament, as unconstitutional, and the contract is in consequence null and void." A similar resolution was passed on May 5 by the Chamber of Deputies, by 223 votes to 149. Sun Yat-Sen issued the following appeal and warning to the Powers, which, because of its importance, deserves mention in full :

"The result of the careful inquiry held at the instance of Parliament to ascertain the truth respecting the assassination of the patriot Sung Ch'iao-Jen at Shanghai, has been to establish conclusively the complicity of the Peking Government in the crime. The situation has consequently become so serious that the nation is now faced by the most dangerous crisis that has so far befallen it.

"The Ministers, conscious of their guilt, and recognising the menace of a national upheaval resulting from their criminal act, hastily contracted for an unconstitutional loan of twenty-five million pounds, to be sub-

scribed by the financiers of five nations, notwithstanding the vigorous protests of the parliamentary representatives now assembled in Peking.

"This tyrannical and unconstitutional action has added to the intense indignation aroused by the murder of Sung Ch'iao-Jen, so that at the present moment the people's anger knows no bounds.

"A terrible revolution seems inevitable, and at any moment during the present acute crisis, a spark may give rise to a disastrous conflagration.

"Ever since the birth of the Republic, I have done all in my power to promote peace, unity, concord, and prosperity in the land. I favoured the election of Yuan Shih-K'ai as President, in the hope of promoting by this means the unity of the nation, and inaugurating an era of peace and prosperity. I have done my best ever since to restore order, and to assist the Government in emerging from the chaos of the Revolution.

"It is my earnest desire to preserve peace in the Republic, but all my efforts will be in vain unless the financiers decline to supply the President with money, which he would employ for the purpose of making war on the people.

"Should the country be plunged into the horrors of civil war, great suffering will be inflicted on the people who have but recently emerged from the miseries caused by the revolution. They have made the utmost sacrifices in establishing the Republic, which they are determined to preserve at all costs. If the people are forced to enter upon a life and death struggle in defence of the Republic, not only will there be terrible suffering among the masses but the interests of the foreigners resident in China will inevitably be compromised. So long as the Peking Government is not supplied with funds, there is hope of effecting a compromise, but the immediate result of a subsidy would be to plunge us into a long and disastrous conflict.

"In the name of and for the sake of humanity, so

sacred in the eyes of civilisation, I beg of you to use all your influence to prevent the financiers from supplying the Peking Government with funds which will certainly be employed in a civil war.

"I appeal to all who have at heart the interests of humanity to extend to us their moral assistance in this critical hour, in order to prevent needless bloodshed, and to protect my countrymen from the cruel fate which they have done nothing to deserve."

Western Democracy and Chinese Reaction

Both the declarations of Parliament and of Sun Yat-Sen were unheeded by the representatives in China of the Consortium bankers who, tempted by the expected commission of $1\frac{1}{4}$ million pounds, and the prospect of being able to dictate China's financial and economic policy in the future, at once placed large cash advances at Yuan's disposal. In Europe, however, the news of the protest of Chinese Parliament against the unconstitutional nature of the loan caused a stir among the financiers who had embarked upon this adventure. They realised that the contract of the loan for which they were about to invite public subscriptions, was not legally valid. Moreover, the legal status of the prospective debtor, namely the Chinese Republic, was internationally still unrecognised. The curious fact now occurred that, while the Republic was considered to be non-existent, the issue of the loan was sanctioned by the leading democratic Powers of the West. In reply to a request for an assurance as to the bona fides of the transaction, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, S. Pichon, wrote to the manager of the Banque de L'Indo-Chine, under the date of May 7, 1913, stating that the loan was notified to the French Legation in Peking on the 29th of April, and that the notification was accompanied by a declaration from the Chinese Government that the contract was binding on itself and its successors. He further intimated that the French Govern-

ment had accepted this declaration, and was in agreement with the Chinese Government regarding the nature of the pledge submitted by the latter. Similar letters were addressed to other Consortium Bankers by their respective Foreign Offices. For the purpose of setting the minds of the prospective investors at rest, it should be noticed that all reference to the Chinese Constitution and to the Chinese Parliament was wisely avoided. A Press campaign was organised with a view to creating a favourable atmosphere for Yuan and discrediting Sun Yat-Sen and the Kuo-Min Tang leaders. The Paris paper, *Le Temps*, for instance, published on May 13, 1913, the following authorised statement:—

“If, contrary to expectation, the revolutionary agitation persists and becomes more serious, he (Yuan) will consider that the time for action has arrived. The money that has been lent him not only furnished him with the means, but makes it necessary for him to restore order, since this financial support was supplied only on condition that peace and order should be energetically maintained. Under the circumstances, it is the best thing that could have happened, not only for the hard-working population of China, but in the interest of the numerous foreigners who hold property in the country.”

The Foreign Policy of Revolutionary China

The action of the Powers, among which were the two great leaders of democracy in Europe—Great Britain and France—in doing everything they could to enthrone Yuan as the Dictator in Peking, and in inspiring the attacks on Sun Yat-Sen and the Kuo-Min Tang, left a very painful impression on the Chinese revolutionary patriots who could only with difficulty believe that those who boasted so loudly of their civilisation, and who were governed by Parliaments which they regarded as the best guarantee of the liberty of the subject, would consent to help Yuan in what amounted to destroying

the Chinese Republic and in inaugurating a reign of terror and assassination in China.¹

Moreover, while the aim of the Kuo-Min Tang was the establishment of the people's sovereignty and the liberation of China from her international bondage, it had always refrained from adopting an anti-foreign policy. It was out to struggle for the independence of China, but it was not out to boycott the foreigner, even if its ultimate aim was to combat foreign aggression in China. The Chinese Revolution was an internal affair; it was not the intention of the revolutionary leaders to interfere with legitimate foreign activities and interests in China, nor to tamper with the existing treaties between China and the Powers, even if their revision by negotiation was desired. On the contrary, the principle of protection to foreign lives and property and the recognition of existing treaties, was reiterated on every occasion.

In the Manifesto, issued by the Tung Meng Hui on its foundation, the maintenance of the peace of the world was declared to be one of its main objects, and the support of the progressive Powers was solicited for the furtherance of the Chinese Revolution. In the spring of 1907, on the eve of the uprising at Ch'ao-chou, Sun Yat-Sen concluded a proclamation to the commander of the revolutionary troops with the following words:

"When the soldiers are departing for the battlefield I ask you to prohibit them making themselves a burden

¹ An edict of Yuan, dated July 22, 1913, directly and officially incites the murder of the prominent revolutionary leaders. After describing Huang Hsing, Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, Po Wen-Wei, Governor of Anhui, as dangerous mischief-making rebels, the edict concludes as follows:

"Any of their comrades who have been led astray by them, but who shall redeem their fault by beheading Huang Hsing and his colleagues, shall likewise be recompensed with gold. Anyone seizing them and bringing them back alive, shall receive an amnesty for past misdeeds. As President of the Republic, I take cognisance solely of obedience or disobedience to my orders, having no concern with parties. This edict is to be issued throughout the land, in order that it may be read by all."

on people and committing crimes ; the merchants and peasants must be able to continue their labours in peace. I especially ask you to protect the lives and properties of the Europeans ; respect their churches and the ports open to international commerce, in order that the foreign Powers may have no cause for intervention . . . ”

On February 6, 1912, shortly after his assumption of the Provisional Presidency, Sun Yat-Sen issued a Manifesto to the Foreign Powers reiterating the intention of the revolutionary leaders not to interfere with legitimate foreign interests in China.

The revolutionary leaders of the time were unfortunately ignorant of the true nature of the foreign aim in China. Brought up in the liberal and democratic philosophy of Rousseau and J. S. Mill, and pinning their faith in the generosity of the progressive elements in the West, they were slow to grasp the incompatibility of their own objects with those of the industrial and financial magnates of the West, whose real power in their respective countries they did not appreciate. They wanted a strong and independent China, and assumed that, as long as they kept faith with the foreigners, the latter would not interfere in their affairs, or at least would maintain a strict neutrality in their struggle against reaction. They did not realise that what the West wanted was not a China strong enough to withstand foreign aggression, but a strong man in China dependent on their support.

The Failure of the Anti-Yuan Expedition

For several months Parliament continued to waste its time on futile obstructionist tactics against Yuan, notably in the matter of the ratification of the loan contract and on the Russian Treaty relating to Mongolia. In June it appointed the Constitutional Drafting Committee, which met behind closed doors at the Altar of Heaven with the object of drafting a permanent Constitution, which not only would incorporate the

principle of absolute parliamentary control over money matters, but would render any *de facto* dictatorship impossible by provision of a Permanent Parliamentary Committee to supervise the Executive. Yuan's delegates were denied a hearing by and barred from the sessions of the Drafting Committee, whose first resolution was that "the pens, ink-slabs, and note-books of the members be preserved for all time" to fill the place in China of America's Liberty Bell. In their *naïveté* they thought that they were making history.

Sun Yat-Sen, on the other hand, considering that Parliament was a useless talking-shop, the law powerless, and realising the failure of his peace-appeal, wanted an immediate war against Yuan, who could understand no argument but that of force. His aim was to take Yuan by surprise, as every delay would be to the advantage of Yuan. Thus he telegraphed Hu Han-Min to declare the independence of Kwangtung, and ordered Ch'en Ch'i-Mei to seize Shanghai. Kwangtung, however, was reluctant; Ch'en Ch'i-Mei made objections, on the ground that Shanghai was too insignificant in respect of its area and inconvenient for offering resistance. Huang Hsing, in spite of the country-wide protests against Yuan's unconstitutional actions, was still opposed to a declaration of war, insisting on solving the question in a constitutional way. It was not until July 9, when Yuan, in pursuance of his policy to purge the provinces from revolutionary elements, issued the edict deposing Li Lieh-Ch'ün from his Tutuh-ship of Kiangsi province, that action was taken against Yuan. Kiangsi proclaimed its independence on July 10, followed by Kiangsu, Anhwei, Szechuan, Hunan and Kwangtung. A Revolutionary Government was established at Nanking, and the punitive expedition against Yuan launched with Huang Hsing as Generalissimo. But it was too late. Owing to the delay of two months Yuan was able to consolidate his power, to equip himself with arms and munitions, and, by a liberal use of the Reorganisation

Loan funds, to purchase the neutrality of the Chinese Navy, which was revolutionary in its sympathies, and had been counted upon as a valuable weapon in cutting off the Yangtse Valley. The Revolutionaries, on the other hand, owing to their previous lukewarmness, had had no time to set up a proper military organisation and to co-ordinate the revolutionary armies. Li Lieh-Ch'ün fought stiffly for a while, but was unable to strike with any success, and his troops were gradually driven into the mountains of Kiangsi, where their numbers dwindled away. Huang Hsing was unable to hold Nanking against the combined attack by the reactionary Chang Hsün and Feng Kuo-Chang. Ch'en Ch'i-Mei's attack on the Shanghai Arsenal failed owing to the lack of artillery. Kwangtung was invaded by Lung Ch'i-Kuang, a brigand-general, who with his 20,000 men had an easy conquest in the province, which, as a reward for his counter-revolutionary services, he was given in fiefdom by Yuan, ruling it with heartless brutality.

In this struggle between constitutional democracy and lawless autocracy, representative foreign opinion, as usual, took the side of the latter. The *South China Morning Post*, the leading Hongkong paper, issued on July 24, 1913, the following declaration :

“As a matter of fact the present struggle has been engineered and financed in the South by officials, who, having proved themselves unqualified for their posts have been dismissed from office or transferred. Men who themselves have been guilty of ‘despotic actions’, ‘gross violations of the Constitution’ and ‘many outrageous deeds’ have hurled the vilifying charges back at Yuan Shih-K'ai in an attempt to discredit him in the eyes of the people. Thanks to the enlightenment which is dawning upon China and the increasing capacity of the people for weighing up the situation for themselves, little impression has been made. Those whose moral and financial support are necessary to the success of the rising are standing aloof in disgust, and only the

worthless rabble follows the white and red-barred flag of the new revolution. That the rising will be short-lived we do not doubt, but as risings are the fashion in China, it may be followed by others until the entire gang of self-seeking politicians has been swept out of existence. They do not impress one as being of the kind who seek to achieve their ends by peaceful means ; they apparently prefer to revel in blood."

The London *Times* of July 19, 1913, in a more gentleman-like way wrote :

"The revolt should decide whether China is to be subjected to strong centralised control or whether the provinces are to be a law unto themselves, whether Peking or the Cantonese are to direct the destinies of the Republic, whether definite though doubtless not very gentle methods are to be used in the regeneration of China or whether the wild and impracticable dreams of the Young China Party are to be given full play, whether one man possess strength and resolution enough to pull the Republic together or whether a dozen aspirants are to fight among themselves for power."

Defeated in the field, after an unequal struggle of only two months, Sun Yat-Sen, Huang Hsing and other prominent revolutionaries had no alternative but to leave China again, leaving the country free for Yuan Shih-K'ai.

"Being thus delivered from all his troubles both within and without, remaining the real representative and sole trustee of the customs, traditions, and conceptions peculiar to his country, in a word, of everything really Chinese, and which the others were so anxious to destroy, Yuan Shih-K'ai will be able to rule with no other care save that of the sovereigns who preceded him, namely, to divide in order to reign, and to see to it that no one climbs high enough to become a dangerous opponent," wrote the *Journal de Peking*, the organ of the French and Russian Legations, on August 7, 1913.

With the help of the Peking *gendarmérie* whom he

employed to intimidate the members of Parliament, by imprisoning them in their own building, he secured, on October 7, his election as permanent President of China. On October 10 he took his final oath as President, and the European Powers and Japan at once extended diplomatic recognition to his government. Feeling himself now safe in his position, he issued, on November 4, a mandate ordering the unseating of all the Kuo-Min members of Parliament, on the charge of conspiracy and complicity with the July Revolution, making it impossible for Parliament to meet owing to the lack of a quorum. Yuan, by the grace of the Great Powers, now became the sole ruler in China, and celebrated his victory by the signing, on the day following the *coup d'état* of November 4, the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia, which virtually ceded the territory to Russia. Parliament was formally dissolved on January 10, 1914. The responsible Cabinet was changed into a Secretariat under Hsü Shih-Ch'ang, and on March 10, 1914, to please his military supporters in the provinces, the Provincial Assemblies were also abolished. Absolutism reigned supreme in China.

CHAPTER IX

CHAOS AND CONFUSION

The Chinese Revolutionary Party

THE failure of the punitive expedition against Yuan Shih-K'ai impressed upon Sun Yat-Sen the necessity of reorganising the Kuo-Min Tang on a secret revolutionary basis. During the first year of the Republic (1912) many had joined the Party for opportunist reasons, and as a consequence the Party became a very loose political organisation, without any discipline and unity of purpose. A group of the former members of the Tung Meng Hui had, under Chang Ping-Lin and Sun Wu, gone over to Yuan Shih-K'ai, and those who became members of the Kuo-Min Tang could be divided into followers of Dr Sun and of Huang Hsing and Sung Ch'iao-Jen, the latter group being the more numerous. To restore unity in the ranks of the revolutionaries, a reorganisation was therefore essential, especially as it was felt that the failure of the July Expedition was chiefly due to the lack of co-ordination arising out of the differences of opinion between the leaders. Thus the "Chung-Hua Ko-Min Tang", or "Chinese Revolutionary Party", was founded.

The new organisation was not satisfactory. Candidates for membership were required to take an oath of loyalty to Dr Sun personally, signing a pledge to that effect, with his finger-print as seal. Sun was to become the single head (Tsung Li) of the Party, and to him all the Party officers were to be responsible. These arrangements kept from participation in the new Party many of his adherents who in principle agreed to the necessity

of reorganisation, such as Wang Ching-Wei and Huang Hsing, but who objected against the oath of loyalty and the finger-print. Out of deference to the leader, they did not, however, raise their protests in public but merely adopted a negative attitude, when Sun insisted on his scheme. Thus, Wang went to France, and Huang Hsing to America. Huang Hsing's post as chief of the Executive Department of the Party was now taken by Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, with Hu Han-Min as Chief Secretary and Liao Ch'ung-Kai as Financial Manager.

The reorganisation of the Party failed to revivify the revolutionary spirit in China. The group under Chang Ping-Lin, who had organised the T'ung-Yi Tang (Centralising Party), had gone over to Yuan completely. Many Kuo-Min politicians, such as Wang Ch'ung-Hui, Chu Chao-Hsin, had been bought over to his side by offers of posts, but the majority of the revolutionary leaders were in exile abroad. Yuan was ruthless in the suppression of newspapers and in the exile and assassination of leaders who even indirectly opposed him. The power he wielded was far greater and more direct than that exercised by any Chinese Emperor since K'ang Hsi. The country was unified and held firmly in control by his military sons. So the moment was deemed ripe to make himself absolutely supreme, *de jure* as well as *de facto*. Yet, in spite of the growing economic prosperity among the masses, the situation had no elements of permanency, but contained the seeds of its own disruption. Outwardly the country was quiet, but inwardly the people were chafing and cursing, awaiting only for a favourable opportunity to rise against Yuan, who did not realise that he was sitting on a safety-valve.

Yuan's Dream Empire

Yuan's first step was the promulgation, on May 1, 1914, of the so-called "Constitutional Compact", a document drafted by Dr F. J. Goodnow, Yuan's constitutional adviser, and later President of the Johns Hop-

kins University. This document was passed by a so-called Constitutional Convention, consisting of fifty-eight "former high officials who have good records, and well-known scholars who have written practical books", and who were all designated by Yuan and his lieutenants. It formally gave the President dictatorial authority, including the right to confer titles of nobility ; it provided for a Council of State to advise him, a Secretary of State to take the place of the responsible Prime Minister, and a Legislature whose laws the President might promulgate or might ignore as he saw fit. The Presidential Succession Law, promulgated on December 29, 1914, was extended to ten years, to be repeated without election, should two-thirds of the Council of State (whose members were appointed and dismissed by the President) so resolve. An elaborate ritual was contrived whereby the President selected three names, which might be those of his own sons, to be deposited in a gold box in the Stone House in the grounds of the Presidential Palace. From those three names in the gold box, only to be opened when death or incapacity deprived the nation of its self-appointed leader, an Electoral College consisting of the Council of State and the Legislature was to elect the Presidential successor. The Vice-President was to be nominated in a similar way by the President.

The beginning of 1915 found Yuan possessed, through his military supporters in the provinces and his friendship with Sir John Jordan, British Minister in China, with more real power than many Chinese Emperors prior to him had had, with the privilege—which he exercised—of appointing his son as his successor. He was, however, not satisfied with the exercise of power ; he wanted also its habiliments and titles. Thus, in August, 1915, he instigated Yang Tu, an old 1898 Reformer, to organise the Ch'ou-An Hui, or "Peace Promotion League", for the purpose of advocating, as the only road to permanent peace, that the nominal Republic in China should be

substituted by a "Constitutional" Monarchy, on the Prussian system, with Yuan as Emperor. In a celebrated pamphlet, *Constitutional Monarchy, or the Salvation of China*, published in the middle of August, Yang Tu argued that "the country cannot be saved except through the establishment of a Constitutional form of government. No Constitutional government can be formed except through the establishment of a monarchy. The Constitutional form of government has a set of fixed laws and the monarchy has a definite head who cannot be changed, in which matters lies the source of national strength and wealth . . . China can enjoy peace so long as His Excellency Yuan Shih-K'ai remains the President, but no longer. Should anything befall the President, every business activity will at once be suspended, shops will be closed, disquiet will prevail, people will become panic-stricken, the troops uncontrollable, and foreign warships will enter our harbours . . . All this will be due to the uncertainty regarding the succession to the Presidency . . ."

Previous to the publication of this pamphlet, Yuan, in order to strengthen his own position morally, invited the opinion of his chief legal adviser, Dr Goodnow, an American who had studied in Germany and who had been appointed to his office on the recommendation of the Board of the Carnegie Institute. Dr Goodnow, who must have known his chief's secret desires, issued the now famous memorandum, in which he stated, among other things, that he had "no doubt in saying that the monarchical system is better suited to China than the Republican system. For, if China's independence is to be maintained, the government should be Constitutional, and in consideration of China's conditions, as well as her relations with other Powers, it will be easier to form a Constitutional Government by adopting a Monarchy than a Republic." This argument, it should be noticed, runs close to the arguments used by Yang Tu and his clique, who, in fact, borrowed their intellectual ammuni-

tion from him. Dr Goodnow also ventured the opinion that "had General Washington—the leader of the Revolutionary Army—had the desire to become a monarch himself, he would probably have been successful. But Washington's one aim was to respect Republicanism and he had no aspiration to become king. Besides he had no son capable of succeeding him on the Throne." In alarm at the very conclusions he so purposefully reached, however, he cautioned Yuan that no change be made, (a) if such a change should arouse the opposition of the Chinese people or the foreign Powers, (b) if the law of succession be not definitely defined (as in the Presidential Succession Law of 1914), (c) if no provision be made for the development of democracy. These qualifications, stated academically, naturally disappeared like chaff, when the monarchy restoration societies decided to popularise his memorandum among the people at large. The main fact was that an American scholar of international repute pronounced himself against the Republic in China. The opposition from the Chinese people was, of course, summarily dismissed, while the foreign Powers, with the exception of Japan, were all too busy in Europe fighting one another. Regarding Japan, when on January 18, 1915, the Twenty-One Demands were handed to him in person by the Japanese Minister Hioki, it was intimated to him that proper action on his part would make the Japanese Government, with whom he had been at loggerheads since his Korean days, inclined to render him any assistance whenever necessary, hinting at a possible "promotion". The Japanese Demands, if carried out in their entirety, would have had the effect of turning China into a kind of Japanese Protectorate, like Korea between 1895-1910. In view of the nation-wide indignation which they caused, Yuan, for a long time, hesitated to agree to them, but finally, after the ultimatum of May 7 he acquiesced and, on May 25, signed the two treaties, embodying the Twenty-One Demands. Yuan had surrendered China's

administrative independence and given away her most valuable concessions, after putting up only a sham diplomatic battle. He was, therefore, confident that there would be no opposition from the side of Japan.

The next step was to carry out a referendum. This was designed to be "fool-proof"; for the guidance of the "Electors" the ballot papers contained only one square with the words: "I vote for Constitutional Monarchy." In a desire to please the Dictator, many of the electors added, "with Yuan-Shih-K'ai as Monarch". Some 2,000 of these papers were forwarded to the Council of State in Peking, which on October 12 informed the President that "all were found to be in favour of the establishment of a Constitutional Monarchy with Yuan Shih-K'ai as the first Emperor. The Council, therefore, requests that Yuan obey the true will of the people and ascend the Throne." He was urged the conventional three times, and since sovereignty was vested in the people, their "demand" therefore released him from his oath of loyalty to the Republic.

All was not well with the people, however. Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao, the life-long advocate of Constitutional Monarchism, upon whose support Yuan had doubtlessly relied, resigned as Minister of Justice, but only in order to throw the weight of his authority on the side of the anti-monarchical movement which was gradually developing all over the country in opposition to Yang Tu, who, although in name the leader of the Ch'ou-An Hui, was in effect only a tool of Liang Shih-Yi, Yuan's right hand and the most unscrupulous plunger into frenzied politics and high finance China had known. In a pamphlet, nominally directed against Yang Tu, but actually an address to the Dictator himself, Liang declared: "Heaven and Earth as well as all living creatures in China and other lands know what the President swore to when he took the oath of office as President. Rumours have indeed been circulated, but whenever they reached the ears of the President he has never hesitated to express

his righteous mind, saying that no amount of pressure could compel him to change his determination . . . that if the people would not spare him he would flee to the refuge he had prepared in England . . . To go back on one's words is an act despised by a vagabond. To suggest that such an act is being capable of perpetration by the President is an insult, the hideousness of which cannot be equalled by the number of hairs on one's head. Anyone guilty of such an insult should not be spared by the 400 million of people . . . Why did I oppose you when you suggested the first change of government (the abdication of the Dynasty)—you were a Republican then—and why am I opposing you again now that you are engaged in advocating another change of governmental system? Because a change in the conduct of a government (the constitutionalising of the Dynasty) is a sign of progress, while a change in the form of the government (from a Monarchy to a Republic, and vice versa) is a sign of revolution, which always retards the progress of a nation . . . ”

The effect of Liang's denunciation of his old colleagues who had hitherto supported the dictatorial regime, was electrical. Hsü Shih-Ch'ang, the Secretary of State, resigned, although vacillating before an offer of a marquisate from Yuan. Li Yuan-Hung, the Vice-President, refused the title of Prince. Sun Pao-Chi, Hsiung Hsi-Ling, and many other important officials sent in a steady stream of resignations. Tuan Ch'í-Jui, Yuan's closest military associate, who in 1911 compelled the abdication of the Dynasty to make room for Yuan by refusing to fight any further, resigned as Minister of War and escaped from Peking in a coolie garb. Feng Kuo-Chang, who defeated Huang Hsing in 1913, was appointed Chief of Staff, but he preferred to remain at Nanking with his army. Ts'ai-Ao, a local hero of the 1911 Revolution in Yunnan, who was a member of the Council of State and a partisan of Liang Ch'í-Ch'ao, escaped the Dictator's watchful eye by pretending to

be sunk in dissipation among the courtesans in the Outer City of Peking, and managed to run away to Tientsin. Of Yuan's more prominent supporters only a few remained loyal, such as Chou Tzu-Ch'i, the signatory of the Reorganisation Loan, Lu Cheng-Hsiang, the Foreign Minister, and his group of career-diplomats consisting of Wellington Koo, Alfred Sze, W. W. Yen, and, on the military side, Lung Ch'i-Kuang, who had the unenviable nickname of "Butcher of Canton", the pig-tailed Chang Hsün, and Chiang Kuei-T'i, the commander of the old-style troops north of Peking. In the country itself the people were only waiting for a suitable opportunity to arise, as one man, against the usurper and perjurer. The foreign Powers too became restive, and on October 29, the Japanese Minister, accompanied by the British and French Ministers, called at the Foreign Office and manifested anxiety as to the results of the change.

On November 10, Admiral Tseng, the Garrison Commander of Shanghai, was assassinated by Yuan's henchmen for conveying a warning to General Feng Kuo-Chang, whom he was ordered to kill. In consequence, Feng Kuo-Chang entered into relations with the revolutionary nucleus at Shanghai, intimating his intention to throw in his lot with them. On December 4, Hsü Shih-Ch'ang's resignation was accepted, and Lu Cheng-Hsiang became Secretary of State, with the special task of preparing for the transition from the Republic to the Empire, which was solemnly proclaimed on December 11. Owing to the representations of the Japanese Government, who had not the least intention of fulfilling their promise made at the beginning of the year, Yuan's coronation as Emperor was postponed. Batches of letters patent, creating Princes, Dukes, Marquises, Viscounts and Barons, were issued daily under the counter signature of Lu Cheng-Hsiang. Yunnan province, under Ts'ai-Ao, suddenly declared its independence on Christmas Day, followed by Kweichow, which accepted

Ts'ai-Ao's authority, and by Kwangsi, which was under Lu Yung-T'ing, a former bandit without any Party affiliations. Kwangtung rose, drove out the "Butcher of Canton", and urged the return to their former stronghold of Sun Yat-Sen and Huang Hsing, who had meanwhile gone back to Shanghai from their respective places of exile. Sun Yat-Sen's return to China gave a powerful impetus to the "Save the Republic Movement". Ever since his Nanking Presidential days he had warned the Chinese people to be careful about Yuan's ambitions; Yuan's assumption of the Throne convinced them that he was right.

For a time it looked as if Yuan might still be able to suppress the revolutionaries as in 1913. Ts'ai-Ao, suffering from tuberculosis, succumbed to the rigours of a winter campaign in Szechuan. Huang Hsing, about to lead the Kwangtung troops, fell ill, and died at Canton. The intervention of Feng Kuo-Chang on the side of the Revolution saved the situation, and by the middle of March, 1916, the whole country was in open revolt. Yuan, deserted by all his supporters, acknowledged himself defeated. On March 22, he renounced the Throne. Lu Cheng-Hsiang, the Imperial Prime Minister, submitted his resignation. Yuan decided to re-establish the system of Cabinet government, and invited Tuan Ch'ijui to become the Prime Minister. Tuan resumed office on April 22, with Lu Cheng-Hsiang as his Foreign Minister. The seceded provinces ignored his move, and organised a rival government at Canton, which, under the influence of Liang Ch'ich'ao, elected, on May 12, the Vice-President Li Yuan-Hung as the President of the Republic, it being held that on acceptance of the Throne Yuan had legally ceased to be President. Li Yuan-Hung, always prudent, declined the honour and responsibility. On May 25, Yuan made a public confession of his crimes, and on June 6 he died, recommending the Vice-President Li as his successor.

The Misrule of the Anfu Clique: The Nishihara Loans

The Republic was saved, but the difficulties of the Revolutionary Party were only just beginning. Nominally, it was victorious, sharing the honours with the Chin-Pu Tang, Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao's old Constitutional Monarchist Group, but actually, the country was under the control of militarists; in the North under Yuan's old Pei-Yang group, and in the South under successful military adventurers.

Li Yuan-Hung's first step was to restore the Nanking Provisional Constitution of March 10, 1912, and to convene the 1913 Parliament. Tuan Ch'i-Jui was reappointed Prime Minister and reconstructed his Cabinet on June 30 so as to allow for the representation of the Revolutionary Party. Cabinet government, however, was only nominal, for the situation was dominated by Tuan who was at the same time Minister of War and the mouthpiece of his military associates, the Tuchüns or Military Governors in the North. On July 19 the Southern Government at Canton dissolved itself. Parliament met on August 1. Nominally, China was united again under a Parliamentary system.

Scarcely had Li Yuan-Hung occupied the Presidential chair a few months, and Parliament elected a new Vice-President in the person of the old militarist, Feng Kuo-Chang, when America's action brought the problem of the World War closer to China. On February 3, 1917, the Secretary of State, Lansing, announced the severance of relations with Germany and invited all neutral nations to follow suit. About the same time Chinese feeling was aroused by the drowning of some 500 Chinese coolies on a submarined French ship. These circumstances created an uneasy diplomatic situation between China and Germany, and in consequence, Parliament was persuaded to follow America's lead and to vote, on March 14, 1917, for the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany.

Wang Ching-Wei, who had meanwhile returned from

France where he did some educational work among the Chinese labourers, advocated going one step further and declaring war on Germany. His argument was that since all the Great Powers were concentrating their attention on Europe, Japan was left a free hand in China, which had induced her to coerce China into accepting the infamous Twenty-One Demands. If in the European War Germany turned out to be victorious, China would be left in the same situation as she was before 1917. But if the Allies became victorious, then Japan as one of them would very likely be given an opportunity to subordinate completely China to her interests. America's subsequent joining of the Allies threw the balance in their favour, and it was now in China's interest also to join the Allies, for if Germany were defeated, China had an opportunity to reopen, at the Peace Conference, the question of the Twenty-One Demands in her favour. Wang discussed this problem with President Li and other influential politicians at Peking. President Li, as usual, had no views of his own, but Premier Tuan and Foreign Minister Wu T'ing-Fang agreed with him, and also the majority of the members of Parliament, including the Chin-Pu Tang, the party of Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao and T'ang Hua-Lung.

It soon transpired, however, that Premier Tuan and the Chin-Pu Tang had entirely different motives in advocating the war against Germany. Ch'en Yu-Jen (better known as Eugen Ch'en), then editor of the *Peking Gazette*, discovered that secret negotiations were being carried on by Ts'ao Ju-Lin, the Minister of Communications, with the Japanese War Office, with a view to obtaining loans and ammunition. Ch'en disclosed and denounced the plot in the newspapers (May, 1917). Premier Tuan's idea was to utilise war participation for the purpose of obtaining funds from Japan, and also America, ostensibly with the object of financing an expedition against Germany, but in reality in order to enable him to crush the Revolutionary Party. In these

tactics he was inspired by Liang Ch'í-Ch'ao, who advised him, "declare, but don't wage, war on foreign countries; make, but don't declare, war on internal enemies". Meanwhile, Kameio Nishihara, the agent of several semi-official Japanese banks, arrived at Peking and began indiscriminately to distribute loans, taking as security worthless pledges of the so-called Anfu (i.e. Tuan's) Clique, some loans being nominally against Chinese mining and industrial resources and enterprises, others against mere debit memoranda given by these men. Japan, who had previously opposed Chinese participation, had, by a series of secret agreements, assured herself of the Allies' support in regard to the Twenty-One Demands, and no longer feared China's presence at the Peace Conference.

The disclosure of the secret negotiations which ultimately led to the Sino-Japanese Military Pact of 1918, turned the Revolutionary Party against the War. They had no desire to have the history of 1913-16 repeated, and to instal Premier Tuan as Dictator in Peking in succession to his dead master, Yuan. Parliament, in self preservation, also declared against the War, and also President Li. The Anfu militarists, under Premier Tuan, however, persisted in their war agitation, and on May 10 went so far as to try and intimidate Parliament by surrounding it with soldiers in plain clothes disguised as hooligans. The President taking the side of Parliament, Tuan's position became impossible, and on May 23 he was dismissed, Wu T'ing-Fang taking his place. But Tuan was backed by his military subordinates, the Tuchüns, who on May 29 declared their independence from the Peking Government and established a Provisional Military Government at Tientsin. They were willing, however, to renew their allegiance to the Government, but only on condition that Parliament be dissolved. President Li, always afraid of trouble, agreed to the dissolution, and, for some unknown reason, asked for the assistance of Chang Hsün to act as mediator between

him and Tuan. On June 10 he issued a decree dissolving Parliament, but Premier Wu T'ing-Fang refused to countersign and left for Shanghai. President Li thereupon appointed General Chiang Ch'ao-Tsung, the Head of the Peking Gendarmerie, Acting Premier, who on the very day of his appointment on June 13 countersigned the dissolution mandate, which was at once printed and promulgated. On June 14, the pig-tailed Chang Hsün entered Peking at the head of his troops, and, in the confusion arising out of Li Yuan-Hung's *coup d'état*, surprised the country by a proclamation, on July 1, announcing the restoration to the Throne of the Manchu Dynasty. The second Manchu Empire, however, lasted barely two weeks. On July 12 Chang Hsün was defeated by the combined forces of Tuan Ch'í-Jui and Feng Kuo-Chang, and took refuge in the Dutch Legation. Li Yuan-Hung, who during the second Monarchist *coup* had disgracefully placed himself under Japanese protection, formally resigned on July 13 after designating as his successor Vice-President Feng Kuo-Chang and reappointing as Prime Minister Tuan Ch'í-Jui. A puppet Parliament, Chin-Pu Tang in complexion, was called into being, and led by T'ang Hua-Lung, it resolved, on August 14, on the declaration of war on the Central European Powers, and on the voting of the War Credits, to be utilised against the Southern provinces who had declared their independence at the time when Premier Tuan incited his Tuchüns to revolt against Parliament and President.

Sun Yat-Sen and the Canton Parliament

While the North was in the grip of militarism under Yuan's old disciples, who were in league with the Chin-Pu Tang, the situation in the South was little better. When the Constitutional Parliament was dissolved for a second time by Li Yuan-Hung, many of its members had left for Shanghai. Dr Sun Yat-Sen now proposed that they should go to Canton and meet there for the

purpose of leading the movement for the restoration of the Constitution, which was violated by the dissolution mandate of June 13. Accompanied by a naval squadron under Admiral Ch'en Pi-Kuang, he thus proceeded southwards. The Southern provinces had declared their independence from the Anfu Clique at Peking, and backed by political power of the Parliamentarians, they were to wage war on the T'uchüns of the North and in this way restore the Constitutional regime in China. On Sun Yat-Sen's arrival at Canton on July 25, the assembled members of the Old Parliament at once held a meeting. There being no quorum they constituted themselves as a Special Parliament. They then elected Sun Yat-Sen as Generalissimo, with T'ang Chi-Yao and Lu Yung-T'ing as Vice-Generalissimi. While a Military Government was to be organised, which to all intents and purposes would be independent of the Peking Government, it was decided, in view of the critical international situation, not to institute the office of President of the Republic so as to maintain the fiction of a united China.

While Sun Yat-Sen was nominally supreme in the Canton Military Government, real power in the South was in the hands of T'ang Chi-Yao and Lu Yung-T'ing. T'ang Chi-Yao was the Governor of Yunnan and Kweichow, in succession to Ts'ai-Ao ; Lu Yung-T'ing controlled the troops in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Sun had no military power behind him, apart from the navy. He could only rely on his influence on the masses and on the Press. There was no real unity between these three leading persons in the South. They were united only in their opposition against Tuan Ch'i-Jui and his warlike policy.

Hostilities between North and South broke out on October 7, when Sun Yat-Sen issued a proclamation declaring Feng Kuo-Chang and his clique traitors to the country, and calling upon the people to support him in his attempt to subdue the Northern militarists. The First Northern Expedition took place, which attained

its object in the sense that it brought about the temporary fall from power of Tuan Ch'i-Jui on November 15. In spite of the successful campaigns in Hunan and Fukien, the situation at Canton was far from satisfactory. The Southern Armies were undisciplined ; corruption in the Government was rampant. Special Parliament was divided into supporters of Sun Yat-Sen and Lu Yung-T'ing. Sun's position in the South was, therefore, very precarious. His only reliable supporters were Wang Ching-Wei, Hu Han-Min, Liao Chung-K'ai and Chu Chih-Hsin. Liao was responsible for finance ; Chu for propaganda. Sun's only hope lay in the People's Volunteer Corps, newly organised by Chu, and in the so-called Kwangtung Army which Wang and Hu were organising with only members of the Revolutionary Party as officers. Of this new Canton army Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming became the Commander, with Teng Keng and Hsü Ch'ung-Chih as Vice-Commanders.

While still at war with the Peking militarists, Lu Ying-T'ing made secret connections with the President, Feng Kuo-Chang, whom he was prepared to recognise. His aim and that of the Kwangsi group generally, of which he and the former Viceroy, Ts'en Ch'un-Hsuan, were the heads, was to eliminate Tuan, the Premier, whose influence in the North was also distasteful to Feng. The recognition of Feng as President would also mean the abolition of the post of Generalissimo in the South, which would enable him to establish his ascendancy over Sun Yat-Sen. Feeling himself secure after his victory in Hunan, Lu proceeded to assassinate Admiral Ch'en Pi-Kuang, who was known to be loyal to Sun, and then bribed Wu Ching-Lien, the Speaker of Special Parliament, and nominally a member of the Revolutionary Party. Assisted by Ts'en Ch'un-Hsuan, he succeeded in inducing Parliament, in May, 1918, to pass a Bill for the reorganisation of the Military Government. A State Council was established to take the place of the office of the Generalissimo. This Council consisted of seven

Directors, all of whom were to have equal authority. The Directors were Sun Yat-Sen, Lu Yung-T'ing, T'ang Ch'í-Yao, Ts'en Ch'un-Hsuan, T'ang Shao-Yi, Wu T'ing-Fang and Ling Pao-I. Sun Yat-Sen, unable to resist this challenge to his authority, had no alternative but to leave Canton. Accompanied by Wang, Hu, Liao and Chu, he left for Shanghai, and started to write his books on revolutionary theory and on national reconstruction.

The Failure of Peace Negotiations

In the North the conflict between Feng Kuo-Chang and Tuan Ch'í-Jui had already started, but open hostilities between the two militarists were avoided by the resignation of Feng Kuo-Chang and the election, on September 4, 1918, by the puppet Anfu-ite Parliament of Hsü Shih-Ch'ang, Yuan's old Secretary of State, to the Presidency on October 9, and of Ts'ao K'un, the infamous commander of the Third Division, to the Vice-Presidency.

The new President professed to be actuated by the desire to re-establish peaceful relations between the North and the South. To make possible the creation of a favourable atmosphere, Premier Tuan, who was identified with the war party, resigned on October 10, 1918, and informal peace negotiations at once started. An armistice was declared on November 17, although the formal peace conference did not meet until February, 1919. The cessation of hostilities, however, enabled the Canton and Peking Governments to send a combined Delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, consisting of Lu Cheng-Hsiang, Alfred Sze, Wellington Koo, and Wang Cheng-T'ing, the latter representing the Canton Government. First Wang Ching-Wei was asked to represent the South, but he declined on the ground that in 1912 he had made a public announcement never to accept any governmental position. He went to Paris, nevertheless, in a private capacity, for the purpose of watching the Conference proceedings and advising the

Chinese Delegation. For China's refusal to sign the Versailles Treaty, he bore a heavy responsibility, in that it was he who was primarily instrumental in making political China realise the implications of signature.

The peace negotiations between the Peking and Canton Governments proved futile. Both Governments were dominated by militarists who were more concerned with their own private interests than with anything else. The period of private wars was being inaugurated by the struggle between the former lieutenants of Yuan Shih-K'ai, now in control of the different provinces which they regarded as satrapies. Until the middle of July, 1920, the group under Tuan Ch'i-Jui, the so-called Anfu group, which was notoriously pro-Japanese, was in power in Peking. It was responsible for the resignation of President Feng Kuo-Chang, the leader of the Chihli clique, and for a year or so held the new President Hsü Shih-Ch'ang in pawn. On July 18, however, a combination under Ts'ao K'un, Wu Pei-Fu, and Chang Tso-Lin inflicted a decisive defeat on Tuan Ch'i-Jui near Paotingfu. Tuan thereupon sent a representative to Shanghai for the purpose of making peace with Sun Yat-Sen. He admitted his past crimes and mistakes and requested to be allowed to collaborate with him. Sun accepted the offer, and issued a manifesto in his support, stating that although Tuan was a militarist he was not so bad as his opponents.

Sun Yat-Sen as President of the Southern Republic

The defeat of Tuan Ch'i-Jui in the North had an important bearing on the situation in the South. Lu Yung-T'ing, finding himself relieved from the menace of Tuan, felt now free to consolidate his power in the South. His first step was to attack the Kwangtung Army, which was stationed on the Fukien-Kwangtung Border. Sun Yat-Sen thus decided to make war on Lu, and ordered the mobilisation of all his followers. The Kwangtung Army attacked Canton, which was under the control of

the Kwangsi group ; Chuchow fell after a brief struggle. Chu Chih-Hsin returned to Kwangtung to organise his People's Army, and managed to capture the Tiger's Gate, an important stronghold which commanded the entry to Canton. Unfortunately, however, Chu was murdered by bandits soon after the capture, and his army was now taken charge of by Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min. At the end of October the Kwangsi troops in Kwangtung were defeated ; Lu had to flee to Kwangsi and Kwangtung came again under Sun Yat-Sen's control, who at once sent for Wu T'ing-Fang and T'ang Shao-Yi from Shanghai to help him to organise a new government. Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming was, meanwhile, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the troops of Kwangtung, and Governor of Kwangtung province. Sun also summoned Special Parliament, which on April 6, 1921, elected him President of the Chinese Republic. This post Sun assumed on May 5 following. He had then the nominal control of the provinces of Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan and part of Hunan, but only over Kwangtung had he effective authority. In Kwangsi Lu Yung-T'ing was still in power, and it was not until August, 1922, that Lu was decisively defeated and the work of reconstruction could be properly taken in hand.

The Failure of the Reconstruction in Kwangtung

Outwardly things went well in Kwangtung after the overthrow of Lu Yung-T'ing. For Lu was essentially an adventurer, whose only claim to rule his province was the possession of a bandit army. Extortion was freely practised by Lu and his associates ; the provincial finances in Kwangtung and Kwangsi were in a state of absolute chaos ; the major part of the revenue was derived from gambling and opium. With the change of regime, a beginning was made with the prohibition of gambling and opium, and the extermination of banditry, which had assumed an alarming proportion during Lu's

misrule. The finances were rehabilitated under the able leadership of Liao Chung-K'ai, the Vice-Minister of Finance. A beginning was made with the modernisation of the city of Canton, which was turned into a municipality under the mayoralty of Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat-Sen. The populace, in spite of the many shortcomings of the new administration, were relieved by the changes which took place, and even hostile foreign observers had to admit the improvement under Sun Yat-Sen. A limited system of local autonomy was introduced in the districts, in the form of election of magistrates. Commerce and industry were gradually developing again. The provincial revenues rose from 18 million dollars in 1920 to 31.8 millions in 1921. Kwangtung was slowly becoming the model province in Southern China.

On the surface, the situation in the Southern Republic was, therefore, satisfactory. But the inner political situation was fraught with the greatest of dangers. In the first place the organisation of the Party was defective. The Chinese Revolutionary Party (Chung-Hua Ko-Min Tang), founded after the defeat in the struggle against Yuan in 1913, had practically ceased to exist after 1916. The revolutionaries in China were kept together solely by the personality of Sun Yat-Sen; membership of the Party became a matter of tradition; it merely meant that one had personal contact with Sun Yat-Sen. When in the autumn of 1920 Kwangtung was captured, the "Chung-Kuo Kuo-Min Tang", or National People's Party of China, was called into being, on the same secret basis of the Ko-Min Tang, but not with so many restrictions, such as the personal oath. People like Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming who had publicly opposed the formation of the Ko-Min Tang, now joined the reconstituted Party. The Party constitution was very loose. The constitution did not, for instance, provide for any periodical meetings. Nor was there any definite connection between Party authority and political or military power. Wu T'ing-

Fang, the Finance Minister, was, for instance, not a member of the Party. Personal relationships continued to be the basis of political authority.

Another problem was presented by the Kwangtung Army. This army, created by Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, was commanded by Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming. It was officered by Party members, but no political training was given to the rank and file of the soldiers, who were not very different in calibre from those of the ordinary Chinese armies. With the defeat of Lu Yung-T'ing, many of his former soldiers were incorporated in the Kwangtung Army, which, growing in numerical strength, deteriorated in quality. After peace had been temporarily established in Kwantung province, a Second Kwangtung Army was organised by Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, who became its Commander. The Second Army was a purely mercenary army; its officers were not Party members, and the only thing in its favour was that its Commander, Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, was known to be absolutely loyal to Sun Yat-Sen. Besides these First and Second Kwangtung Armies, there were other small units which were all under the command of Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming. But Ch'en, being ambitious, also wanted to get the direct control over the Second Kwangtung Army, and carried on intrigues to oust Hsü from his position. In this he failed. He now tried to consolidate his military position by infiltrating the First Kwangtung Army with his own men who owed allegiance to him rather than to Sun Yat-Sen. He dared not, however, for the moment, openly declare his independence of Dr Sun, being deterred by Teng Keng, his Chief-of-Staff and Commander of the First Division, the strongest division in the First Army. For Teng Keng, although nominally the right-hand man of Ch'en, was loyal to Dr Sun and was keeping an eye on Ch'en's activities on the latter's behalf.

The Revolt of Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming

Sun Yat-Sen had good reasons to be on his guard

against Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, lest the latter should attempt a *coup d'état* similar to that of Lu Yung-T'ing in May, 1918. As subsequent events showed, Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming had undoubtedly already at that time in mind the capture of the control over the two Kwang provinces. At the time of the establishment of the Southern Government in April, 1920, Ch'en had opposed Dr Sun's plan of establishing a National Government independently of the Peking Government. He wanted the support of the Tsuchüns of Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechuan and Hunan for his own ambitions, and in return supported and encouraged them in their schemes of a Federated Government of autonomous provinces. For they disliked Sun's plans of a Centralised Government, which would mean a surrender of their semi-independent position in the provinces. They had to pay a nominal allegiance to Sun Yat-Sen as President of the Southern Republic, as they were themselves at war with the Peking militarists. But they had no intention of accepting Sun Yat-Sen's authority, although they could not afford to repudiate it publicly.

The differences of opinion between Sun Yat-Sen and Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming gradually grew into an open conflict. Nominally, Sun was supreme in the South, or in Kwangtung at least, but actually all military and civil power was concentrated in the hands of Ch'en, who often saw fit to act independently of the President. The conflict became so acute that Party members and other representative people became restive. They were anxious that the conflict be settled and were looking to Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min to mediate. For Wang and Hu had a long Party history; they were the creators of the Kwangtung Army and had a great influence with both the military and civilian leaders in Canton. But Hu had become the Chief Secretary to the President's office, and became himself involved in the conflict. Moreover, Ch'en had a secret grudge against him ever since Hu's report on the March 29 Insurrection. Wang,

who held no office, was, therefore, left to himself. Previously, Wu Chih-Hui had tried to take a hand in the affair, by proposing a formula "If Sun wants to monopolise all power, he is an adventurer; if Ch'en usurps Sun's authority, he is an ordinary militarist." This, of course, was hardly acceptable to the parties, and made things worse, rendering Wang's task all the more difficult. After many negotiations, however, Wang managed to get the solution accepted whereby in all affairs relating to the central administration Sun would be supreme, whereas provincial affairs should be left entirely to Ch'en. As the Kwangtung province was the mainstay of the Southern Government, this settlement was greatly in favour of Ch'en, but as events proved, it was regarded merely as an armistice by the latter.

Meanwhile, war had broken out in the North between Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-Fu, who were in control of the Peking Government, and Chang Tso-Lin, who was in alliance with Tuan Ch'i-Jui. Tuan had also an understanding with Sun Yat-Sen, who, therefore, ordered a punitive expedition against the Peking Government. The object was to oust Wu Pei-Fu from the Yangtse basin. To that end he sent Wang Ching-Wei to Shanghai to take charge of propaganda and Party affairs in the Yangtse and be his plenipotentiary representative there. Accompanied by Hu Han-Min and Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, who were to take charge respectively of civil and of military affairs, he led the Second Kwangtung Army into Kwangsi and established his headquarters at Kweilin, the capital of Kwangsi. His aim was to go through Hunan to Hankow, but developments in his rear frustrated his plans.

For Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, who had stayed behind at Canton, was preparing himself for an open revolt. In March, 1922, Teng Keng, his Chief-of-Staff, was murdered by a hireling in the pay of an associate of Ch'en, who objected to Teng Keng's loyalty to Sun. When the assassination took place, Ch'en did not know who was

responsible for it, and gave orders to arrest the murderer. On learning that it was one of his own men, however, he hushed up the case. Ch'en also entered into negotiations with one of the Tschüns of Hunan, Chao Heng-T'i, who had entered into relations with Wu Pei-Fu. Ch'en encouraged Chao to obstruct Sun's passage through Hunan. Controlling the finances of Kwangtung, Ch'en, in spite of the agreement entered into, cut off the supply of Sun's funds. Sun feeling himself, as it were, locked up, in Kwangsi, therefore decided to return to Kwangtung at the end of April, and at once dismissed Ch'en from his posts.

Meanwhile, the war in North China turned in favour of Sun's enemy, Wu Pei-Fu. On May 3, 1922, Chang Tso-Lin was defeated near Chang-Hsin-Tien, on the Peking-Hankow Railway, and had to withdraw to Manchuria, whose independence he proclaimed. Wu Pei-Fu, victorious, expelled, on June 4, Hsü Shih-Ch'ang from the Presidential Chair, and intended to run China without a President or Capital and all it connoted. In time, he said, a new and true type of government would evolve, but meanwhile, he would concentrate all military authority in himself, whereas the people should be content with their local institutions. He was persuaded, however, that foreign relations necessitated the maintenance of a capital and the forms of a central government. He thus invited Li Yuan-Hung to resume, for the second time, the Presidency of the Republic. Li Yuan-Hung took up his post on June 11, and at once summoned the original Parliament of 1913 to complete their unfinished term—the new Anfu-ite Parliament being dissolved after Tuan's defeat in July, 1920.

The majority of the available members of the Old Parliament obeyed the summons and went to Peking. Among these were also the greater part of the members of Special Parliament at Canton, who, with the prospect of receiving a salary from the Customs Surplus, confirmed Li Yuan-Hung as the legitimate President.

Deceived by outward appearances, a group of prominent Party members in the North, headed by Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, the Chancellor of the National University at Peking, despatched a telegram to Sun Yat-Sen, urging him to give up the Southern Presidency since Parliament was restored. This telegram had a disastrous effect on the political situation in the South, and was the direct cause of the open rebellion of Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, who saw in this message the declining influence of his chief. On the night of June 16, 1922, he ordered his men, who were concentrated on the East River and at the White Cloud and Kwan Yin Mountains, to attack the Presidential House. The *coup* took Sun completely by surprise. It was only one or two hours before the attack actually took place and after Ch'en had posted his guards in the city, that Sun was informed about the conspiracy. Thus, Sun left the House in secret with the two comrades who came to warn him, having to pass through Ch'en's guards, in order to reach the gunboat, *Yung Feng*, which was stationed near Whangpoo, and had always remained loyal to him. Madame Sun herself refused to accompany her husband lest her presence should betray his identity. She only left after the bombardment of the House by machine-guns and light artillery had started. Protected by her bodyguards, of whom several were killed, she managed to fight her way through the machine-gun fire. Among the treasures destroyed by the fire was Sun's manuscript on "The Principle of Democracy", "The Principle of Livelihood", and drafts of other books, which were to be published under the general title of *The Reconstruction of the State*. These represented his complete exposition of the Programme of National Reconstruction. The loss of "The Principle of Livelihood" especially was unfortunate, as in the absence of any authoritative guidance, his followers had only their own interpretation of this principle.

Sun Yat-Sen remained in the *Yung Feng* for over

fifty days, from June 16 to August 10. He was hoping that the Second Army in Kiangsi would succeed in returning to Kwangtung to reconquer the province from Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming. Half of Kiangsi was then already captured, but on entering Kwangtung, Hsü Ch'ung-Chih was defeated by Ch'en at Shiuchou. Hsü was obliged to return to Kiangsi, and moved on to Fukien. With Hsü's defeat Sun realised that his case was hopeless for the time being, and, accompanied by Wang Ching-Wei and Chiang K'ai-Shih, who was shortly to become prominent, left, via Hongkong, for Shanghai, where he arrived on August 15 and was met by Hu Han-Min.

China in the Grip of the Militarists

The resumption of the Presidential office by Li Yuan-Hung and the reconconvocation of the 1913 Parliament raised high hopes among the people as to the speedy unification of China. President Li had the reputation of being an honest well-meaning politician and was credited with the desire of upholding Constitutional government, in spite of his surrender to Chang Hsün in 1917. His inaugural decree on June 13, 1922, promised the speedy suppression of the Tuchüns and the disbandment of the troops. Another decree on June 16 ordered the suspension of hostilities between the Chihli group of Wu Pei-Fu and the Mukden group of Chang Tso-Lin. Unfortunately, however, Li was a man of mediocre ability and devoid of any political convictions; he lacked both vision and a sense of reality. His decrees proved to be nothing more than statements of intentions. He had neither the power nor the courage to enforce them. For dominating everything in Peking was Wu Pei-Fu, the War Minister, who had managed to make both President and Parliament his tools. The Central Government in Peking was only a government in name, deriving its prestige mainly from the fact that it was the government in China recognised by the foreign

Powers, and, on account of this recognition, was able to obtain revenues from the Customs Surplus. A creation of Wu, it was essentially a regional government, controlling only Chihli, Honan, Shensi, part of Kiangsu, Shangtung and Hupeh. The rest of China was under the control of groups of independent war lords under some super-Tuchün. The Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) were under Chang Tso-Lin; Chekiang was under Lu Yung-Hsiang, a subordinate of Tuan Ch'í-Jui, as also the rich region of Shanghai. Shansi had been practically independent since Yuan's death, under Yen Hsi-Shan. Hunan, Szechuan, Kweichow and Yunnan had belonged to the Southern Republic and had not revoked their independence. In common with Ch'en Ch'üing-Ming, who controlled Kwangtung and Kwangsi, their Tuchüns were only willing to discuss the unification of China on the basis of a federation of autonomous provinces.

Paradoxically, Sun Yat-Sen's defeat by Ch'en Ch'üing-Ming only raised his stock among the people. When Wu Pei-Fu expelled Hsü Shih-Ch'ang from the Presidency, he had issued on June 6, 1922, a manifesto denouncing Wu as a common militarist, and putting forward his own solution of the chaos in China, suggesting how to deal with militarism and how to achieve a truly democratic government. On his arrival in Shanghai, after his expulsion by Ch'en Ch'üing-Ming, he issued, on August 16, another manifesto, explaining the reasons of his defeat. These manifestos had a great effect on the people. For it did not take Wu long to throw off his uncomfortable mask of the self-appointed saviour of China. It was soon realised that Wu was merely trying to follow in the footsteps of Yuan Shih-K'ai, using the same methods of intimidation and bribery in his dealings with Parliament, as his former chief. Ch'en had, by his treachery, lost the confidence he had among the people, as he had never been able to meet Sun's charges of double dealing.

While Sun's prestige among the people was increasing, the military situation in the South also turned in his favour. On October 2, 1922, Fuchow was captured by Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, who had the assistance of Hsü Shih-Tseng, one of Tuan Ch'i-Jui's subordinates. Sun thus sent Chiang K'ai-Shih to Hsü as the latter's Chief-of-Staff, with the instruction to prepare for the recapture of Kwangtung. There were three further armies at Sun's disposal for this purpose. One was the Yunnanese Army under Yang Hsi-Min, the rival of T'ang Chi-Yao, Ch'en's ally, who unable to defeat T'ang had moved into Kwangsi. There was also the Kwangsi Army of Liu Chen-Huan, who had a grudge against Ch'en. Then there was the remnant of Lu Yung-T'ing's army in Kwangsi under Shen Hung-Ying. These three armies had declared their willingness to accept Sun's orders and were secretly moving from the West into Kwangtung, while Hsü Ch'ung-Chih was attacking Kwangtung from the East. Ch'en, ignorant of the troop movements in the West, only mobilised his forces for defence on the East River against Hsü. The three armies came down the West River without any struggle. Ch'en's First Division, stationed at Chao-Ch'ing, an important strategic point dominating Canton, at once went over to the side of the invaders. Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming, on hearing of the fall of Chao-Ch'ing, had no alternative but to leave Canton immediately, and to join his troops on the East River. On January 26, 1923, Kwangtung province thus returned its allegiance to Sun Yat-Sen, who, still at Shanghai, decided to appoint Hu Han-Min as Civil Governor to act for him for the time being.

Having regained the nominal control over Kwangtung, Sun's troubles had only just begun. There was no centralised authority in the province, which was still infested by enemy armies. Even at Canton itself, disunion soon showed among the associated military leaders, who were essentially only adventurers. Shen Hung-Ying had started to make connection with Wu Pei-Fu,

and at a meeting conference had opened fire at Hu Han-Min, the Governor. Hu Han-Min's life was only saved by the intervention of Liu Chen-Huan; he, at once, resigned the Governorship. Sun Yat-Sen, on hearing about this, at once left Shanghai for Canton with Wang Ching-Wei, while, at the same time, instructing Hsü Ch'ung-Chih to attack the East River. He also sent for Chiang K'ai-Shih, who was then in Fuchow. Wang was sent back to Shanghai, to be his plenipotentiary representative there, and in this capacity renewed the connections with Chang Tso-Lin and Lu Yung-Hsiang. Wang proposed that the Triple Alliance between Sun Yat-Sen, Chang Tso-Lin and Tuan Ch'i-Jui (Lu Yung-Hsiang's superior) should be based on something wider than pure militarism, and proposed that Chang and Tuan should be induced to accept the Kuo-Min Tang programme. Sun consented and asked Wang to draft the agreement. Mukden and Chekiang accepted all Wang's proposals, without any discussion, remarking in passing, that Wu Pei-Fu should first be overthrown, and the programme discussed after the unification of China. The result was politically disappointing, but it deterred Wu from sending his main force to help Shen Hung-Ying, who had meanwhile openly rebelled and had been defeated by Yang and Liu. The small army which Wu had despatched from Kiangsi in support of Shen, was easily defeated, with the result that by May, 1923, the situation in Kwangtung was more stable, only the East River being occupied by Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming's mercenaries. Swatow was soon after taken by Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, but being over-confident of victory, he was badly beaten by Ch'en, losing more than two-thirds of his forces.

After Hu Han-Min's resignation several people of secondary importance were appointed in succession as Governor, but the real power in Kwangtung lay with Yang Hsi-Min and Liu Chen-Huan. Yang and Liu were not members of the Kuo-Min Tang; they were purely adven-

turers, whose aim was to consolidate their own power under the cover of Sun Yat-Sen's prestige. The Kwangtung finances were entirely under their control. There was no centralisation of administration possible. Corruption and graft were shameless; Yang and Liu and their satellites grabbed what they could in their spheres of influence. The populace became very discontented owing to their extortion.

Sun Yat-Sen was powerless to stop the malpractices, which were carried on in his name. He had no adequate force to deal with Yang and Liu. There was no question of continuing the punitive expedition against Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, who carried on piratical activities on the East River. Whenever Sun ordered Yang and Liu to proceed against Ch'en, they asked for more money, did a little fighting, but always returned empty-handed to Canton again. In desperation, Sun thus addressed Yang and Liu: "You defeated and expelled Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming and welcomed me back to Canton. For this I am very grateful to you, but since my return to Canton, you put my cap on your head, and using this cap, you ruin my native place (Kwangtung). I am warning you. Our native people cannot bear their burdens any longer. But this is not really very important. I am a revolutionary. I have always sacrificed myself, and have advised other people to make sacrifices, for the revolution, if by sacrifice the nation can be saved. This would be quite worth while. But you people have come here to eat at the expense of my native people, but at the same time you are doing nothing for the nation. And now, not only have I no face towards my native people, but I have also lost face towards the nation. I have decided that you should no longer wear my cap. I rather become an ordinary person again and return to my native village, and suffer from your oppression and misrule in common with the others." Whenever Sun approached them in this way, they trembled before him, and feigned repentance, promising to turn over a new

leaf. But once back at their headquarters, they continued as before. It was due to this difficult situation, that Sun Yat-Sen at last decided on the reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang, in the winter of 1923.

CHAPTER X

THE REORGANISATION OF THE KUO-MIN TANG

The Necessity of Reorganisation

WHEN the reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang was being considered by Sun Yat-Sen in 1923, the Chinese Republic, of which he was the Father, had already been in existence for over ten years. At the time of its establishment it had raised high hopes among the progressively-minded people of China. A new era of peace and prosperity was expected to follow the period of official corruption and national humiliation associated with the Manchu regime, which it supplanted. An objective survey of the situation, however, showed that the Republic was only a name, that China was ruled by militarists, some of whom were more rapacious and corrupt than the worst Manchu bureaucrat. Under the monarchy there was at least some system of official responsibility; the Central Government, weak though it was, was effective and relatively stable. Ten years after the establishment of the Republic which was to give China a strong democratic government, the Central Government at Peking had become a shadow of its former self; its writ had no authority outside the massive and ancient walls of the city and often very little within; at frequent intervals there was no Cabinet, only a Minister being kept at the Foreign Office to act as the official letter-box of the foreign Powers in their dealings with China. On June 4, 1922, Wu Pei-Fu expelled Hsü Shih-Ch'ang, and restored Li Yuan-Hung to the Peking Presidency, but on June 13, 1923, already Li in turn was expelled as a result of a dispute over the disposal of the receipts from the Peking

Octroi. Parliament then openly sold itself to Wu, and elected his old chief, Ts'ao K'un, to the Presidency. The permanent Constitution, which had gone through its first reading in 1913, its second in 1917, and its third under Li's second Presidency, was promulgated on October 10, 1923, but at the time of its promulgation already, it was a dead letter and only of historical interest.

China was divided up into fiefs under the different war lords and super-tuchüns. In the North, Wu Pei-Fu and Ts'ao K'un were predominant. Besides Wu and Ts'ao, there were Chang Tso-Lin in Manchuria and Lu Yung-Hsiang in Chekiang, both antagonistic to them. In the South, the provinces of Szechuan, Hunan, Yunnan and Kweichow had the reputation of being revolutionary provinces, but, in reality, they were under the control of militarists, who were as eager of military adventuring as their colleagues in the North. The situation in Kwangtung and Kwangsi was even worse than in the other provinces. Bandits and pirates had free play with the lives and properties of the populace. Commerce, industry and education were stagnant. The whole system of national economy was in disorder; the suffering of the people was intense; the political and intellectual leaders were despondent as never before.

The mission of the Kuo-Min Tang and of the Chinese Revolution as interpreted by Sun Yat-Sen was to achieve the fundamental reconstruction of China in its international, political and economic aspects, but everything seemed to be against it. There were the same internal troubles in the Party as in 1913. Many were members of the Party without an understanding or a belief in the principles the Party stood for. A great part of the members were old-style intellectuals, officials and militarists who bargained and negotiated with feudal lords and politicians, and sought to get into a place of power, on the basis of the reputation of Sun Yat-Sen, whom they made a habit of betraying. There was no unity of purpose, there was no concerted action. Too much stress

had further been laid by Sun Yat-Sen on military action, and too little on political propaganda. In spite of his manifest concern for the masses, Sun had little opportunity to consult or take them into his confidence. His forced affiliations with elements basically opposed to his ideals had resulted in compromises, which were little conducive to his political standing in the country. All these internal weaknesses were manifest during the rebellion of Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, and were shown still more clearly by the misrule of Yang and Liu.

Added to the internal difficulties were the foreign obstacles. Ever since the foundation of the Republic, the foreign Powers and foreign agents in China had shown a hostile attitude towards the Chinese revolutionaries, and obstructed every move in the direction of the emancipation of the Chinese people. The revolutionaries' aim to re-establish the sovereignty of the people both in the internal and international sphere, was given an anti-foreign meaning. Every effort was made to strengthen the hands of reaction in China and to crush the forces working for the establishment of a genuine Republic. In 1913 Yuan Shih-K'ai obtained an illegal loan of £25 millions on the eve of making war on the Kuo-Min Tang. Almost simultaneously Great Britain and Russia invaded Tibet and Mongolia. In 1915 Japan forced China to acquiesce in the Twenty-One Demands, with the subsequent sanction of the Powers. The independent provinces of China were forced to contribute to their Peking enemies by the withholding from them, with an insignificant exception, their *pro rata* share in the Customs Surplus, which was under British control. An informal alliance was established between native militarism and foreign imperialism, both aiming at the permanent enslavement of the people of China. Sun Yat-Sen who had always advocated co-operation with the Western Powers, and solicited their support in his struggle against the Peking militarists, at last began to realise that the fight of the Kuo-Min Tang should be two-fold, internally against

militarism, and externally against imperialism. To liberate China it was necessary that both should be overthrown, and to achieve this aim a well-organised Party based on popular support was a first necessity.

The Russian Orientation

Another factor in hastening the reorganisation of the Party on a popular basis was Sun Yat-Sen's disappointment with the results of the Versailles Peace Conference, and his consequent relations with Soviet Russia, which was then an outcast in Europe. At the time of China's entering the Great War on the side of the Allied Powers, Sun Yat-Sen was opposed to participation, to the extent of sending a telegram to Lloyd George, begging him not to involve China in the War. His view in advocating the maintenance of neutrality was that China could not possibly benefit from joining the Allies, in whatever way the War was settled. If Germany won the War, the position for China would be worse. If the Allies were victorious, China would be left in the same position as she was in 1917. For Sun clearly saw that the Allies were only fighting for their own interests, and not for the cause of humanity as a whole ; they would certainly put no pressure on Japan to cancel the Twenty-One Demands, nor consent to the abolition of Extraterritoriality, and to the restoration of the Tariff Autonomy. He approved of the resolution of Special Parliament at Canton, declaring war on Germany, in order to present a united diplomatic front at the Versailles Conference, but much against his better judgment ; he approved merely because he did not want to act unconstitutionally. And the result of the Versailles Conference, which went entirely against China, only proved the essential rightness of Sun's views.

Meanwhile, Sun Yat-Sen viewed with keen interest the experiments carried out in Russia after the success of the Russian Soviet Revolution in 1917. Early in 1918 he had sent, through many intermediaries, a congratulatory message to Lenin, expressing his sympathy with the

struggle of the Russian people against Tsarist and Capitalist oppression. He had been informed that Lenin was giving his attention to the oppressed peoples of the East and had the intention of presenting a united front with them against the Imperialist nations of the West. On September 27, 1920, Karahan declared, on behalf of the Soviet Government: "void of force all the treaties concluded with China by the former Government, renounced all seizures of Chinese territories, without compensation and for ever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie." In 1921 Lenin sent his secretary, Mahlin, to China, who first met Wu Pei-Fu in the North and then went South to see Sun Yat-Sen at Kweilin, who asked him many questions about the Russian Revolution and the New Economic Policy.

Mahlin had during his stay in China secretly organised the Chinese Communist Party, and on his return to Moscow recommended that the Third International should enter into relations both with Sun Yat-Sen and Wu Pei-Fu. He reported that the only person he met in China who had principles and a programme was Sun, and the only effective Party the Kuo-Min Tang, while the man with the strongest military force was Wu, but Wu knew nothing about politics. Moscow accepted Mahlin's report and made connections with both Sun and Wu, so as to secure protection for the Chinese Communist Party. On February 7, 1923, however, Wu massacred many of the workers who were participating in the strike on the Peking-Hankow Railway, which was organised by the Communist Party. For this reason Moscow broke with Wu, instructing the Communist Party to have relations with Sun only.

Many members of the Chinese Communist Party had by that time joined the Kuo-Min Tang, keeping their membership of the Communist Party secret. Li Ta-Chao, a professor of the Peking National University, was the first Communist who joined the Kuo-Min Tang as a

Communist. Li met Sun at Shanghai just after Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's rebellion. He was introduced by Chang Chi, who had also become a Professor at the Peking University. In the interview with Sun, Li said that he was a member of the Communist Party, but would like to join the Kuo-Min Tang on the basis of the Three People's Principles with the object of working for the National Revolution. He did not propose to give up his Communist membership, but promised to follow loyally Sun's instructions. Sun Yat-Sen agreed, and Li Ta-Chao's admission inaugurated the general policy of admitting Communists into the Kuo-Min Tang.

In December, 1922, at Shanghai, Adolf Joffe, the Soviet Special Envoy, had an interview with Sun Yat-Sen, as a result of which a joint manifesto was issued, on January 26, 1923, which became the foundation of the Kuo-Min Tang-Soviet Entente. In this manifesto:

"Dr. Sun Yat-Sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet System cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task he has assured Dr Sun Yat-Sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.

"In order to clarify the situation, Dr Sun Yat-Sen has requested Mr Joffe for a reaffirmation of the principles defined in the Russian Note to the Chinese Government dated September 27, 1920. Mr Joffe has accordingly reaffirmed these principles and categorically declared to Sun Yat-Sen that the Russian Government is ready and willing to enter into negotiations with China on the basis of the renunciation by Russia of all the treaties and exactions which the Tsardom imposed on China, including the treaty or treaties and agreements relating to the

Chinese Eastern Railway (the management of which being the subject of a specific reference in Article 7 of the said Note).

"Recognising that the Chinese Eastern Railway questions can be satisfactorily settled only at a competent Russian-Chinese Conference, Dr Sun Yat-Sen is of the opinion that the realities of the situation point to the desirability of a *modus vivendi* in the matter of the present management of the Railway. And he agrees with Mr Joffe that the existing railway management should be temporarily recognised, pending agreement between the Chinese and Russian Governments, without prejudice, however, to the true rights and special interests of either party. At the same time, Dr Sun Yat-Sen considers that General Chang Tso-Lin should be consulted on the point.

"Mr Joffe has categorically declared to Dr Sun Yat-Sen (who has fully satisfied himself as to this) that it is not and never has been the intention of the present Russian Government to pursue an Imperialistic policy in Outer-Mongolia or to cause it to secede from China. Dr Sun Yat-Sen, therefore, does not view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer-Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China, the more so on account of the inability of the present Government at Peking to prevent such evacuation being followed by a recrudescence of intrigue and hostile activities by White Guardists against Russia and the creation of a graver situation than that which now exists."

According to the Sun-Joffe Manifesto, Russia pledged herself to assist the Kuo-Min Tang in its fight against Imperialism and in the accomplishment of the National Revolution, while undertaking not to make any propaganda in China for the Communist order of society, which it acknowledged to be impracticable in China. In a conversation with Liao Chung-K'ai, who had at Sun's request accompanied Joffe to the hot-springs at Tennawuni in Japan to discuss in greater detail the Russian purpose, Joffe admitted that what was in operation in Russia was

not Communism. Liao asked him whether Communism could be realised in Russia in ten years' time. Joffe said "No." "In twenty years?" "No" was the answer again. "In a hundred years?" "Perhaps" said Joffe. "Well," said Liao to Ch'en Kung-Po, a young student who once belonged to the Communist Party and was to play a very important rôle in Chinese revolutionary politics some years later, "what is the use of dreaming about a Utopia which might or might not be realised, when we are all dead. Let us all be revolutionaries to-day, and work for the accomplishment of the National Revolution on the basis of the Three People's Principles. These we can realise within our lifetime. We must, however, unite with all the revolutionary forces available, and agree on an immediate common aim, no matter what our ultimate ideals are."

In March, 1923, Liao returned to Canton to report to Sun on his conversations with Joffe. Sun became more and more convinced of the necessity of working hand in hand with Russia in the common struggle against Imperialism. Sun then sent Chiang K'ai-Shih on a mission to Moscow to study the situation on the spot. Chiang stayed in Russia for six months, during which time he had frequent interviews with Trotsky and Stalin, who explained to him the organisation of the Communist Party of Russia, of the Red Army System, of the political and economic system. Chiang reported very favourably on the Russian system, and his report made the reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang inevitable. Together with Liao Chung-K'ai, Chiang K'ai-Shih was principally responsible for the Russian orientation of Sun Yat-Sen and the Kuo-Min Tang. Sun Yat-Sen's right and left hands, Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, were then at Shanghai, and were left in ignorance of the impending developments. "Both Ching-Wei and Han-Min will not agree to the revolutionary method of Russia. It is not really necessary to have them to participate, for Ching-Wei is not a scholar of the Russian school (i.e., not a Marxist) and he

will, therefore, not agree to the Russian type of revolution," wrote Sun to Chiang.

In October, 1923, Borodin arrived at Canton with a letter of introduction from Karahan, the Soviet Ambassador at Peking. In this letter Karahan expressed his regret that diplomatic affairs prevented his meeting Sun personally, and he recommended Borodin as his representative. "You can trust Borodin as you may trust me," wrote Karahan. Borodin had a great and varied experience as an organiser; he had been Adviser to Kemal Pasha and had done valuable work in the Turkish struggle for independence. "I have come here to put myself at the disposal of the Chinese National Revolution. Your aim is to fight foreign Imperialism, which is also our aim. As to Communism, China is not in a position to discuss it as conditions are not suitable," he said to Sun Yat-Sen. Referring to the policy of Lenin and the Third International, Borodin said, "In the West, in Europe and America, one is justified in propagating the idea of Communism and in preaching the necessity of the class war. In the Orient, notably in China, however, our policy is to promote the National Revolution, and we have instructed the Chinese Communist Party to concentrate on this rather than on Communism. We have also considered the question whether the success of the Chinese National Revolution would mean the success of Chinese Communism, and have come to the conclusion that, since the Kuo-Min Tang in its Third Principle of Livelihood is opposed to capitalism, the ultimate aims of the Kuo-Min Tang and the Third International are not in conflict. As to the methods to be adopted, we must be careful to think out only those which are suitable to the social conditions of China." On the subject of the Kuo-Min Tang, Borodin said that he was strongly in favour of the Three People's Principles, because they met the demands of the Chinese Revolution. "All revolutionaries in China, including members of the Communist Party, should strive to carry out these principles under the banner of

the Kuo-Min Tang and under your direction." "But," he added, "there are very serious shortcomings with the Kuo-Min Tang. In the first place, the Kuo-Min Tang organisation is very incomplete and there is no discipline worth speaking of. Secondly, there are many impure elements in the Kuo-Min Tang, corrupt bureaucrats and adventurers. Then the Kuo-Min Tang lacks a popular basis in the form of the organisation of the masses. These things have all to be rectified before the Kuo-Min Tang can be an effective revolutionary weapon." Sun Yat-Sen concurred with Borodin's views, which were subsequently frequently repeated in his speeches, and appointed him Adviser to the Kuo-Min Tang, with the special task of assisting him in its reorganisation.

Thus, Borodin entered a career which not only gave him a world-wide reputation, but also changed the whole spirit of the political atmosphere in the Far East, and had it not been for the fact that he occupied two positions, which, as time went on, became increasingly incompatible, he might have ended his political life in China in honour and glory as the greatest foreign friend of China. Borodin was Adviser to the Kuo-Min Tang, but at the same time he was the representative of the Third International in China, whose servant he primarily was. As Adviser he accepted no salary, but the Government provided him with accommodation and paid his expenses from the reception fund under the Ministry of Finance.

The First National Congress of the Kuo-Min Tang

At the end of October, 1923, Sun Yat-Sen decided to hold a Congress of Kuo-Min Tang delegates on January 1, 1924, to decide on the new Party Constitution and the Party Programme. He sent a telegram to Wang Ching-Wei at Shanghai and other veterans of the Party asking them to return to Canton to take part in the work of the Congress. Why he asked them to return, after ignoring them before, was never cleared up. Probably Sun was shy of consulting Wang and other "old comrades"

before he had finally made up his mind on the Reorganisation and the Russian Orientation, but felt that their co-operation, especially of Wang, his right hand from 1905 onwards, was essential if his scheme were to be successful. When in 1912 the United League (Tung Meng Hui) was reorganised into the Kuo-Min Tang, at the instance of its Parliamentary members, headed by Sung Ch'iao-Jen, neither Wang nor Sun himself was satisfied, as an open political party was an unsuitable revolutionary instrument in the existing circumstances. When Sun organised the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Chung-Hua Ko-Min Tang), Wang agreed in principle, but objected to the oath of allegiance to Sun. In 1920, when the National People's Party of China (Chung-Kuo Kuo-Min Tang) was established, Wang also abstained from active participation, owing to the over-centralisation of power in Sun's hands. But the draft Constitution of the reorganised Kuo-Min Tang was based on the principle of democratic centralisation, of which he was an advocate. With Liao Chung-K'ai, Hu Han-Min, Tai Chi-T'ao and Borodin, he thus set himself whole-heartedly to work to prepare for the Congress.

The Draft provides for small local nuclei as the basic units of the reorganised Party. These are to be the source of Party authority and Party strength. Absolute democracy is to prevail here, in the sense that authority is concentrated in the members' meetings, which are to be held once a fortnight. The members' meetings are to elect two committees, an Executive Committee charged with organisation, discipline and propaganda, and a Supervisory Committee, the function of which is to audit the accounts, to exercise a general control and to prosecute against breaches of party rules and discipline. In any locality any five persons can form a nucleus. The nuclei are to be subject to the control of the sub-district Party branch. The same organisation as in the nuclei is to prevail here, only with a wider scope. In the place of members' meetings, however, there are to be conferences

of delegates from the nuclei, meeting once a month. The next unit in the organisational hierarchy is the District Party Organisation, with quarterly delegates' conferences, then the Provincial Organisation, with half-yearly delegates' conferences, until we come to the Central Party Organisation, with its annual National Congress and its Central Executive and Supervisory Committees.

Supreme authority in the Party lies in the National Congress, which, however, meets only once a year, and only for two or three weeks. During the time it is not in session, this authority is exercised by the Central Executive Committee. It is to this Committee that the Provincial and District Party branches must look for direction and guidance. It decides on all important questions which affect the Party as a whole, but in so doing, it is not to deviate from, or reverse, any policy decided upon by the National Congress. The Central Executive Committee, as the custodian of Party authority during the time the National Congress is in adjournment, must be representative of the whole Party; not only of the different political opinions and tendencies that find expression in the Party within the limits of Party discipline, but also of the territorial divisions of China, and must also allow for oversea representation. It is of necessity a large body, unsuitable for day-to-day administration. For this reason a Standing Committee is to be instituted to deal, in the name of the Central Executive Committee, with the more or less routine matters of the Party. The Central Executive Committee is to meet in plenary session at least every six months, to deliberate on all important issues involving determination of policy.

In order to make Party authority and discipline a reality, the principle is adopted whereby all matters may be freely discussed by the Party members, but once a decision is made, this decision must be obeyed by everyone. All lower organisations must obey the directions of the higher organs, but a right of appeal is given to them, with the National Congress as the final arbiter.

The proposed constitution instituted a veritable revolution within the Party. Previously, the Party depended solely on the personality of Sun Yat-Sen. Everything was decided by him. There were no open discussions by Party members, but only occasional meetings with his chief lieutenants. These meetings were always informal, no vote being taken, and Sun Yat-Sen always dominated the situation. The result was a growing dissatisfaction among Sun's adherents—notably Wang Ching-Wei—who could not agree to being simply Sun's instruments, however greatly they respected him. Reorganisation, however, brought about a fundamental change ; it reconciled the principle of democracy with the needs of effective and centralised leadership ; it created an organisation even more coherent than the United League.

To determine the organisation of the First Congress, the method of election of delegates, and the number of delegates the different localities were entitled to send, Sun Yat-Sen appointed a Provisional Central Executive Committee, consisting of nine persons, of which he himself, Wang Ching-Wei, Hu Han-Min, Liao Chung-K'ai, Chang Chi, Chang Ching-Chiang, and Tai Chi-T'ao were the most important members, with Borodin acting as their adviser. This Committee met for the first time on October 25, 1923. It was found that, since the Party at that time operated to a great extent underground in enemy territory, the selection of delegates on purely elective lines, was impracticable. It was, therefore, decided that delegates should be elected by the localities, when possible, and the remainder designated by Sun Yat-Sen, taking the best advice he could get. In this way 199 delegates were sent to the Congress, not only from the eighteen provinces of China proper and the Three Eastern Provinces of Manchuria, but also from Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan, and from branches overseas as far as Sydney and New York. The delegates from the overseas and the dependencies were especially welcome. The former, because they reminded the Kuo-

Min Tang of the old days, when the Party owed its very existence to the material and moral support of the Chinese emigrants, the latter as symbolising the Kuo-Min Tang as the Party for the minority races. Mention must also be made that, for the first time, Chinese women were admitted to membership of a representative political assembly, namely Sung Ch'ing Ling (Madame Sun Yat-Sen), Ch'en Pi-Chün (Madame Wang Ching-Wei), and Ho Hsiang-Ning (Madame Liao Chung-K'ai), the two latter being prominent revolutionaries in their own rights. All opinions were represented in the Congress, from the most reactionary of the Old Guard, from the Anarchist, to the most violent of the Communist Left. The Congress was formally opened by Sun Yat-Sen in the evening of January 20, 1924, with an address in which the following significant passages occurred :

"This first Congress of the Kuo-Min Tang of China marks the beginning of a new era. Formerly, in 1911 when the Dynasty was overthrown by the revolutionary tide, the old reactionaries who had joined the movement with the view to monopolising its success used to say, 'Now the revolutionary armies are springing up, the Revolutionary Party should be dissolved.'¹ This saying was echoed blindly by many, with the result that people only saw the troops and not the Party. Militarism killed the revolutionary spirit, and with the failure of the Party came the failure of the Revolution. For the Revolution cannot succeed, without the guidance of the Revolutionary Party, whose mission it is to achieve the fundamental reconstruction of the country. . . .

"China as a nation is in a bad state. Its prospects to-day are worse than ever before. Nevertheless, there is still a way out and hope for a successful reconstruction. For thirty years the Revolutionary Party has, disregarding all consequences, been working for the Revolution. When this was accomplished we became at a loss as to

¹ Sun Yat-Sen was referring here to a saying of Chang T'ai-Yen, who went over to Yuan Shih-K'ai.

how to carry out the work of reconstruction. But now we have found the methods. It is for the purpose of presenting these for your consideration and adoption that we have gathered together the comrades from all over the world to meet here in congress. . . . These methods have been determined after careful study of, and comparison with, the revolutionary methods of other countries. They are not free from imperfections, hence the necessity for this Congress, and for your co-operation and revision. The task which lies before you is, therefore, twofold. Firstly, to reorganise the Kuo-Min Tang, so as to re-vitalise it into a powerful and organised political party. Secondly, to consider the ways and means to be adopted by the Party in the solution of the problem of national reconstruction. . . .

"There is another thing I want to call your attention to. That is that in former days our failure was not so much due to the fact that we had powerful enemies, as to our mind and discernment being immature. This caused senseless misunderstandings between ourselves, scattering the whole power of our Party, and resulting in the very failure of the Revolution. We were not destroyed by our enemies. We destroyed ourselves. Therefore, if we are going to succeed, we must be united and of one mind. In order to achieve this spiritual unity which is so vital to a political party, the comrades must be prepared to sacrifice their individual freedom, and to put all their ability at the disposal of the Party. In this way alone, can the Party itself both have freedom and command ability, and shoulder the great work of the Revolution, the reconstruction of the country. The failure of the Party in the past was due to the fact that while the individual member enjoyed freedom, the Party as a whole had none; that while the individual member possessed ability, the Party as a whole was deprived of it. Herein lay the failure of the Kuo-Min Tang. In re-organising the Party our task is, therefore, to rid the Party of all its shortcomings. . . ."

Thus, the Congress proceeded to consider the important proposals that were laid before it. Never before in the political history of modern China had a representative assembly taken on itself more momentous responsibility, inasmuch as the destiny of the Party and of the nation depended on its decisions. It is a testimony to the overwhelming personality of Sun Yat-Sen that, in spite of the tremendous opposition which his reorganisation proposals and his "Shake Hands With Russia" policy encountered from the veterans in the Party, the Congress as a whole accepted his guidance in its entirety, and was thereby enabled to give China, only after three days' meeting, its Charter of National Freedom and Independence, and a Programme of National Reconstruction.

The Manifesto of the First National Congress

This Charter of National Freedom and Independence is the celebrated Manifesto of the First National Congress, drafted by Wang Ching-Wei and mentioned by Sun Yat-Sen in his political testament.¹

In *The Present Situation in China* it was pointed out that the aim of the Revolution was not merely the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, but the establishment of a strong and efficient Government, which would liberate the Chinese people from the dominating influence of the Imperialist Powers, and restore China as an independent nation, by lifting her from the semi-colonial status to which she had been reduced. "But the realities of the situation were unfavourable to our revolutionary aim. Although the Revolution succeeded in its immediate object, what the Revolutionary Government really achieved was only the realisation of the principle of racial emancipation. And within a minimum of time circumstances

¹ It is often alleged, both by the Communists and the reactionaries, that this Manifesto was the work of Borodin. The truth is just the opposite. The draft was submitted by Wang Ching-Wei to Borodin for advice, who was not satisfied with it. Borodin wanted Wang to put forward the doctrine of the class struggle and the principle of the confiscation without compensation, but Wang steadfastly refused, and carried his point.

forced it into a compromise with reactionary despotism, which, indirectly, was also a concession to Imperialism, and the fundamental cause of the first defeat of the Revolution." It admitted, however, that defeat was unavoidable, partly owing to the reluctance among the revolutionary leaders to prolong the civil war, but chiefly owing to the absence of a coherent Party organisation and Party discipline, and to the fact that the majority of the Revolutionaries did not understand the very mission and aims of the Revolution. The Manifesto further recognised and emphasised, for the first time in an official pronouncement by the Party, the rôle played by foreign countries in the chaos in China. "The phantom government at Peking being under the control of the Militarists was utilised by them to court favour with the foreign Powers so as to strengthen their own positions. By means of loans from the Imperialists their war-chests were filled, and civil war in China thus became recurrent without end. This provided the Powers with an opportunity to fish in the troubled Chinese waters and enabled them to obtain such concessions and privileges, which, if carried into effect, would result in the absolute subjugation of China, in China becoming an international dependency. Imperialism and Militarism are working hand in hand to the lasting ruin of the people. Moreover, the chaos into which the country had fallen, frustrated the development of native industries and enabled foreign goods to reign supreme. Chinese industries cannot compete with foreign manufactures even in the home market. Not only politically, but also economically, we are in danger of extermination. Everywhere we see desperation and disintegration. The middle classes are suffering increasing hardship. The small merchants are becoming bankrupt. The handicraft workers are losing their employment, degenerating into vagrants and bandits. Farmers, unable to till their land, are selling out at ruinous prices. The cost of living is daily increasing and taxes are becoming unbearable. The arbitrary rule of

the Militarists and the domination of the Imperialists are getting worse every day, and China is sinking deeper and deeper into the hell of a semi-colonial condition."

The Manifesto proceeds to review the several proposals put forward to bring an end to the deplorable state into which China had gradually fallen since 1911, and mentions the constitutional, the federative, the peace conference, and the Government by merchants, solutions. It dismisses them all as futile or hypocritical, as they all leave the problem of Militarism and Imperialism untouched. "The only way out for China is the establishment of a genuine People's Government, by the realisation of the Three People's Principles through the National Revolution."

The Three People's Principles

The second part of the Manifesto contains the formulation of the Three People's Principles, or San Min Chu I, of Sun Yat-Sen, and constitutes the ideological basis of the Kuo-Min Tang programme. These Three Principles of Nationality, of Popular Sovereignty, of the People's Livelihood, have, in the course of their twenty years' development, undergone considerable changes in intent and scope.

Previous to the Republican Revolution of 1911, the principle of Nationality was known as the principle of racial struggle, and was in effect little more than primitive tribalism rationalised to serve as a weapon in the struggle against the Manchu oppressors. It was the corner-stone of revolutionary theory, and by emphasising the racial distinction between the ruling and the oppressed classes, succeeded in uniting the entire Chinese people against the Manchu Dynasty. With the establishment of the Republic, the conception became less narrow, acquiring the meaning of the union of the five racial groups, including the Manchus, which comprised the Chinese Republic, with a view to its liberation from all forms of exploitation by foreign Powers. The ideal was

the formation of a unitary national State. With the close of the Great War, a movement for independence began in Mongolia, and it was felt that if China was to win the sympathy of the oppressed peoples, she should reciprocate in her relations with the minority races in her own territory. The principle of Nationality thus acquired a two-fold aspect :

- (a) the emancipation of the Chinese people from Imperialist domination,
- (b) the complete equality of the nationalities composing the Chinese Republic, carrying with it the right of secession.

“ In the emancipation of the Chinese people the Kuo-Min Tang depends for its support on the masses of the country, on the intellectuals, the peasants, the labourers, and the merchants. For the principle of Nationality has the same meaning to all classes of the population, namely, their liberation from continued foreign control. There is no possibility of developing the national industries if China lies prostrate under the shackles of foreign economic control. Its effect on the condition of the working classes is still worse, since there can be no question of protecting them against the rapacity of the militarists and the capitalists, both native and foreign, as these latter are in league with the imperialists. The nationalism of the Kuo-Min Tang means unequivocal anti-Imperialism, and a conviction that the real freedom and independence of the nation can only be achieved by the close contact and co-operation of the Party and the masses of the people.”

With regard to the principle of racial equality within the Republic the Kuo-Min Tang dissociates itself from the policy pursued by the Peking mandarinat which has caused a widespread feeling of misgiving among the minority races. “ The Kuo-Min Tang is to establish an organised connection with the minority races in order that concrete measures may be devised for the solution of their specific problems and the realisation of their

specific needs. The interests of the minority races are bound together with the success of the National Revolution. The Kuo-Min Tang solemnly recognises the right of self-determination of all the races within the Republic of China, which, with the victory of the National Revolution over native militarism and foreign Imperialism, will be a free union of independent nations."

Coming to the Second Principle, it should be noted, that when Sun Yat-Sen first enunciated his doctrine of popular sovereignty, he had no personal experience of government. In advocating the granting to the people of the rights of election, of recall, of initiative and of referendum, and in proposing the five-fold division of constitutional authority by the establishment of the Five Independent Powers, i.e. legislative, executive, judiciary, examinatory and censorial, he was theoretically considering the ideal constitution for China which would supplement the shortcomings of the prevailing systems of representative government and rectify the evils of the purely elective system, both of which had tended to become the monopoly of the propertied classes. He had never been in favour of the Parliamentary system on the French model, which Sung Ch'iao-Jen was advocating, and which was subsequently embodied in the phantom constitution of 1923. He had vaguely in mind, the conception of the Three Stages, of the military, educative and constitutional period. The existence of the National Assembly in 1912, when he took office as Provisional President, did not fit in with his constitutional scheme, which required a preparatory period for the people to get rid of the slave-psychology, the natural product of the autocracy to which they had been subjected since time immemorial. The treachery of Yuan Shih-K'ai in 1913 forced him, to all intents and purposes, to embrace the cause of Parliament, which was the only bulwark against the new despotism. Events between 1917 and 1923, however, showed the essential rightness of his views, and the conception of the Three Stages was embodied in an

official document, the *Programme of National Reconstruction*, which, published in October after the First National Congress, may be regarded as the fundamental Constitution of the Chinese Republic. This provided that only when the period of Constitutional Government had been reached, should the Four People's Rights and the Five-Power Constitution become operative (Article 19). Sun Yat-Sen also came to the realisation that if the Revolution was to fulfil its mission, it should be made impossible for the counter-revolutionaries to carry on their intrigues. Thus, the Manifesto of the First National Congress views the principle of democracy not from the Utopian standpoint of the natural rights of mankind, but as a principle compatible with the revolutionary demands of China. "The Kuo-Min Tang shall see to it that the privileges of citizenship do not fall to those who are opposed to the Revolutionary State, to be used as an instrument against it. Only those who are loyal to the Revolution, and opposed to Imperialism, will enjoy the benefits of the Revolution. The enemies of the people and the traitors to the country will be debarred from the exercise of the privileges of citizenship." In this declaration is thus found the basis of a Party dictatorship as the sole expression of revolutionary power in China.

It was with regard to the Third Principle, the principle of the People's Livelihood, that the greatest trouble had arisen. Ever since the foundation of the United League, this principle formed part of the revolutionary programme, but in actual practice it had never been popular with the majority of the members of the League. Chu Chih-Hsin, Wang Ching-Wei, Hu Han-Min and Liao Chung-K'ai were the only ones who prior to the 1911 Revolution had discussed the subject with Sun Yat-Sen. During the period of the Nanking Provisional Government Sung Ch'iao-Jen even went so far as to advise Sun Yat-Sen to stick to the First and Second Principle, but "to talk no longer about the Principle of Livelihood". This

advice naturally enraged Sun, who, slapping the table, retorted, "The Revolution aims at the welfare of the people and the solution of the problem of livelihood. If we discard the Principle of Livelihood, we may as well give up the whole Revolution." In view of the opposition of the senior Party members, little progress was made with this principle, until the Russian Revolution in 1917 brought the whole question into prominence.

When Sun Yat-Sen first propounded his Three People's Doctrine, in 1905, the Principle of Livelihood, which was often referred to as Socialism, was interpreted to mean solely the equitable redistribution of land after the scheme of Henry George. Chu Chih-Hsin, who was a Marxist, saw the inadequacy of confining the Third Principle to the land question, but it was not until 1913 that Sun added to it the conception of the control of capital. The broadening of the livelihood principle, or, as Sun himself often translated it, the Principle of Socialism, coincided with the growth of capitalist industrialism in China. A Chinese industrial class had come into existence after the close of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, when the victory of Japan started the Second Reform Movement in China. The introduction of the factory methods of production to China by foreign capitalists was made possible, by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in 1895. It did not take long for the new industrial processes to find favour with the Chinese moneyed men, who also started building modern cotton and silk factories, ran river and coastal steamers, and conducted modern banks and financial houses. But the development of the Chinese industrial bourgeoisie was hampered by the feudalistic outlook and general inefficiency of the Imperial Government, by the artificially low tariff and by the unfair competition of the foreigner, whose goods were not only favoured in the matter of the inland transit duties, but who himself had preferential treatment owing to his exemption from Chinese taxes. With the establishment of the Republic, however, and the outbreak of the

European War which brought to China a temporary relief from foreign pressure, the industrialisation of China made real headway. This is clearly shown by the development of the textile industry and of modern banking. The first cotton mill in China was founded by Li Hung-Chang in 1890 as a semi-governmental concern with 65,000 spindles. In 1902 there were 17 mills with 564,000 spindles; by 1911, 32 mills with 831,000 spindles. But by 1924 the number of mills had increased to 124, of which 73 with 2,112,154 spindles were Chinese-owned, 46 with 1,218,544 spindles Japanese-owned, and 5 with 250,516 spindles were British. In 1912 there were only 9 modern Chinese banks; in 1913 the number grew to 14; in 1926 it had jumped to 141, with a total authorised capital of 315 million dollars.

While it is easy to exaggerate the extent and influence of the industrialisation of China, and while the bulk of the Chinese people are still living under the old economy of the agricultural village, the development of Chinese industrialism has, in spite of privileged foreign competition, by 1923 assumed such proportions as to put the Kuo-Min Tang on its guard against the evils of unrestricted capitalist industrialism. Thus, not only is the Principle of Livelihood to mean the equitable distribution of the land, through the instrumentality of taxation, and, if necessary, conditional expropriation, but private industries, whether Chinese or foreign owned, which partake of the nature of monopolies or are beyond the power of individual investment, such as banking, railway and steamship undertakings, should be managed or controlled by the State, in order that private capital may not have the power to interfere with the economic life of the people. In this interpretation, the Principle of Livelihood, informed as it is with the spirit of Socialism, still falls short of what is commonly regarded in the West as Socialism proper, but it is important to realise that any theory of social organisation must take into account the peculiar needs of the country if it is to be a practical issue. The

redistribution of wealth as the keynote of modern Socialism presupposes the existence of economic welfare, but, as Sun Yat-Sen remarks on some other occasion: "All Chinese are poor; there is no great Capitalist class. The difference between the rich and the poor in China is in fact the difference between the intolerably poor and the extremely poor."

To meet the immediate needs of the people—so as to give the Principle of Livelihood a concrete meaning to the masses, the Manifesto enumerates certain measures which directly promote the interests of the peasants and workers, such as State grants of land to landless peasants, improved irrigation schemes, provision of agricultural credit by the State, factory and labour legislation, unemployment relief, old age pensions, and the like. "For the success of the National Revolution depends on the participation of the peasants and the workers of the country. The Kuo-Min Tang is pledged to assist the peasant and the labour movements, and to raise the economic status of the peasant and workers, so as to increase the effective power of the National Revolution. It invites the peasants and workers to join the Party so as to secure a united front against the Militarists and Imperialists, in fighting whom the masses are effecting their own emancipation."

The second part of the Manifesto concluded by emphasising the necessity of maintaining a strong discipline within the Party, in order to maximise its influence and power. It stresses the importance of political training, and urges Party members to undertake an energetic propaganda for the principles of the Party, and to qualify themselves for leadership in the popular movements, so as to facilitate the success of the Revolution.

The principle of the Party dictatorship as the sole guarantee for the permanent enjoyment of the fruits of the Revolution is then explicitly put forward. "Only a well-organised Party in supreme authority can be trusted to deal effectively with the counter-revolutionary in-

triguers and Imperialist plotters, and bring about the full realisation of the Three People's Principles to the happiness of the masses and the glory of the country."

The Platform of the Kuo-Min Tang

The third part of the Manifesto is concerned with the series of concrete measures, which form its minimum and immediate programme. It is divided into two sections. The first section, containing six items, deals with international policy, the keynote of which is that "all unequal treaties, namely those establishing the foreign concessions in China, extraterritorial jurisdiction, the foreign control of the maritime customs, should be abolished, and the extra-legal privileges of foreigners, without any basis in law, but nevertheless endangering Chinese sovereignty, cancelled. New treaties on the basis of equality and mutual respect are to be negotiated." Those Powers which, on their own initiative, renounce their special privileges and voluntarily abrogate the treaties infringing on the sovereign rights of China, shall enjoy most favoured nation treatment. All international agreements, which are in any way detrimental to China's interests, will be revised on the principle of mutual respect of sovereign rights. China's external loans which are properly secured shall be repaid, provided that such repayments do not cause injury to her political and industrial interests. Foreign loans negotiated by irresponsible Chinese Governments, which by bribery and corruption have come into power, will be repudiated as these loans were made solely to maintain the existence of the Militarist cliques, the enemies of the people. A conference of delegates from social, commercial and financial organisations is to be called, for the purpose of devising ways and means of repaying the foreign indebtedness of China, in order to free her from the state of economic bondage arising out of the fiscal complications with the Powers.

It should be noted that the provisions relating to foreign loans indicated a concession on the part of the

Kuo-Min Tang to the Banking Consortium, which floated the 1913 Reorganisation Loan. It may be remembered that when this loan was concluded, Sun Yat-Sen and the Parliamentary leaders stigmatised it as illegal, and repudiated the responsibility of the Chinese people for its repayment. Under the terms of the Kuo-Min Tang declaration this loan is recognised in principle, but continuance of payment is made subject to future negotiations. It is only the unsecured Nishihara loans and a few other loans to Wu Pei-Fu and Chang Tso-Lin, which are unmistakably repudiated. As to industrial loans proper, there is, of course, no question of repudiation.

The domestic programme of the Kuo-Min Tang provides, in the first place, for the distribution of powers between the Central and Provincial Governments along the line of equilibrium, neither inclining towards centralisation nor towards decentralisation. An immediate beginning is to be made with self-government in the *hsien* or district. Military conscription is to be introduced, to put an end to the evils of the mercenary system, and special attention will be given to the vocational and political education of the soldiery. The Manifesto further emphasises the necessity of providing measures for the protection of the interests of the peasants and workers, such as the introduction of agrarian laws, social and labour legislation. The freedom of association, of speech, of publication, of domicile and of belief is to be incorporated in the law of the land. The legal, social, educational and economic equality between the sexes is recognised. Other provisions are included, indicating what the Kuo-Min Tang considers as the minimum basis of civilised existence.

The Constitution of the Kuo-Min Tang

The Manifesto to the Chinese People was passed on January 23. On January 28 it passed, with a few but significant dissenting votes, the Constitution of the Party. On the whole, the document voted by the Congress was

the same as the draft presented by Sun Yat-Sen. Sun, in his draft, abolished the Presidency of the Party, but the Committee appointed to report on the proposed Constitution, reinstated the institution of the Presidency as, in its view, the reorganisation was still in its transitional period, and was in need of the active guidance of Sun Yat-Sen. Thus, in the chapter on the Presidency it is stated that Sun Wen (Sun Yat-Sen), being the originator of the Three Principles and the Five Powers, is to be President for life. The Party, having as its aim the realisation of these theories, is to obey the direction of the President, who has the right to veto the decisions of the Central Executive Committee and the right to refer back resolutions of the National Congress.

In passing the Constitution of the Party, the Congress gave to the Party a new weapon which changed the entire political outlook in China. Previous to the reorganisation, the Party was on an individual basis, loosely organised and undisciplined. The Constitution provided for an integrated system with a central organ of direction and with local units as its foundation, emphasising the importance of obedience to Party orders, and the need of united action and thought.

The Entente with the Third International

Another momentous decision taken by the Congress was its endorsement of Dr Sun's policy of co-operation with Soviet Russia and of admitting the Communists into the Kuo-Min Tang. Sun pointed out that China was surrounded and menaced by the Imperialist Powers. The very Congress held its sittings under the guns of the foreign gunboats at Shameen (the foreign concession of Canton). The only way to deal with this Imperialist menace was to form a common front with anti-Imperialist Russia. In co-operating with Russia, it did not mean that China should adopt the Communist regime, but the Russian method of revolutionary organisation, which had

withstood the test of civil war and Imperialist invasion. Sun Yat-Sen then referred to the Joint Manifesto, which he signed with Joffe on January 26, 1923. In this Manifesto "Dr Sun Yat-Sen holds strongly that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot be actually introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions which might ensure the success of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr Joffe, who is further of opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence ; and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr Sun Yat-Sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia." "This", explained Sun, "means that Russia has no intentions of forcing Russian institutions upon China, nor of making Communist propaganda in China." As to the admittance of the Communists into the Party, Sun said, "The Communists are joining our Party in order to work for the National Revolution. We are, therefore, bound to admit them. If our own members are only active in their propaganda of the principles of the Party, and build up a strong organisation and submit unquestioningly to Party discipline, we need have nothing to fear from Communist machinations. In any case, if the Communists betray the Kuo-Min Tang, I will be the first to propose their expulsion."

Some delegate then suggested that if a Communist joined the Kuo-Min Tang, he should give up his membership of the Communist Party. Whereupon Li Ta-Chao, the leader of the Communist delegates, got up and made the following declaration: "We are joining the Kuo-Min Tang according to a resolution of the Chinese Communist Party. We cannot, therefore, repudiate our membership of the Communist Party just for the sake of joining the Kuo-Min Tang. But we do not join the Kuo-Min Tang collectively as a Party, but separately as individuals. In joining the Kuo-Min Tang, however, we

propose to abide by the Constitution of the Kuo-Min Tang and submit to its discipline. If we ever try to make Communist propaganda in the Kuo-Min Tang, the Kuo-Min Tang is free to punish us according to the rules of the Party." This declaration is accepted by the Congress at its full face value.

From the preceding paragraphs it is, therefore, clear that the Russian Entente and the admittance of the Communists are based on a clear and definite agreement, even if the terms of the agreement are not formally stated. Should Russia violate the Sun-Joffe Manifesto, or should the Chinese Communist Party instruct its members to make Communist propaganda inside the Kuo-Min Tang, the Kuo-Min Tang would be justified in severing its relations with Russia and the Third International. In spite of these conditions, however, there was no unanimity among the delegates, notably among the veterans of the Party. The group headed by Wang Ching-Wei, Hu Han-Min, Liao Chung-K'ai and Tai Chi-T'ao strongly supported the Russian orientation. A small but influential group led by Chang Chi, Lin Shen, Hsieh Ch'ih, actually disagreed, but they habitually obeyed Sun Yat-Sen and dared not raise their objections publicly. They were to create trouble in the Party afterwards. A third group under Feng Chih-Yü actively disagreed and left the Party to carry on their opposition in concert with the enemies of the Party.

On the last day of the Congress, January 30, Sun nominated a number of persons as members and deputy members for the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, who were all passed unanimously. The majority of the Central Executive Committee consisted of old Kuo-Min Tang members, with only three Communists, but among the deputy members, the Communists were more numerous than the proper Kuo-Min Tang members. The Central Supervisory Committee consisted entirely of veteran Kuo-Min Tang members. A notable feature was the absence of Sun Fo, the son of

Sun Yat-Sen, from the list of nominations, in spite of the pressure put on Dr Sun to include him.

In concluding this chapter, two incidents occurred at the Congress which deserve a brief mention. On January 24, the Congress learnt that J. Ramsay MacDonald had been charged with the formation of a Government in Great Britain, and Sun Yat-Sen thus decided, on behalf of the National Congress, to send a telegram of congratulation to the first Labour Prime Minister of England. No acknowledgment was, however, received. The following day, the official news of the death of Lenin which had taken place on the 21st, arrived at Canton. The Congress at once adjourned for a few minutes in order to record its sympathy with the Russian people, and for three days no official banquets were given as a sign of mourning. Russia officially thanked the Congress by a telegram from Chicherin, the Foreign Commissar.

CHAPTER XI

THE CONQUEST OF KWANGTUNG PROVINCE

The Reorganised Party

ON January 17, 1924, while the Congress was still sitting, Sun Yat-Sen gave the first of his weekly lectures on the *Three Principles of the People*. The majority of his followers, notably the veterans of the Party, were men of action, but, with a few exceptions, they had no clear political principles. Sun's object was to make them understand the basic ideas of the Party and the aims and ideals of the Chinese Revolution, as he fully realised that without a distinctive revolutionary philosophy, no fundamental reconstruction was possible. In 1918 he had already published his *Plans for National Reconstruction* consisting of three parts: "Psychological Reconstruction," "Material Reconstruction," "Social Reconstruction," and he had planned to write another series under the title of *Reconstruction of the State*. This was to include eight parts: "The Principle of Nationalism," "The Principle of Democracy," "The Principle of Livelihood," "The Quintuple Power Constitution," "Local Government," "Central Government," "Foreign Policy," "National Defence." The sudden revolt of Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming, however, resulting in the destruction of his notes and finished manuscripts, put an end to the whole scheme, and Sun, owing to pressure of other work, was obliged to propound his social and political philosophy in the form of lectures, extemporaneously given. His other object in giving these lectures was to make the Communists understand that the Kuo-Min Tang had its own principles and policies, so as to give them no excuse

for breaking their undertaking not to make any Communist propaganda in the Party. These lectures were taken down in shorthand and published under the title of *San Min Chu I* (The Three Principles of the People). Unfortunately, however, his lectures on the Principle of Livelihood were interrupted by his trip to the North, and were never completed because of his death. While unable to write in detail about his political system, he did succeed in drafting the so-called *Programme of National Reconstruction*, consisting of twenty-five articles, in which he formulated his social, political and administrative ideas. This document, which gave prominence to the conception of the Three Stages of Reconstruction, was published on October 13, 1924, with an introduction by Wang Ching-Wei, who emphasised the dangers of the premature introduction of the Constitutional Stage. The *Programme of National Reconstruction* is of the greatest importance, as it constitutes the basis on which any future Chinese Constitution is to be built.

Sun Yat-Sen's second task was to awaken the masses of the Chinese people from their long lethargy. He gave special attention to the organisation of peasants and workers, encouraging the formation of peasant and labour unions, and of small merchants' and students' organisations. The two slogans he formulated were: "Peasants, Workers, Merchants, Students, Unite!" "Help the Peasants and the Workers!" Around these two slogans hundreds of mass organisations were formed. Sun Yat-Sen also established a Labour and Peasant Workers' Department under the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang, and, indicative of the importance with which he regarded it, he appointed Liao Chung-K'ai, one of his most important lieutenants, as its head.

Thirdly, Sun established the Military Academy at Whangpoa, with a view to training the officers for the Party Army, which he had in mind. The Academy was organised on Russian lines, and Chiang K'ai-Shih, who was the first Chinese officer who had been to Soviet

Russia, was appointed the Director of the Academy. Russian officers were appointed advisers and professors, and the greater part of the finances of the Academy and practically the whole of its initial equipment were given by Russia, without whose help the Academy would probably never have come into existence. As it was, the Academy became one of the most important creations of Sun Yat-Sen. It was here that Wang Ching-Wei, who had become the Head of the Propaganda Department under the Central Executive Committee, gave his famous lectures on the History and Principles of the Kuo-Min Tang. These lectures formed the most important course of the Academy and were attended by Chiang K'ai-Shih himself, by every professor and cadet.

The reorganisation of the Party, together with the establishment of the Central Party Headquarters and its different organs at Canton, made the Party a living reality. For the first time propaganda among the masses was seriously undertaken, directly and through the mass organisations. The Chinese youth, idealistic and fearless, were especially attracted to it, and joined in increasing numbers. Being very active and alert, they rendered great service as propagandists and organisers of mass movements. All over the country and overseas, branches were established. Trouble was, however, brewing inside the ranks of the Party over the question of the Communist members, who, prominent in the mass organisations, began to excite the jealousy of the older members. Ill-feeling became so pronounced that Sun Yat-Sen felt constrained to summon a joint meeting of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees in order to deal with the matter. This joint conference exhorted both sides to keep the peace, and to co-operate loyally in all activities. Supporting the co-operation between Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party, the Conference had the effect of accentuating the gulf between the Left and Right Wings. The Left are for a strong organisation and a strict discipline, in the spirit of the Manifesto

of the First National Congress. They advocate the policy of awakening the masses of the people and of soliciting their support in the struggle against Militarism and Imperialism. They form the majority of the reorganised Party, and of the new members attracted to the Party, because of the very aggressiveness of the new spirit. The Right consist mainly of the veterans of the Party, of old officials, bureaucrats and militarists, who object to organisation and discipline. Their fundamental aim in being members of the Kuo-Min Tang was to overthrow the Northern Militarists, but only so that they could themselves replace them; they did not want to bring in the masses and so divide the spoils of victory.

Canton was at that time still under the control of Yang Hsi-Min and Liu Chen-Huan; corruption and extortion were rampant. In these circumstances it was natural that the Chinese youth and students rallied to the Left, which they identified with a new social and political order. The Communists also did their best to help the Left; they aimed at winning the confidence of the Left leaders and in this way consolidating their own position. It must be clearly understood that by the term Left is meant pure Kuo-Min Tang, not Communist. In order to discredit the Left, however, the Right spread the rumour that the Left had ceased to be Kuo-Min Tang, and had turned completely Communist and were under the absolute domination of Moscow. Sun Yat-Sen at last became tired of the obstructive tactics of the Right, and decided to get rid of them. To accomplish this he established the Political Council, which was to be the only body competent to assist him in making political decisions. From this Political Council—which consisted of himself as Chairman, Wang Ching-Wei, Hu Han-Min, Liao Chung-K'ai, Tai Chih-T'ao, C. C. Wu, the Foreign Minister, who was not a member of the Central Executive Committee, and the Communist T'an P'ing-Shan—he excluded the Right altogether. Henceforth the Right was doomed to inaction at Canton.

The Revolt of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps

Owing to the systematic oppression and extortion under the rule of Yang and Liu, a widespread dissatisfaction existed among the merchants of Canton, who were the chief victims of their misrule. In order to safeguard their own interests and in self-defence, they organised the Merchants' Volunteer Corps. In this they were supported by Sun Yat-Sen, who was doing his best to curb the piratical activities of Yang and Liu, and on the day of their inauguration, he presented the Corps with its official banner. Unfortunately, however, the Corps soon changed its nature. The enemies of the Kuo-Min Tang were getting active. They misrepresented the peasant and labour policy of the Party. The nervous merchants and rich peasants took the fright, and led by Ch'en Lien-Pai, the local compradore of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, they began to turn against the very Government which wanted to bring an end to the oppressive regime of Yang and Liu. Thus, they made secret connections with Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming and proposed a compromise with Yang and Liu. Instead of helping the reformers, they now directed their efforts towards the overthrow of Sun Yat-Sen, by making an alliance with the very people responsible for the corruption in Canton. The Merchants' Volunteer Corps had, without the knowledge of the Government, bought some 10,000 rifles and 3,000,000 cartridges. This consignment arrived at Canton on August 10, on board the Norwegian steamer *Hav*. The War Office was then approached for a licence to import rifles, but the fact that those rifles had already arrived was not disclosed at the time of application. The official in charge at the War Office carelessly granted the licence. This was, however, brought at once to the knowledge of Sun Yat-Sen, who summarily dismissed the official and ordered the detention of the *Hav*. He then summoned Ch'en Lien-Pai and Ch'en Kung-Shou, the leaders of the Corps, but both had already fled to Hongkong. This was on the 11th. After some negotiation,

however, Sun agreed, after investigation, to return the rifles to the Volunteer Corps, a line of action which incurred him the displeasure of many of his own supporters. Liao Chung-K'ai, the Governor of Canton, went so far as to resign, and his place was taken by Hu Han-Min, who adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the Corps. The Corps grew more and more restive and insolent; their propaganda became violent. On August 20, they declared a general stoppage of business, and started erecting barricades in the Saikuan district of Canton. Sun Yat-Sen thereupon declared the importation of the rifles as constituting an act of high treason, which would be prevented with all the forces at his disposal, and warned the Corps that if they continued to make war-like preparations, he would not hesitate to open fire on them. At this point, the British intervened. On August 26, Sir Bertram Giles, the British Consul at Canton, suddenly delivered a message to Sun Yat-Sen to the effect that he had received word from the Senior Naval Officer at Canton that, acting on the instructions of his Hongkong superiors, he was to take energetic action with all the naval forces at his disposal in the event of the Chinese authorities firing on the city. The British ultimatum clearly indicated that Ch'en Lien-Pai had managed to persuade the Hongkong authorities to interfere, in his favour, in what was essentially an internal Chinese affair.

Sun Yat-Sen was dumbfounded at the British action. The advent of the British Labour Party to Office had filled him with the hope that a new spirit had entered into British policy towards China, that Britain would abandon what was rightly called the "Gunboat" policy. He had expected that the British Labour Cabinet would sympathise with his efforts to put an end to the misrule of the reactionaries and militarists in China. Instead, he found that a change in the Cabinet in London did not affect in the slightest the British traditional policy of supporting every conceivable "strong man" in China

against the forces of democracy and progress. He, therefore, instructed C. C. Wu, the Foreign Minister, to draft a reply to the British Ultimatum, but when the draft was presented to him, he thought it too feeble. Ch'en Yu-Jen (Eugen Ch'en) was then asked to draft one, which he accepted, and published on September 1 in the form of a Manifesto. After referring to the universal disappointment in China caused by the continuation of the "Gunboat" policy by the Labour Government, the Manifesto stated :

"My Government repudiates the suggestion that it desired to open fire against a defenceless town, as it merely concerns the district of Saikuan, the stronghold of the Ch'en Lien-Pai rebels. But this perfidious suggestion, coming from the perpetrators of the massacre of Singapore, of the slaughter of Amritsar, and of other atrocities, committed in Egypt and Ireland, is only a specimen of British hypocrisy. In my own country, at Wanh sien, quite recently, the bombardment of a defenceless town by British naval forces was only avoided by the sacrifice of two of my compatriots, who were summarily decapitated without any trial, to satisfy a bloodthirsty Imperialism. Is it because such crimes can be perpetrated with impunity, in our weak and disunited country, that now British naval forces threaten to bombard a Chinese town again ?

"I see in this defiance of British Imperialism, a more profound and sinister meaning. Considering this fact in the light of the diplomatic and moral support which the Imperialist Powers have given, and of the hundreds of millions which they have benevolently lent for the last twelve years to the counter-revolution, it is impossible for me not to see in it a premeditated effort to destroy the Revolutionary Government of which I am the Head. In effect, the open revolt against this Government of the most devoted agent (Ch'en Lien-Pai) and the most powerful instrument of British Imperialism (the Hong-kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) is supported

by the self-styled British Labour Government, which prevented me from utilising the only measure which could save me effectively.

"Is it the Revolutionary Government that Imperialism wants to destroy? It is the only directing body in the country that means to conserve the spirit of the Revolution. It is the sole centre of resistance against the counter-revolution, and it is against this that British guns are directed.

"Formerly the battle-cry of the Revolution was the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty. Henceforth it will be the overthrow of Foreign Imperialism in China, whose intervention is the principal obstacle to the achievement of the historic mission of the Revolution."

Owing to the British intervention the situation in Canton remained at a deadlock. Meanwhile, war had broken out again in the North between Tuan Ch'i-Jui and Wu Pei-Fu, and between Chang Tso-Lin and Ts'ao K'un. By the terms of the Triple Alliance this also meant war for Sun Yat-Sen against Wu Pei-Fu. Sun, therefore, left everything at Canton to Hu Han-Min and took charge himself of the Expeditionary Forces against Wu Pei-Fu. He established his headquarters at Shaokuan, and from there he issued, on the 5th, 10th and 18th September, three manifestoes to the people, explaining the aim of the Expedition and soliciting the support of the people.

Sun's departure from Canton gave courage to the Fascist rebels, who grew more and more insolent. In order to pacify them, Hu Han-Min, the Governor of Canton, decided to compromise and to return the confiscated rifles to the Merchants' Volunteer Corps. This happened on October 10, China's Independence Day. But as soon as the Corps had possession of the rifles, they started mobilising and barricading the streets in the West District, the Merchant Quarters. Meeting with a procession of students, peasants, workers, women and shop employees, they suddenly opened fire on them, causing several hundred of casualties. A police detach-

ment came on the scene to restore order, but the Volunteers fired at them too, killing and wounding many of them. Not content with this unnecessary bloodshed they then mutilated the bodies of the fallen. For the Volunteer Corps consisted in the main, not of merchants themselves, but of hirelings recruited from bandits and vagabonds.

Sun Yat-Sen was informed by telegraph about the event. He immediately cabled back, appointing Wang Ching-Wei, Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, Eugen Ch'en, Liao Chung-K'ai and Chiang K'ai-Shih as a Commission Extraordinary with full powers to suppress the revolt. Hu Han-Min the Governor was excluded, as Sun thought him unfit to take part in the suppression, his policy of excessive compromise having led directly to the revolt. The composition of the Commission indicated that Wang and Liao were to take charge of political affairs, Hsü and Chiang of military affairs, and Eugen Ch'en of diplomatic affairs. It was generally known that Yang and Liu were secretly backing the Volunteers, so the only military forces available to deal with the situation were those of Hsü and Chiang. But Chiang's cadets had only a training of about six months, and were badly equipped.

The first task of the Commission was to secure the neutrality of Yang and Liu. This was done with some difficulty. All Party members were then mobilised for propaganda work among the citizens of Canton. Then, on October 15, Hsü gave the order to the Kwangtung Army to attack the West District, and after a fight of two days the Volunteers were defeated and disarmed. It was a comparatively easy success, for although the Volunteers consisted of professional soldiers and were well armed, they were no good for fighting. Moreover, although there were many in Canton who were sympathetic to the cause of the Merchants, it was realised that they had spoilt their case by their relations with Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, with Hongkong, and with Yang and Liu. The barbarous atrocities they committed finally destroyed all the sympathy people might have had with them.

The swift victory of the Government, however, astonished them all alike.

Sun Yat-Sen's visit to the North

While the situation in Canton had been clarified by the defeat of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps, in the North the Triple Alliance was also victorious, owing to the defection from Wu Pei-Fu of Feng Yü-Hsiang, who was tired of the internecine strife. Feng, who held the capital Peking, put up Tuan Ch'i-Jui as the Chief Executive in the place of the deposed President Ts'ao K'un. Tuan thereupon despatched Hsü Hsi-Ying, his secretary, to the South for the purpose of inviting Sun Yat-Sen to Peking in order to discuss measures for the rehabilitation of the country. Feng Yü-Hsiang re-enforced the invitation by a very cordial personal telegram.

As peace had been re-established in the North, the Expedition against Wu Pei-Fu was called off, and Sun decided to accept the invitation of Tuan and Feng. He appointed Hu Han-Min to act for him as Generalissimo, and instructed Hsü and Chiang to pay special attention to the training of the Party Army. Liao was appointed Party Representative in the Party Army and in all the Cadet Schools; his function was to supervise the political education of the soldiers and officers and to countersign all orders given by the military commanders. Sun's idea was to maintain the political *status quo* in the South; for this he charged Hu Han-Min with the responsibility. The execution of the constructive part of his policy was entrusted to Liao, Hsü and Chiang. Wang Ching-Wei he appointed his Chief-of-Staff during the trip to the North.

On his departure from Canton on November 11, he instructed Wang to issue a Manifesto to explain to the Chinese people his present move. The Manifesto reiterated the aim of the Chinese Revolution and of the Northern Expedition as being not only the overthrow of Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-Fu, but the overthrow, once and for all, of all Militarism in China, the prevention of any

Militarist after the fashion of Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-Fu from springing up again. Not only Militarism, but also foreign Imperialism on which the native Militarist depended for his support. In order to attain these objects a National People's Assembly should be summoned as a first step.

Sun and Wang went first to Shanghai, where they parted. Sun crossed over to Japan, Wang proceeded straight to Tientsin, where he was to wait until Sun's arrival. By that time the situation in Peking had become unfavourable to Sun. Feng Yü-Hsiang, who had been most anxious to meet and welcome Sun, had had to leave Peking on December 19 for the Wu T'ai Shan mountains north-west of Peking, because of a disagreement with Chang Tso-Lin, regarding the settlement of the situation. For although Chang agreed with Feng in putting Tuan as Chief Executive, he did not intend to co-operate with him, nor with Tuan, whom he merely intended to be a figurehead; and in effect Tuan's office became of less importance than Chang's secretariat. For Chang's intention was to get the control over the territories vacated by Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-Fu, and subsequently also over the Yangtse Valley. Chang and Tuan had, however, this in common, that they were both essentially feudal Militarists, aiming at the perpetuation of the corrupt regime of Peking. They proposed the so-called Rehabilitation Conference, which, according to Tuan's decree of December 24, was to be composed of "the great military chiefs, high civil officials, and some thirty notable citizens designated by the Provisional Chief Executive. . . . It is to deal with the reorganisation of the Army, the consolidation of the finances, the method of convoking an Assembly of representatives of the people . . ."

Such a scheme would, of course, not carry Sun's approval. While he was in Japan delivering his famous lectures on the Pan-Asiatic ideal, and advocating the convocation of a National People's Assembly, he had a cordial welcome from the Japanese radicals, but the Japanese authorities treated him coolly. He deduced

therefrom a secret co-operation between Tuan and the Japanese Government, whom he suspected of acting on a hint from Tuan, the leading pro-Japanese in China. He had intended to visit Tokio, but the attitude of the Japanese Government made him decide to cancel his visit to the Japanese capital, and from Osaka he went straight to Tientsin, arriving there on December 4. On his arrival at Tientsin, the French Consul intimated to him that his stay in the French Concession was not desired. A welcome demonstration which was prepared for him in the streets of the concession through which he was to pass after his embarkation, was also forbidden, on the ground that the students who were waiting for him on the quay carried with them red flags. In spite of everything, however, the masses of the people in Tientsin gave him such an enthusiastic welcome that Sun himself was surprised, for he did not expect to have such a hold on the imagination of the people in the North.

Sun remained in Tientsin nearly a month. He had arrived a sick man, and had to stay in bed all the time. Nevertheless, he retained a close hold on the direction of general affairs, leaving to Wang Ching-Wei only the execution of his decisions. He had made up his mind to abstain from the Rehabilitation Conference, which was convened by Tuan for February 1. Instead he concentrated on the organisation of the masses and the establishment of Party branches. He pushed the propaganda of the idea of the National People's Assembly. This was to consist of representatives of :

- (1) the industrial organisations,
- (2) the merchant organisations,
- (3) the educational associations,
- (4) the universities,
- (5) the provincial students' unions,
- (6) the labour unions,
- (7) the peasant associations,
- (8) the armies opposed to Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-Fu,
- (9) the political parties with a definite programme.

The members of the Assembly were to be elected by the organisation they were to represent, and not nominated by the Government. Their function would be to settle, in the first place, the internal difficulties of China; secondly, the relationship with the foreign Powers, including the question of the abolition of the Unequal Treaties. These proposals were enthusiastically received all over the country, and from as far as Canada and Paris telegrams poured in at Peking and Tientsin in their support.

In spite of his extreme weakness, Sun decided to leave Tientsin on December 31 for Peking. On his arrival at Peking, however, the doctors ordered him a complete rest. His illness continued to aggravate, and on January 26, 1925, he entered the Peking Medical Union Hospital to be operated on. The operation disclosed the fact that Sun had been suffering for a long time from cancer in the liver, which had now reached its last stage. His death-sentence was pronounced.

The Death of Sun Yat-Sen

When the news of Sun Yat-Sen's incurable illness got abroad, there was consternation among his closest followers. For the political and military situation was getting very bad for the Kuo-Min Tang. They had practically no military force behind them and were opposed by practically all the Militarists of China. In Peking they were under the very roof of Tuan Ch'í-Jui and Chang Tso-Lin. In spite of the country's wide support, which the proposals of the National People's Assembly contained, and the numerous demonstrations condemning Tuan's proposed Rehabilitation Conference, the political future of the Kuo-Min Tang was very dark. The imposing personality of Sun Yat-Sen, which had kept the Party together ever since its inception at the Tung Meng Hui, was fading into the background. Many Party members had come to Peking to see Sun for the last time, and had started discussing what to do with

the Party in the event of Sun's death. One group under Feng Chih-Yü had already openly revolted against Sun Yat-Sen, and had joined the Anfu Clique of Tuan, on the ground that he was against the Russian orientation and the Communist alliance of Sun, but in reality because he was against all organisation and discipline. A group of veterans of the Party, the so-called Old Comrades, were also of opinion that the Reorganisation of 1924 should be revoked after Sun's death. Prominent among these were Chang Chi and Wu Chih-Hui. Chang Chi had already before revolted against Sun, in Tokio in 1907, in the company of Chang T'ai-Yen. He was the person responsible for the introduction of Li Ta-Chao, the Communist leader, to the Kuo-Min Tang, but raised objections to the general co-operation with the Communists, when he saw that the result of the Reorganisation of 1924 had resulted in the tightening of organisation and discipline. Wu Chih-Hui was the oldest of the Party members, being six or eight years Sun's senior. He had never been very active in the Party, neither in organisational nor in propaganda work. He was a famous scholar, being the principal exponent of the scientific view of life in China. His advice to the Chinese intelligentsia, to study science and bury the Confucian books in the cellar for at least thirty years, had become classical. Unfortunately, he meddled from time to time in politics. He was a theoretical anarchist, and had once even published a monthly journal, the *New Century*, for the purpose of propagating anarchism in China. In 1922 when Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming rebelled against Sun, Wu tried to act as mediator in the conflict, but the formula he proposed made him the laughing-stock in the Party. In 1924 he took part in the reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang, and supported the policy of admitting the Communists into the Party. "The Communists intend to co-operate with the Kuo-Min Tang just as we anarchists want to help the Kuo-Min Tang for the benefit of the people." In a letter, dated May 15, 1924, to a fellow-

anarchist, Hua Ling, who criticised him and his friend, Li Shih-Ts'eng, for taking an active part in the Kuo-Min Tang, he wrote, "My anarchism cannot be realised before three thousand years." That was why he joined the Kuo-Min Tang and exhorted his fellow-anarchist to follow suit, quoting Kropotkin, who also assisted the Bolsheviks. His anarchism soon took the upper hand, and he recanted his views regarding the Communists, making himself thereby very popular among the reactionaries of the Party, who hailed him as their leader. One good thing, however, can be said about him, and that is, that there has never been any doubt about his own personal integrity, he never having had any connections with the Militarists, nor any desire for office.

In view of the dissensions within the ranks of the Kuo-Min Tang, which had already led to the formation of an anti-Communist group some forty strong, the situation at Peking was very serious indeed. Tuan and his fellow-Militarists were openly rejoicing at the impending split in their opponents' ranks. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-Sen's condition was causing great anxiety. On February 24, at 4.25 p.m., the attending physician declared that Sun's life would be ended in a few days. Wang Ching-Wei, who was at his bedside, thereupon asked Madame Sun and Sun Fo, his son, to appear before Sun to ask him for his testament. Madame Sun, however, was too overtaken by sorrow to desire to undertake the delicate task. It was, therefore, proposed by those present that Wang himself should speak with Sun on their behalf. In the sick-room only a few were present beside Sun and Wang, but in the adjoining room there were many assembled, and every word spoken in the sick-room could be heard by the others.

Wang began the conversation by saying that the comrades were very desirous to act according to the ideals and principles propounded by Sun. "By giving them your instructions, you will greatly add to their courage. Since you are ill, and since it will take at least a year or

so for you to recover, your instructions are urgently necessary at this moment." Sun asked, "What do you want me to say?" Wang: "We have written out the ideas you so often spoke about—'For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the People's Revolution, whose aim is to win for China national liberty and international equality. From the gathered experience of these forty years I have come to the realisation that the only way to attain this object is by awakening the masses of the people and by joining hands with those nations in the world that treat us as equals in our struggle for the common cause. The Revolution is as yet unfinished. I thus exhort the comrades in the Party to continue, until victory is attained, the fight for the realisation of our goal, in accordance with the *Plans for National Reconstruction* (Chien Kuo Fang Lueh), the *Programme of National Reconstruction* (Chien Kuo Ta Kang), the *Three Principles of the People* (San Min Chu I), and the Manifesto of the First National Congress. Especially my reasoned designs for the convening of a National People's Assembly, and for the abolition of the Unequal Treaties, should be fulfilled within the shortest possible time. This is my Last Will.'" Sun signified his approval and then gave the following warning, "Your attitude is clear. But you are in a dangerous position, as the political enemies are preparing to demoralise you after my death. Standing firm, you must consider the dangers ahead." Wang replied, "We are not afraid of dangers, but we will act according to your instructions." Wang then asked Sun to give his family will, and read out the following draft: "Having devoted my life entirely to the service of the people, I have not had an opportunity to build up a personal fortune. I bequeath all I possess, my books, clothes, house and the rest, to my wife, Sung Ch'ing-Ling. My children are grown up and well able to take care of themselves. I hope they will agree to this arrangement and continue the work which I have left unfinished." This too was approved by Sun. When

asked to sign the two documents, however, he refused, saying that it was not necessary yet. The conversation, which is of great historical importance, was taken down by Wang *ad verbatim*, and a minute to that effect was signed by Wang and witnessed by K'ung Hsiang-Hsi, Sung Tze-Wen, Sun Fo and Tsou Lu. The wills were signed on March 11 and witnessed, apart from Wang Ching-Wei, by Sung Tze-Wen, Sun Fo, Shao Yuan-Ch'ung, Tai En-Sai, Wu Ching-Heng (Wu Chih-Hui), Ho Hsiang-Ning (Madame Liao Chung-K'ai), Tai Chi-T'ao, and Tsou Lu. On that day Sun also signed a farewell message to Soviet Russia, which Eugen Ch'en had drafted in English.¹ The signing of the documents by Sun took place shortly before 11 a.m. Sun was then still able to converse with his family and friends.

His conversation was still very clear and intelligible. It was only at night that his aspiration weakened, to become discontinuous at 3 a.m. of March 12, and to stop altogether at 9.30 a.m. His last words were "Peace", "Struggle", "Save China".

The Defeat of the Kwangtung Militarists

With the passing of Sun Yat-Sen China lost her greatest son, the oppressed peoples and classes of the world their greatest friend, and the Chinese Revolution its leader. How his death affected the hearts of the Chinese people can be gauged from the fact that, when on March 20, his body was removed to the Central Public Garden to lie in state, over a hundred thousand people followed

¹ A controversy has lately arisen around the authenticity of Sun Yat-Sen's political testament. The rumour has been circulated by the Right that Sun's Will was in fact a forgery of the Left, if not of Borodin. It should be noted that among those who signed the minute of the conversation and the Will only Wang Ching-Wei and Ho Hsiang Ning belonged definitely to the Left; Shao Yuan-Ch'ung, Tsou Lu and Wu Chih-Hui were members of the extreme Right, the so-called Western Hills group. As to Borodin, ever since January 26, the day of Sun's operation, he had not called on Sun at all, except on March 11 when Sun was already half-unconscious. The original documents are at present in the hands of Wang Ching-Wei, who was the author of all the important manifestoes issued by Sun Yat-Sen ever since the foundation of the Tung Meng Hui.

the procession. And this was in Peking, the stronghold of military feudalism and corrupt bureaucracy.

But while the masses of China were bemoaning the loss of the greatest leader of all times, the Militarists and other counter-revolutionaries felt a profound relief. Their most formidable enemy had gone, never to return, and they at once got busy with their plottings and intrigues. In the South, already in January, when the news of Sun's fatal illness became known, Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming had started making connections with Tuan Ch'i-jui and had made a secret agreement with Yang and Liu. Liu had even gone to Yunnan to see T'ang Chi-Yao, and had proposed to back him for the succession to Sun, if he would send an army through Kwangsi to assist him in the capture of Canton.

Canton was, therefore, to be attacked from three sides ; from the West by T'ang Chi-Yao, from the East by Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, and from the inside by Yang and Liu. For the defence of Canton the Government could only rely on the forces of Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and Chiang K'ai-Shih. The expeditionary forces against Wu Pei-Fu had, on Sun's departure for the North, fallen under the command of T'an Yen-K'ai, who was not much good as a commander. T'an had attacked Kiangsi, but had been heavily defeated. He came back to Kwangtung with a demoralised army. Hsü's army was in good order. After his defeat in the spring of 1923, Hsü had become very active in the reorganisation of his army, and had already spent two years in training it, ably assisted by Chang Wen-Ta, the commander of the Second Division. Chiang's forces consisted entirely of Whangpoa cadets, but in equipping these Chiang had no free hand, being dependent for money and munitions on Yang and Liu, who kept a close watch on their activities. In spite of these difficulties, Chiang and Liao had been able to organise a model regiment, the superior officers of which were professors, and the lower, graduates of the Academy. The soldiers were professional hirelings, but they had

been given not only a military, but also a political training. To all intents and purposes Chiang's regiment was a Party army, which, because of the secret aid from Russia and other voluntary contributions, was efficient to an extent that Yang and Liu could not realise. They even despised it, as this regiment had had no previous fighting experience at all. But Yang and Liu were soon to be disappointed.

On February 23, Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming started the offensive against Canton, first attacking Hsü, who was stationed East of the city. Chiang's regiment now at once combined with Hsü's forces to meet the attack, and after a struggle lasting several days, Ch'en's rebels were heavily defeated. The news of the victory reached Sun Yat-Sen just shortly before his death. Among the documents found in Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's headquarters were letters relating to the secret negotiations with Yang and Liu, thus confirming the suspicions of Hsü and Chiang, who were now preparing to attack them. Yang and Liu decided to wait for the arrival of T'ang Chi-Yao's army from the West, before openly revolting.

After Sun's death, Wang Ching-Wei decided to remain in Peking with a view to organising the National People's Assembly in opposition to the sitting Rehabilitation Conference of Tuan. Owing to the strain in attending to Sun's illness and funeral arrangements, he had fallen seriously ill. On recovering and while still convalescent he wrote his famous treatise *China and the Nations*, in which he explained the reference to the Unequal Treaties in Sun's political testament. Intended as a draft report to be submitted to the National People's Assembly, which was never held, the book had a tremendous circulation in China, and was translated into several languages.

The comrades in the South, however, desired his immediate return, as the situation became critical. Hsü, Chiang and Liao sent him daily cables pressing him to leave Peking. Wang finally yielded to their demand, knowing fully well that by so doing the convocation of

the National People's Assembly had to be postponed indefinitely, and at the beginning of May he arrived at Swatow, where he met Hsü and Chiang. These two were there with their troops, engaged in clearing up Eastern Kwangtung of Ch'en's remnants, not caring very much about the threatened revolt of Yang and Liu, as they had gained a new stronghold in Swatow. Three days after Wang's arrival Liao also arrived at Swatow to report on the situation at Canton. Hsü and Chiang had by that time decided to return to Canton to start the attack on Yang and Liu, when Liao reported that he had already made arrangements with the Hunan Army of T'an Yen-K'ai, the Yunnan Army of Chu Pei-Teh, and the Kwangtung Army under Liang Hung-K'ai, Li Chi-Tsen, Li Fu-Lin, and Wu T'ieh-Ch'eng to make a combined attack on Yang and Liu. On learning this, Wang decided that he should return to Canton at once with Liao, while Hsü and Chiang were to lead back the troops to Canton.

The situation at Canton, however, was complicated owing to the internal conflicts among the leading members of the Government. There was first the conflict between Hsü, Chiang and Liao, and Hu Han-Min, the acting Generalissimo.

The causes were complex, but the main one was that the elder brother of Hu Han-Min, Hu Ch'ing-Sui, who had no official standing in the Government, had surreptitiously acquired the control of the Kwangtung finances by inducing Hu Han-Min to farm out the different provincial taxes to companies in which he was interested, and from which he received a substantial commission. Hu's younger brother, Hu I-Sheng, had further entered into relations with Yang. All this was a public secret. Nevertheless, Hu Han-Min took no measures against his brothers, to the great annoyance of his colleagues, especially as the situation in the Party and Government was critical owing to Sun's death.

There was further an ill-feeling between Hsü and Chiang, the main reason of which was that Hsü's officers

were jealous of Chiang's successes during the campaign against Ch'en. For Chiang was a relatively junior officer, and not a native of Kwangtung, and it was his intervention and new strategy (learned from the Russians) which had turned the scale against Ch'en. Hsü's subordinates now tried to create an anti-Chiang faction among the troops, under the slogan of "Kwangtung for the Kwangtungese". They also made connections with Wei Pang-P'ing, formerly the Chief of the Canton Police under Lu Yung-T'ing, who had close relations with the Merchants' Volunteer Corps. They further entered into relations with the defeated officers of Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming. Yang K'un-Yü, who defended Huichow (Waichow) on Ch'en's behalf, and had surrendered to Hsü, was re-appointed Garrison Commander at Huichow, and Yang's officers were also reinstated. They were all Kwangtungese. Part of Ch'en's remnants, who had retreated to Fukien, were appealed to by Hsü to surrender, for incorporation into his army; they were promised the control of Chaochow. This policy was not so objectionable as Hu I-Sheng's intrigues with Yang, as Hsü in attacking Yang was unguarded in the rear. Actually, Ch'en's defeat was so overwhelming that there could be really no fear of them, as in the event of their making trouble, they were bound to be crushed after Yang and Liu had been dealt with.

Wang Ching-Wei, in reviewing the situation, was therefore not at all pleased. The main thing, however, was the preparation for the attack on Yang and Liu. Hu Han-Min himself was soon converted to the idea of taking action, although his younger brother continued his intrigues with Yang. The first step taken was for Wang, Liao, Hu and T'an Yen-K'ai to leave Canton for Honam, the island opposite Canton, and establish themselves at the Cement Factory, which also was Sun's headquarters when Generalissimo. As the site was too exposed, they moved up to Whangpoa. Li Fu-Lin and Wu T'ieh-Ch'eng then concentrated their troops in

Honam, adjacent to Whangpoa. T'an Yen-K'ai's troops were at the North River, those of Liang Hung-K'ai and Li Chi-Tsen at the East River. They all remained there without any movements, waiting for the arrival of Chiang and Hsü.

Having put the troops into position, public opinion must now be won by explaining the necessity for the elimination of Yang and Liu. Wang Ching-Wei, therefore, on May 25, 1925, proposed in the Central Executive Committee a motion to the effect that all military affairs and the civil and financial administration should be centralised by being placed exclusively in the hands of the Government, and that all the armies in Kwangtung should be given political training. This motion was passed unanimously. War on Yang and Liu was in effect declared, as Wang's proposal was obviously directed against them. At the same time, it was decided to establish political departments in the different armies under the direct control of the Government, the chiefs of which were to be equal in status with the military commanders.

For several reasons, however, Yang and Liu remained quiet. In the first place, they were waiting for the arrival of T'ang Chi-Yao's troops. Secondly, they had become very rich because of their control of the gambling tax and their protection of the gambling trade. They were so rich that they were like mosquitoes, who had sucked too much blood and could not fly any more. But the Government troops were ready. Chiang K'ai-Shih was appointed Commander-in-Chief for the duration of the campaign, as Hsü was left behind at Swatow to take charge of the rear. It was decided to attack Canton first from the East River, as the main part of Yang's troops was stationed there. Operations started in earnest at the end of May. At the beginning of June Huichow (Waichow) was passed, and Yang, already defeated, on the way to Canton. Part of Yang's troops retreated to Canton, followed by the Government troops. Then

Canton was attacked from Honam in the South and from the North and the West. On the 9th of June the Government troops entered Canton, where they found many posters issued by Yang and Liu, on which was subscribed, "Support the San Min Chu I; Down with the Bolsheviks." The reference to the Communists indicated that Yang and Liu had the support of those Kuo-Min Tang members who were opposed to the Reorganisation of 1924. But these placards had no effect on the populace, as Yang and Liu were universally hated.

In the battle round Canton Russian artillery was first tested by the Eastern (Chiang's) attack on the White Cloud Mountain, which was held by one of Yang Hsi-Min's generals. Only about fifty projectiles were fired from two special cannons, but every one of them reached its mark, killing even the enemy Commander. Yang and Liu's soldiers fled in disorder, but the populace bore them such a hatred that anyone falling into their hands was instantly lynched. Those who fell captive to the regular forces were treated as prisoners of war and were dealt with by the Political Department of the Government Army. The whole city was cleared by June 12, 1925.

CHAPTER XII

THE CONSOLIDATION OF KWANGTUNG

The Establishment of the National Government at Canton

AFTER the defeat of Yang and Liu the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang held a plenary session, lasting from June 13 to June 28, 1925, for the purpose of deliberating on Party, Governmental and military affairs. As to Party affairs, it was decided that there should be no successor to Sun Yat-Sen in the Presidency of the Kuo-Min Tang, as no one was deemed worthy enough to occupy the position. The Presidency was to be put in perpetual commission under the Central Executive Committee, which henceforth was to be the highest Executive organ in the Kuo-Min Tang. It accepted the charge issued by the late President in his Political Testament, and, on the motion of Tai Chi-T'ao, it was decided that thereafter, in all the meetings of the Party and of all the organisations affiliated to it, Sun's Last Will should be read. Regarding the Government, it was decided to abolish the office of Generalissimo, the style which Sun Yat-Sen adopted as Head of the Government, and instead to organise a National Government on a committee system. This was done on the motion of Liao Chung-K'ai, supported by Wang Ching-Wei, Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and Chiang K'ai-Shih, who realised that Hu Han-Min, who had become Acting-Generalissimo purely as a temporary expediency, aspired to that position. They wanted to put an end to Hu's ambitions, which they felt would give rise to endless intrigues. The National Government was to be only an organ of the Central Executive Committee, set up for the purpose of

putting into execution decisions and policies determined by the latter. In order to make Party authority a reality, all important decisions of the National Government had first to be approved of by the Central Executive Committee.¹ Under the Central Executive Committee there was to be organised a Political Council to assist it in making the political decisions to be handed down to the Government. A Political Council had already been organised the year before, but, with Sun Yat-Sen's departure to the North, it had gone into abeyance, and was now re-established.

All military affairs were to be under the unified control of the Central Executive Committee and the Political Council. For the purely routine administration, however, a Military Council was to be established. This was to be the instrument of the Central Executive Committee for the execution of its military decisions. Financial affairs were expressly excluded from its province; these were to be under the centralised control of the Ministry of Finance. Under the Military Council was to be organised, apart from the General Staff and the Supplies Department, the Political Training Department, to take charge of the propaganda and of all Party Affairs among the soldiers. Special Party Representatives were to be appointed in the different units; they were political officers under the Central Executive Committee, and their standing was to be equal to that of the Military Commanders, whose orders they had to countersign, even concerning purely military affairs.

On the last day of the Session, June 28, it was decided to appoint the personnel of the different new organisations. Then Wang Ching-Wei suddenly announced his intention to leave for the North in order to resume his activities in Peking, having already booked his passage. The meeting, however, disapproved of his intended

¹ In practice, however, all important decisions originate from the Central Executive Committee, the leading members of which also hold the most important posts in the Government. These decisions are transmitted in the form of orders to the Government.

departure, considering his presence at Canton far more important than his activities in the North. He was asked to become a member of the National Government and of the Military Council which were about to be organised. He consented to remain at Canton, but refused to participate in the Government and the Military Council on the ground that ever since 1912 he had resolved never to become a Government official. Together with Wu Chih-Hui, Li Shih-Ts'eng, Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei and Chang Ching-Chiang, he had even organised the Six-No Society, aiming at no smoking, no gambling, no drinking, no promiscuity, no officialdom, no bribery and corruption. It was pointed out to him, however, that this abstention from Governmental responsibilities was of little consequence when the Party was under the personal leadership of Sun Yat-Sen, but, owing to his death, a critical situation had arisen which made it necessary for all active members of the Party to render the best service to the people that they possibly could. The Kuo-Min Tang system of government was based on the idea of Party Dictatorship, and, therefore, all members of the Central Executive Committee had to be prepared to participate in all political, administrative and military affairs. Wang was already a member of the Central Executive Committee and of the Political Council, and had in effect, therefore, already taken part in Governmental affairs. He could not now shirk taking up definite administrative responsibilities. Thus, Wang was persuaded to change his mind, and accepted nomination for the Government Council and the Military Council. The result of the election was a Government Council consisting of Wang Ching-Wei, Hu Han-Min, Liao Chung-K'ai, T'an Yen-K'ai, Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, Chu Pei-Teh, Tai Chi-T'ao, Sung Tze-Wen, Sun K'ao (Sun Fo), C. C. Wu. The first five persons formed the Standing Committee. Wang was also elected Chairman of the Government Council and of its Standing Committee. He was proposed for the Chairmanship by Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, and

actively supported by Liao and Chiang. He himself voted for Hu Han-Min, but significantly Hu Han-Min voted for T'an Yen-K'ai. Sun K'o and C. C. Wu were leaders of the so-called T'ai-Tze P'ai, the group of the "Crown Prince" (Sun K'o or Sun Fo was the only son of Dr Sun) as opposed to the group of the "Emperor", i.e. the veteran followers of Dr Sun himself. At that time the Crown Prince group was hostile to Hu Han-Min, but friendly towards Wang. Tai was still neutral as between Hu and Wang. The result of the voting was unfortunate, for Hu Han-Min, deprived of the office of Generalissimo, was now also deprived of the Chairmanship of the Government. Hu began to have a secret grudge against Wang, his involuntary rival. For he was not satisfied with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs which was assigned to him, feeling it a degradation as compared to his previous post of Acting-Generalissimo, especially as Wang was also elected as the Chairman of the Military Council.

On July 1, 1925, the inauguration took place of the Government Council, the Military Council, the Kwangtung Provisional Government and the Canton Municipal Government. The ceremonies took place in public in the open air in the First Public Garden of Canton, attended by thousands of people.

The Hongkong-Shameen Strike

With its inauguration the difficulties of the National Government were only beginning. While the Central Executive Committee was still sitting, there suddenly occurred the incident of June 23. On that day, in the afternoon, a mass meeting took place in the East Parade ground of Canton to protest against the unnecessary killing of Chinese students and labourers by British policemen at Shanghai on May 30, 1925. After the demonstration the crowd marched through the streets, armed with posters and handbills, a usual feature of parades in Canton. In this parade, the labourers were

in front, followed by the farmers and merchants, then by boy and girl students, while Whangpoa cadets and regular soldiers marched behind closing the procession. From the East Parade Ground they marched along the Bund to Shakee, which was separated by a wide canal from the island of Shameen, the Anglo-French Concession in Canton. As three-quarters of the procession and the first batch of the student demonstrators had passed the West Bridge which connected the British Concession from the mainland, a Lewis gun detachment from H.M.S. *Tarantula* and French marines suddenly opened fire on the procession, killing 52 and wounding 117 Chinese students, labourers, merchants and cadets. The demonstrators, apart from the cadets and the regular soldiers were entirely unarmed, and medical evidence seemed to show that dum-dum or soft-nosed bullets were used, which, under international law, was not tolerated. It was admitted by the British authorities that the Chinese demonstrators were unprepared for anything in the nature of violence. On the part of the British and French, however, great preparations had been made for a display of force on the two days preceding the procession.¹ German merchants and the American staff of the Canton Christian College expressed at the time horror and indignation at the occurrence, and a conviction that the responsibility rested with the Shameen authorities. It was agreed between some of the Consuls and the Canton Commissioner for Foreign Affairs that there should be an independent Commission of Enquiry, on which the American and German Consuls might sit, to collect statements on oath. To this Sir James Jamieson, the British Consul-General, however, replied, "I have let it be known . . . that I am quite prepared to assist in procuring such evidence, but that I will not permit any Chinese official or Commission to impune the veracity of my statement as to what I actually saw with my own eyes, i.e. that the firing was opened from the Chinese

¹ Cf. Cmd. 2636/1926, pp. 1, 2, 9.

side," declaring, in effect, that he was only willing to have an independent Commission of Enquiry so long as he could dictate what it should report. Before the Shakee Massacre, relations between Canton and the British authorities had already become strained, as a result of the "walk-out" of June 18, when several tens of thousands of Chinese workers went on strike in Hongkong in protest against the incident of May 30. As these workers had gone to Canton, the Governor of Hongkong charged the Government at Canton with the responsibility for the walk-out, and, on June 20, had decided, by Order-in-Council, to blockade Canton.

The result of British aggressiveness in Hongkong and Shameen was a strike of some two hundred thousand Chinese workers, who simply left the British colony and sought protection and support from the Canton Government. This strike lasted some fifteen months, perhaps the longest in the history of the world. But while it delivered one of the most severe blows to British prestige and prosperity in the East, it also created a very real embarrassment to the National Government, who had to assist the strikers by way of organisation and temporary employment, and save them from starvation. In the matter of direct subsidy alone, the strike meant a financial sacrifice to the Government of about 300,000 dollars a month, during its height from June, 1925, to March, 1926, which was equal to the cost of maintaining an Army Corps on a war basis.

Counter-Revolutionary Intrigues and Internal Dissensions

The blockade of Canton by the Hongkong authorities and the financial strain on the National Treasury arising out of the maintenance of the strikers presented the Government with serious problems menacing its very existence. But the menace from Hongkong was comparatively easy to deal with: it was only necessary for the Canton Government fully to utilise and promote the wave of nationalism which was growing stronger every

day in China as a result of the Shanghai shootings and the attendant short-sightedness and vindictiveness of the British authorities, who, no doubt, did not then represent the best sentiments of the people in Britain itself. Far graver were the difficulties which confronted the Government in dealing with the internal situation.

There were first the remnants of Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's rebels who had surrendered to Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and had been given the control over Huichow (Waichow) and Ch'aochou. After Hsü had returned with his men to Canton for the campaign against Yang and Liu, Ch'en's men went back to their former allegiance and declared their independence of Hsü. The results of the February victory were thus completely nullified, for Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming had regained a foothold in Eastern and Southern Kwangtung. There was further the menace from Yang and Liu, who, although defeated in Canton, had been able to flee in safety, and had organised propaganda centres in Hongkong, Shanghai and Peking, working in conjunction with those members of the Kuo-Min Tang who were against the Reorganisation of 1924. They used anti-Communism as their slogan, and aimed at the overthrow of the National Government and the Military Council, and the return to the *status quo* before June 12.

Among the armies under the control of the National Government was a certain division of the Kwangtung Army of Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, which was commanded by Liang Hung-K'ai. This division was stationed in the West of Canton, and was really useless and as bad as the armies of Yang and Liu, using the same methods of oppression and extortion as they did. The Military Council had decided to disarm and disband this division in pursuance of the policy of military and financial unification. The decision, however, leaked out, probably from Hsü's office (he was still nominally the Commander-in-Chief), with the result that the whole scheme fell through, for Liang Hung-K'ai at once started an agitation against it. Some time later, the Military Council

decided to abolish the territorial names of the different armies and to denominate them by numbers. Thus, the Whangpoa cadets under Chiang were called the First Army; T'an Yen-K'ai's Hunanese, the Second Army; Chu Pei-Teh's Yunnanese and remnants of Yang and Liu incorporated with them, the Third Army. These three Armies were under the direct control of the Military Council and dependent for finances on the Ministry of Finance. To each of them was attached a Political Director, appointed by Ch'eng Kung-Po, the Chief of the Political Training Department of the Military Council. Hsü Ch'ung-Chi's Kwangtung Army, however, was bigger than any of the three Armies, numbering some 25,000 men. Consequently, Hsü was given special treatment and was allowed to decide for himself on the reorganisation of his Army into two or three Armies. His subordinate officers, however, were against the proposed reorganisation. They wanted the Kwangtung Army to remain united so as to be able to dominate the other three. They were not against the National Government and the Military Council, to whom they paid nominal obedience, but they wanted Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, the Kwangtungese, to be supreme over all other commanders who came from other provinces.

In addition, the younger brother of Hu Han-Min, Hu I-Sheng, created another difficulty for the National Government. He had organised a secret society for the single purpose of raising opposition to Wang Ching-Wei, Chiang K'ai-Shih and Liao Chung-K'ai. He controlled a newspaper, the *Kuo-Min Hsin Wen* (Nationalist News), and through it, spread rumours to the effect that Wang, Chiang and Liao were Communists. He was not against the foreign armies, nor against the National Government as such, but merely aimed at making his brother, Hu Han-Min, supreme in Canton.

Moreover, differences of opinion manifested themselves in the ranks of those who supported the Reorganisation of 1924 regarding the expediency of co-operation with the

Communists, who, since the defeat of Yang and Liu, had gained greatly in power and influence. The Communists had, under T'an P'ing-Shan, been very active, and in the ensuing struggle against Hongkong Imperialism, they had also taken a very prominent part, both in propaganda and organisational work. When the National Government was established Borodin took a prominent part in it, generally advising the Kuo-Min Tang leaders as to the organisation of the different Councils and Departments. Invited by Hu Han-Min, the Foreign Minister, to become High Adviser to the Foreign Ministry, he was instrumental in revolutionising Chinese diplomatic methods. Thanks to him the National Government, in their dealings with British and other diplomatic officials, had not only assumed the position of the only bona fide Government in China, but of one that was in fact equal in status with the Governments of the Great Powers. The policy of an occasional protest coupled with passive submissiveness had become a thing of the past. Imperialist aggression was met with Nationalist resistance, the stubbornness of which surprised enemy and friend alike.

The prominent position which the Communist members occupied in the new revolutionary system, exciting the jealousy of many rank and file members, not unnaturally caused anxiety among the leaders of the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party. Borodin, too, was greatly concerned about it, and often during 1925 he discussed the question with Wang, Liao, Hu and Chiang. "Ever since the Reorganisation in 1924, the Kuo-Min Tang was divided into two parties, those supporting and those opposing the Reorganisation. Those supporting it are called Leftists; those opposing it Rightists. This division, however, is not a serious problem, for the Leftists are bound to be victorious. What would be serious, however, is that there might be a division in the Left itself," he said, foreseeing the split between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party. "The only way

to surmount future difficulties is, therefore, for the leaders of the Left to present a united opinion," he counselled. The majority of the leaders in Canton were of the same opinion as Borodin, with the exception of Tai Chi-T'ao. Tai had no relations with either Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming, Liang Hung-K'ai or Hu I-Sheng; he was some ten years Wang and Hu's junior in the Party, but he was generally regarded as a loyal follower of Sun Yat-Sen, being also one of those who had energetically helped Sun in his Russian orientation. By the middle of July, 1925, however, he began to have doubts regarding the expediency of admitting Communists into the Party, and in August he published a book, entitled *The National Revolution and the Kuo-Min Tang*, in which he attacked the Communist ideology, and put forward the view that every society, instead of being divided into social classes, consisted of those who were conscious and those who were not conscious of their social responsibility. The conscious were the leaders of the not-conscious, and the natural custodians of their interests. Therefore, the conscious capitalists were to take charge of the interests of the not-conscious working people; the conscious landlords of those of the poor peasants. In this he merely restated old feudal conceptions so as to suit the wishes of the rising bourgeoisie in China, ignoring entirely the letter and spirit of the Congress Manifesto. His book became at once very prominent and obtained a large circulation, being hailed by the Right and the reactionaries as their bible.

The conflict between the Kuo-Min Tang members and the Communist members had become acute among the cadets and graduates of the Whangpoa Military Academy. This institution was generally regarded as a Communistic organisation, the Third International having presented it with 3,000 rifles on its foundation in May, 1924, and contributing a great deal towards its initial expenses. In actual fact, the cadets and their professor were sharply divided into Kuo-Min Tang members and Communist

members. For a time they were united in the *Sunyatsenist Society*, which, founded in January, 1925, aimed at organising a definite Left Wing in opposition to the Right. But already during the war at the East River against Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming, the February and March following, a conflict broke out between the two constituent groups. The Communist members were expelled from the Sunyatsenist Society, which became a pure Kuo-Min Tang organisation. The expelled Communist members of the Society organised another Society, the *Union of Military Youth*. From the Academy the conflict was carried over to the different Armies, as the graduates of the Academy retained their membership in their old societies. In Chiang's First Army the Sunyatsenist Society predominated, but not so in the Second and Third Armies, where the Union of Military Youth was stronger.

This conflict among the cadets and graduate officers was very awkward for the Government, so Wang, Chiang and Liao often tried to effect a reconciliation. "We are now all attacked by counter-revolutionaries, so instead of attacking one another we must unite against the common enemy . . . We are not leading you to the goal of the counter-revolution, nor to that of Communism, but we are taking you along the path of the San Min Chu I", pleaded Wang.

The Assassination of Liao Chung-K'ai

With the dissensions within the ranks of its own supporters, the National Government, burdened with the legacy of Yang and Liu's misrule and the complications with Hongkong, seemed to be doomed from the very moment of its establishment. With the coming of August the counter-revolutionary propaganda in Canton grew also more and more violent. Hu I-Sheng, in the *Kuo-Min Hsin Wen*, had ceased merely creating rumours to the effect that Wang, Liao and Chiang were Communists, but had gone so far as to suggest the advis-

ability of putting them out of the way entirely, especially Wang and Liao. He attacked Liao for holding so many offices, as that of Minister of Finance, Chief of the Labour and Peasant Department, Party Representative in the Army, concluding that Liao would die soon. During Wang's stay in the Straits, where he did Party work intermittently for twenty years, he had acquired the nickname of "the Saint", owing to the fact that he had always led an exemplary moral life. In the *Kuo-Min Hsin Wen*, Wang was not mentioned by name, but always referred to as "a certain Saint" who had done this or that, the editorials always ending up with "the Saint must die". To anyone acquainted with Wang's personal history, i.e. the majority of the Party members, the identity of the Saint was apparent, but as Wang was not mentioned by name, the National Government did not take any action against the paper, especially as Hu I-Sheng was the younger brother of Hu Han-Min, the Foreign Minister. Anonymous handbills were further openly distributed, inciting the assassination of Wang, Chiang and Liao.

While no official action was taken, private investigations were made by Wang, Liao and Chiang, about the middle of August, as to who were really behind the scene. The inquiries disclosed the fact that Hu I-Sheng had organised a secret society, the *Wen Hua Tang*, which, nominally headed by a man of straw, consisted of Hu I-Sheng's own followers and also of the Kwangtung officers of Hsü. He had persuaded the latter to make common cause with him, for although his brother, Hu Man-Min, and Hsü Ch'ung-Chih were enemies, their common and greatest enemies were Wang, Liao and Chiang, and until these were out of the way, he had promised not to attack Hsü. Beyond the fact that a plot was in existence to assassinate these three persons, and some other relatively less important ones, like T'an P'ing-Shan and Ch'en Kung-Po, no further information could be obtained. The absence of an adequate political

intelligence service, while satisfying to the sentimentalist, is indeed surprising, considering the hundreds of intrigues which were going on in Canton. As a rule, in spite of the state of emergency which in fact existed, the members of the National Government, with the occasional exception of Chiang, were also unprotected against sudden attacks. From this time onwards, however, they began to take some precautions in the form of a small body-guard. But as events would show, the measures taken were quite inadequate.

In the morning of August 20, 1925, Liao, Mrs. Liao and Ch'en Ch'iu-Lin, who were members of the Board of Control and Inspection in the National Government, went together in a motor-car to the headquarters of the Central Executive Committee. Here six or seven persons were waiting for them, concealed between the front and inner door of the building. Liao, who went in first, was suddenly shot at, in three places, and at once fell down. Ch'en Ch'iu-Lin was wounded, but he was able to get inside the building to ask for assistance. Mrs. Liao was shot at, but the bullet missed her. One of Liao's bodyguard was also shot at and wounded, but another of them managed to shoot down one of the assassins who was arrested. The others managed to flee. On hearing the news, Wang, Hu, Chiang, Hsü and Borodin rushed down to the scene of the assassination, and at the look of Liao's body, Wang and Chiang wept bitterly and loudly. So did Borodin. Hu and Hsü, however, did not betray any emotion. Immediately, Liao and Ch'en were sent to the hospital attached to Canton University, but Liao died on the way and Ch'en the next day. The arrested assassin was badly wounded. He was sent to the same hospital, where care was taken to prolong his life as long as possible. On his person was found a pistol, containing a machine-gun bullet, and a list of names, presumably of fellow assassins, each name being followed by entries of moneys. The persons contained in the list were the private guards of Chu

Cho-Wen, a former officer in the air force, who was a very prominent member of the Wen Hua Tang. Chu Cho-Wen had previously been in constant touch with Hu I-Sheng, often in secret meetings. His immediate arrest was ordered, but he had fled an hour before. In his house another pistol was found with bullets identical with those used by the assassins.

It was understood in Canton who was behind the assassination. The Central Executive Committee at once called a Joint Conference with the Political Council, the Government Council and the Military Council. This Joint Conference decided to organise a Special Committee consisting of Wang, Chiang and Hsü, with practically dictatorial powers to deal with all political, military, financial and police affairs. It could give any orders for execution in its own name, but had to report them afterwards to the Political, Military and Government Councils.

The first function of the Special Committee was to conduct the investigations into the murder of Liao. These lasted from August 20 until August 23. Cross-examined the wounded assassin disclosed the names of the other murderers, which confirmed the list found on his body. He informed the Special Committee that he had received instructions from Chu Cho-Wen to organise the job. He did not, however, know who were the people who visited Chu's house or who associated with him. He stated that Hongkong merchants had spent much money for this purpose, but asked whether these Hongkong merchants were Chinese or foreigners, he did not know. He died soon after the cross-examination.

As Chu Cho-Wen was a member of the Wen Hua Tang, the Special Committee paid special attention to the members of this Society, shadowing them with spies. It was discovered that Hu I-Sheng had been seeing Wei Pang-P'ing every night, and that his house had become a rendezvous of many officers on active service, who were constantly coming in and out. But these spies

could not get into the house and could, therefore, not report on the conversations held.

While the investigations were in progress Li Fu-Lin, the Commander of the Fifth Army, reported to the Special Committee that Hu I-Sheng had called on him and told him that the regiment of Whangpoa Cadets under Chiang had been mobilised to keep in readiness to attack the Kwangtung Army stationed in Honam, i.e. his own Army. Li also told them that Hu had advised him also to prepare himself for a counter-attack.

What embarrassed the actions of the Special Committee was that it was in the dark as to the complicity of Hu Han-Min, who was also a leading member in the Councils of the Party. Action was, therefore, delayed until August 24, when it was decided to declare the whole city under martial law, in order to safeguard it against incipient revolts, and to arrest all suspects in connection with Liao's murder. It was decided first of all to arrest Hu I-Sheng, who lived opposite Hu Han-Min, the latter occupying the same house as his elder brother Hu Ch'ing-Sui. A search party went to Hu I-Sheng's house in the morning to ascertain his whereabouts. The soldiers were told that he had gone to the house opposite. They rushed thither, but could not find him. Hu Han-Min was at that time in his house, but sensing alarm, had disappeared through a back door. Only his elder brother was found, and taken to the Special Committee which was sitting at Hsü Ch'ung-Chih's headquarters. Hu Ch'ing-Sui denied that his youngest brother had been hiding in his house, and was released.

Hu Han-Min had hidden himself in a derelict house in the neighbourhood. Wang's house was situated not far from Hu's, and someone of Hu's household, not knowing anything of the case, had gone to Wang's in order to inform him that Hu's house had been visited by soldiers. Wang at that time was already at the Special Committee, but his wife, Ch'en Pi-Ch'ün, was still at home. So she went to the Special Committee to

ask them about their attitude towards Hu Han-Min. Hsü Ch'ing-Chih was very antagonistic towards Hu, in spite of the fact that Liao was one of his greatest antagonists, and favoured taking energetic action against Hu, advocating his arrest. Wang and Chiang, however, were inclined towards moderation. They considered that definite and direct evidence against Hu was lacking, and that it would be unwise to precipitate decisions, especially from the political point of view, Hu being one of the few "old comrades" supporting the Kuo-Min Tang regime at Canton. But as Hu I-Sheng had fled, public opinion at Canton began to throw grave suspicions upon Hu Han-Min, who was openly charged with complicity in the affair. In order to protect Hu against untoward incidents, Wang and Chiang, therefore, decided that Ch'en Pi-Ch'ün (Madame Wang) should take Hu to Chiang's house near the Academy at Whangpoa, where he would stay for the time being.

Borodin, who was present at the Special Committee, at first also suggested dealing strictly with Hu. For some time he had practically severed relations with Hu, refusing to attend meetings at the Foreign Office, in order to show his resentment against Hu tolerating the intrigues of his younger brother. When Borodin found out that Wang and Chiang were opposed to Hsü Ch'ung-Chih's drastic plans, Borodin also changed his mind, and promised to see Hu again and induce him to go to Russia on a mission of investigation. The sudden change of Borodin was probably due to the fact that he foresaw that Wang would not remain for long on good terms with the Chinese Communists. In the event of Wang separating from the Communists, Hu would then be able to come back and take Wang's place, and Borodin would retain his position of trust.

All the other warrants for arrest were also issued in vain, except in the case of Lin Chih-Mien. Lin was an old comrade, one of the two persons who on June 16, 1923, warned Sun Yat-Sen about the impending

attack on the Presidential House for Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming. When arrested, he was, therefore, well treated. During the first examination he refused to reply to any questions. At the second examination, however, he asked for paper and ink, and was given the freedom to write as he liked. His voluntary declaration was not checked and could not, therefore, be deemed reliable. Two points in his statement, however, attracted attention. In the first place he admitted that in writings and in actions he and his friends had done many things to oppose Liao, but denied that they had murdered him. He further stated that he had heard that the Kwangtung officers wanted to revolt against the Government, and that the Hongkong merchants agreed to help with two million dollars. He had reported this news to Hu Han-Min. Hu Han-Min asked him to tell T'ang Cha-Yü, an old comrade from overseas, and once the Head of the Canton Provincial Kuo-Min Tang, about it, with the instructions to pass it on to Li Fu-Lin and others, coupled with the advice, however, not to revolt. Lin was temporarily detained, to be re-examined after Hu I-Sheng's arrest had been effected. Apart from Lin, some of Chu Cho-Wen's hirelings were arrested. But they were of no importance, being only hired assassins and not the prime movers of the plot. Thus they were immediately sentenced to death according to the law.

As a consequence of Lin's statement, the Special Committee decided to take action against the conspiring Kwangtung officers. Wei Pang-P'ing's arrest was ordered, but he had already disappeared. Then a warrant was issued for the arrest of Army General Liang Hung-K'ai and Divisional General Yang Chin-Lung. These arrests were effected, and their respective troops disarmed. On his arrest Yang Chin-Lung confessed that in the beginning he had no intention of joining in the plot, and it was only after Hu I-Sheng told him that the Hongkong merchants had offered two million dollars that he decided to throw in his lot with them. Another

Army General, Chang Kuo-Chen, was arrested. The arrest was ordered by Chiang, with the approval of Wang, but under protest of Hsü Ch'ung-Chih. Chang was one of the principal men who instigated Liang Hung-K'ai and other Kwangtung officers to revolt. When arrested, he declared that originally Wei Pang-P'ing, Liang Hung-K'ai, Yang Chin-Lung wanted to overthrow Wang and Chiang, as well as Hsü. He was, however, against the latter idea, for he considered that Hsü, as the Head of the Kwangtung Army, was their proper chief. In his opinion they should only deprive Wang and Chiang of their power, but not kill them. In his own opinion he had, therefore, done nothing criminal. He considered that he should be given some credit, for he was trying to conciliate the Kwangtung officers with Hsü.

The pleadings of Yang Chin-Lung and Chang Kuo-Chen, however, availed them nothing. They were condemned to death and executed. Liang Hung-K'ai and Lin Chih-Mien were given into the custody of Chiang, who confined them at the Tiger Gate Fort; they were released by Li Chi-Tsen in April, 1927.

The Consolidation of the Revolutionary Base

As a result of drastic measures taken by the Special Committee the expected revolt, of which the assassination of Liao Chung-K'ai was but the prelude, did not take place. The situation in Canton, however, remained critical. For Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's remnants in Eastern Kwangtung were making preparations to attack Canton, for the defence of which the National Government had only the troops of Chiang and Hsü at their disposal. Chiang's troops consisted of only one division, stationed at Canton and Whangpoa. Hsü had three divisions, but he had only a small force in Canton itself, the majority of his troops being along the Canton-Kowloon Railway. The first of his divisions was commanded by his brother, Hsü Chi; the second by Cheng Yun-Chih, formerly an

officer under Wei Pang-P'ing ; the third, by Mo Hsiung, a personal follower of Hsü. These three divisions, after the execution of Chang Kuo-Chen, continued to intrigue against Wang and Chiang, entering into relations with Yang K'un-Yü, Ch'en's man at Waichow (Huichow). Hsü's army was, therefore, entirely unreliable, and only Chiang's single division could be depended on. But if Chiang's division were sent out to the East to deal with Ch'en's remnants, Canton might be immediately lost to the counter-revolution.

By the middle of September the situation for the National Government had become very dangerous, perhaps more dangerous than in February, 1925, during the Swatow campaign against Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming. The already critical condition became still more complicated by the arrival at Canton of the Szechuan Army of Hsiung K'e-Wu, which, after defeat in Szechuan by Wu Pei-Fu's forces, had made its way through Hupeh and Hunan to Kwangtung. Hsiung was the Tüchün of Szechuan ; his army was over 10,000 men strong, and nominally under the orders of the Kuo-Min Tang. But Hsiung had allowed himself to be utilised by the counter-revolutionaries. The National Government had put several districts in the North River at his disposal to station his troops in. On his arrival at Canton, however, simultaneously with entering into formal relations with the National Government, he had despatched a personal representative to Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming. Thus, Canton was at once threatened by two enemies within its midst. Facing this situation, Wang and Chiang decided first to disarm Hsü Ch'iung-Chih's men, and secondly to deal with Hsiung K'e-Wu as soon as a suitable opportunity presented itself.

First of all, Wang paid a visit to T'an Yen-K'ai and Chu Pei-Teh for the purpose of soliciting their support in disarming Hsü's three divisions. This support was promised to Wang. Then Li Chi-Tsen was persuaded to co-operate. Among Hsü's own officers there were also

several officers who had signified their intention to support the Government. On September 20, 1925, Chiang then ordered his Whangpoa cadets to disarm the three divisions of Hsü. This was done so suddenly that the three Divisional Generals commanding them were taken entirely by surprise, one of them having even gone to Hongkong to negotiate with Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming. As a great many officers had pledged their allegiance to the National Government, little resistance was encountered in the process of disarming. The soldiers were subsequently reorganised by Chiang, and incorporated into the First Army.

In Canton itself nothing happened, except that Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, feeling his position untenable, petitioned for leave of absence to Shanghai. As Hsü was genuinely ignorant of the intrigues of his subordinates with Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming, and in view of his past meritorious services to the Party, the Government had no desire to put restraints on his movements, and allowed him to leave Canton.

A general military stocktaking now took place. There were all kinds of miscellaneous troops in the West and in Honan. These were organised into two armies. One, made into the Fourth Army, was stationed in the West and South of Canton, and Li Chi-Tsen was appointed its Commander. Li Fu-Lin was ordered to guard the island of Honam and given the Fifth Army. The orders were given to T'an Yen-K'ai, of the Second Army, and to Chu Pei-Teh, of the Third Army, to concentrate on the North River, this being understood to mean that they were to guard Canton against possible attacks by Hsiung K'e-Wu. Then Chiang was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Expedition, which was to clear the East River District of all enemies. First of all, however, it was decided to get rid of Hsiung K'e-Wu and make him harmless.

Hsiung, who had been given some territory in the North and who had been given funds for his military

expenditure, was then summoned to Canton, ostensibly for discussing the proposed Eastern Expedition. On his arrival at Canton, on October 3, 1925, he was arrested. Letters were found on him showing his intimate relationship with Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming. Photographic copies of these letters were made and published. The task of disarming his troops was then assigned to T'an Yen-K'ai and Chu Pei-Teh, who, however, only partially succeeded, the greater part of them being able to retreat to Hunan and Kwangsi. Those who surrendered were incorporated into the Second and Third Armies.

The six weeks from August 20 to October 3, 1925, were the most critical days for the National Government during the period of its existence, fighting against enemies ten times stronger than itself, and all the more difficult to deal with because they assumed the guise of friends. In addition, the Government was handicapped by one of the fiercest external struggles any Chinese Government had waged ever since the Boxer Movement. The death of Liao Chung-K'ai had further deprived the Party and Government of one of their most valuable servants and strongholds. Liao was the person *par excellence* responsible for the Russian Orientation and the Labour and Peasant policies of the Kuo-Min Tang, being in addition one of the best financial brains in the Party. He was renowned for his public integrity and lived (it was rare in China) only on his salary. And not only was he honest personally but he also managed to keep all his subordinates honest, never tolerating any malpractices—in striking contrast to Hu Han-Min, who, personally irreproachable, was always surrounded by professional fortune-seekers, one of the grounds why during Sun's lifetime he was, only as a last resort, appointed to responsible administrative posts. At the time of his assassination Liao occupied the posts of Party Representative in all the Armies and Military Academies; of Finance Minister in the National Government and Financial Commissioner in the Kwangtung Provincial Govern-

ment, besides being the Head of the Labour and Peasant Department of the Central Executive Committee. As Party Representative in the Armies and Academies, he was succeeded by Wang, which was an unsatisfactory arrangement, as Wang was already overworked with his different Chairmanships. In the Ministry of Finance his successor was a nominee of Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, T'ang Cha-Yü, the former merchant from Kwala Lumpur, who regarded the Ministry as a kind of private estate. His only claim to prominence was that he had once contributed 10,000 dollars to the Revolutionary League. With Hsü's fall T'ang was dismissed, and T. V. Sung took his place. Neither in the Labour and Peasant Department was a suitable successor found. It was one of the most important departments, dealing, among other things, with the conduct of the Hongkong-Shameen Strike, before this latter function came directly under the Political Council. It was also one of the most difficult Departments to administer, owing to the growing conflict in the Labour movement between the Communists and the Kuo-Min Tang members, a conflict aggravated after Liao's death.

In spite of everything, the Kuo-Min Tang came victoriously out of the greatest trial to which it had been subjected since its foundation. There was a new spirit animating it, the spirit of unity and determination, as a result of the growing understanding by the masses of the principles and policies of Sun Yat-Sen. Against this new force in the Kuo-Min Tang the counter-revolution, whatever its material resources, could not avail. Responsible for the shaping of this new force, and guiding it to success, were two leaders, Wang Ching-Wei and Chiang K'ai-Shih. Wang was the civilian Party leader, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, of the Government Council and of the Military Council, whose past history, personality and intimate association with the late Sun Yat-Sen marked him out as the latter's natural successor. He was determined to crush

all reaction and to build a new social order in China in the spirit of Sun Yat-Sen's political testament. Chiang was the military leader, who was imbued with the spirit of the Revolution, and conscious of the necessity of co-operation between the soldiers and the masses of the population. His army, although smaller than those of any of his opponents, consisted of officers and men who were more or less Party men, and whose moral and fighting strength were, therefore, superior to those of the enemies. He was of one mind with Wang, realising that without Wang's political guidance and influence, he would not be able to achieve very much. Wang also knew that without Chiang's military help he would be powerless. It was due to the whole-hearted co-operation of these two leaders that the Party came out victorious against the overwhelming odds. In addition, T'an Yen-K'ai, Chu Pei-Teh, and Li Chi-Tsen also accepted Wang's political direction, and greatly facilitated his task. The Communist Party, realising that a victory of the reactionary spirit in China would endanger its very existence, also actively assisted the Revolutionary Force in the Kuo-Min Tang, which accepted their co-operation against the common enemy.

As a result of the success of the revived Kuo-Min Tang in overthrowing all the reactionary forces in Canton, the basis for the enduring unification of Kwangtung was laid. The June decisions of the Central Executive Committee could now be put into operation, and from October 3, 1925, all military, civil and financial affairs were centralised in the Political Council of the Central Executive Committee, which decided on their general direction. Decisions referring to civil and financial affairs were referred to the Government Council (National Government) for execution; those referring to military affairs, to the Military Council. No army unit was allowed to have any independent financial dealings, or interfere with civilian administration, and all army units had to obey the orders of the Military Council, which consisted of

the chief military Commanders and prominent Party leaders.

The Consolidation of Kwangtung Province

Having disposed of the treacherous elements in their midst, the Military Council now decided to clear the East River of the remnants of Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's forces. Chiang K'ai-Shih had been appointed Commander-in-Chief for this Eastern Expedition, which started on October 8, 1925. All his troops and those of Li Chi-Tsen were mobilised, except Ch'en Ming-Shu's division stationed at the River Gate, to guard against the South, which was still under Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's control. Ch'eng Ch'ien's Hunanese troops were also mobilised against the East. It was only a short campaign. By the middle of October, Waichow was captured. On November 6 Swatow fell, and by November 16 the whole of the East River district was cleared of Ch'en's forces, which, pursued by Chiang, retreated into Fukien.

As to the remnants of Hsiung K'e-Wu's troops, those who had fled into Hunan were attacked by T'ang Sheng-Chih, and incorporated into his army. Those who retreated into Kwangsi were reorganised by Li Tsung-Jen, Huang Shao-Hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi. The relationship between these Kwangsi generals had started in 1924, but it was only a loose co-operation, as they were not members of the Party. In the summer of 1925, they had resisted the advance of T'ang Chi-Yao through Kwangsi, who invaded the province in order to reinforce Yang and Liu in Kwangtung. They succeeded in defeating T'ang, and were able to get the control over the whole of Kwangsi. A closer co-operation between Kwangtung and Kwangsi was the result. Neither was T'ang Sheng-Chih a Party member, but in September, 1925, he was introduced to the National Government by Li Tsung-Jen and Huang Shao-Hsiung, who were his fellow cadets at the Paoting Academy. He had expressed a desire to Wang Ching-Wei to join the Kuo-Min Tang.

At that time he was the nominal subordinate of Chao Heng-T'i, the Tüchün of Hunan, who was a follower of Wu Pei-Fu. He felt, however, discontented with the policy of Wu Pei-Fu, having learnt to appreciate the principles of the Kuo-Min Tang. He was admittedly one of the best fighters in Hunan, having inflicted heavy defeats on Ch'eng Ch'ien and T'an Yen-K'ai. When T'an Yen-K'ai was Tutuh (Civil Governor) of Hunan, he had as his Commander-in-Chief Ch'eng Ch'ien. One of the Divisional Commanders under Ch'eng Ch'ien was Chao Heng-T'i, under whom T'ang Sheng-Chih served. There was a discord between T'an Yen-K'ai and Ch'eng Ch'ien on the one hand, and between Ch'eng Ch'ien and Chao Heng-T'i on the other hand. T'an Yen-K'ai thus provoked an acute quarrel between Ch'eng and Chao, and in the ensuing struggle T'ang Sheng-Shih, fighting for Chao, delivered heavy blows on Ch'eng. This resulted in Chao Heng-T'i becoming supreme in Hunan. Chao then entered into relations with Wu Pei-Fu. In the autumn of 1923 Sun Yat-Sen sent T'an Yen-K'ai back to Hunan to retake the province from Chao Heng-T'i. T'an had already nearly captured Changsha, when suddenly T'ang Sheng-Chih repulsed him and ousted his army from the province. In view of the fact that T'an Yen-K'ai and Ch'eng Ch'ien had become very prominent in the Party, T'ang Sheng-Chih felt very awkward in openly applying for membership of the Party, as he was afraid that T'an and Ch'eng would object. Wang assured him that he need not be afraid, but told him for his own sake not to be precipitate, but to wait until he fully understood the Kuo-Min Tang ideals and policies. For Wang was not in favour of admitting any and every militarist, however famous as a fighter, without any preparation and military training. While not a member of the Party, T'ang could, however, secretly co-operate with the National Government. T'ang agreed with Wang, and gave up all the vices commonly indulged in by militarists, such as

promiscuity, opium smoking, drinking, and gambling. He dismissed all his concubines but one, started smoking cigarettes and reading Buddhist bibles, while concentrating his entire energy on his army.

While the Eastern Expedition was in progress, Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's remnants in Southern Kwangtung, under Teng Pen-Yin, who had been in control there ever since Ch'en's main troops were forced to the East, suddenly made an attack on the River Gate, the southern key to Canton. When at the end of August Liang Hung-K'ai, whose troops were stationed there, was arrested, a section of his troops had managed to retreat to Southern Kwangtung, and had joined Teng Pen-Yin. The only troops to defend the River Gate were those of Ch'en Ming-Shu, but these did not amount to more than one-fifth of the strength of the enemy. The Kwangsi allies sent some reinforcements, but they were quite inadequate. Wang then ordered T'an Yen-K'ai and Chu Pei-Teh, who had defeated Hsiung K'e Wu, to return from the North to reinforce the River Gate. The Southern attack was repulsed, and being victorious in the East, Li Chi-Tsen was ordered back to Canton, in order to lead in the Southern campaign. Under Li Chi-Tsen was a divisional general, Chang Fa-K'uei, who in the Eastern Expedition had distinguished himself by winning every battle he fought, which earned him the name of "Iron General". Thanks to him, the whole of Southern Kwangtung was pacified before the end of the year, while at the beginning of January, 1926, the island of Hainan was also captured. The province of Kwangtung was now at last consolidated and unified under the National Government.

The Western Hills Conference

The departure of Hu Han-Min, on September 20, 1925, for Russia, and the final victory of the National Government over the reactionary forces in Canton, was followed by an exodus from Canton to Shanghai and Peking of the so-called Old Comrades, who were opposed

to the Reorganisation of 1924. Only a few, like Ku Yin-Fen, formerly Finance Minister, remained, being left unmolested as long as he kept quiet, for the National Government did not want to have too many enemies. Among these who took flight were several members of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, such as Hsieh Ch'ih, Tsou Lu, Lin Shen, Wu Chih-Hui and Chang Chi. On November 3 a group of them held a conference lasting for about a fortnight before the body of Sun Yat-Sen in the temple on the Western Hills near Peking, and constituted themselves into a new Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committee, as they considered that the governing bodies of the Kuo-Min Tang at Canton had become completely Bolshevised, relying as they did for their authority on the support of the masses. They decided to expel all the Communist members from the Kuo-Min Tang, claiming that they were the only true representatives of the Party. Then they wanted to expel Wang Ching-Wei and Chiang K'ai-Shih from the Party, but at the last moment they changed their mind, and decided to attack only Wang, but not Chiang, under the slogan of "Ally with Chiang to overthrow Wang". They suspended Wang's membership for six months, during which time he would be deprived of participation in all governmental organs. The particular crimes with which they charged Wang were having postponed the Second National Congress which Hu Han-Min had, on his own authority, promised to convene for August 15, 1925, and having completely surrendered to Borodin. They also declared that henceforth the Central Executive Committee would have its headquarters in Shanghai instead of Canton. In order to safeguard their own reputations they professed their undying hatred of the Imperialists and their handmaids, the Peking Government, and their desire that the war declared on the Northern Militarists be pushed vigorously. The fact, however, that at that time Peking was under the control of Tuan Ch'i-Jui, and that their very Conference

was held under Tuan's protection, was significant. And behind them all was the figure of Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, who, although he did not personally attend the Conference, was, with Chang Chi and Hsieh Ch'ih, its moving spirit and responsible for its finances.

To the denunciations and allegations of the Western Hills group, the Central Executive Committee replied by declaring them an illegal organisation, in secret alliance with Tuan Ch'i-Jui. As to the Second National Congress, this had been unavoidably delayed owing to the critical military and political situation prevailing at the time, a delay which was authorised by the Statutes of the Party. This Congress had already been called for January 1, 1926, to meet in Canton.

Chiang K'ai-Shih, who was then camping at Swatow, on receiving information about the Western Hills Conference, also denounced the malcontents, especially their slogan of allying with him to overthrow Wang. He was, however, in a difficult position, owing to the existence in his army of two antagonistic factions, the Sunyatsenist Society and the Union of Military Youth. The Sunyatsenist Society were, of course, different from the Western Hills faction, and also publicly repudiated any connection with them. They declared that they differed from the Western Hills people on three points. Firstly, the Western Hills group were against the Reorganisation of 1924, while they supported it. Secondly, the former consisted only of corrupt and reactionary bureaucrats, conservatives and anarchists, while they were active revolutionaries. Thirdly, the object of Chang Chi, Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and their confederates was the overthrow of Wang and Chiang, while they accepted them as their leaders. But while belonging to the Left, they were as actively and energetically opposed to the Communists as were the Western Hills people. They also desired to break with the Communist Party, and that was why they wanted to have the Union of Military Youth, which consisted of Communists, suppressed. Chiang had the

greatest difficulty in keeping the peace between the two rival organisations, which composed the Whangpoa Military Academy and the best part of his troops. In an article written on December 5, 1925, for the School Annual of the Whangpoa Military Academy, he reminded the cadets that during the campaign in the East River against Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming many of the graduates of the Academy who died a heroic death on the field belonged equally to the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party. "The School, which is the creation of the Kuo-Min Tang, is composed of Communists and non-Communists. Both groups are eager to fight under the Kuo-Min Tang flag for the realisation of Dr Sun's principles. I too am willing to lie beside the graves of those who have already fallen as martyrs to the National Revolution, the Three People's Principles and Communism. I, therefore, appeal to those of us who are still alive not to discriminate against one another nor to show any disunity. Live and die together. Carry out the responsibility to the National Revolution, and honour the memory of the fallen comrades, in the spirit of unison, love, sincerity and righteousness, in order that we may realise, directly, the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun and, indirectly, international Communism . . .

"The National Revolution cannot do without Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles. Neither can the International Revolution neglect Communism. We cannot deny that the Chinese Revolution is part of the World Revolution. The realisation of the Three People's Principles means the realisation of Communism. Knowing that we cannot separate the Chinese Revolution from the World Revolution, why should there be any quarrel amongst us, about the Three People's Principles and Communism? . . .

"We cannot realise the Three People's Principles without being sincere. Neither can we put Communism into practice and not be sincere. Nobody who is insincere to the Three People's Principles can be sincere to

Communism. Nobody who is sincere to Communism can be insincere to the Three People's Principles."

In writing this article, Chiang showed himself to be a firm adherent of the alliance with Russia and the Communist Party. But Chiang's faith in the Kuo-Min Tang was greater than his belief in Communist principles. Therefore, he appointed to the military commands, with only a few exceptions, only Kuo-Min Tang members, leaving the responsibility for political propaganda to the Communists. Wang Ching-Wei adopted the same policy as regards the civil administration. In the National Government and in the Secretariat of the Government there were no Communists, apart from Borodin in an advisory capacity at the Foreign Office. Ch'en Kung-Po and Kan Nai-Kuang, who occupied different responsible positions both in the Party and Government, had the reputation of being Communists, but this was due to the propaganda of their political opponents. In the Military Council there were Russian advisers, and in the Political Department there were also Communists, but in the General Staff and in the Financial Bureau of the Military Council, and in the Arsenal, there was not a single Communist officer. In the Central Executive Committee there were several Communist members, nominated by Sun Yat-Sen, but in the Secretariat, which was controlled by Wang, there were none. Wang and Chiang considered that the Kuo-Min Tang was the principal Party, the Communist Party only auxiliary to it. Hence the important key positions always went to Kuo-Min Tang members, only the less important ones being given to the Communist allies. Their followers in the Kuo-Min Tang knew this, and, therefore, gladly accepted their orders. But the Communists also understood their position, and were merely waiting for an opportunity to discredit Wang and Chiang, especially the former, whom they feared because of his great popularity among the masses of the people. Besides, Wang, although a sincere believer in the Sino-Russian Alliance as an instrument

to liberate the oppressed nations of the world, had never flirted with the idea of Communism and the violent World Revolution to such an extent as had Chiang. Wang had, in fact, on several occasions, repudiated it, being more the Danton than the Robespierre of the Chinese Revolution. Chiang, on the other hand, perhaps because of his more intimate association with his Russian military advisers, liked to flatter the Communists, and was proud of his personal association with Moscow. Whereas Wang insisted that Borodin was merely an adviser without the right to vote, Chiang often quoted a saying of Dr Sun to him that in taking Borodin's advice he would be taking his (Dr Sun's) advice. Borodin reciprocated by exhorting that "no matter whether Communist or Kuo-Min Tang, all must obey General Chiang". It had been due to Chiang's action, in placing guards at the disposal of Borodin after an attempted assassination, that the myth had spread that Borodin had become the super-Governor of Canton.

The Second National Congress

The province of Kwangtung unified and under the absolute control of the Kuo-Min Tang, the reactionaries within the Party driven to impotence, the Second National Congress of Delegates met in an exultant mood on January 1, 1926, at Canton, "under the spiritual guidance of Sun Yat-Sen" and under the Chairmanship of Wang Ching-Wei. Only eight provinces, however, had been able to send properly elected delegates, the others being prevented by the fact that they were still enemy territory.

The Congress, which lasted until January 19, began its proceedings by formally accepting the Last Will of Sun Yat-Sen as the fundamental Charter of the Kuo-Min Tang, and declared its readiness to accomplish the charge which its defunct leader had delivered. It reiterated the aims of the Chinese Revolution, namely, the destruction of Imperialism in all its forms, the alliance between the weak nations and oppressed races, the extermination in

China of the brigand-militarists, the reactionary bureaucrats, the compradores in league with the Imperialists, the unorganised bandits and pirates. In order to achieve these, a strong People's Army, politically conscious, was required, besides a new honesty and a spirit of efficiency in the administrative system. It would also be necessary to render assistance to the nascent Chinese industry, apart from ameliorating the conditions of the depressed peasants and workers. Regarding the Communists, in pursuance of Dr Sun's intentions, they could continue to be admitted into the Party, but only as auxiliaries and not as principals. Therefore, in order to safeguard the *san-min-ist* character of the Party, the number of Communists in any Committee or Council would never exceed one-third of the total. The Congress also laid down the general principles governing the relationship between the Central and Provincial Governments, and passed resolutions supporting the youth, labour, peasant, women's organisations, etc. In the Manifesto it issued, no changes or additions were made in the minimum programme of the Party, except in the matter of detail, for the purpose of clarification, the view of the Congress being that not a single important item of the Programme under the First Manifesto had yet been realised. A minor amendment to the Party Constitution was proposed and carried, to the effect that the Presidency of the Party was held by Sun Yat-Sen in perpetuity. It was further decided to expel Lin Shen, Hsieh Ch'ih, Chang Chi, Tsou Lu and a few others of the Western Hills group from the Party. Others like Tai Chi-T'ao received a warning to keep quiet. Many delegates had wanted to excommunicate the whole group and order their arrest, but Wang counselled moderation, his leniency to political opponents being his weak point.

On the last day of the Congress the election of members and deputy members of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees took place. Of the new additions to the Central Executive Committee, Chiang

K'ai-Shih was the most prominent, and Ch'en Kung-Po and Kan Nai-Kuang, being just about thirty, the most youthful. For the first time in its history the Congress also elected women members to the Supreme Governing bodies of the Party. To the Central Executive Committee were elected Madame Sun, the widow of the President, and Ho Hsiang Ning (Madame Liao Chung-K'ai). To the Central Supervisory Committee it elected Ch'en Pi Chün (Madame Wang Ching-Wei). Both Ho Hsiang-Ning and Ch'en Pi-Chün were prominent revolutionaries in their own rights, ever since the formation of the Tung Meng-Hui. Ch'en Pi Chün might be remembered as one of the conspirators who took part in the attempted assassination of the Prince Regent in 1910, while Ho Hsiang Ning, the senior woman revolutionary of China, is also known as the "Mother of the Chinese Revolution".

The Second National Congress, which accepted the spiritual guidance of Sun Yat-Sen and undertook to execute his Last Will, was entirely under the influence of the Left. This was only natural. For Sun Yat-Sen, ever since the blockade of Canton in 1923 by American, British, Italian and French gunboats, in connection with the dispute regarding the disposal of the surplus of the Kwangtung Customs, had turned steadily towards the Left, culminating in his Reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang in 1924. The Second National Congress was convened in order to continue the work of the First Congress and was, of necessity, Left. A Congress dominated by the Right would only have meant the beginning of the counter-revolution and reaction in Kwangtung, and a return to the old system of personal rule and endless intrigues.

CHAPTER XIII

THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION

The Rehabilitation of Kwangtung

KWANGTUNG militarily consolidated, the most pressing task of the National Government was to bring some kind of order into its financial system. The finances of Kwangtung had been reduced to utter confusion by the depredations of former Militarists, in whose hands the real control of the province was vested. Ever since 1923, when Sun returned to Canton, the military leaders had intercepted practically all the revenues. They extorted funds from the local people, while at the same time threatening and blackmailing the Ministry. This was, for instance, the reason why when Sun appointed Liao to the Finance Ministry after the Merchants' Revolt in August, 1924, he refused the office, being unable to get the military Commanders to leave him a free hand. The annual revenue of Kwangtung had been successively reduced from 31.8 million dollars in 1921, to 24 millions in 1922, to 13.6 millions in 1923, until in 1924 it reached its nadir point of 9.3 millions. The establishment of the National Government in July, 1925, after the defeat of Yang and Liu, and the appointment of Liao Chung-K'ai as Finance Minister, did not bring any material change in the financial situation, owing to the opposition of Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to any concentration of financial authority in the Ministry of Finance. After Liao's death, the Finance Ministry fell into the hands of T'ang Cha-Yü, who was completely subservient to Hsü. It was only after Hsü's fall on September 20, 1925, which brought about T'ang's dismissal, and the appoint-

ment of Sung Tze-Wen, the manager of the Central Bank, as Minister of Finance, that a beginning could be made with the financial reconstruction of the province. The military leaders under the Kuo-Min Tang had pledged themselves to obey the orders of the Government and Military Councils. Wang Ching-Wei had further assured Sung that so long as he was in power, no interception of revenues by any military commander would be allowed. The army units were also prohibited from approaching the Ministry of Finance direct for funds, but they had to apply to Wang first, as Chairman of the Military Council. The result of the new arrangement, coupled with the improvement and simplification of collection, was a sudden jump in the provincial revenues to about 6 million dollars a month, and the year 1925 closed with a fiscal yield of 48·5 million dollars.

With the improvement of the financial system, a growing understanding began to develop between the Government and all classes of the population. New Year's Day of 1926 witnessed a review of the National-Revolutionary Armies, which was enthusiastically attended by deputations from the peasants', workers', students' and merchants' organisations. Since the National Government relied for its authority on the support of the masses of the population, co-operation between the Party, Government and mass organisations was to be expected. Not so the friendly relations between the Government and the mercantile classes. Ever since the Fascist Revolt of 1924, a great gulf separated the merchants from the Government, although many of the Canton merchants had no sympathy with the attitude of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps. Gradually, however, the merchants themselves began to realise that the Government policy of unification and centralisation was actually to their benefit. They saw that the Kuo-Min Tang was sincere in its determination to put an end to the extortions and oppressions of the feudal Militarists, and to establish law and order in the province, such as they had not enjoyed for many years. In spite of the considerable

losses they suffered from the Hongkong-Shameen boycott and strike, they realised that the issue was not one of class struggle, notwithstanding the Communist influence in the Strike Committee, but one of national prestige in defence against foreign aggression. Wang often received deputations from merchants' associations for the purpose of discussing their particular problems. It was through them that Wang sent messages of goodwill to the merchants in Hongkong, inviting them to Canton to meet Kuo-Min Tang leaders. Thus, while the Hongkong-Shameen struggle was in full progress, delegations consisting of prominent Hongkong merchants paid courtesy visits to Canton, invariably returning full of admiration for the reconstructive work done at Canton under Wang's leadership, and many of them joined the Kuo-Min Tang. In these circumstances, the Hongkong-Shameen boycott could, unless the Hongkong Government completely capitulated, have gone on for ever, especially after measures had been taken by the National Government to establish direct communications with Shanghai and the outside world, cutting off Hongkong as the intermediary port. Nevertheless, in view of the preparations for the Northern Expedition and the imminent removal of the seat of government to Wuhan, the Government decided, largely on Borodin's advice, to call off the strike and boycott on October 10, 1926.

In spite of the initial success, it was, however, impossible for the National Government to concentrate on the internal reconstruction of Kwangtung with a view to making it the model province of China. The reason was the existence of some 90,000 soldiers in Kwangtung, divided into six armies, the maintenance of whom required some four-fifths of the revenues of the province. This was an intolerable burden on the province which made civil reconstruction entirely impossible. It was also felt that as long as the rest of China was under the control of reactionary Militarists, Kwangtung was in constant danger of invasion from the North. The first requisite to any

scheme of reconstruction on a large scale was, therefore, the unification, not only of the province, but of the entire country, and the establishment of the authority of the National Government over the other provinces. The impossibility of the single province of Kwangtung keeping such a large standing army, and the necessity of the military consolidation of the whole Republic before reconstructive efforts had any chance of permanent success, made Wang Ching-Wei finally propose to the Political Council to declare war on Wu Pei-Fu and other Northern Militarists, and to send the armies on the Northern Expedition, leaving only a small force behind for the extermination of the remnants of the different enemy forces, who had turned bandits and were infesting Eastern and Southern Kwangtung.

War Preparations

Wang's war proposals were adopted on January 27, 1926, and on February 6 Chiang was appointed Inspector-General of the military forces in Kwangtung, with the special task of putting the troops on a war basis. All the armies were reviewed; defects in equipment rectified; unreliable officers and soldiers were disarmed, and other measures taken to increase the efficiency of the troops. In the middle of February Wang went to Wuchow on the Kwangsi border, to meet Li Tsung-Jen, Huang Shao-Hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, to arrange for a closer co-operation between Kwangtung and Kwangsi, to ask for their support in the Northern Expedition, and to discuss about the defence of the two provinces against T'ang Chi-Yao of Yunnan. Wang succeeded in effecting the desired co-operation and in persuading the Kwangsi soldiers to pledge their allegiance to the National Government. He brought with him to Canton Pai Ch'ung-Hsi for the purpose of studying the Kwangtung system of government, which was to be introduced into Kwangsi. Kwangsi was, therefore, incorporated into the Kuo-Min Tang system, and the Kwangsi Army came under the direction

of the Military Council. Party propagandists were sent out by the Central Executive Committee to Kwangsi to establish new branches there and to work among the newly gained troops. In Wuchow Wang also effected a reconciliation between T'ang Sheng-Chih and T'an Yen-K'ai. T'ang had for a long time intended to join the National Government, but was afraid to do so on account of the presence of T'an Yen-K'ai, with whom he had had a serious conflict. Wang explained to T'ang's delegate, Yeh-Ch'i, that the National Government would welcome T'ang in the Government and told him that T'an had made up for the past quarrels. As a result of this interview, T'ang Sheng-Chih, submitted to the National Government and pledged his co-operation against Wu Pei-Fu. On February 25, 1926, the National Government published a Manifesto denouncing Chang Tso-Lin and Wu Pei-Fu as the enemies of the country, as the marionettes of the foreign Imperialists, who at their behest deliberately prevented the holding of the National People's Assembly which would have unified the country. It appealed to the entire Chinese nation to rise and help the National Government to overthrow these two criminals and their running dogs. This Manifesto was in the nature of a formal declaration of war, in spite of the fact that the Canton Government were not yet ready to embark on the Northern Expedition. Preparations went on until the middle of March, 1926.

The Incident of March 20, 1926

Meanwhile, a political crisis took place on March 20, which resulted in the temporary retirement of Wang Ching-Wei from the National Government.

The Western Hills faction, annoyed at Chiang's repudiation of their slogan, "Ally with Chiang to overthrow Wang," had adopted different tactics for treating dissensions within the National-Revolutionary ranks. They gave up their overt propaganda, and instead sent down to Canton on a secret mission Chang Ching-Chiang, whose

adherence to their group was not known to the outside world. Chang was an old Party member who became famous in the early days of the Tung Meng Hui for the readiness with which he had placed his whole fortune at the disposal of Sun Yat-Sen. He was one of the best friends of Chiang, whom he had frequently assisted when the latter was still in obscurity, employing him as a junior clerk in the Stock Exchange which he set up in Shanghai after the Revolution, and even marrying him to a member of his household. He was now to exploit his friendship with Chiang in order to create a breach between Chiang and Wang, utilising every means to destroy his faith in Wang. A born conspirator, he managed to surround Chiang with his own men, and then returned to Shanghai, from which place he now directed his intrigues.

Ever since the Second National Congress, when Wang persisted in rejecting Borodin's proposal to bring up before the Congress the policy of forcible confiscation without compensation as part of the agrarian programme of the Kuo-Min Tang, the Communists had come to regard Wang and Chiang as serious obstacles to the spread of their ideas among the Chinese masses. They, therefore, started attacking Wang and Chiang with a view to securing their overthrow, singly or together, so as to increase their own influence. Borodin had taken leave of absence to the North in the beginning of February, 1926, ostensibly for a change of climate, and for conferring with Feng Yü-Hsiang regarding the Northern Expedition, but actually, in pursuance of the advice of the Third International which regarded him as being so closely related to Wang and Chiang as to embarrass the actions of the Chinese Communists. His subordinate advisers in the Military Council, the Whangpoa Academy and in the six Armies were, however, openly favouring the Chinese Communists, with the result that relations became strained between them and Chiang. Chiang, annoyed at the unreasonable criticisms of the Communist cadets and officers, put restrictions on the activities of

the Union of Military Youth. The Communists replied by demanding from the Military Council the resignation of the Chief of the Arsenal, Teng Yen-Ts'un, and the appointment of one of their own number to the post.

Wang rejected the Communists' demand straightforwardly, not caring about their attacks. Chiang, on the other hand, was more reticent. For since the establishment of the Whangpoa Military Academy Chiang had made many friends among the Communist cadets and now felt hurt at their growing estrangement, which he took rather seriously. It was in these circumstances that Chang Ching-Chiang found his opportunity. He gave instructions to his agents, who were surrounding Chiang, to conceal from him the propaganda which the Communists directed against Wang, and to impress Chiang with the Communist hostility against him. He also spread the story that the Communists were allying themselves with Wang against Chiang. Chiang took these rumours seriously. Wang was entirely ignorant as to the origin of the rumours. He did not know that they originated in Chiang's environment, and only gradually were allowed to leak out to the public. Ascribing them all to Western Hills propaganda, he did not take the trouble to investigate.

Chiang, for the purpose of testing Wang's attitude, then presented a demand upon Wang for a change in the Russian advisory staff in the Military Council, on the ground of disagreement with them. Wang approved of Chiang's desires, as he had full confidence in Chiang regarding military affairs. Chiang thus sent a letter to Borodin stating that the present Russian advisers had quarrelled with him and begged him to send for other advisers. This letter too was approved by Wang and sent to Borodin through the intermediary of Shao Li-Tze. Meanwhile, Chang Ching-Chiang continued his secret propaganda against Wang.

One of the deputy members of the Central Executive

Committee and simultaneously Commander of the Tiger Gate Fort, Ch'en Chao-Ying, had abused the patrol boats under his control for the purpose of using them for salt smuggling. This malpractice was brought to the notice of Wang, who at once proposed in the Central Executive Committee to suspend his deputy membership of the Committee, and in the Military Council to dismiss him his command of the Tiger Gate Fort. Orders were then given to Chiang to investigate into the salt smuggling affair. Ch'en was a close friend of Chiang, in whose environment were also many of his supporters. When the salt smuggling case was discovered, many of these people around Chiang attempted to influence Wang to exercise clemency in Ch'en's case. Wang was adamant, taking the view that Ch'en deserved exemplary punishment, as he had betrayed the high positions of trust he occupied both in the Party and Government. In this way Wang, therefore, acquired a new set of enemies. He was at the time, however, not yet aware of the fact. On March 17 Wang fell ill and for three days had not been able to attend to his functions at the Headquarters of the Government Council. Wang's enemies now felt the field free to take action. Someone of the name of Owyang Keh, who had been dismissed by Wang for inefficiency from his post as Head of the Political Department in the Naval Bureau under the Military Council, and had been able to return to a subordinate position in his old department, had spread the rumour that Li Chih-Lung, a Communist, who had succeeded him in the Political Department of the Naval Bureau, had ordered the gunboat *Yung Feng* (later renamed *Chung Shan*) to manoeuvre with a view to taking action against Chiang, and had himself, during Wang's absence, told Chiang about the supposed Communist *coup d'état*.

Chiang, at last succumbing to the anti-Wang propaganda, on the basis of this rumour, and without consulting anyone, then suddenly declared on his own authority, on March 20, 1926, a state of martial law in

Canton and ordered the arrest of Li Chih-Lung and the detention of the *Yung Feng*. At the same time, he sent out soldiers to surround the houses of the Russian military advisers, and caused all the Party Commissioners attached to the regiments and lower units of the Second Division of the First Army, which was under his direct control, to be arrested.

All this took place in the morning of March 20. In the afternoon Chiang went to Wang's house to report on what he had done. Chiang explained to Wang that the steps he had taken were not directed against Wang personally, but only against the Communists, whose activities he wanted to curb. He admitted that he was wrong in acting without previously obtaining Wang's consent as Chairman of the Government and Military Councils. For this abuse of authority, however, he was willing to receive punishment. Wang agreed to hold a meeting of the Political Council the following day for the purpose of settling the whole affair.

The next day Wang was still ill, and the meeting was held in his bedroom. In this meeting Wang proposed that an investigation be held to inquire into the Li Chih-Lung case, which proved to be very complicated, involving many other questions. On his motion Chiang and T'an Yen-K'ai were appointed to conduct the investigation. Secondly, in view of the urgency of the situation and the fact that he was feeling seriously ill, he proposed to the Council to grant him a leave of absence and to appoint someone to act in his place as Chairman of the different Councils. This proposal, however, was rejected by the other members of the Council, but as Wang was bedridden, the question was left open until his recovery. They tried to persuade him to remain in Canton so as to be available for consultation. Wang persisted in leaving, as he needed a more complete rest. Apart from this, he felt very strongly about the case of Li Chih-Lung, the declaration of martial law and the arrest of the Party Commissioners. Regarding Li Chih-Lung, whose case was being investi-

gated, by Chiang and T'an, Wang was entirely ignorant of the affair. Should Li be found guilty, Wang would consider himself as responsible for the whole thing, being the Chairman of the Military Council; in the contrary event, Chiang would have been guilty of gross negligence for taking such a drastic action just on a rumour. As to the declaration of martial law and the arrest of the Party Commissioners, Wang's point was that whether these should have been necessary or not, was irrelevant. Chiang had transgressed the authority of the Party and Government, and his actions were, therefore, *ultra vires*. Ever since he became Chairman of the different Party Councils Wang had struggled hard for the supremacy of the Central Executive Committee, the Government Council and the Military Council. He had staked everything in order to get the principle accepted that every important action should first be approved of by these organs, seeing in it the foundation of the success of the Revolution. Chiang's single act had destroyed the whole of his work; the single mistake in procedure had made all co-operation between himself and Chiang impossible. For Wang felt that a great principle was at stake, namely the entire subordination of the military to Party authority. As soon as the military authorities, however exalted, ceased taking orders from the Military Council, the way to military dictatorship was open.

What decided Wang finally to retire, however, was the fact that he did not want to play into the hands of the Western Hills group, whose aim was to get Chiang definitely opposed to him. Not being in entire agreement with Chiang, he felt that either he himself or Chiang had to retire, so as to keep a united front against the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Being ill, and not personally ambitious, he considered that the best way to solve the situation was for him to retreat and to allow Chiang to take charge of affairs for the time being. He, therefore, moved to a village in the neighbourhood of Canton, keeping his whereabouts secret, but when his illness grew worse

he decided to go to France in May, and was finally operated on in the following September.

A great deal of misunderstanding existed regarding the incident of March 20, 1926. The Western Hills faction interpreted the departure of Wang Ching-Wei and of the dismissal of the Russian advisers as the imminent abandonment by Chiang of the Russian orientation which Wang should want to retain. They had sent congratulatory telegrams to Chiang on what they imagined to be his return to sanity. They were, therefore, extremely disappointed when Chiang, on April 3, issued a Manifesto stating that the Russian Alliance was as strong as ever and should any reactionary or counter-revolutionary put in an appearance at Canton, he would forthwith be arrested and court-martialled. Shortly afterwards, on April 16, Chiang also made a speech at the Whangpoa Academy in which he expressed the opinion that the Chinese Revolution was organically related to the World Revolution and that, therefore, the Kuo-Min Tang should accept the direction of the Third International. Borodin also returned to Canton from the North, at the end of April, together with Hu Han-Min, who had just returned from Moscow, where he showed himself very pro-Communist, to the extent of proposing the formal affiliation of the Kuo-Min Tang to the Third International. Arrived at Canton, Hu, however, turned to the Right again, and not being able to work with Chiang, he soon left for Shanghai. Chiang's relations with Borodin became more cordial than ever. To the vacancies caused by the departure of the Russian advisers with whom Chiang had quarrelled, Borodin nominated others, who were appointed accordingly.

The First Plenary Session

The result of the investigations by Chiang and T'an in the Li Chih-Lung affair disclosed the intrigues of Owyang Keh, who was accordingly arrested and locked up. Li Chih-Lung was released and rehabilitated, the *Yung Feng* case proving only to be a *canard*. On May 15,

the Central Executive Committee held a plenary session, and here Chiang admitted his wrong and invited the Committee to punish him. It was decided, however, not to reopen the question, but to telegraph to Wang, assuring him that he had committed no mistakes whatever, and urging him to return immediately after his recovery in order to resume his functions in the Party and Government. In this session Chiang also proposed to confirm his policy of admitting the Communists into the Party. In order to curb the activities of the Communists, it was decided, however, to disqualify the Communists from serving as Heads of Departments under the Central Executive Committee.

In demanding Wang to resume his posts as soon as possible, the Central Executive Committee therefore desired that Wang and Chiang should continue working together. The fact that Moscow and the Communist Party remained silent on Wang's departure, while the Russian advisers continued working side by side with Chiang, proved that the suggestion that the Communists had been desirous to assist Wang to overthrow Chiang, was without any foundation. The people of Kwangtung, however, were puzzled for a long time about the March 20th incident. But gradually they sided with Wang in his conflict with Chiang, recalling his past activities, and sent many telegrams and resolutions either directly to Wang or to the Central Executive Committee, urging Wang's return. From October, 1926, a definite movement in favour of Wang was noticeable until April 1, when he finally arrived at Shanghai.

The Outbreak of Hostilities; Some Kuo-Min Tang Commanders

T'ang Sheng-Chih's association with the Kuo-Min Tang was discovered by Wu Pei-Fu in the beginning of March, 1926. Wu was at that time engaged in a struggle against Feng Yü-Hsiang in the North-Western provinces, and could take no direct action against T'ang. He only

ordered Chao Heng-T'i, the Hunan Tuchün subordinate to him, to dismiss T'ang. T'ang, however, was too powerful for Chao, so Chao resigned his Governorship and retreated to the North, leaving T'ang in control of Changsha, the provincial capital, which he occupied on March 16. Meanwhile, however, Chao received reinforcements from Wu, and started the offensive, compelling T'ang to withdraw to Hanshan in Southern Hunan.

The National Government by this time had completed the preparations for the Northern Expedition. All the armies under the jurisdiction of the Military Council had been mobilised. Chiang K'ai-Shih had on May 28, 1926, been appointed Commander-in-Chief for the duration of the Northern Expedition. At the advice of Borodin, in the beginning of July, he was also given emergency powers to the effect that all military, political, and party affairs, both relating to the front and the rear, were concentrated in his hands.

The armed forces at the disposal of the Military Council consisted of seven Armies. Each Army consisted normally of three divisions, each division of three regiments of 1,620 rifles, making the total strength of each army 14,580 men. For the period of the Northern Expedition all the powers pertaining to the Military Council were to be exercised by Chiang, the Commander-in-Chief. Chiang, besides having the general direction of the Expeditionary Forces, which he shared with Galens, his Russian military adviser, had direct control over the First Army, which was commanded by his lieutenant, Ho Ying-Ch'ing, one of the professors under him in the Whangpoa Academy. Only the Second Division of the First Army, however, was sent to the front, the First and Third Divisions being left behind, as Chiang wanted to consolidate his basis in Kwangtung.

Ho Ying-Ch'ing was the only Commander who owed allegiance to Chiang personally; the other Army commanders were not his subordinates. Most of them had in fact a longer historical standing in the Party, and some of them had, until but a short time ago, occupied a higher

official position than Chiang himself. They were obedient to him, however, because of the fact that he derived his authority from the Party. Another factor was the Russian orientation of the Party, of which Chiang was the strongest living advocate, the other being the late Liao Chung-K'ai. A short description of the different commanders during the Northern Expedition might perhaps be useful.

T'an Yen-K'ai, the Commander of the Second Army, was an old type official of the Ch'ing Dynasty, who, at the time of the Republican Revolution in 1911, had been forced, like Li Yuan-Hung, to assume the Governorship of Hunan, a post which he occupied until 1923, except for the interval of 1913-16, when he took part in the campaign against Yuan. During the Northern Expedition of 1924 T'an Yen-K'ai was commanding under Sun Yat-Sen the armies in the front, the rear being under Hu Han-Min. His command of the Second Army was, however, a nominal concurrent post. For T'an remained himself at Canton, being appointed to take Wang's place during his absence. His troops were led by Lu Tih-Ping, the Vice-Commander. Actually, he was not much good as a fighter, but as he had been prominent in official circles, he was useful as a figure-head.

Chu Pei-Teh, of the Third Army, was a brigadier-general in 1916, when he led his Yunnanese soldiers to attack Lung Ch'i-Kuang, Yuan's supporter in Kwangtung. In 1917, when Sun Yat-Sen took over Kwangtung, he became more intimately connected with the Party. He became a Divisional Commander under Sun Yat-Sen. His official standing was about the same as Chiang's, but his services to the Party were more prominent than Chiang's prior to 1925. When Wang was at Canton, he was one of his closest military collaborators.

Li Chi-Tsen was a native of Kwangsi, whose official and Party standing was inferior to that of Chiang. In 1921 he returned from Peking to Canton and became Chief-of-Staff of the First Division of the Kwangtung Army.

In 1924 he was made Dean of the Whangpoa Military Academy by Chiang. When Hsü Ch'ung-Chih's army was reorganised in September, 1925, he was appointed the Commander of the Fourth Army. Of the three divisions under his command, only two were sent out to the front, Li himself staying behind. The two divisions were respectively under Ch'en Ming-Shu and Chang Fa-K'uei, the latter of whom enjoyed the popular distinction of being called the "Iron General", owing to the fact that he had never lost a battle.

Li Fu-Lin, the Commander of the Fifth Army, was originally a bandit, who got the nickname of "Chimney of the Lamp", as he frightened the people with it. He joined the Tung Meng Hui in 1908, and was very prominent in the insurrection of March 29, 1911. He was a very faithful Party member, whose standing in the Party before 1925 was about the same as Chiang's. His military merits were not less great, but as he was illiterate he had never been very prominent in the Councils of the Party. His Army was the smallest unit under the Military Council, and only part of it was mobilised for the front, the remainder staying behind for police duty in Honam Island and the West River.

Ch'eng Ch'ien, the Commander of the Sixth Army, was made a Divisional Commander in 1911, when T'an Yen-K'ai became Tutor of Hunan. In 1917, when the Southern provinces declared their independence from Tuan, he was made the Commander-in-Chief of the Hunanese forces. He became Minister of War under Sun Yat-Sen in 1923-24. Before 1925 his official position was, therefore, higher than Chiang's. His Party standing was about the same, but he had not been so intimately related to Sun Yat-Sen as Chiang.

These six Armies had been a direct charge on Kwangtung province. In addition, there were the Kwangsi troops, under Li Tsung-Jen, with Huang Shao-Hsiung as Vice-Commander. They formed the Seventh Army, which was numerically the biggest of the Revolutionary

Armies, numbering about 30,000 men. Only half of this Army was mobilised at the front under Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, Huang remaining behind with the remainder. These Kwangsi generals were new-comers into the Party. By their own efforts they had unified the province of Kwangsi and had joined the Kuo-Min Tang system in February, 1926, forming something like a federation. Their subsequent history, however, indicated that it was more for reasons of expediency than out of conviction that they entered the Kuo-Min Tang, being still imbued by the spirit of military feudalism.

A few words must now be devoted to Chiang K'ai-Shih's own career before he attained the pre-eminent position in the Chinese revolutionary movement. For politics in China, as elsewhere, have always been closely associated with, and shaped by, the personalities of a few leading individuals, and a clear insight into one who was to become the biggest single influence in present-day China, is of great importance. Chiang was a native of Chekiang, born in 1888 in the little village of Fenghua. He first had his military education in the Paoting Military Academy, and then went to the Tokio Military Academy as a Chinese Government scholar. When he was about to graduate, the 1911 Revolution broke out. He hurried back to Shanghai, and was at once commissioned by Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, the revolutionary Tutuh of Shanghai, who was also a Chekiangese, to command the 83rd Brigade, a band of some 3,000 men recruited from the riff-raff of Shanghai. He gave his band a severe training, but soon he abandoned himself to a life of intense dissipation. He would disappear for months from headquarters in the houses of sing-song girls, and for some reason or other he acquired a fiery, uncompromising temper which weighed very tryingly on his friends. It was during this period that he became friendly with Chang Ching-Chiang, who was to become one of the most sinister characters in the Revolutionary Movement. He also came into contact with the leaders of the secret societies in Shanghai, which later on

became very useful to him in his dealings with the Shanghai capitalists. The failure of the 1913 campaign against Yuan Shih-K'ai had a sobering effect on him. He gave up his dissolute life, and accompanied Ch'en Ch'i-Mei to Tokio, where he was introduced to Sun Yat-Sen. He had, however, no direct relations with Sun until 1916, when his immediate chief, Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, was murdered by a hireling of Yuan Shih-K'ai. When in 1917 Sun returned to Kwangtung, to organise the Generalissimo's office, he took Chiang with him as a member of his staff. Sun recognised his ability, but on account of his violent temper and ill-mannered ways, which made him very unpopular among his colleagues, Sun had difficulty in assigning to him any responsible work. For seven years he remained an obscure member of Sun's staff, only interrupted by a business venture in association with Chang Ching-Chiang during the Stock Exchange boom in 1920, when he made a profit of an odd million dollars which he presented to Sun's war-chest. He had been at different times also attached to Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming's and Hsü Ch'ung-Chih's staff, both of whom had a high regard of his capacity.

Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming's revolt on June 16, 1922, increased his prestige tremendously. At that time he was in Kwangsi with Sun Yat-Sen and Hsü Ch'ung-Chih. Foreseeing the impending revolt of Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming, he advised Sun to withdraw at once to Canton, and crush Ch'en first, before starting the Northern Expedition against Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-Fu. Hsü's plan was to drive away Ch'en's forces, but not to eradicate them. The adoption of Hsü's advice caused Chiang to leave for Shanghai in a temper. Sun later on recognised that he had made a mistake in not adopting Chiang's ideas—a mistake which led to his being driven out from Canton by Ch'en. From the gunboat, into which Sun had taken refuge after his defeat by Ch'en, Sun thus wired to Chiang to join him. When in October following, Hsü's forces captured Fukien, and Hsü was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Southern forces, Chiang

was made his Chief-of-Staff, but he soon left his post again, on a pretext of illness, although actually because of some disagreement with Hsü. When in February, 1923, Sun returned to Canton, he invited Chiang to come along with him, and although holding a low nominal position, Chiang enjoyed a greater share of Sun's confidence than either Ch'eng Ch'ien, the Minister of War, or Li Lieh-Ch'ün, the Chief of the General Staff. In July, 1923, he was sent to Russia, returning in December, 1923, and became the principal advocate of the Russian orientation. In May, 1924, he was appointed Director of Whangpoa Military Academy, after which his success had been meteoric. He was chiefly responsible for the victories in the East River district against Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming in February, 1925, and for the suppression of Yang and Liu the following June. After Liao's assassination, Chiang did not confine his activities to the military sphere, but took an active part in purely Party affairs, being elected a member of the Central Executive Committee at the Second National Congress.

Unfortunately, Chiang, being trained in the military tradition, was incapable of independent political thinking, and invariably fell under the influence of his environment. A friendly observer wrote about him, "Formerly he was very loyal to Ch'en Ch'i-Mei. After the latter's death, he was very loyal to Dr Sun, and took Dr Sun's orders in absolute obedience." Looking on Wang Ching-Wei as the *alter ego* of Sun Yat-Sen, he once told Wang, after Wang's return from Peking to Swatow in May, 1925, "Now our Leader has departed, I will regard you as I have regarded him." During his friendship with Borodin, he often remarked that Dr Sun told him to take Borodin's advices, which would be equal to taking his own words. The most lasting influence on Chiang, however, was that exercised by Chang Ching-Chiang, who, knowing how to deal with Chiang, absolutely dominated Chiang's mental and political outlook. Thus, Chang, to whom Chiang owed a great deal during his days of obscurity, including one of

his former wives, managed to become Chiang's personal representative in the Party Councils, after he had successfully stage-managed the incident of March 20, 1926.

A confidential Soviet report, dated May, 1926, characterised him as follows: "As a personality General Chiang K'ai-Shih is by nature a self-conceited, self-loving, reserved and ambitious man, with some ideas of European progress, who, however, did not altogether break away from his Chinese prejudices. With some knowledge of the General's character, by praising him in a delicate manner and speaking in correct form, much can be obtained from him; only one never must show one's self to be above or beneath him; one must be on the same level with him and never show that one wants to usurp even a particle of his power." Further, "as an active worker, he is hardly different from other Chinese military leaders of medium quality. Like the overwhelming majority of them, he easily becomes enthusiastic and then, just as easily crestfallen, not knowing how to take a middle course, and lacking the necessary coolness and firmness of character."

The National-Revolutionary Victories

With the arrival of reinforcements from Kwangtung in the form of three divisions under Ch'en Ming-Shu, Chang Fa-K'uei and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, at the beginning of July, 1926, T'ang Sheng-Chih was able to retake the offensive against Wu Pei-Fu's troops, and on July 17 he reoccupied Changsha. T'ang Sheng-Chih was then formally admitted into the Kuo-Min Tang. His troops were reorganised into the Eighth Army and he was appointed its Commander. The anti-North Expedition had started in earnest.

In the beginning the Northern Expedition was aimed solely at Wu Pei-Fu. This campaign was short and decisive, ending to all intents and purposes on October 10, with the capture of Wuhan, as a result of which Hunan and Hupeh provinces joined the Kuo-Min Tang system. But then Sun Chuan-Fang, the self-styled over-

lord of the five provinces of Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Fukien, Anhui and Chekiang, felt himself menaced by the unprecedented successes of the National-Revolutionary forces, and declared his solidarity with Wu Pei-Fu. The National Government was, therefore, compelled to declare war on him also.

In the campaign against Wu Pei-Fu, the main Nationalist forces were those of T'ang Sheng-Chih, Chang Fa-K'uei and Li Tsung-Jen. The forces against Sun Chuang-fang consisted of those of T'an Yen-K'ai, Chu Pei-Teh and Ch'eng Ch'ien. Sun's resources were, however, very formidable. Hence easy victories alternated with heavy defeats, which made it necessary for Li Tsung-Jen and Chang Fa-K'uei to reinforce from time to time the forces operating against Sun.

On November 8 the Second and Sixth Armies managed to capture the province of Kiangsi. After this, Chiang dispatched his two divisions which had remained in Kwangtung, to Fukien, which fell in December. From Fukien Chekiang was invaded, but here Chiang met with serious reverses from the hands of Sun Chuan-fang, and defeat was only averted by timely reinforcements from T'an Yen-K'ai and Ch'eng Ch'ien. On February 18, 1927, Chekiang also fell. From Chekiang the attack northwards was continued. Chiang, who had remained in Nanchang in Kiangsi during all these operations, then suddenly rushed to the North-Eastern front to direct the campaign against Shanghai itself. Shanghai fell on March 22, and on March 27 Chiang made his entry into the city. Three days previously, on March 24, Nanking, the ancient capital, had also fallen.

The reason of Chiang's sudden move was the change in the political and military balance of power within the Kuo-Min Tang system, as a result of the sweeping victories of the commanders nominally subordinated to him. He himself had very few troops under his personal command, namely the Second Division, which for some reason or other had always been losing battles. On one occasion,

in the campaign in Kiangsi against Sun Chuan-Fang, he himself was nearly captured. By common consent Chang Fa-K'uei, the "Iron General", had come out best during the Northern Expedition, having won every battle he fought; next came T'ang Sheng-Chih; then Li Tsung-Jen and Chu-Pei-Teh; fourthly, T'an Yen-K'ai and Ch'eng Ch'ien; his own troops last. Geographically, he had no foothold over the newly conquered provinces Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi. On the other hand he was a native of Chekiang, and was familiar with the Shanghai people. It was in Chekiang and Kiangsu where he thought his strength must lie. He could always rely on the local forces of Chekiang province and on the secret societies of Shanghai with which he had had contact during his Shanghai days. The provinces formerly under Sun Chuan-Fang had been subjected to little Kuo-Min Tang propaganda, and it only needed him to talk against Communism to have the gentry and the rich merchants on his side. From the working classes he expected little opposition, as these were little influenced by Kuo-Min Tang principles. He further wanted to be on good terms with the Kwangsi generals, Li Chi-Tsen and Huang Shao-Hsiung, who, when the Northern Expedition started, had been charged with the garrisoning of Kwangtung and Kwangsi respectively. Li and Huang preferred consolidating their power in these two provinces to taking part in a risky campaign. Chiang's personal control over new provinces, therefore, gave these two Kwangsinese a sense of security, which made them available as allies in case of emergency.

The Communist Ascendancy

Wang Ching-Wei's absence abroad and Chiang K'ai-Shih's pre-occupation with military affairs left no one of any outstanding importance at headquarters to take charge of Party affairs. Nominally, Chiang was, on behalf of Wang, at the head of the Government and Party. Actually, he had deputed T'an Yen-K'ai to act as Chair-

man of the Government Council, and Chang Ching-Chiang as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee. T'an Yen-K'ai, however, was only a figurehead, who had no fixed political principles and was easily bullied by others, while Chang Ching-Chiang was distrusted, being suspected of having connections with the Western Hills faction. In these circumstances, Party affairs fell entirely under the control of the Communists. For although the Communist members of the Central Executive Committee, such as T'an P'ing-Shan, had been discharged from their headships of Departments, under the Central Executive Committee (in this instance the Department of Organisation), they continued to control the Party branches. Chiang's speech to the effect that Party members should accept the instructions of the Third International, also encouraged the Russian advisers in their Communist propaganda.

The most powerful man at that time in Canton and subsequently, after the removal of the Capital, in Wuhan, was Hsü Ch'ien. Hsü, a Hanlin of the Ch'ing Dynasty, had joined the Party at the time of the Republican Revolution, and had many times been either Minister of Justice or Chief Justice, first in T'ang Shao-Yi's Cabinet, and later under Sun Yat-Sen in Canton, whom for a time he also served as Chief Secretary. A Confucianist, he became for some reason in 1916 a Christian, and adopted the Christian name of George. In 1924 Hsü was introduced to Feng Yü-Hsiang, who invited him to propagate the Christian Religion and the Three People's Principles among his soldiers, a work which he did until the end of 1925. In January, 1926, he was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang, to represent Feng's Provinces. The following March he accompanied Feng to Russia. In September, 1926, Feng returned to the North-Western Provinces to resume the command over his Army, while Hsü went to Canton as Feng's representative. As he was already a member of the Central Executive Committee, he at once joined the

National Government on his return to Canton, becoming Minister of Justice and Chief Justice.

At that time most of the members of the Central Executive Committee and the National Government, such as Ch'en Kung-Po, Ku Meng-Yü, Kan Nai Kuang, Ch'en Shu-Jen, Ho Hsiang Ning, were not favourably inclined towards Chiang K'ai-Shih, as a result of the March 20th incident. Chiang's environment knew them to be Wang's adherents, and wanted as little to do with them as possible. Neither did the Communists like them, as they were doing considerable underground Communist propaganda directed against Wang. The Left under Wang were, therefore, attacked both by the Right, who were opposed to the 1924 Reorganisation, and by the Communists. Being a new-comer, Hsü Ch'ien became the link between Chiang on the one hand and the Central Executive Committee and the National Government on the other, in addition to being Feng Yü-Hsiang's personal representative. Having just returned from Russia, and enthusiastic about Russian institutions, he became very intimate with Borodin, who used him as his chief tool. For Borodin, who, after Wang's departure, and with Chiang preaching obedience to the Third International, had become practically a dictator in Canton, was careful enough not to offend Chinese susceptibilities by openly exercising his power. This he left to Hsü Ch'ien, who encouraged the Communists in their propaganda.

Apart from Hsü Ch'ien, Borodin used Sun Fo (Sun K'uo), the son of Sun Yat-Sen, as the instrument of his policy. Sun Fo, the former Mayor of Canton, had after the Reorganisation of 1924, in which he took a considerable part, suddenly turned to the Right in 1925, to the extent of supporting the Western Hills faction with funds, probably because of his disappointment in not being nominated by Sun Yat-Sen to the First Central Executive Committee. He had left Canton after the Shameen Shootings on June 23, 1925, but during the Second National Congress in January, 1926, had returned to

Canton, and was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee, and at the same time Minister of Communications. For some unexplained reason, he turned to the Left again, becoming more and more extreme, until, when Borodin achieved supreme power, he was to all intents and purposes a Communist, greatly to the annoyance of such colleagues as Ku Meng-Yü, Eugen Ch'en, and of Madame Sun Yat-Sen. People thus nicknamed him "Sun Wu Kung", the monkey in Chinese mythology who could in one somersault jump tens of thousands of miles.

The Movement for Wang Ching-Wei's Return

On October 15, 1926, a few days after the fall of the Wuhan cities, a Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee was held, jointly with delegates from the different provincial organisations, to consider the administrative and constitutional problems arising out of the extension of National-Revolutionary Authority over Southern China. It was decided to extend the committee system in all the newly acquired provinces; provincial governments were to be organised by several persons appointed for the purpose by the Central Executive Committee, jointly with members of the provincial executives. The minimum programme of the Kuo-Min Tang, including the adoption of industrial protection, the prohibition of illegitimate taxation, the lowering of agricultural rents by 25 per cent, the limitation of the rate of interest to 20 per cent, the abolition of the tenant contract system, the enactment of Labour laws giving the workers the right to organise and to strike and providing for labour and capital arbitration councils, was reiterated. The removal of the seat of government to Wuhan was also considered. This took place on November 10, but it was not until a month later that the National Government was established in the new Capital.

The Joint Session also passed a resolution urging Wang Ching-Wei to return immediately after his recovery, in

order to resume the Chairmanship of the different Councils in the Party and Government.

Before the fall of Wuhan, a movement had already started among the Left members demanding the return of Wang. Chiang, although superficially on good terms with Wang since the event of March 20, 1926, had, however, always set his foot against this, realising that it would mean his abdication from the supreme position he occupied. Therefore, whenever officers in his armies wanted to demonstrate in Wang's favour, he always refused permission. Borodin too was against the idea of Wang's return, his policy being to support Chiang alone against the other members of the Left. The movement, however, was too strong for both Chiang and Borodin to suppress, and when the Joint Session passed the Wang resolution, Chiang was obliged to support it by sending a separate telegram to Wang to that effect.

The movement became more powerful every day, coming mostly from the Left members in the Party, the mass organisations and the Army, but owing to the fact that Chiang was the Commander-in-Chief, the Leftists in the Army did not dare to express themselves very clearly. It was the general sentiment, both among the civilians and the troops that Chiang's authority had been substituted for Party authority, which they found incompatible with the idea of government by the Party. The issue came finally to a head when Chiang, badly defeated in a counter-attack by Sun Chuan-Fang after the capture of Nanchang, asked Chu Pei-Teh, the commander of the Third Army, for reinforcements. About to leave for the front to assist Chiang's troops, Chu told Chiang, "I have some parting words to say to you. You must request Wang to return to resume his posts". This came as a thunderbolt to Chiang, for he knew that there was no personal friendship between Wang and Chu, but that the former was merely voicing the sentiments of the rank and file of the Army. Borodin, to whom knowledge of this was brought, then suddenly changed his policy vis-à-vis

Chiang, and shortly afterwards at a banquet in Wuhan at which Chiang was present, he openly criticised him and managed to turn the whole atmosphere against Chiang. Chiang, feeling insulted, at once returned to his headquarters at Nanchang, and swore never to visit Wuhan again.

The Communists in the Kuo-Min Tang had meanwhile joined the pro-Wang movement. Their aim was to overthrow Chiang, in order to increase their own influence. But they were reluctant to come out in the open solely as anti-Chiang. They, therefore, put up the slogan "Welcome Wang to overthrow Chiang", in line with their policy to put up one Kuo-Min Tang member against the other.

From about the end of December, 1926, the provinces of Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi had a definite anti-Chiang character, as also the majority in the Central Executive Committee. Sun Fo became the most violently anti-Chiang person in the National Government, siding openly with the Communists. Chiang, who formerly could always dictate his wishes to the Central Executive Committee, could do so no more. Neither could he use the name of the Party to control the other Armies any longer, for these followed the instructions of the Central Executive Committee rather than his own, and the troops under his direct command also became unreliable from this point of view. He directed his enmity, however, against Borodin, because formerly Borodin always exhorted the Kuo-Min Tang members to obey him, and now did so no longer. Thus Chiang also began to desire Wang's return. In this he was sincere, for he was afraid that the Communist members might succeed in their propaganda against him by putting up Wang. He wanted Wang to return in order to restore the Party and Army to him, and drive Borodin away. From January, 1927, he therefore sent repeatedly telegrams to Wang, demanding his return, and even threatening to resign if Wang remained much longer abroad. It was also at this time that he concentrated his attention on the conquest

of the remaining provinces of Sun Chuan-Fang. His success in this campaign left him at the beginning of March, 1927, with practically complete control over Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang and Fukien, and through an understanding with Li Chi-Tsen and Huang Shao-Hsiung, also over Kwangtung and Kwangsi, leaving to the Central Executive Committee and the National Government only Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi. He was not strong enough, however, to revolt openly against the authority of the Central Executive Committee, until he was assured of the possession of Shanghai. Thus, on March 7, 1927, he issued a declaration, urging all Party members to support the Central Executive Committee in order that centralisation in the direction of Party affairs and concerted effort in wiping out feudal influence might be possible and the dawning of a new democracy may be realised. "The history of the Revolution is not made up of stories of personal glories, but records achievements in the interests of the people. The triumph of the whole Party is the prize to be fought for, not the ascendancy of one particular person. . . . The Central Executive Committee must be made the supreme democratic organ of the Party."

The Crisis at Wuhan

When the movement against Chiang K'ai-Shih started, Wang Ching-Wei was just recuperating in France after his operation. He had intended to take a prolonged rest, thinking that, with the sweeping victories culminating in the capture of Wuhan, everything was well in China. In October and November, 1926, however, affairs relating to Chiang, the Communists and the Central Executive Committee, pointed to a crisis, and so he decided to return in December via Siberia. Arriving in Berlin, however, he fell ill again, and was laid up for two months. It was not until March, 1927, that he could continue the journey, arriving at Shanghai on April 1, 1927.

While Wang was on his way back, on March 10, 1927,

the Central Executive Committee at Wuhan held the Third Plenary Session. This Session, boycotted by Chiang, who refused to leave Nanchang, was entirely dominated by Borodin, working through Sun Fo and Hsü Ch'ien. Previously the Central Executive Committee had sent many cables to Wang asking him to return and resume his posts, but as soon as they received information that Wang was on his way to China, they resolved to abolish the Chairmanship of the Political Council, appointing seven persons to form a Presidium, the Chairmanship of the National Government, appointing five members to a Standing Committee, and the Chairmanship of the Military Council, appointing seven members as a Presidium, adding afterwards two more members to it. Borodin's idea, carried out by Sun Fo and Hsü Ch'ien, was to get Wang back, but deprive him of his powers, so that he could be used as a tool to oust Chiang. T'an Yen-K'ai, who acted as Chairman at the Session in the place of Wang, had as usual no opinion on the matter, just following whomever was bullying him. Sung Tze-Wen, the Minister of Finance, had no decided opinions in this matter; he was greatly obliged to Borodin in financial matters, and accepted his political advice. Eugen Ch'en did not take part in the plot, being opposed to the whole idea. It was true that he consulted Borodin on all questions of foreign affairs but merely to solicit information, in many cases overriding him. (Madame Sun Yat-Sen also disapproved of the idea, considering that her stepson, Sun Fo, in allowing himself to be Borodin's tool, had lost his head.) For this was not the only serious decision taken. Not only was the Central Executive Committee brought under the influence of the Communist Party, but the National Government as well, by the passing of the resolution that the Communist Party and the Kuo-Min Tang should together rule China, the Kuo-Min Tang, therefore, being in fact made to repudiate the principle of Party dictatorship. T'an P'ing-Shan, the leader of the Communist Party and its representative in

the Communist International, was made Minister of the Peasantry, a post specially created for him. Su Shao-Ching, a former Hongkong butcher who had become prominent as a strike and trade union leader, was appointed Minister of Labour.

Wang Ching-Wei arrived at Shanghai on April 1, 1927, staying in Sung Tze-Wen's house. Chiang K'ai-Shih immediately called on him, together with Wu Chih-Hui, Li Shih-Ts'eng, Chang Ching-Chiang and a few others. Chiang told him that owing to the attacks made by Hsü Ch'ien and others on him he had found it impossible to co-operate with the Central Executive Committee at Wuhan, and wanted to separate. He also told Wang that he was desirous of accepting orders from him, but asked Wang to support his two proposals. Firstly, Chiang wanted to continue the policy of the Russian orientation, but suggested that Borodin should be sent back to Moscow. Secondly, he wished to give up the policy of admitting the Communists into the Party, as they were doing everything they could to destroy the Kuo-Min Tang. Wang asked, "Since the Central Executive Committee and the National Government are at Wuhan, how should these proposals be carried out?" Chiang answered, "The Central Executive Committee and the National Government are now controlled by the Communist Party. We are not against the Central Executive Committee or the National Government, but we only want to expel Borodin and the Communists." Wang again asked how this should be done. This time Wu Chih-Hui answered for Chiang to the effect that the Central Supervisory Committee should make the decision, and instruct the military leaders to execute it. To this Wang objected as, according to the constitution of the Kuo-Min Tang, the decisions of the Central Supervisory Committee must first be voted upon by the Central Executive Committee before execution, for the Central Supervisory Committee had only the power of supervision, not of execution. Here Wu Chih-Hui significantly re-

marked, "Yes, but we don't want any constitutions." They discussed the question for three days, but did not come to any agreement. Then on April 3, Chiang sent out a circular telegram to all the armies announcing the fact that Wang had returned, and would be henceforth responsible for all political and Party affairs. He also stated that he himself would absolutely obey Wang's order with all the forces under his command.

In sending out the telegram, Chiang did not get Wang's consent. Wang felt very uncomfortable about it, as he considered that Chiang had not the right to assign to him the control of political and Party affairs, reserving military affairs to himself. Wang felt that he had no right to receive these charges from Chiang, as the power to assign duties belonged in Wang's opinion exclusively to the Central Executive Committee. As to the policy vis-à-vis Russia and the Communists, Wang considered that these two policies had been initiated by Sun Yat-Sen, and should, therefore, not be changed in a light-hearted and arbitrary manner. Should there be any necessity for modifying a policy, this had to be decided on by the National Congress, or at least, by the Central Executive Committee in Plenary Session. Otherwise, by allowing a member or a group, of members to act independently on discovering some defect in policy, complications in the Party would arise; discipline would vanish, the very Party would be destroyed. For this reason he strongly opposed Wu Chih-Hui's proposal that the Central Supervisory Committee, of which Wu himself, Chang Ching-Chiang, Li Shih-Ts'eng were prominent members, should be allowed to usurp the powers of the Central Executive Committee, and to work hand in hand with the military leaders to the exclusion of the regularly constituted Party organs, as this would pave the way for a military dictatorship. Wang visualised the necessity of separating from the Communist Party. Even then it would be necessary to make careful preparations, so as to prevent the "corrupted elements", who had been on

occasion expelled from the Party, and other reactionary and counter-revolutionaries, from smuggling themselves into the Party.

In the course of the discussions which lasted until April 5, Wu Chih-Hui suggested to him that the Communist Party intended to attack the Three People's Principles and overthrow the Kuo-Min Tang altogether. Wang was surprised about this, and, therefore, asked Ch'en Tu-Hsiu, the General Secretary of the Communist Party in China, to meet him to find out the truth about Wu's statement. Ch'en denied it altogether. In order to put an end to the rumours about the impending *coup d'état* of the Communist Party, Ch'en proposed to Wang—who agreed—to issue a joint Manifesto. In this Manifesto, issued on April 5, Ch'en reminded his fellow-Communists that the Communist Party had accepted the Three People's Principles as the basis of the national revolutionary movement, and exhorted them to remain faithful to the Sun-Joffe Manifesto and the declaration made at the First National Congress of the Kuo-Min Tang. Wang and Ch'en realised that the ultimate aim of the Parties they represented were different, and that at some future date they might separate, but for the time being they asked their fellow-members to maintain a united front against the militarists, imperialists and reactionaries.

Wang was, of course, against any attempt of the Communist Party to dominate the Kuo-Min Tang, as was manifested in the decisions taken by the Third Plenary Session. He was also against any precipitate break with the Communist Party, but wanted to settle all the disputes outstanding in a regular, peaceful way, and, therefore, proposed the convening of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee. Among the members of the Central Executive Committee who were at Wuhan, there was a majority of pure Kuo-Min Tang members as compared with the Communist members, twelve as against five. The Kuo-Min Tang group consisted of Madame Sun,

Ho Hsiang Ning, T'an Yen-K'ai, Sun Fo, Ch'en Kung-Po, Ku Meng-Yü, Ching Heng-Yi, Chu Pei-Teh, P'eng Tseh-Min, Wang Fa-Ch'in, and Yü Shu-Teh. Besides these there were the deputy members of the Central Executive Committee, and the members and deputies to the Central Supervisory Committee who were overwhelmingly Kuo-Min Tang. He believed that he could get the support of the great majority of the pure Kuo-Min Tang members of the Central Executive Committee to effect a revision of the decisions taken by the Third Plenary Session, even if one or two members like Hsü Ch'ien and Sun Fo would be difficult to deal with. He, therefore, wanted to go to Wuhan to discuss this with them, and persuade them to come down to Nanking, which had just been captured, to hold the Plenary Session with Chiang and the rest, so as to maintain the unity of the Party. He also wanted to study the situation in Wuhan at first hand as, having just returned to China, he was entirely ignorant of political and social conditions there and the activities of the Communist Party. Thus, on April 6, after broadcasting his proposals for the Fourth Plenary Session to the main Party branches, he took the boat from Shanghai *en route* for Hankow (Wuhan).

CHAPTER XIV

THE SPLIT IN THE KUO-MIN TANG

The Coup d'état at Nanking

ON Wang Ching-Wei's arrival at Hankow on April 10, 1927, he was informed that the Central Executive Committee had already decided to remove its headquarters and the seat of the National Government to Nanking. Wang, therefore, knew that his proposals for the holding of the Fourth Plenary Session had every chance of being accepted, and at once entered into discussions to give effect to them. Suddenly, however, on the 13th, he received news that Chiang K'ai-Shih had, on the 12th, caused the arrest of Communist leaders and the massacre of several thousand workers at Shanghai, and had inaugurated the so-called "Purification Movement" against the Communists. On the 15th he learnt that Chiang had gone to Nanking, together with Wu Chih-Hui, Li Shih-Ts'eng, Chang Ching-Chiang, Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Hu Han-Min, Ch'en Kuo-Fu and several others, for the purpose of organising another Central Executive Committee and a new National Government, which was finally inaugurated on April 18. These events were entirely unexpected at Wuhan. Wang considered this to be a breach of faith in addition to an open rebellion against the lawfully constituted authorities. Under his Chairmanship the Central Executive Committee at Wuhan, therefore, decided on April 17 to expel Chiang K'ai-Shih, Wu Chih-Hui, and all others who had participated in the Nanking *coup d'état*, from the Party and to deprive them of all their posts.

It was sometimes thought that Chiang, before deciding formally to secede from Wuhan, had agreed to the holding of the Fourth Plenary Session, and had, on April 12, cabled Wang and the other members of the Central Executive Committee to come to Nanking at once, in order to deal with the state of emergency at Shanghai. But as Wang and his colleagues did not come immediately, Chiang could not wait any longer for them, and was compelled to put up his own organisation. This explanation, however, does not square with the facts. The real reason of Chiang's rebellion was that having broken faith with the Central Executive Committee at Wuhan, he had expected Wang to help him against the Wuhan people. But as Wang had gone to Wuhan, he realised that he could no longer rely on him. The reactionaries in the Party had further, after the formation of the Western Hills faction, been trying hard to bring about an estrangement between Wang and Chiang, so as to destroy the work of the First National Congress and regain their former influence. They were greatly surprised at Wang's sudden arrival at Shanghai. After Chiang had sent out the telegram of April 3, they were afraid that Wang and Chiang would resume their co-operation, and thus nullify the effects of the incident of March 20, 1926. In order to make this co-operation impossible, they exploited Chiang's recent antagonism against the Communists, and made him order the massacres of the workers in Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and other places. Chiang, desirous of separating from Wuhan, needed allies, and he, therefore, made terms with his former reactionary enemies, and with their help he organised a new Party and Government. His task was further facilitated by ill-feeling aroused among the Kuo-Min Tang members by Borodin's domination of the Wuhan Central Executive Committee, as manifested in the decisions of the March Plenary Session, and by the personal attacks on him by such people as Hsü Ch'ien.

The Situation at Wuhan

When Wang arrived at Wuhan, he found that the Kuo-Min Tang members of the Central Executive Committee had entirely lost control of the situation there, which was dominated by the Communists. One of the first persons he met on arrival was Madame Sun, who expressed her joy that Wang had returned. Things were very bad, she said, Sun Fo had entirely lost his head, being a complete tool of Borodin. She hoped that with Wang's return things would improve. Eugen Ch'en, whom he saw a day or two after, expressed the same opinion. The Communists had been admitted into the Kuo-Min Tang, in order to assist the Kuo-Min Tang in the struggle against Militarism and Imperialism, but now, instead of being the auxiliaries of the Kuo-Min Tang, the Communist Party had become the co-ruler with the Kuo-Min Tang, and would soon become the predominant partner. He and Madame Sun were strongly opposed to the domination of the Communists. Sun Fo, however, adopted every possible advice which Borodin cared to give to him. He trusted that Wang would put up a good fight against the Communist Party, and he pledged his whole-hearted support.

At that time, owing to the activities of the Communists, practically all the factories in Wuhan had been closed. An atmosphere of tension existed between the employers and employees ; conflicts between shop-keepers and their assistants took place practically daily. The Labour Movement in Wuhan was practically dead, as all the 300,000 workers had turned strikers. The Hanyang district Party Branch of Hupeh, which was entirely under Communistic control, had in May confiscated fifteen private factories, and had organised workmen's councils to manage them—a move which turned out to be a complete failure, and which put the Government into serious financial difficulties. In spite of this, they proposed that the Government should nationalise all the factories, which would have had the effect of further

embarrassing the Government, and so exposing its weaknesses still further. In self-defence Wang, therefore, proposed in the Political Council to reorganise the Han-yang Branch, and to take definite measures for the protection of commerce and industry, as otherwise no revenues would be forthcoming. There were violent discussions on these proposals, but finally they were carried.

There was further the agrarian question. In the Political Council the Communist members had proposed formally to adopt the policy of confiscation of farm lands, and to put it into practice, as an experiment, in Hunan first. Owing to Wang's vehement objections these proposals were turned down by the majority of the members. They had already given out in the countryside such slogans as "Down with the Landlords", "All Land Owners are rowdies and all Gentry criminals", and had instigated bands of vagabonds and vagrants to seize any land they could get hold of, erroneously calling their policy "Give Land to the Cultivators". For in order to understand the agrarian problem in China, an analysis of the social groupings in the countryside is necessary. As elsewhere, the rural population in China consists, briefly speaking, of landlords, farmers, and vagabonds without any occupation. Owing to the peculiar character of the Chinese family system, both the very rich and the very poor are found in one family, the rich members being landlords and the poor leading a vagrant life. There is an obligation on the part of the richer members of the family to support their poorer brothers, who, however, only get a bare livelihood. It is these poor brothers of the landlords who mainly compose the class of the vagabonds. They have much the same ideas and outlook as their richer brothers. The Communist agrarian policy now merely works in the interests of these vagabonds, not of the peasant-cultivators, the farmers. For the latter are on the whole unable to read and to understand the meaning of the Communist agitation. The

vagabonds, on the other hand, are more literate, being gentry-to-be, and to them the policy of land seizure had a special appeal. Not so to the majority of the bona fide farmers, who cannot gain anything by it, but who are bound to suffer on account of the disorganisation of the whole system.

Wang at once realised that the policy of the land seizures was a dangerous thing to play with, since from the gentry of Hunan and Hupeh the majority of the subaltern officers of the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Armies (those under T'an Yen-K'ai, Ch'eng Ch'ien and T'ang Sheng-Chih) were drawn. "Direct Action" in the economic sphere had been ruled out by Sun Yat-Sen and the National Congresses of the Kuo-Min Tang, who, instead, prescribed definite political and legislative methods in the provision of land for the poorer peasantry. One of the first questions he asked Borodin on his arrival was, therefore, "Since your proposals relating to the policy of confiscation had never been brought before the First and Second National Congresses, on what grounds do you justify this policy of land seizure in Hunan?" Borodin denied that he was responsible for the movement, but mentioned his colleague M. N. Roy, an Indian Communist, as the instigator of all the troubles, stating that Roy had the complete confidence of Stalin, even more so than himself. T'an P'ing-Shan, the Communist member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang, expressed the same opinion, although, strangely enough, it was he who was responsible for bringing Roy over from Moscow. Wang then asked Borodin what he proposed to do about it. Borodin could only answer to the effect that the only way was to modify the movement. This was, however, an utterly useless advice, for already on May 21, 1927, riots had broken out among the Wuhan forces at Changsha, the capital of Hunan, as a result of the unauthorised policy of land seizure of the Communists, working through the Provincial Kuo-Min Tang and Provincial Government. The insurrection of military forces

which Wang had foreseen, had occurred. While Wang, in the Political Council, held that the Wuhan officers should be held responsible for tolerating the revolt against the Provincial Government, he also held that those who were responsible for the policy of confiscation should be equally taken to task. He opposed the proposal of Borodin and the Communists that the Central Executive Committee should order the attack on the revolting army and the punishment of the guilty officers, as he realised that they had been acting under grave provocation. Instead, T'ang Sheng-Chih was sent to Changsha to investigate into the affair and restore peace.

In the matter of relations with the foreigners the Communists in Hunan had also started to make trouble. Foreigners were openly molested and their properties endangered, and in this the Communists and vagabonds were encouraged by the Hunan Provincial authorities, who were going beyond their authority. Wang took the matter to the Political Council, and, as a result, an instruction on foreign affairs was issued, to the effect that local authorities should realise that the Kuo-Min Tang was anti-Imperialist, but not anti-foreign, and that, therefore, the lives and properties of foreigners should be safeguarded, and that under no condition should foreigners be attacked without provocation.

The anti-foreign movement in Hunan (and Hupeh) was a result of disagreement which had for some time arisen between Eugen Ch'en and Borodin. When Borodin started his career as High Adviser to the Foreign Office, he adopted on the whole a "moderate" policy, strongly opposing the use of force against the British as part of the Kuo-Min Tang policy to regain China's independence. After the Shameen Shootings of June 23, 1925, when the Whangpoa cadets in the heat of the moment wanted to take Shameen, the Anglo-French Concession of Canton, by force, he made them realise the folly of precipitating a struggle with Great Britain before they had yet made sure of one Chinese province. Similarly,

during the negotiations in January, 1927, between Eugen Ch'en and O'Malley relating to the retrocession of the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang, Borodin had proved himself very useful in securing the best possible terms from the British for China. After the restitution of the concessions, however, Ch'en and Borodin started disagreeing. Ch'en considered that Great Britain, in agreeing to the handing back of the concessions to China, showed a spirit of compromise, and wanted to adopt a relatively friendly policy towards Great Britain, so as not permanently to antagonise her. Borodin, on the other hand, wanted to pursue the policy of armed peace towards Great Britain, and aim at the establishment of an entente between Russia, China and Japan. Russia, in pursuance of this aim, he said, was ready to give up all traditional hatred against Japan. (Wang, when passing through Moscow on his return to China, was told the same thing by Stalin.) In any conflict between China and Great Britain, it was always Great Britain who suffered, to the advantage of Japan. Borodin cited the Hongkong-Shameen boycott in support of his statement, and asserted that Japan would never impede the National Revolution. Borodin's views were keenly supported by the Japanese merchants and the Japanese Consul-General in Wuhan.

To Ch'en and Wang the idea of aiming at an alliance with Japan at that particular moment, and for a long time to come, was sheer moonshine. Both of them knew Japan and the mentality of the Japanese ruling classes intimately. Ch'en, when Editor of the *Peking Gazette*, in 1917, had had dealings with Japanese political agents, and knew that under the constitutional system of Japan, there was a continuity of foreign policy under all Cabinets. Wang had been a student in Japan and had frequently sojourned in that country. He knew that Japan was absolutely dead against the Communist menace, and that she feared Russia above all countries.

Whatever the changes in detail, in broad outline

Japanese policy had been directed towards the domination of China, ever since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. At that particular moment, May, 1927, Tanaka had just organised a Cabinet in Japan, and Tanaka had always been one of the very worst enemies of China, being the person actually responsible for the Twenty-One Demands on China in 1915. But Borodin, in spite of the objective facts, persisted in his scheme, and to make diplomatic relations difficult between Wuhan and the British, he embarked on the policy of creating troubles with the foreigners in Hunan and Hupeh.

In order to counteract the activities of the Communists the first necessity was the restoration of unity among the Kuo-Min Tang members of the Central Executive Committee. Wang, whose authority the Communists had been very active in destroying, therefore, got secretly together all the pure Kuo-Min Tang members of the different Party organs, and secured that before every meeting a preliminary meeting was held at his private residence for the purpose of presenting a united front in the different Councils against the Communist members. The separation between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communists was in the air, ever since Wang had seriously settled down to affairs in Wuhan. Owing to the military situation at the different fronts, however, a separation would have been fatal at that moment, and Wang, therefore, only proposed to restrict the activities of the Communists by exercising a stricter control over them.

The Drive Against the North

Chiang K'ai Shih had, on his dismissal from his Commandership-in-Chief, already started to make preparations to attack Wuhan. The forces under his command were equal in strength to those of Wuhan, and in addition, he had the navy. On the other hand, the Wuhan forces in Kiangsi and Anhui were also ready to invade Chiang's territories. But in the North, in Honan, the Wuhan forces and their allies had suffered serious reverses at

the hands of Chang Tso-Lin, who could at any moment invade Hupeh from Honan. The question for Wuhan to decide was, therefore, whether to fight Chiang K'ai-Shih or Chang Tso-Lin, to concentrate against the North or against the East. After careful consideration the Political Council decided, on April 19, 1927, to mobilise the Wuhan forces against Chang Tso-Lin only. What would have happened if Wuhan had decided on the other alternative would be interesting to speculate, but in any case, the history of the Kuo-Min Tang would have been quite different to-day. T'ang Sheng-Chih was thereupon appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Expedition, having under his command two Army groups. The first, consisting of the Eighth (his original), the Thirty-Fifth and Thirty-Sixth Armies, was under his direct control. The Second Army group, consisting of the Fourth, Eleventh, and Miscellaneous Armies, was under the command of Chang Fa-K'uei. These armies were the best armies under the Kuo-Min Tang. They were the crack forces in the campaign against Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Chuan-Fang in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi; especially Chang Fa-K'uei's Fourth and Eleventh Armies, who had merited the name of "Ironsides". Only relatively small forces were left for the defence of Wuhan itself. Chu Pei-Teh's forces were left at Kiangsi, in order to keep Chiang K'ai-Shih in check. Chiang was, however, busy himself defending Nanking against Chang Chung-Ch'ang from Shantung. So there was no actual war between Wuhan and Nanking, but two independent campaigns against the North.

It had been arranged that T'ang Sheng-Chih should attack Chang Tso-Lin from the South, and Feng Yü-Hsiang from the West. Yen Hsi-Shan, the so-called Model Governor of Shansi who after long vacillation had joined the National Revolutionary cause, was to attack Peking from Shansi, and so cut off the rear of Chang Tso-Lin. But Yen kept himself in the background, and did not attack Peking at all. Feng came out, but too

late, so that Chang Tso-Lin was able to concentrate his forces in an attack on the Southern Armies. A fierce struggle, therefore, ensued in the beginning of May, 1927, between Chang Tso-Lin and the Wuhan armies. The battles engaged in by the contending forces in Honan were unprecedentedly serious. The Mukden armies were much more numerous and better equipped and armed than the Wuhan troops, and Chang Tso-Lin had practically unlimited reserves to make up for his losses. But the Wuhan soldiers had a common purpose, and knew what they were fighting for. Although regiments were decimated, they kept on fighting.

At this critical moment, Yang Sen, Wu Pei-Fu's Governor of Szechuan, who was responsible for the bombardment of the open city of Wanhsien by the British on September 6, 1926, also started attacking Wuhan, which he knew was practically defenceless. The Wuhan Commander of the Garrison at Ichang, Hsia Tou-Yin, had gone over to Yang Sen and was suddenly moving against Wuhan itself. He had already come within thirty li (ten miles) of Wuhan, before the Wuhan Garrison realised the danger which threatened it. It at once mobilised, and measures were taken to prevent a demoralising panic among the populace, who had already started fleeing to the foreign concessions. The Central Executive Committee decreed that any Government or Party official who joined the exodus to any territory not under direct Nationalist control was liable to instant dismissal. Propagandists also got busy at once. After a fierce struggle Hsia Tou-Yin was finally defeated, and retreated to the North, passed over the Anhui, and then joined Chiang at Nanking.

After a series of battles, which may be considered as the bloodiest in modern Chinese history, the Wuhan armies finally obtained a decisive victory over Chang Tso-Lin, and had advanced by the Peking-Hankow Railway towards Chengchow, but their casualties were very heavy, amounting to about 13,000 killed and wounded, out of

some 70,000 men. Feng's troops had meanwhile broken through Tungkuan and captured Loyang, but this was only a minor attack, his own casualties amounting to some 50 men only. Chang Tso-Lin was practically defeated on May 28, when he ordered the retreat North of the Yellow River of all his armies. The Wuhan armies and Feng then successively captured Chengchow and Kaifeng, the key cities in Honan. War in Honan ended on June 2, 1927. Chiang too was victorious in his campaign, capturing on June 1 Hsüchow, an important railway junction on the Tientsin-Pukow and the Lunghuai Railways.

The Expulsion of the Communists

The anti-Communist riots at Changsha in Hunan on May 21, 1927, indicated that the time had arrived for the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party to separate. It became increasingly clear that Joffe's declaration of January 26, 1923, and Li Ta-Chao's undertaking at the First National Congress had come to be regarded by the Communists as obsolete, and that Ch'en Tu-Hsiu in issuing the declaration of April 5, 1927, had either acted in a personal capacity only or else tried to play a trick on Wang. The aim of the Kuo-Min Tang was to lead the National Revolution to the goal of the Three People's Principles. This was accepted by the Communists as a basis for co-operation, and in so doing they definitely made themselves subordinate to the Kuo-Min Tang, and recognised thereby the sole right of the latter to govern China. This would in due course result either in the transformation of the Communist Party into a section of the Kuo-Min Tang, which was Sun Yat-Sen's aim, or else in its extermination as a political force. Events after Wang's return showed that the Communists had changed their mind. They now wanted to lead the National Revolution to the goal of Communism, and either transform the Kuo-Min Tang into the Communist Party or destroy it as a governing Party. On Wang's arrival at

Wuhan on April 10, the Communist slogan was, "Welcome Wang to overthrow Chiang." Since April 19 the date of the inauguration of the Expedition against Chang Tso-Lin, however, there were no more cries of welcome, but all kinds of intrigues to destroy the authority of Wang and the Kuo-Min Tang. After the Changsha riots, the Communists began to attack Wang and the Kuo-Min Tang openly.

The relations between the members of the National Government and Borodin became strained. Borodin's position since the Changsha riots had become merely that of an honoured guest, no longer that of a trusted adviser. On June 1, 1927, M. N. Roy, the other representative of the Communist International, invited Wang to meet him for an important conversation. Wang went to Roy's flat, and there Roy told him, "There is a telegram from Stalin addressed to Borodin and me. Has Borodin shown it to you?" Wang said, "No." Roy continued, "Borodin does not like to show you this telegram, which is a secret resolution by the Moscow Bureau. I, on the other hand, think that it is most advisable that you should know what it is about, as I am quite sure that you would approve of it. Here it is, and have a look at it." Roy then handed over to Wang the original Russian text and its Chinese translation. In this telegram Stalin instructed the Chinese Communist Party, through Borodin and Roy, to push forward the policy of land seizure all over the Wuhan territories, and, while leaving the possessions of the Wuhan officers and soldiers alone, so as not to arouse their opposition, on no condition to give way to the Kuo-Min Tang on the agrarian question. They should further aim at reconstructing the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang and its different organs, with a view to increasing the proportion of reliable, i.e. Communist, labour and peasant leaders on these bodies. The Communist Party should also build up a regular army, 20,000 men strong, and consisting only of Communists, besides choosing 50,000 peasants and labourers

to form peasant and workers' detachments, to be used against the loyal Kuo-Min Tang forces. They were further to put pressure on the Kuo-Min Tang leaders to organise revolutionary courts for the sole purpose of dealing with the anti-Communist officers.

Wang was, of course, very astonished on learning Stalin's new attitude towards the Kuo-Min Tang, although the telegram went far to explain the change which had come in the relationship between the Communists and the Kuo-Min Tang. Wang at once told Roy that on no account could the Kuo-Min Tang accept the conditions contained in the resolution. They argued about it for some time, of course, without any result. About to leave, Wang asked Roy whether he would let him have a copy of the translation. Roy hesitated for a moment and then said, "Yes. I will send you a copy of it tomorrow, as there are one or two verbal alterations to be made." Wang received the promised copy next day, and at once showed it to Madame Sun and Eugen Ch'en. Eugen Ch'en's face became pale on learning its contents, "That means war between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party."

The following day Roy saw Wang again, and remarked, "I am glad that I have shown you the telegram, which you can take as an ultimatum. If you accept the tenor of the telegram and grant facilities for its execution, the Communist International will continue to co-operate with you. If not, it will have nothing to do with the Kuo-Min Tang." Wang replied, "The conditions for co-operation between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Third International laid down by Joffe and Borodin in 1923 were entirely different from those presented in your ultimatum. It is not for us to refuse your conditions, for it is you who has violated the agreement." Roy then made a statement to the effect that he did not agree with the conditions and the policy of Borodin. Whereupon Wang said that he was not interested in the new conditions. "We only care for the conditions we have agreed on before."

For handing over the telegram to Wang, Roy was severely taken to task by Borodin, who was thereby put in a still more difficult position vis-à-vis the Kuo-Min Tang leaders. Borodin at once cabled to Stalin and requested him to withdraw Roy. Roy's idea was that the Left Kuo-Min Tang could only survive when in alliance with the Communists, as otherwise they would be crushed by the Rightists. They should, therefore, be informed of Stalin's cable. Borodin, however, realised that the Left Kuo-Min Tang was much stronger than Roy thought it was, and knew that if they saw the resolution, they would at once sever their relations with the Communists. He had, therefore, suppressed the resolution, and was naturally annoyed when he learnt about Roy's recklessness in making it known to Wang. A majority of the Chinese Communists sided with Borodin, being also of the opinion that the time for overt action had not come yet, and they drove Roy back to Russia.

On June 4, Wang went to Chengchow with the other members of the Presidium of the Government Council, T'an Yen-K'ai, Sun Fo, Ku Meng-Yü, and Hsü Ch'ien, for the purpose of informing T'ang Sheng-Chih, Chang Fa-K'uei, and other important commanders about the contemplated *coup d'état* of the Communist Party, ordering their immediate return to Wuhan and instructing them to disarm the Communists in their armies. Honan province, which had just been conquered from Chang Tso-Lin, was assigned to Feng Hsü-Hsiang, who was also informed of the Communist activities in Hunan and Hupeh. Feng on his part also reported on the measures he had taken in the matter of restricting the Communist activities in Shensi. While they were still conferring at Chengchow, they received a telegram from Chu Pei-Teh, who was in Kiangsi, to the effect that Chiang K'ai-Shih, who had been able to defeat Chang Chung-Ch'ang, and taken Hsüchow, was making preparations to attack Wuhan. Wang, therefore, immediately returned to Wuhan, together with the other members of the Presidium,

and T'ang Sheng-Chih and Chang Fa-K'uei. Hsü Ch'ien, however, remained at Chengchow.

They arrived at Wuhan on June 13, and at once got to work, preparing for the immediate expulsion of the Communists from the Kuo-Min Tang, and taking measures to meet the attack of Chiang K'ai-Shih. The question of the separation with the Communists was a complicated one, owing to the differences of opinion existing among the Kuo-Min Tang members of the Central Executive Committee. Madame Sun and Eugen Ch'en, while opposed to the Communist dominance of the Kuo-Min Tang and favouring the ultimate termination of the Communist alliance, held that the moment of actual separation had not arrived yet, owing to the danger of attack from Nanking. They were of opinion that Chiang K'ai-Shih should first be dealt with and eliminated, and that the expulsion of the Communists should take place afterwards. Otherwise, the Wuhan forces would be divided against themselves, and be powerless against Chiang. Madame Sun was the widow of the perpetual President and a member of both the Central Executive Committee and the Political Council; Eugen Ch'en was also a member of these bodies and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the best and most successful diplomat of Modern China. Their opinions had always been highly regarded, but on this occasion it was felt by the majority, of which Wang was the leader, that they had not been adequately informed of the situation. Being of a retiring nature, Madame Sun had had little opportunity to develop her capacity for political judgment and had little sense of political reality. Eugen Ch'en was unfortunate enough to have been born outside China and was not fully acquainted with the Chinese language; in his dealings with his colleagues he always had to avail himself of interpreters. Owing to the handicap of the language it was only natural that his knowledge of the internal political situation, as distinct from foreign affairs, was defective. In Wang's opinion they were under-estimating

the strength of the Communists ; not only in the labour and peasant movements, but also among the troops, especially in Chang Fa-K'uei's army (the Ironsides), they possessed considerable influence. If the Kuo-Min Tang waited for their expulsion until the defeat of Chiang was assured—which would mean renewed laurels for the Communist soldiers—the Communists would become so entrenched in the National-Revolutionary Army that it would be impossible to expel them without courting defeat. Wang's opinion was supported by T'an Yen-K'ai, Ku Meng-Yü, Sun Fo and Ch'en Kung-Po. Ever since Wang's resumption of office, both Sun Fo and Hsü Ch'ien had gradually emerged from Borodin's influence and had accepted Wang's guidance. Hsü Ch'ien, who had the reputation of being the reddest of the red, had also turned anti-Communist and was making violent anti-Communist speeches among Feng's soldiers during the Chengchow Conference. He had, however, remained in Chengchow with Feng, in spite of the repeated requests from Wang to return to Wuhan in order to assist him in the work. He was afraid for his personal safety, feeling that the Wuhan Communists were after him. Hsü then went to a summer resort, and as people were tired of his ambiguous attitude, he was soon left in the wilderness. After a series of secret meetings in Wang's residence lasting for some ten days, the decision was finally taken to take immediate measures for the expulsion of the Communists. The decision of the Presidium was kept secret for the time being and not formally communicated to the Political Council.

T'ang Sheng-Chih had on his return to Wuhan immediately gone to Hunan in order to investigate the Changsha riots. He was Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government, and technically responsible for the affairs of the province. The result of his investigations confirmed the existence of the Communist conspiracy against the Kuo-Min Tang. He found that the revolting officers had been acting under grave provocation, and

advised the immediate expulsion of the Communists from the Party. Being informed of the secret decision of the Presidium, he at once dismissed all the officers under his immediate command who were known to have Communist affiliations. There were not very many of them, as his policy had always been to reserve all the important posts in his army to the pure Kuo-Min Tang members. The expulsion of the Communists from Chang Fa-K'uei's armies was more difficult. Chang was a first-class general, loyal to the Party and outspoken in nature, but he had little political sense, which made it easy for the Communists to penetrate his armies. Chang's army group consisted of three armies. The Commander of the Fourth Army was Huang Ch'i-Hsiang; of the Eleventh, Chu Hua-Yeh; of the Twentieth, Ho Lung. Ho Lung had some time previously secretly joined the Communist Party, but Chang was ignorant of it. One of the divisional generals of the Eleventh Army was also a Communist, Yeh T'ing, and so were many of the subordinate officers, with the result that Chang's army group had become a Communist stronghold. This situation was brought about by Teng Yen-Ta, a deputy member of the Central Executive Committee, who had been a member of the staff of the Whangpoa Military Academy in 1924. In 1925 he had gone to Germany for the purpose of study. When in 1926 he returned to Canton, Chiang K'ai-Shih made him the Educational Director of the Academy, and backed him up for the post of Chief of the Political Training Department under the Military Council, in succession to Ch'en Kung-Po whom Chiang did not like, as Ch'en was unwilling to be his instrument. In March, 1927, he became a member of the Presidium of the Military Council, and concurrently President of the Wuhan Military Academy. Teng Yen-Ta was officially a member of the Kuo-Min Tang, but followed the precepts, and accepted the policies, of the Communist Party. Chang Fa-K'uei had great trust in Teng Yen-Ta, and had accepted all his nominees for the different vacancies.

These nominees were mostly Teng's Communist friends. When the secret decision at the unofficial meeting to expel the Communists was taken, Teng immediately resigned his posts, closed the Wuhan Military Academy and went to Moscow, but his nominees in Chang Fa-K'uei's army groups remained, and as there were so many of them, it was impossible for Chang to expel them wholesale without provoking a rebellion.

On July 15, 1927, after about a full month of preparation, Wang then formally proposed in the Political Council the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuo-Min Tang. This meeting was not attended by the Communist members, and those Kuo-Min Tang members, who disagreed with the secret decision also stayed away. A quorum was nevertheless obtained and Wang's motion was carried unanimously. At this meeting Borodin's resignation, which had been sent in several weeks before, was accepted. Borodin had wanted to resign earlier, as his position had been made impossible by the open attacks by the Communists on the Kuo-Min Tang. But at that time his wife was being detained by Chang Chung-Ch'ang's men. And as his departure under those circumstances might induce Chang Chung-Ch'ang to play with her life, he had been asked to remain at his post for the time being. On July 12 Madame Borodin was released, and Borodin was, therefore, also allowed to depart. In parting from Borodin, the Central Executive Committee wrote him a letter acknowledging the great services he had rendered to the National Government, and conveyed to him the friendly sentiments which existed between its members and him personally. It also expressed its appreciation of the help which Russia had given to the nascent National-Revolutionary movement, but expressed its regret that owing to the changed policy of Russia towards the Kuo-Min Tang, an intimate co-operation was no longer possible, although it desired to continue close diplomatic relations. Regarding the Communist Party, the Central Executive Committee proposed to

recognise it as a political, as distinct from a governing, Party, with its individual members fully enjoying the rights of citizenship, provided they did not interfere with the affairs of the Kuo-Min Tang.

Borodin left Hankow with full honours. He first went to Lusan in Kiangsi to take some rest, although afterwards it was found that when at Lusan he had secret conferences with the Communists there, who were preparing for an insurrection. Borodin then returned to Wuhan and on July 27 took the Hankow-Peking Railway to Loyang, where he stayed for three days as Feng Yü-Hsiang's guest, and then through Mongolia proceeded to Russia.

The intention of the Central Executive Committee to grant full protection to the Communists as citizens proved, however, impracticable. For the Communists continued their attacks on the Kuo-Min Tang. On the 16th July documents were found, dated July 13, to the effect that the Central Commission of the Chinese Communist Party had decided to withdraw their members from the National Government, but to instruct the Communists not to resign from the Kuo-Min Tang. They were to establish their own secret nuclei in the Kuo-Min Tang, and utilise every opportunity to incite disorders to discredit and destroy that Party. Circulars found on July 20 and issued by the Young Communist League on July 19 were to the same effect, only the language used was more violent. Wang thereupon wrote an article on July 21, declaring that the Kuo-Min Tang was being attacked from two sides, by the corrupt reactionaries and by the Communists; both had now to be opposed. The dismissal of the Communist members from their positions in the Government and the Army proceeded at full speed, for the Central Executive Committee realised that the Kuo-Min Tang armies were being in danger of being utilised as tools by the Communists. Those who for some reason had not yet been dismissed were closely watched. Suddenly, however, the Twentieth Army, under Ho Lung,

and Yeh T'ing's Division of the Eleventh Army withdrew to Nanchang in Kiangsi, and on July 30 declared their independence from Wuhan, in the name of a Revolutionary Committee, which purported to consist of Madame Sun, Eugen Ch'en, Teng Yen-Ta, T'an P'ing-Shan, Su Shao-Ching, and others. As the first three persons had already left China, and Madame Sun and Eugen Ch'en were known to be anti-Communists, their names had obviously been used without their authorisation. In the name of this Committee, the Communists then created a reign of terror, looting all the banks and Exchange offices, and putting whole sections of the town on fire. They only stopped their depredations when Chu Pei-Teh arrived with his army and defeated them. Chang Fa-K'uei, who was technically responsible for Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, felt very guilty about the affair, as he had been delaying the expulsion of the Communists from his armies. He therefore sent all his available troops to Nanchang, to crush Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, and pursued them into Kwangtung. Wang, who was at that time in Kiukiang, at once returned to Wuhan and proposed to the Political Council to adopt the most drastic measures against the Communist Party, making it an illegal organisation. The revolt was suppressed about August 5. He then proposed in the Central Executive Committee his own impeachment for having neglected taking appropriate measures against the Communists before it was too late. For although only a member of the Presidium, Wang felt that he was really personally responsible for the whole affair, as force of circumstances had made him the sole *de facto* leader in Wuhan. No notice was taken of his typically Chinese self-condemnation, but the Central Executive Committee proceeded to adopt measures which changed the policy of peaceful separation with the Communist Party into a policy of violent repression, in defence of their very existence. Owing to the violent attacks of Bukharin in Moscow on the Kuo-Min Tang and the National Government, the proposed diplomatic

entente between Wuhan and Moscow was also unpracticable.

The Rapprochement between Wuhan and Nanking

After the Chengchow Conference, Feng Yü-Hsiang went to Hsüchow to discuss the current situation with Chiang K'ai-Shih, and to find out his attitude towards Wuhan. Chiang said that there was really no conflict between Nanking and Wuhan, but that Borodin should be sent back, and the Communists expelled. Feng cabled this information to Wuhan, who replied that these measures had already been decided upon at Chengchow, and that they were making active preparations to carry them into effect. Wuhan pointed out, however, that the Nanking group had in April organised a separate Party and Government, which was unconstitutional and illegal. If Nanking wanted to reunite with Wuhan, after the expulsion of the Communists, it would have to abolish its separate organisation, and submit to the authority of the Central Executive Committee. Feng transmitted these observations to the Nanking group, but no answer was given, and Feng discontinued his efforts at reconciliation. Instead, Nanking mobilised its troops stationed at Wuhu to move against Wuhan; these troops consisted mainly of the Seventh Army of Li Tsung-Jen. Wuhan decided to mobilise T'ang Sheng-Chih and Chang Fa-K'uei's troops to meet the attack. On July 30, Wang had gone to Kiukiang, where, with Chang Fa-K'uei, he was directing operations against the revolting Communist troops. Chang Fa-K'uei now kept himself ready against Li. T'ang Sheng-Chih too started mobilising his troops against Nanking, when the news came that Chiang's troops in the North had been defeated by Chang Chung-Ch'ang and Sun Chuan-Fang, who had recaptured Hsüchow. At the same time the Seventh Army under Li Tsung-Jen showed signs of disobeying Chiang's orders, and Chiang was, therefore, compelled to postpone hostilities against Wuhan.

On August 3, 1927, after the defeat of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, Wang sent a telegram to Feng reporting the details of the expulsion of the Communists and about the Nanchang revolt, and stating the intentions of the National Government to attack the Communists from the rear. Feng transmitted this telegram to Chiang's group. Then, on August 8, 1927, a telegram was received at Wuhan addressed to Wang Ching-Wei, T'ang Sheng-Chih, Sun Fo, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chu Pei-Teh, Chang Fa-K'uei, and all other members. It was signed by Li Tsung-Jen, Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, Ho Ying-Ch'ing, Chiang K'ai-Shih, Hu Han-Min, Li Lieh-Ch'ün, Niu Yung-Chien, T'sai Yuan-P'ei, Wu Chih-Hui, and Li Shih-Ts'eng. In this telegram the Nanking group congratulated the Wuhan members on their success in dealing with the Communists. It apologised for their "many rash actions as a result of Communist troubles" (namely the expulsion of the Communists without the sanction of the Central Executive Committee, and the establishment of a new Government at Nanking). It expressed its agreement with the Wuhan idea that a Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee be held to settle all outstanding questions, and it invited the Wuhan members to come to Nanking to hold the Session there.

The telegram was framed in a very cordial way. What was significant about it, however, was the order of the signatures. The first name appearing at the end of the telegram was Li Tsung-Jen's, who was only a group commander. He was the leader in this move. Chiang K'ai-Shih, the Commander-in-Chief, had his name occupying only a fourth place. The reason for this was that since May Chiang had practically lost the control of the armies nominally under his command, especially after his evacuation of Hsüchow on July 23. On August 5, in an attempt to recapture the town, he had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Northerners, and had to flee to Nanking as a fugitive. His own forces had ceased to count as compared with those of the Kwangsi generals,

Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi. Li and Pai were anxious lest Nanking itself would fall, being attacked both by Sun Chuan-Fang and Chang Chung-Ch'ang from the North, and by the Wuhan forces, which had already started to mobilise, from the West. They wanted to overthrow Chiang and then make a compromise with Wuhan. Chiang, being entirely powerless and knowing that he was the object of the attack by Wuhan, therefore, yielded to Li Tsung-Jen the first place, and allowed him to lead in the peace negotiations.

Wuhan replied on August 10 with a telegram in the name of Wang Ching-Wei, T'an Yen-K'ai, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Sun Fo, Ch'en Kung-Po, T'ang Sheng-Chih, Ku Meng-Yü, with a note that Chu Pei-Teh and Chang Fa-K'uei were then at Nanchang and could not, therefore, join the telegram. In this message the Wuhan group expressed regret at the fact that their belated action against the Communists had enabled the latter to carry out the Nanchang insurrection. Referring to the necessity of separating personal sentiments from Party and National affairs, they pointed out that the Central Executive Committee and the National Government were at the moment quartered in Wuhan; these were the supreme organs of the Party and the Nation and merited recognition as such. They further emphasised the necessity of holding the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee to settle all outstanding questions, including the question of the reorganisation of the National Government. The telegram concluded, "If all feelings of aversion are resolutely given up at the Fourth Plenary Session, your former measures devised to meet emergencies, will be whole-heartedly excused by us all, and you will thereby render the greatest of services to the Party and the country."

This exchange of telegrams was the beginning of the Wuhan-Nanking *rapprochement*, both sides expressing their regret about their past actions, and expressing the desire for a satisfactory settlement of all outstanding

questions. There are, however, several points of difference in the two telegrams which deserve attention. Both Nanking and Wuhan agreed to hold a Plenary Session, but whereas Nanking merely referred to a Plenary Session, Wuhan explicitly mentioned the *Fourth* Plenary Session. Nanking asked the Wuhan members to come to Nanking. Wuhan, on the other hand, did not refer to this point at all, but instead demanded that the Nanking group should recognise the existing organs at Wuhan as the supreme organs in the Party and Government, thereby implicitly denouncing the Nanking Party and administrative organisations as irregular and unconstitutional organs. For Wuhan considered itself as the only lawfully constituted authority in National-Revolutionary China, deriving its mandate directly from the Second National Congress.

When the cable arrived at Nanking, Chiang K'ai-Shih had already resigned his posts, and had left Nanking for Shanghai, accompanied by his personal bodyguard of 400 men, and from Shanghai had gone to his native village Fenghua. The reason of his sudden resignation was the pressure from Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Chung-Hsi, who, realising that he was the object of Wuhan's enmity, forced his resignation in the hope that negotiations would run more smoothly. His resignation was made public on August 15, on which date Chang Ching-Chiang, Wu Chih-Hui, Hu Han-Min, Li Shih-Ts'eng and Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei also left Nanking for Shanghai, followed by a host of second-class politicians and officials. Only Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi remained at Nanking. Then, all of a sudden, Sun Chuan-Fang began an offensive on Nanking itself. Li Tsung-Jen, Pai Ch'ung-Hsi and Ho Ying-Ch'ing cabled in panic to Wuhan, stating that Chiang K'ai-Shih had resigned, that the five persons mentioned above had also suddenly left Nanking, and that Sun Chuan-Fang was attacking them. The position of Wuhan at that time was very strong. Chang Fa-K'uei had captured the whole province of Kiangsi from the Communists and was pursuing them into Kwangtung. T'ang

Sheng-Chih had managed to occupy Anhwei province. The Political Council at Wuhan thus decided to mobilise all available forces on the Lower Yang Tse basin. On August 20, Wang Ching Wei then went to Kiukiang, accompanied by T'an Yen-K'ai, Yü Yu-Jen (a veteran Party member, ex-governor of Shensi and a friend of Feng Yü-Hsiang), Sun Fo, Ku Meng-Yü, and T'ang Sheng-Chih. They arrived at Kiukiang on August 21, and there they were joined by Ch'en Kung-Po, Chu Pei-Teh and Ch'eng Ch'ien. They had plenipotentiary powers to settle everything, as in Chengchow. Li Tsung-Jen met them at Kiukiang on board a gunboat. Wang at once inquired about his attitude towards the Wuhan cable of the 10th. Li replied to the effect that there was no longer any Party or Government at Nanking. Wang said that they would go to Nanking to hold the Fourth Plenary Session, with which Li declared his concurrence. As the situation at Nanking was very critical, Li wanted Wuhan to declare its willingness to co-operate with Nanking. He urged that the Wuhan members should go to Nanking to organise the Central Executive Committee and National Government there. As to the military situation, however, he considered that his own forces were strong enough to deal with Sun Chuan-Fang's offensive, and thought it unnecessary for the Wuhan forces to move Eastwards to assist them.

Wang had a consultation with his colleagues, and the meeting came to the following conclusion. Firstly, that as the Central Executive Committee and the National Government could not be removed to Nanking immediately, Tan Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo were to proceed to Nanking to investigate and to report by cablegram so as to receive fresh instructions. Secondly, as Li Tsung-Jen had intimated to them that it was not necessary for Wuhan to render him any military assistance, all troop movements were stopped so as to avoid all possible misunderstandings.

T'an Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo left for Nanking on the

23rd August in the same gunboat with Li Tsung-Jen; Wang and the others remained at Kiukiang. Then it was decided that if the Central Executive Committee and the National Government were to remove to Nanking, a local Political Council would be reorganised at Wuhan, similar to that at K'aifeng.

The situation had become very critical for Nanking. The very gunboat on which T'an Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo travelled had been fired at by Sun Chuan-Fang's troops, who were then crossing the river at Nanking, and was nearly sunk. Li Tsung-Jen's troops suffered defeat after defeat. From the 26th August onwards Sun Fo and T'an Yen-K'ai sent daily cables to Wang, asking him to instruct the Wuhan armies to come to the rescue of Nanking. On the 30th August another telegram under the names of T'an Yen-K'ai, Sun Fo, Li Tsung-Jen, Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, and Ho Ying-Ch'ing at last requested the Wuhan armies to come down Eastwards immediately in relief of Nanking and asked that a public announcement to that effect be issued.

On receiving this telegram, the Wuhan group of Kiukiang immediately held a meeting and decided to give orders to T'ang Sheng-Chih and Ch'eng Ch'ien to move to the East and counter-attack Sun Chuan-Fang. T'ang's troops were then already at Anhwei, and they immediately marched to Wuhu, an important city between Anking, the capital of Anhwei, and Nanking. It cabled back to Nanking that the Wuhan armies were moving and that a circular telegram would be issued at once, so as to restore the morale of Nanking.

Sun Chuan-Fang's attack was repulsed. T'an Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo then cabled to Wang to remove the Central Executive Committee immediately to Nanking. Li Chung-Jen, Pai Ch'ung-Hsi and Ho Ying-Ch'ing did the same thing, their reason being that there was a complete anarchy at Nanking. The Wuhan group thus decided to come down to Nanking. They were Wang Ching-Wei, Ku Meng-Yü, Hsü Ch'ien (who had rejoined

them), Ch'en Kung-Po, Ho Hsiang Ning, Chu Pei-Teh, Ch'en Chia-Yü, Huang Shih, and arrived at Nanking on September 5. Yü Yu-Jen, Wang Fa-Ch'in, P'an Yün-Ch'ao arrived later, T'ang Sheng-Chi and Ch'eng Ch'ien were delayed on account of military duties.

The Establishment of the Special Committee

When Wang and his group arrived at Nanking they discovered that T'an Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo had already left Nanking for Shanghai. Surprised at the fact, Wang asked Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi what the reason of their strange departure was. They told him that they had gone to Shanghai in order to induce Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Wu Chih-Hui, Chang Ching-Chiang, Hu Han-Min, and Li Shih-Ts'eng to return to Nanking. Wang then asked, "What for?" Li and Pai replied that they wanted them to return to attend the Plenary Session, as it was essential that the Nanking group should also attend the Session, so as not to make it a purely Wuhan affair. The following morning Wang received a report that the Party organisation and the Government at Nanking was still intact. To Wang's question why they were still functioning, when a few days before he was told that they were no longer existing, Li and Pai answered, "Otherwise there is no one to give orders."

The point was that when Li and Pai forced Chiang's resignation, Sun Chuan-Fang was at the height of his attack on Nanking, and the town was at the same time being threatened by the Wuhan armies, which had already gone down from Kiukiang to Anking. Li and Pai were then suffering reverse after reverse at the hands of Sun Chuan-Fang, and the only way out for them was to come over definitely to the side of Wuhan. But after Wuhan had come to their assistance, they were victorious. They then changed their intention to submit to Wuhan's authority, and instead claimed equality of status. Further, at the time of Chiang's resignation, many second-class politicians and officials had fled to the foreign settlements

at Shanghai, but after Nanking was saved, they immediately returned to Nanking. They reprimanded Li and Pai, stressing the fact that their action in welcoming Wang and his group was tantamount to a complete surrender to Wuhan. The minor officials at Nanking then started making propaganda against Wuhan, using the slogans, "Down with Wang Ching-Wei," "Kill Hsü Ch'ien and Ku Meng-Yü," and the like, and organised many propaganda meetings against the Wuhan Central Executive.

By this time Wang and his colleagues with him had become suspicious and lost their faith in T'an Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo, whom they had previously sent on a confidential mission to the Nanking group, accompanied by Li Tsung-Jen.

As to T'an Yen-K'ai, at the time of the establishment of the National Government in July, 1925, he was made a member of the Government, concurrently keeping his command of the Second Army. He himself had no political opinions, but had always followed Wang's directions, never voting at meetings until Wang had voted. During the Wuhan period, he was a member of the Presidium of the three governing organs there, again keeping his military command. When Chiang K'ai-Shih declared his independence in April, 1927, the Second Army was under the direct command of Chiang. It had to flee back to Wuhan with heavy losses. Now T'an Yen-K'ai had a personal grudge against T'ang Sheng-Chih, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wuhan armies. This quarrel had been patched up in February, 1926, when T'ang Sheng-Chih was proposing to join the National Government, but it seemed that T'an Yen-K'ai was unable to forget the defeats which T'ang had inflicted on him during his unredeemed days. Li Tsung-Jen was aware of the relationship, and when on August 23, they travelled together to Nanking, they had already been discussing plans to overthrow T'ang Sheng-Chih. At Nanking Pai Ch'ung-Hsi joined in the conspiracy. Here

Li and Pai put forward their demands, which T'an, whose chief aim was the revenge on T'ang, accepted in their entirety, as was subsequently disclosed.

During the Wuhan period, Sun Fo belonged to the group of Teng Yen-Ta and Hsü Ch'ien, after previously belonging to the Western Hills faction. The reason why he suddenly changed from the extreme Right to the extreme Left, no one knows, probably because he thought that in standing half-way between the two, he would be attacked from both sides. When Wang came to Wuhan, Sun Fo turned to Wang's views, and in the decision to expel the Communists from the Party he had taken a prominent part. It seemed, however, that in spite of his extreme Radical attitude at Wuhan prior to Wang's arrival, he had never ceased personal relations with the Western Hills faction, just like Malinowsky, a member of the Russian Duma during the Tsarist days, who managed to have relations both with the Ochraha and with Lenin. For after the Communists were expelled, he proposed to Wang that the vacancies caused by the separation with the Communists, should be filled by Old Comrades, meaning the members of the Western Hills group. Wang at that time told him that he did not mind the Old Comrades rejoining the Party and Government, but for the proposal to be practicable, one must first be assured of the Old Comrades supporting the policy of the Central Executive Committee. For the Western Hills group had declared itself not only against the Communists, but also against the Party Reorganisation of 1924. And the spirit of the Reorganisation demands, in the matter of principle and policy, the abrogation of the Unequal Treaties and the awakening of the masses of the people and their participation in the National Revolution and the affairs of State. In the matter of organisation, it means the setting up of an integrated machinery and the enforcement of a strict discipline. "The Old Comrades must first accept the principles of the Reorganisation before we can admit them," Wang told Sun Fo, who professed his

agreement. Some time later Sun Fo introduced to Wang a representative of Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, who after his expulsion from Kwangtung in September, 1925, had become one of the leading members of the Western Hills faction in Shanghai. In his presence Wang then told Sun Fo that as they were negotiating for co-operation with the Nanking group, he saw no reason why it would not be possible also to co-operate with the Old Comrades, provided that they accepted unconditionally the spirit of the 1924 Reorganisation. Sun Fo said that he was sure that Hsü would accept this condition, and Hsü's own representative reaffirmed this. Then followed an exchange of letters between Wang and Hsü. On August 26 Hsü sent his representative to Kiukiang to see Wang again, and Wang wrote another letter to Hsü affirming his basis for co-operation, and stating that he proposed to hold the Fourth Plenary Session for the purpose of settling all outstanding questions, as had been decided upon by the Central Executive Committee at Wuhan.

At the beginning of September, Sun Fo went to Shanghai for the purpose of meeting Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and his colleagues, the majority of whom belonged to the Western Hills group. There Hsü proposed to Sun Fo that in order to re-establish unity within the Party, both the Wuhan, Nanking and Shanghai Committees should all be abolished, and a Special Committee, comprising them all, should be established in their place. Sun Fo immediately expressed his agreement with the idea, which he knew was entirely in contradiction to the policy of Wuhan. Sun Fo had given up the Wuhan scheme of holding the Fourth Plenary Session, and accepted Hsü's scheme. As he explained afterwards, his reason for doing so was that Li Shih-Ts'eng, Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Wu Chih-Hui, Chang Ching-Chiang, the so-called Elder Statesmen, and Hu Han-Min had been boycotting him, the representative of the Wuhan group, and he, therefore, wanted the assistance of Hsü Ch'ung-Chih. When Wang arrived at Nanking on September 5, T'an Yen-K'ai had already

made a secret agreement with Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, and Sun Fo with Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, thereby betraying the Wuhan decisions. They had gone to Shanghai without letting Wang in Kiukiang know about it; neither did they report to him the defeat of Sun Chuan-Fang. On his arrival Wang cabled T'an Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo to return at once to Nanking. They arrived there on the 7th, but they both kept their negotiations secret. They only told Wang that they saw these five members to induce them, on behalf of Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi to return to Nanking, but that they had refused, and that they demanded that Wang should send an emissary first to Shanghai to exchange opinions. On September 8, the Wuhan group held an informal meeting together with Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, and Li Lieh-Ch'ün, the only important Nanking member left at Nanking. In this informal meeting these three persons stated that if those five members would not come to Nanking to attend the meeting, it would only consist of Wuhan members, which would not serve any useful purpose. They proposed that Wuhan should send a deputation to Shanghai to ask them for the reason of their refusal. This was accepted, and Wang Ching-Wei, T'an Yen-K'ai, Sun Fo and Chu Pei-Teh were charged with the mission to Shanghai. They were to be accompanied by Li Chung-Jen and Li Lieh-Ch'ün.

On their arrival at Shanghai in the evening of September 9, they at once made arrangements to meet the Old Comrades. Of the Nanking group they were only able to see Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Li Shih-Ts'eng and Chang Ching-Chiang. Hu Han-Min and Wu Chih-Hui refused to meet them, without stating any reasons. Of the Western Hills group they met Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and Chang Chi. The discussions which lasted from the 11th to the 13th took place at C. C. Wu's house. C. C. Wu was a son of Wu T'ing-Fang, a close personal friend of Sun Yat-Sen. After his father's death in 1922 he was appointed in 1923 Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Canton Government

by Sun Yat-Sen. In 1924 he joined the Kuo-Min Tang. He was then Mayor of Canton, in succession to Sun Fo, who had been dismissed by his father owing to certain irregularities in connection with his office. At the Second National Congress he was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee. When the June 23 incident took place at Shameen in 1925, he was Foreign Minister at Canton. At the end of May, 1926, Chiang K'ai-Shih drove him out of Canton on the ground that he had been secretly negotiating a loan with Hongkong of some 100 million dollars, and appointed Eugen Ch'en as his successor. This accusation Chiang stated in a letter to Chang Chi, which was published in the June following in Chiang's own organ. It was never seriously denied by C. C. Wu, who had never taken the trouble to demand an investigation by the Central Executive Committee so as to rehabilitate himself. When Chiang in April, 1927, revolted against Wuhan, Wu was made Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government. All the time while he was in exile at Shanghai, however, he maintained secretly close relations with Sun Fo, to whose clique, "the Party of the Crown Prince," he had belonged, and with Hsü Ch'ung-Chih.

On the first day of the Conference, September 11, Wang formally proposed to Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Li Shih-Ts'eng and Chang Ching-Chiang, that they should come to Nanking to attend the Fourth Plenary Session. They all refused. Asked for the reason, they stated that they did not recognise the Third Plenary Session of March, 1927, so that they could not possibly attend the Fourth Plenary Session. Wang then said that if they did not agree with any of the decisions of the Third Plenary Session, they could bring in whatever amendments they liked at the Fourth Plenary Session. With this they did not agree, nor did they argue about it. Wang then turned to Li Tsung-Jen and said, "At Kiukiang you supported our proposal of holding the Fourth Plenary Session at Nanking, and now why is this sudden change of mind?" Li replied, "As they don't agree, what can I do?" The meeting ad-

journed without any result. The following day another conference was held. Here Sun Fo suddenly presented a written proposal which he had obviously drafted with Hsü Ch'ung-Chih. In this he suggested that the Central Committee of Wuhan, Nanking and Shanghai be abolished. The members of these three groups should then come together in a Special Committee, and this Committee would organise a new National Government. Chang Chi and Hsü Ch'ung-Shih immediately rose to their feet supporting him. Chang Ching-Chiang, Li Shih-Ts'eng and Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei applauded the proposal. So did T'an Yen-K'ai. Chu Pei-Teh, on the other hand, was greatly surprised. Wang was indignant and angry as he had never been in his life. His point was that it did not matter very much that the Nanking and Shanghai groups were not sincere in their negotiations, but the betrayal of Sun Fo and T'an Yen-K'ai was too much for him. He refused to stay any longer, and immediately made ready to depart. The supporters of the proposal for the Special Committee then begged Wang to stay to consider the proposal more in detail. T'an Yen-K'ai, previously jubilant, turned pale at Wang's attitude, as a criminal caught *en flagrant délit*. Wang, however, was persistent, took his coat and went out, not heeding the people who ran after him to the front door. Li Lieh-Ch'ün, a veteran soldier, had tears in his eyes and tried to persuade Wang to remain by going prostrate after him. In this way the meeting at C. C. Wu's house ended.

The following day Wang went to T. V. Sung's house to discuss the situation with his fellow-members from Wuhan. This meeting was attended, apart from him, by Chu Pei-Teh, Sun Fo, T'an Yen-K'ai, and by Ch'en Kung-Po and Ku Meng-Yü, who had also come to Shanghai. A violent discussion took place, during which T'an Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo maintained that they had been forced to issue their proposals because there was no other way out. It now became clear to Wang that T'an Yen-K'ai and Sun Fo had foully betrayed him and his colleagues ; previously

he had merely observed some inexplicable changes in the attitude of T'an and Sun. As Nanking and Shanghai were under the military control of Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, he considered that negotiations were broken off. On the night of the 13th he secretly boarded a ship for Kiukiang. He was, however, still undecided about officially separating from the supporters of the Special Committee idea, and was trying to find a peaceful way out.

The following day, September 14, the Nanking and Shanghai groups decided to go to Nanking and, in spite of Wang's absence, to hold a meeting there of the available members of the Central Executive Committee to decide formally on the formation of the proposed Special Committee. This meeting was held at Nanking the following day, September 15. It was attended by only seven members of the Central Executive Committee, namely T'an Yen-K'ai, Sun Fo, Wu Chao-Chu (C. C. Wu), Li Lieh-Ch'ün, Chu Pei-Teh, Ch'eng Ch'ien, and Yü Yu-Jen. Of the deputy members there were Chu Min-Yi and Miao Pin. There were further Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Li Shih-Ts'eng, and Chang Ching-Chiang, who were members of the Central Supervisory Committee, and Li Tsung-Jen, a deputy member. Ch'eng Ch'ien, who was supposed to be a Wuhan member, attended because he too had a personal grudge against T'ang Sheng-Chih, and had agreed to support T'an Yen-K'ai in his plot to overthrow the latter. Chu Pei-Teh and Yü Yu-Jen attended the meeting, not realising its importance. But those who refrained from attending the meeting because of their opposition to the proposed Special Committee were nineteen in number: of the Central Executive Committee, Wang-Ching-Wei, Ching Heng-Yi, Ho Hsiang Ning, T. V. Sung, Wang Fa-Ch'in, Ting Wei-Fen, Ku Meng-Yü, Kan Nai-Kuang, Ch'en Kung-Po, Hsü Ch'ien; of the deputy members, Ch'en Shu-Jen, Chu Chi-Ch'ing, Wang Loh-P'ing, Chow Ch'i-Kang; of the Central Supervisory Committee, Liu Ya-Chih, Shao Li-Tze, Ch'en Pi-Ch'ün, and Ch'en Kuo-Fu; and further the deputy member P'an

Yü-Ch'ao. For they had come to Nanking in order to attend the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, not in order to execute its death-warrant.

The meeting, attended by only thirteen members out of an available thirty-two, was without a quorum, and, therefore, unconstitutional and illegal. Those who opposed the meeting and desired to hold the Fourth Plenary Session could, of course, get a proper quorum for their meetings, but they realised that such a meeting, in the absence of the Nanking members, would serve little purpose. It was in these circumstances that the Special Committee was formed, according to the plan of Sun Fo and Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, to supplant the existing Central Executive Committee at Wuhan, the sole custodian of Party authority between two National Congresses, and this without its own consent. And as if with the intention thereby of investing the Special Committee with its special authority, Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi held a military demonstration at Nanking, displaying the strength of their troops. The Special Committee then organised the Government Council and out of this the National Government, and issued a Manifesto which ended with the slogan, "All who oppose the Special Committee are counter-revolutionary."

The Struggle Against the Special Committee

Immediately after the establishment of the Special Committee a movement arose among the rank and file of the Kuo-Min Tang members, the provincial and district, and even overseas branches, denouncing this Special Committee, issuing Manifestoes and circular telegrams to that effect. The Wuhan Branch of the Central Political Council, formed after the decision on August 22 at Kiukiang, thus sent some of its members to Kiukiang, inviting him to relate to them the events which led to the formation of the Special Committee. This he did in the report which he gave verbally to the Wuhan Political Council on September 22, 1927. He pointed out that

there were precedents in the history of the Party for establishing Special Committees with dictatorial power, which included also members who did not belong to either the Central Executive or the Central Advisory Committee, as in the case of the Nanking Government. But in all those cases the Committee created had merely emergency powers delegated by the Central Executive Committee, which continued to exist, and to which it was responsible. As for the Nanking Special Committee, however, it was to take the very place and exercise the very authority of the Central Executive Committee. This had not been provided for by the Party Constitution, nor could it have been the intention of any National Congress of the Party. He then referred to the difference between the true revolutionaries and the Militarists. "We revolutionaries abide by the resolutions of the Party, and struggle for its principles and carry out its policies, in the interest of the people. The Militarists, on the other hand, ignore Party, principles, policies, and the people, and only care for their footholds and their privileges, obtained at the expense of the country. We should bear in mind the goal of our struggle, and then strive for it with all our might. This is our constructive task, which if wholeheartedly pursued, will ensure the permanent subjugation of the Militarists. Otherwise, the overthrow of Militarism is but a dream, and the result will be that we ourselves will become Militarists." Concluding he said, "Nowadays there seems to be along the Yang Tse River a habit of saying that all those who are anti-Communists are loyal comrades. This is, of course, a fallacy. We could say that all good comrades are anti-Communists, but this is quite different from saying that all anti-Communists are loyal members."

Wang in this speech spoke in a very restrained way about the Nanking Special Government. He realised that if he had denounced it in a straightforward manner, the result might be war against Nanking, and he was still trying to find a peaceful settlement.

The other centre of opposition against the Special Committee was Canton. After Chang Fa-K'uei had captured Nanchang on August 5, he pursued the Communist rebels into Kwangtung, which province he entered after some negotiation with Li Chi-Tsen. Part of his troops had occupied a section of Canton, and when Li Chi-Tsen and Huang Shao-Hsiung at the time of the formation of the Nanking Committee proposed to hold a public demonstration in celebration of the event, Chang Fa-K'uei, who had just arrived at Canton, vetoed the meeting. On October 2, Li Chi-Tsen and Chang Fa-K'uei cabled to Wang to the effect that they did not recognise the Special Committee and invited Wang to return to Canton. On October 6, Chang Fa-K'uei issued another telegram, this time under his own name, denouncing in unmeasured terms the Special Committee. He then got hold of the text of Wang's speech before the Wuhan Political Council, but was not satisfied with Wang's moderation, and wrote to him to that effect. Wang sent Ch'en Kung-Po to Canton to act as his deputy, and since then Canton became the main centre for the overthrow of the Special Committee. Wang himself went to Kiukiang, to deliver some lectures on Party principles and Party organisation.

While at Kiukiang a deputation from Nanking, consisting of Sun Fo, C. C. Wu, Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and Chang Chi, visited him on October 4, bringing with them a letter from T'an Yen-K'ai. They also brought with them a representative of Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung Hsi, while at the same time a representative of Li Chi-Tsen from Canton also arrived. So many Party branches had issued circular telegrams and Manifestoes, denouncing the Special Committee, that the Nanking group began to feel uneasy, and now wanted to ask Wang to return to Nanking to take charge of affairs, as he was also a member of the Presidium of the Special Committee. But as the majority of the members who were opposed to the Special Committee, such as Ku Meng-Yü, had gone to Wuhan, he

invited them to Wuhan in order to discuss the question with the Central Party members there.

As a result of the discussions at Wuhan, it was decided to hold the Plenary Session, to restore the Central Executive Committee, and its Standing Committee, to maintain the Special Committee, but to specify and limit its powers. Wang had managed to get those responsible for the formation of the Special Committee to cancel their decisions, which seemed to have been taken under the pressure of the military demonstration of Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi. There were several less important decisions taken on military co-operation, and the like. All these decisions were embodied in an agreement, signed by Wang Ching-Wei, Ku Meng-Yü, Wang Fa-Ch'ien, Chu Chi-Ch'ing, Sun Fo and C. C. Wu. Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and Chang Chi expressed their desire to support the agreement, but they did not sign it, as they were not members either of the Central Executive or of the Central Supervisory Committees. On the evening of October 11 the Nanking deputation returned with the agreement in their pockets, and on the 14th Wang received a cable, dated the 13th, in the name of T'an Yen-K'ai, Li Chung-Jen, Ch'eng-Ch'ien, and Ho Ying-Ch'ing, signifying their adherence to the agreement, and proposing that the Fourth Plenary Session be held on November 1.

On October 16, Wang made his report to the Wuhan Political Council, but on October 18 he suddenly received the news that the Nanking troops had started an attack on T'ang Sheng-Chih's soldiers, who were stationed at Wuhu, not far from Nanking. It transpired that the attacking Nanking troops were those of Ch'eng-Ch'ien's, acting on the orders of the Government organised by the Special Committee. The mandate ordering the dismissal of T'ang and the punitive expedition against him was issued by that Government without the previous sanction of the Special Committee. It was, however, ratified subsequently.

The attack on T'ang Sheng-Chih was due to two reasons. In the first place, Li Tsung-Jen, Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, Ch'eng-Ch'ien and T'an Yen-K'ai had long wanted to overthrow him in order to consolidate their own forces. Secondly, the Special Committee being attacked by all the Party branches and Wuhan being one of the main centres of opposition, the war with Wuhan was deemed necessary so as to break the opposition against the Special Committee, besides showing the military strength of Nanking. When signing the Wuhan agreement of October 11, it may be possible that Sun Fo and C. C. Wu were ignorant of the plot of their military supporters to overthrow T'ang. Real power in Nanking being in the hands of the military members, it was, of course, unnecessary for them to consult Sun Fo and C. C. Wu about their plans. The strange thing, however, was that the Nanking signatories of the Wuhan agreement, instead of raising objections against the actions of the Nanking Militarists, implicitly approved of them. The motive of the Militarists in inviting Wang to Nanking and signifying their adherence to the Agreement, while simultaneously preparing for war, was even less creditable. As the Special Committee was being attacked from all sides, it was quite impossible for them to carry on much longer, unless they had a prominent and popular political member behind them, and they, therefore, decided to make use of Wang. If Wang did come and support their actions, he would be an admirable person as their nominal leader. But even if Wang were not inclined to support them, they had him as a hostage. In any case, Wang was under restraint and the movement against the Special Committee was deprived of its most prominent leader.

Not without reason Wang was very indignant on learning that Nanking had without provocation declared War on T'ang Sheng-Chih, and at once issued a circular telegram denouncing the Nanking Militarists. He then had a consultation with the other members of the Central Executive Committee and with T'ang Sheng-Chih. They

decided at last to mobilise all the Wuhan troops for an expedition against Nanking, to unite openly with Chang Fa-K'uei in the anti-Nanking movement, and further, to make an alliance with Chiang K'ai-Shih, as it was learnt that Chiang, who had gone to Tokio, had also expressed his opposition to the Special Committee. T'ang Sheng-Chih was to take charge of military affairs at Hankow, while Wang was to conduct the negotiations with Chang Fa-K'uei and Chiang K'ai-Shih. Wang left Wuhan on October 20 for Shanghai, where he arrived on the 24th, and from here he communicated with Chiang K'ai-Shih in Japan. He then proceeded to Canton, arriving there on October 28.

Li Chi-Tsen and Huang Shao-Hsiung had meanwhile decided to assist Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, their clansmen, and to despatch troops against Hunan. They did not, however, want to use their own troops for this purpose, but only those armies which they wanted to get out of Kwangtung, namely Fan Shih-Sheng's Yunnanese soldiers, Fang Ting-Ying's division of Whangpoa cadets, and Li Fu-Lin's Fifth Army on Honam Island. Huang Shao-Hsiung had already ordered his troops from Kwangsi into Kwangtung for the purpose of forcing the above-mentioned troops to go to the North, when Chang Fa-K'uei again set his foot against it. Chang declared that the mandate to attack T'ang Sheng-Chih was issued by the Nanking Special Committee, and as the Party members did not recognise the legality of this body, its orders should not be obeyed. He also started mobilising his troops at Canton, which was more or less under his control. Fan Shih-Sheng, Fang Ting-Ying and Li Fu-Lin knew of the intention of Li Chi-Tsen to utilise the order from Nanking as a pretext to get them out of Kwangtung, and as soon as they learnt about Chang Fa-K'uei's attitude they decided not to obey Li Chi-Tsen, and to remain where they were. Instead, they made connections with Chang Fa-K'uei.

Faced with this situation Huang Shao-Hsiung decided,

in agreement with Li Chi-Tsen, to change tactics, i.e. not to take action at the moment, but to make preparations so as to attack the insubordinate generals at the same time as Chang Fa-K'uei. Huang Shao-Hsiung, therefore, immediately returned to Kwangsi to mobilise his forces on the Western frontier of Kwangtung. Li Chi-Tsen was to concentrate part of his forces at Canton, which were inferior to those of Chang Fa-K'uei, in Southern Kwangtung, and part under Ch'en Chi-T'ang, at the East River. Ch'en Chi-T'ang was also to make connections with Ch'en Ming-Shu's troops who were in Fukien. In this way Chang Fa-K'uei was being threatened from three sides, the East, South and West. Comparing the relative strength of the contending forces, Chang Fa-K'uei's were superior in quality and fighting power, but those under Li Chi-Tsen and Huang Shao-Hsiung were more numerous, more than twice Chang's numbers. Chang dominated at Canton, his adversaries in the countryside. They were, therefore, nearly of equal strength, which kept the situation for a time in suspense.

It was in these circumstances that Wang arrived at Canton, where Chang Fa-K'uei put himself at once at Wang's disposal. But Li Chi-Tsen too declared that he would accept Wang's orders, as not long ago Li had issued a telegram demanding the co-operation of Wang and Chiang, whom he declared to be the only persons suitable for national leadership. After Wang's arrival Li, therefore, stopped his hostile preparations against Chang Fa-K'uei, and joined Wang in attacking the Nanking Special Committee. By that time Chiang K'ai-Shih had also replied to Wang's letter, declaring that Wang was the only person who could save the situation. Chiang had also asked T. V. Sung to go to Canton to see Wang on his behalf for the purpose of discussing ways and means of overthrowing the Special Committee, and during T. V. Sung's stay at Canton Wang was daily in telegraphic communication with Chiang.

Events leading to the Fourth Plenary Session

In the beginning of November, Chiang K'ai-Shih decided to leave Tokio, cabling on his departure to Wang that either Wang should go to Shanghai or else that he, Chiang, should come to Canton. Unfortunately, when Chiang arrived at Shanghai, T'ang Sheng-Chih, attacked by the combined troops of Li Tsung-Jen, Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, Ch'eng Ch'ien and T'an Yen-K'ai, had just been defeated, and had to flee on November 13. The complete collapse of the Wuhan armies affected Chiang K'ai-Shih's plan to mobilise his forces, the First and Ninth Armies, in Chekiang. He intended to attack Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi from the rear, while Chang Fa-K'uei would drive out the Kwangsi troops from Canton. Now that T'ang Sheng-Chih was defeated, Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi could quietly return to Nanking without fearing any military action on the part of Chiang.

The only thing Chiang could do now was to concentrate on political affairs. He publicly expressed his approval of Wang's attitude to the Fourth Plenary Session, and supported the overthrow of the Nanking Special Committee and the restoration of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees. The procedure was to hold a preliminary meeting at Shanghai, to be followed by a formal meeting at Nanking attended only by members of the Central Committees.

When Wang arrived at Canton he first intended the Fourth Plenary Session to be held at Canton. In the first place, the Constitutional provision that meetings of the Central Committees should be held at the seat of the Nanking Government did no longer apply, as the existing National Government, being created by an unconstitutional body, was itself unconstitutional. The very existence of the Special Committee at Nanking would hinder the proceedings of the Plenary Session, even if its convocation at Nanking were feasible. But with Chiang openly supporting his proposal for the Fourth Plenary Session, the position changed, since a meeting at Nanking

was equivalent to a direct attack on the Special Committee. Wang, therefore, decided to go to Shanghai so as to expedite the preliminaries to the formal session and to come to an agreement with Chiang on different questions. He invited Li Chi-Tsen to accompany him to Shanghai for the purpose of making peace with Chiang. Li knew that Wang and Chiang were again co-operating, and although the Kwangsi troops had defeated T'ang Sheng-Chih, he was still afraid of the Wang and Chiang combination, and, therefore, accepted the suggestion. At that time he held that a peaceful settlement would be preferable to a military conflict. Wang had told him quite frankly that if the Special Committee were abolished, and the Fourth Plenary Session were held, and Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi obeyed the orders of the National Government, it would not be necessary for Wang to declare war on the Kwangsi generals. Wang then also invited Chang Fa-K'uei to accompany him to Shanghai, so as to assure Li Chi-Tsen that during his absence the *status quo* in Kwangtung would be preserved. Chang Fa-K'uei agreed on that condition.

Chang Fa-K'uei thus left Canton for Hongkong *en route* for Shanghai on November 13. Wang and Li Chi-Tsen followed the next day. On the 15th they boarded a steamer for Shanghai, but just as they were about to depart the information reached Chang Fa-K'uei that Huang Shao-Hsiung had arrived at Canton from Kwangsi, to take Li Chi-Tsen's place. This was not in accordance with the verbal understanding entered into, and Chang Fa-K'uei therefore secretly left the steamer and returned to Canton. In the early morning of November 17, Chang Fa-K'uei's troops surrounded Huang Shao-Hsiung's residence at Canton, but Huang, sensing that his intended *coup d'état* had failed, had secretly left Canton again the previous night. The troops he had brought with him to Canton were, however, disarmed.

On his arrival at Shanghai, on November 18, Wang immediately had an interview with Chiang to decide

upon common action with regard to the Special Committee and the Kwangsi Militarists. The sudden change in Canton, however, was embarrassing. War had been declared in the South, while Chiang was not yet ready in the North. Chiang had also resigned his Commandership-in-Chief, so he had no authority to order the mobilisation of his armies. Moreover, these armies, the First and Ninth Armies, were engaged in a campaign against Sun Chuan-Fang for the purpose of recapturing Hsüchow. It was only after the recapture of this town, that those armies could return to Nanking. Meanwhile, Chiang could take no military action. He could only co-operate with Wang in the political sphere. The resumption of co-operation between Wang and Chiang resulted in the opposition in Shanghai and Nanking to the Fourth Plenary Session dying down and becoming silent. There were no longer cries of "Support the Special Committee". On December 2, the first Preliminary Meeting to the Plenary Session was held in Shanghai in Chiang's house. At this meeting it became obvious that the Kwangsi Militarists, the Western Hills faction and the Rightists had already combined together for the purpose of defeating the Wang and Chiang combination. On the military side they ordered the execution of Huang Shao-Hsiung's plan for the three-cornered attack on Chang Fa-K'uei. Politically they attempted the same tactics as those which, in 1926, led to the March 20 incident. Li Shih-Ts'eng, Wu Chih-Hui, Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei, Chang Ching-Chiang used every possible means to destroy the confidence of Chiang in Wang. These four persons were Chiang's closest friends. They had accepted office in Chiang's Government on April 15 and had resigned simultaneously with him on August 12, when he was driven out by the Kwangsi generals. They started all kinds of rumours against Wang and threatened to break off their friendship with Chiang if he continued to co-operate with Wang. Chiang tried to conciliate the Old Comrades with Wang, but the effect of his assuming the

rôle of conciliator was only to strengthen the opposition to Wang and to cause his isolation.

In the South the Kwangsi Militarists were gaining ground. Huang Shao-Hsiung's troops had started the attack on Chang Fa-K'uei from the West, but they were defeated. But then Ch'en Chi-T'ang from the South attacked the River Gate, which compelled Chang Fa-K'uei to turn his attention to the South. This enabled Huang Shao-Hsiung to renew his attack from the West. At the same time, Ch'en Chi-T'ang started movements from the East and was reinforced by Ch'en Ming-Shu's troops from Fukien. Chang Fa-K'uei, attacked from three sides, could only deal with the situation in the West and the South, leaving the Eastern frontier and Canton practically defenceless. While militarily at a disadvantage in the South, politically at the Preliminary Meetings Wang was meeting with some measure of success. In the first meeting it was decided that the Special Committee should be abolished at the first sitting of the Fourth Plenary Session. The second Preliminary Meeting decided that the Nanking Government was to obey whatever instructions and resolutions relating to Party, military and administrative affairs were passed at the Preliminary Meetings. Then the Kwangsi group and the Four Elder Statesmen, Wu, Chang, Ts'ai, and Li, became apprehensive, and wanted again to boycott the Plenary Session. But they realised that such a course would be futile, as it could not be done effectively. For Wang and Chiang were in agreement here, and they were supported by the majority of the members of the Central Committees. All those who had boycotted the unconstitutional Session of the Central Executive Committee of September 15 had already arrived in Shanghai, and a quorum would be obtained even if Li Chi-Tsen and the Four Elder Statesmen and their group boycotted the Plenary Session. They, therefore, changed their tactics. They first presented a written demand to the Preliminary Meeting for an adjournment of three days. During these

three days they held secret meetings at Li Chi-Tsen's house in Nanyien (South Garden) for the purpose of discussing ways and means to destroy the plans of Wang and Chiang. Li Chi-Tsen then drafted a motion to the effect that none of the Central Committee members from Canton should be allowed to attend the Plenary Session. The Four Elder Statesmen drafted a similar motion, mentioning Wang Ching-Wei, Ku Meng-Yü, Ch'en Kung-Po and Kan Nai-Kuang by name. But these motions they did not bring up before the Preliminary Meeting, knowing fully well that they had no chance of being passed. Instead, they sent them directly to the newspapers to be published, so as to create a confusion in the public mind. In an interview to newspaper reporters, they declared that they were not opposed to the holding of the Formal Session, but that they demanded that it should be held at once at Nanking. The major part of the Kwangsi troops were at Wuhan, which they had occupied after T'ang Sheng-Chih's defeat. Li Tsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, however, had still some troops at Nanking and Shanghai, and they now made arrangements that the train on which the Central Committees would travel from Shanghai to Nanking should be fired at.

Chiang K'ai-Shih's attitude also showed a change. At the beginning of the Preliminary Meeting he had addressed a circular letter in which he stated that "the formidable enemies of the National Revolution are decidedly not the Militarists, nor the Communists. It is the failure of our military members" (here he referred to the Kwangsi group) "to realise the necessity of upholding the prestige of the Central Party, and the exploitation of this defect by the politicians" (i.e. the Elder Statesmen), "that are dealing the death-blow to the National Revolution. . . . We must strive on to induce our military members to repent, so as to prevent civilian politicians from trouble-making and manipulating, to build up a central organ for our Party, to raise the Party authority, and to strengthen Party discipline. But these cannot be achieved without

the Fourth Plenary Session." In spite of this letter, the course of action which Chiang intended to take was really still obscure. His armies had not yet recaptured Hsüchow, and he was not sure whether he would be able to control Nanking and Wuhan. At the same time, the situation in the South had turned unfavourable to Chang Fa-K'uei. The Four Elder Statesmen had further threatened to break their ties with him. He became hesitant about whole-heartedly giving his support to Wang.

The Canton Insurrection and the Break with Russia

Meanwhile, rumours were rife at Shanghai, spread about by Li Chi-Tsen and the Four Elder Statesmen, that Chang Fa-K'uei and Ch'en Kung-Po, the civilian head of Kwangtung, had turned Communist. These rumours did not affect the public greatly, but what Wang was worrying about was that in order to meet the three-cornered attack of the Kwangsi group, Chang Fa-K'uei had left Canton unguarded, thus giving rise to a situation which would certainly be utilised by the Canton Communists to effect a *coup d'état*. On November 7, the Russian Consul at Canton had, from the Consular motor-car, distributed handbills carrying the inscription, "Down with the Kuo-Min Tang." Arrested by the authorities, he pleaded diplomatic immunity, and was thus released. Advices continued to reach Wang from Canton that the Russians and the Chinese Communists there were carrying on open propaganda. In order to meet the situation, Wang, therefore, gathered members of the Central Committees in his residence, and they decided to instruct Wang's wife, Ch'en Pi-Ch'ün, to return to Canton for the purpose of seeing Chang Fa-K'uei, and Ch'en Kung-Po, and advising them to pay special attention to the activities of the Communists. Ch'en Pi-Ch'ün met the commander of the Eleventh Army and the chief of the Canton Police. From the latter she gathered that the Communists were utilising every means to make connections with the army,

with a view to carrying out an armed insurrection. As they used the Russian Consulate as their headquarters, it was not possible to effect their arrest. She then conveyed Wang's warning to Chang Fa-K'uei and Ch'en Kung-Po, and then returned to Shanghai to report. Meanwhile, Wang received the information that the Russian Consular offices, taking advantage of their diplomatic privileges, had been smuggling arms into the Consulate, using for that purpose British steamers and the Consular motor-boat. Wang thus ordered the immediate search of the Russian Consulate and the arrest of all Communist leaders at Canton. In the telegram which he sent to Chang Fa-K'uei and Ch'en Kung-Po he also expressed the opinion that Huang Ch'i-Hsiang, the commander of the Fourth Army, had been very careless in allowing the Communists to penetrate into Canton, and called for an investigation into his case and, if necessary, also his punishment.

Having succeeded in his primary aim, the convocation of the Fourth Plenary Session, Wang began to have doubts about the advisability of continuing the co-operation with Chiang for the purpose of restoring the authority of the Party, especially in view of the surreptitious propaganda that the Kwangsi group and the Rightists conducted against him. They continued announcing that they were not against the Fourth Plenary Session, but only against Wang's attendance. Wang, therefore, decided that he had better retreat at that juncture and let Chiang alone be responsible for the Session.

On December 10, at the final Preliminary Meeting, he, therefore, sent in a motion, supported by ten other members, proposing that Chiang K'ai-Shih be urged to resume his Commandership-in-Chief of the National-Revolutionary Army, to continue the Northern Expedition, to prepare the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session, to determine its date and meeting-place, and to provide safe conduct for those attending it. Wang's motion was unanimously carried, it being assumed that this Session would take

place on January 1, 1928. Wang then announced his resignation, "so as to avoid complications and misunderstandings".

Before the Preliminary Meeting adjourned, Chiang K'ai-Shih proposed the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia on the ground that the Russian Consulates had ceased to be what they purported to be, but had become Communist centres of intrigue. Wang at first opposed the motion, desiring to have some more definite evidence. He had already ordered the search of the Canton Russian Consulate, and was waiting for a report. He finally consented to take immediate action, regarding severance of relations as only a precautionary measure against eventual Communist outrages. But in so doing, his aim was not, as transpired afterwards in the case of Chiang, to curry favour with the Imperialist Powers.

While Chang Fa-K'uei and Ch'en Kung-Po were discussing at Canton how to give effect to Wang's telegram, and to find ways and means of searching the Russian Consulate, there suddenly took place the Canton Insurrection of December 11. The news of the impending arrest of the Communists had leaked out. In order to avoid arrestation they, therefore, decided to act at once, instead of waiting till December 15, as they had originally decided. They had at their disposal only one regiment of 1,100 men, the especially trained regiment in Huang Ch'i-Hsiang's army. On the second day the Communists were reinforced by an army of some 800 bandits, who, however, stayed in Canton for only eight hours, during which time they plundered the banks and exchange offices, and left Canton after they had got what they wanted. Their leader, Yuen Hsia-Cho, was a famous bandit leader. The Communists further armed the rickshaw men, and they released the prison inmates, whom they also provided with arms. They also imported into Canton other bandit bands, which they passed as peasant regiments.

As Chang Fa-K'uei's main troops were in the West

and South, campaigning against Huang Shao-Hsiung, the Communists managed to get the control of Canton. Chang Fa-K'uei and Ch'en Kung-Po, therefore, retreated to Honam Island, where Li Fu-Lin put his troops at their disposal, meanwhile patrolling Canton River with gunboats. Orders were immediately given to the troops in the South and the West to attack Canton, and serious battles took place on the 12th and 13th. On the 14th, Canton city was captured from the Communists and bandits, many of whom were arrested and executed on the spot. Fires had meanwhile been set at ten different points by the rebels and whole streets were destroyed. The anger of the population against them was beyond measure, and no doubt in the quelling of the rebellion many innocent persons were sacrificed.

After the rebellion was crushed, Chang Fa-K'uei and Ch'en Kung-Po submitted themselves to the local Political Council for punishment, accepting full responsibility for the insurrection. But Canton was in complete anarchy, and as Huang Shao-Hsiung in his turn attacked Canton, they decided to escape from Canton.

The Canton Insurrection was, of course, fully utilised by the reactionaries for propaganda purposes. The chief of the Shanghai garrison had already negotiated with the authorities of the foreign Settlements in Shanghai for the extradition of Left members of the Central Executive Committee on the grounds that they were Communists. Those living in the International Settlement were visited by the police, but no harm was done to them personally; those in the French Concession were left unmolested. On the 13th, Wang and his group therefore decided to issue a Manifesto explaining the real situation at Canton and the events leading to the crisis, strenuously repudiating the suggestion that Ch'en Kung-Po and Chang Fa-K'uei were Communists. When the news of the recapture of Canton and the driving out of the Communists by Chang Fa-K'uei arrived at Shanghai on the 14th, people at once accepted Wang's Manifesto at its

face value. The Kwangsi group and the Four Elders, therefore, no longer spread the rumour that the Left were Communists, and they had to change their tactics. They now demanded that Wang should be made responsible for knowingly allowing the Insurrection to take place.

Wang, who had decided to go abroad after his resignation on December 10, in order to take a rest-cure, had to postpone his departure for a few days owing to the Canton revolt. On the 17th he left Shanghai for France, and on departing issued a circular telegram summarising his activities in overthrowing the Special Committee, and reminding the Party members of their revolutionary task. "Party-saving is as important as Party-purging. The Fourth Plenary Session must be convened, the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees must be restored, and the Special Committee abrogated. And an end must be put to the mischief-making activities of the corrupted elements and counter-revolutionaries."

After Wang left for Europe, Chiang then acted as conciliator between the remnants of the Central Committees and the Kwangsi Militarists. The Fourth Plenary Session was finally held in February, 1928. The Special Committee was abolished, the Central Committees restored, and the National Government reorganised. Nominally at least the Party was saved.

CHAPTER XV

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN OLD AND NEW CHINA

The Meaning of the Struggle within the Kuo-Min Tang

THE revolt of Chiang K'ai-Shih against the Central Executive Committee at Wuhan in April, 1927, and the protracted negotiations and conflicts preliminary to the holding of the Fourth Plenary Session revealed a fundamental divergence of interests among the different groups which composed the Kuo-Min Tang, of which the struggle centring round the abolition of the Special Committee and the restoration of the Central Committees of the Kuo-Min Tang was but the outward manifestation. The unity of the Kuo-Min Tang had always been more formal than substantial, being in its origin a more or less loose federation of political interests kept together only by the force of Sun Yat-Sen's personality. The Reorganisation of 1924 was essentially an attempt by Sun Yat-Sen to create a real unity among its members by the establishment of an integrated organisation, the enforcement of a strict discipline, and the formulation of different methods of procedure. It was recognised that the realisation of the Three People's Principles, on which the hope for national salvation depended, could only be achieved by concerted action on the part of its members, and not by individual venture. The principles of a party only define the quality and direction of its general purpose ; the discipline of the Party indicates the way and the method of attainment. A party must, therefore, not only have good principles but also a good discipline. A party having the one but lacking the other is doomed to failure. A party is like an army. The Imperialist forces are subject to good discipline, but

the principles actuating their actions are bad. With the former they have conquered the world, because of the latter they will end in defeat, like the Central European forces during the World War. From the point of view of national salvation, there is no one in China who could take exception to the principles of the Kuo-Min Tang, but as it was devoid of any discipline prior to 1924, it failed to realise any one of its objects. The Reorganisation brought about an entire change, in that a machinery was provided for the translation of the abstract principles into concrete realities. Organised propaganda enabled the principles and policies of the Party to be understood and supported by the masses of the population. The improvement of party organisation and the tightening up of party discipline enabled the revolutionary elements to concentrate on a definite goal, while at the same time ousting the pseudo-revolutionary and corrupted elements in the Party from their strongholds. Thus the Party became supreme in the military as well as political sphere. Politically, there was a new spirit of honesty and responsibility, which overcame all administrative and financial difficulties. Militarily, because of the loyalty and obedience of the armed members to the Party, Kwangtung was unified and consolidated within two years and succeeded in conquering several provinces as big as France and Germany in but a few months.

Many of the so-called Old Comrades, who had been accustomed, ever since the foundation of the Republic in 1912, to look on the Party as a mutual benefit society only, to be utilised for their own advancement, were opposed to the new scheme with its organisation and discipline, and to the linking up of the Party with the masses of the people. They realised that the Reorganisation would mean the end of their opportunities. As at the time of the Reorganisation, the policy of admitting the Communists into the Party and of co-operation with Soviet Russia was also adopted, they exploited the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet scare for the purpose of attacking

the spirit of the 1924 Reorganisation. Their arguments, as stated by Wu Chih-Hui, who was also the leader of the Chinese anarchists, could be summarised as follows: (1) Sun Yat-Sen did not voluntarily reorganise the Kuo-Min Tang, but was forced to do so by the Communists; (2) Sun was flattered by A. Joffe, the Soviet Envoy, who promised him material supplies from Russia; (3) Sun finally decided to invite the Communists into the Party to join in the work of reorganising the Kuo-Min Tang, because he feared that the Kuo-Min Tang might not be able to stand up against the Communist Party with its strict, but trouble-making discipline. This misrepresentation was facilitated by the Communist claim that "the Kuo-Min Tang began to have its organisation and discipline only when, and because, it admitted the Communists into its ranks".

Another source of misunderstanding is the confusion between a principle and a policy. Both are relative to time and environment, but whereas a principle is relatively stable and permanent, a policy, being the instrument for the realisation, a by-product, of a principle, depends mainly on the exigencies of the moment. There was Sun Yat-Sen's policy of allying with Tuan Ch'i-Jui and Chang Tso-Lin in order to drive out Ts'ao K'un and Wu Pei-Fu, the worst and most oppressive of the Northern war-lords. After the downfall of Ts'ao and Wu, Sun went to the North and declared that not only was it necessary to overthrow Ts'ao and Wu, but also anyone who aspired to take their place, so that Militarism might be abolished. When Tuan Ch'i-Jui and Chang Tso-Lin showed no signs of coming into line with the policy of the Kuo-Min Tang, but instead allied themselves with the Imperialists and summoned the so-called Rehabilitation Conference, the Triple Alliance was abandoned, and war was declared on the former allies. The Three People's Principles, on the other hand, are inherent in the Kuo-Min Tang itself, ever since its inception as a secret revolutionary party. They can only become obsolete after the concrete realities for

which they stand, have been attained. At the 1924 Reorganisation the three-fold policy of allying with Russia, admitting the Communists, and helping and co-operating with the peasants and workers was inaugurated. During the period of Communist ascendancy in Wuhan in 1927, the term "Three Great Policies" was invented so as to put the Russo-Communist orientation and the peasant and labour policy on the same level as the Three People's Principles. The result of this was to confuse the essence of spirit of the Reorganisation with Communist dominance, even after the Russo-Communist orientation had become impracticable. Everything which originated during the time of the Russo-Communist alliance became regarded as evil. Organisation, discipline, Party authority, co-operation with the masses, were regarded as Communist institutions, notwithstanding the fact that only because of the restoration of discipline among the Kuo-Min Tang members in Wuhan, the expulsion of the Communists in Wuhan was made possible.

The Revolt of the Right: the Old Comrades

A section of the Old Comrades, under Feng Chih-Yü, revolted openly at the time of the Reorganisation of 1924. Expelled from the Kuo-Min Tang, they joined the Anfu Club of Tuan Ch'i-Jui. Others, like Chang Chi, Tsou Lu, Lin Shen, Hsü Ch'ung-Chih, and the so-called Elder Statesmen—Wu Chih-Hui, Chang Ching-Chiang, Li Shih-Ts'eng, and Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei—did not voice their opposition till after Sun Yat-Sen's death, when they organised the so-called Western Hills faction. Not all of them, however, joined this openly. Hsü Ch'ung-Chih and the Elder Statesmen only co-operated with the Western Hills group in secret, retaining their membership and their positions in the Party. While one group therefore attacked the reorganised Kuo-Min Tang openly, another group worked from the inside of the Party so as to create dissensions between the leading Party members. That they were allowed to retain their high positions in the

Party (with the exception of Wang Chung-Hui, who because of his continued service under the Peking Government of Chang Tso-Lin was deposed from his membership of the Central Supervisory Committee in 1927) was due to the tolerance of those in power in Canton at the time. Engaged in a life-and-death struggle both against the Northern Militarists and the Hongkong Imperialists, these latter did not desire to turn into open enemies people who had been in close relations with Sun Yat-Sen during his lifetime. The Kuo-Min Tang was further considered to be an all-inclusive Party in which representation should be given to all interests and shades of opinion within the limits of the Three People's Principles, and in the Central Supervisory Committee, as distinct from the Central Executive Committee, they could do little harm.

The group of Old Comrades form the so-called Right Wing of the Kuo-Min Tang. They play the same rôle in the Kuo-Min Tang as formerly the Kuan Fu-Hui under Chang T'ai-Yen. Mainly consisting of intellectuals, old officials and bureaucrats, it has no mass following in the Party, relying for its influence mainly on the former association of its members with Sun Yat-Sen. Its outlook is semi-feudalistic, aiming at the restoration of Chinese sovereignty without bringing any fundamental changes in the social and political structure of the country. Standing for personal rule instead of government by the Party as a whole, it is against all mass movements and against the democratic centralisation of political power. In this it is in agreement with the feudal Militarists who either for self-preservation or for self-aggrandisement has at the time of the Northern Expedition joined the Party, and had, in the name of the Party, managed to secure the control of different provinces. Nominally, these provinces were under the rule of the Party; actually they became the private estates of the neo-Militarists, who saw fit to pay lip-service to the Three People's Principles, but habitually ignored the orders of the Central Party Authorities. Instead of supporting

the subjection of recalcitrant military commanders, the leaders of the Right, notably the Elder Statesmen, advocated the establishment of "regional autonomy", so as to curry favour with the neo-Militarists. In this the Elder Statesmen thought to realise their anarchist conceptions, which, however, are in complete contradiction to the conception of the Unitary State of Sun Yat-Sen as set forth in his Plan of National Reconstruction and in the Manifesto of the First National Congress. In advocating "temporary peace" with the neo-militarists they are creating the same situation in Revolutionary China as that which existed after the compromise with Yuan Shih-K'ai in 1912, and which became the source of the Civil War after 1915. Ascribing the progress of the Northern Expedition entirely to the fighting ability of the Party Troops, and all complications in the Party to the activities of the members, Wu Chih-Hui, the intellectual leader of the Right, made, at the time of Nanking's revolt against Wuhan, the classic utterance, "The Party troops are full of merit, but the Party members deserve death". This saying, reminiscent of Chang T'ai-Yen's "The Revolutionary Party may be dissolved when the revolutionary armies are springing up", however, conveniently ignored the fact that at the time of the co-operation with the Communist Party, Communists were found both in the Party and among the troops. In December, 1927, at the time of the struggle for the Fourth Plenary Session, Wu Chih-Hui went even further, and proposed the handing over of the Kuo-Min Tang to the control of the military members. "The formal procedure is of no importance. Even if our military members can become really obedient and forget that they themselves are members of the Central Committees, most of the civilian members, being insincere, will continue to look upon them as strangers. Some of them regard them as bandits who must not be offended, while other trouble-makers look upon them as war-lords who must be opposed. Our military members are not treated as fully-fledged members; how can they

regard themselves as the pillars of the Party. . . . If the Party is handed over to the control of our military members two things might happen. In the event of a Kemal Pasha arising, the Kuo-Min Tang will naturally succeed. Should unfortunately it be dominated by a Chang Tso-Lin, a second Kuo-Min Tang or the Communist Party could take its place. In any case, this would be better than to have it lead its present languishing existence."

Whatever the political failings of the Elder Statesmen, one thing could be said for them—they had never been out for their own personal gain. With Wang Ching-Wei, who for twenty years was their close personal friend, they founded, after the Great War, the Six-No Society, pledging themselves not to take any Government post, not to smoke, not to drink, etc. Their moral integrity is unquestioned, they having never accepted any posts in the Peking Government since the break of Sun Yat-Sen with Peking, nor acquired any money illegitimately. With the exception of Chang Ching-Chiang, they all had made their reputation as educationists: Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei as the titular leader of the Peking National University at the time of the Intellectual Renaissance, Wu Chih-Hui and Li Shih-Ts'eng as leaders of the Scientific School in China. While Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei is the best known among the people by virtue of his University Chancellorship and the fact that he has been the first Education Minister under Sun Yat-Sen, Wu Chih-Hui is their intellectual leader and the most forceful personality among them. Chang Ching-Chiang, a born schemer, is the diplomat among them; he owed his standing in the Party solely to the fact that he was the great supplier of funds to the Tung Meng Hui before the Revolution. He is the most powerful of the Elder Statesmen, owing to his personal influence on Chiang K'ai-Shih, which made him the power behind the "throne" at Nanking.

The power which Chang Ching-Chiang exercises is always hidden, which disqualifies him for political leader-

ship. This is reserved to Hu Han-Min, the only other living person who can claim to have "a history" in the Party beside Wang Ching-Wei, the right-hand man of Sun Yat-Sen. Hu Han-Min had been closely associated with Sun Yat-Sen ever since the days of the Tung Meng Hui. Capable and always able to hit the point when confronted with a complicated problem, he rose to high positions of trust under Sun Yat-Sen, and became one of his most faithful lieutenants. Sun, however, had never been able to trust and rely on him as completely as on Wang Ching-Wei, who during his lifetime had always refused to accept any official position. This was due to Hu's favouritism and nepotism, and his association with doubtful personalities which made him disliked by many people, and had compromised him on several critical occasions. He came of a poor family, but, in spite of the high posts he has held, has remained poor until the present day. As it happened, however, his brothers were less scrupulous than himself, and a misguided conception of family loyalty made him tolerate them living as parasites on the people. In 1923, when Sun Fo was Mayor of Canton, a Cantonese merchant, Chao Ten-Pang, had been arrested by Sun Fo for speculating in currency. Hu Han-Min's elder brother was a good friend of Chao, and Hu now asked Sun Fo to release him. Sun Fo refused, and referred the matter to his father, who told Hu to mind his own business and not that of his brother. Whereupon Hu resigned his post as Chief Counsellor to the President and left for Shanghai. In 1924, after the Reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang, Hu became Civil Governor of Kwangtung. Sun Fo had then been dismissed from the Mayoralty of Canton, and Sun Yat-Sen had already decided to appoint C. C. Wu as his son's successor, when Hu intervened and proposed his younger brother, Hu I-Sheng—who was later on implicated in the murder of Liao Chung-K'ai—for the mayoralty. He had numerous other conflicts with his colleagues, never on a question of principle or policy, but always on a question of appointment. Because of this

nepotism, an estrangement took place between him and Wang Ching-Wei, Liao Chung-K'ai, Chu Chih-Hsin, who had been his closest friends. While disapproving of Hu's attitude, they could nevertheless not express themselves freely to him about it, being afraid of coming into conflict with him.

Another cause of the dislike of people for him was his secretiveness. Sun Yat-Sen's attitude was always clear ; the same with Liao and Wang, who always came out openly with their intentions. When the Fourth Plenary Session was finally decided on in January, 1928, by Chiang K'ai-Shih, he left the country, without stating any reasons for boycotting the Session. Wang, on the other hand, always explained his reasons, as for instance when in conflict with Chiang and subsequently when opposing the Kwangsi generals. Hu Han-Min claims politically to be a Socialist, but to please Wu Chih-Hui he also maintains that the Third Principle (of Livelihood) means anarchism. In 1926 Lenin's *State and Revolution* was brought to his notice by a German-educated student, and full of admiration, he arranged for a Chinese translation of the book. At the same time, however, he joined the Western Hills faction. Having advocated during his stay in Russia in 1925 the affiliation of the Kuo-Min Tang to the Communist International, he proposed in 1928, during his stay in Europe, its affiliation to the Labour and Socialist International, and asked Tsou Lu—who had been driven out from Nanking as being responsible for the Nanking students' massacre of November, 1927—to apply for its affiliation at the Socialist Congress at Brussels. On his return from Europe in September, 1928, he found Chiang K'ai-Shih and the Kwangsi generals (Li Tsung-Jen, Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, etc.) in conflict. He advocated, together with the Elder Statesmen, a compromise between them, and became the political leader of the Kwangsi group, and with their military backing he was able to assume the leadership of the entire Right. His purpose was to oust Chiang from the leadership of the Party and Government,

but when the actual conflict between Chiang and the Kwangsi group broke out in the Spring of 1929, he allowed himself to be the tool of Chiang, who made him denounce in public his allies, although secretly he maintained connections with them. His primary aim now is to maintain his nominal position in the Party and Government.

Prominent in the Right Wing has also become Sun Fo (or Sun K'o), the son of Sun Yat-Sen, who, as a result of the Mayoralty of Canton in 1923, is one of the richest men in China. But in view of his ability to execute spectacular changes—from the extreme Left to the extreme Right, and vice versa—it is difficult to foresee how long he will remain a leader of the Right.

Mention must now be made of Wang Ch'ung-Hui, Doctor of Civil Law of Yale University, member of the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang, Chairman of the Judicial Yuan (Council) in the Nanking Government, and Deputy Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. Wang Ch'ung-Hui (not to be confused with Wang Ching-Wei) is not of political prominence, claiming only to be a legal expert, but his career and outlook is typical of the average member of the Right. He began his official career in 1907, when as practically the only Chinese who had any knowledge of international law, he was made Imperial Assistant-Delegate to the Second Hague Conference. In 1911 he became Minister of Justice under Sun Yat-Sen. He had then served, like Talleyrand, every possible master in Peking—Yuan Shih-K'ai, Li Yuan-Hung, Tuan Ch'ijui, Hsü Shih-Ch'ang, Wu Pei-Fu and Chang Tso-Lin, either as Prime Minister, or Minister of Justice, or Chief Justice or President of the Bureau of Codification. When the Northern Expedition took place he was safely in Peking under Chang Tso-Lin as President of the Extraterritoriality Commission. After the Nanking Revolt against Wuhan he went to Shanghai, having previously told Chang Tso-Lin that he would try to make peace between Peking and the Kuo-Min Tang. Instead, how-

ever, he joined the Nanking Government as Minister of Justice in May, 1927, shortly after his expulsion from the Kuo-Min Tang in March, 1927. In September, 1928, he was made Chairman of the Judicial Yuan at Nanking. From time to time, however, he found it useful and convenient to escape the rather overcharged political atmosphere at home and undertake more remunerative judicial functions at The Hague. A typical mandarin rather than a revolutionary, he owed his position in the Party to his former acquaintance with Sun Yat-Sen and to his ability to impress the Party members with his legal authority.

The Heritage of Sun Yat-Sen

Opposed to the Right is the Left Kuo-Min Tang. The term "Left" is unfortunately chosen, as it conveys a sectional meaning and is liable to confusion with the Communist Party; it is, however, in general usage, and a convenient expression. Before the Reorganisation of 1924, there was, properly speaking, no Kuo-Min Tang in the sense of an organised political Party. The existing Kuo-Min Tang was an agglomeration of different individual politicians, the majority of whom, caring little for the principles Sun Yat-Sen stood for, were merely out to exploit his great reputation and prestige among the population for their own ends; its membership, with honourable and distinguished exceptions, consisted of officials, bureaucrats, Militarists, and office-seekers; the common people as a whole did not participate. Sun Yat-Sen then gradually came to the realisation that if his principles were going to be realised, it must be done through an instrument which combined political leadership with mass support. This machinery he created at the Reorganisation Congress of 1924, as a result of which the Reorganised or "Left" Kuo-Min Tang came into being. The Old or Right Kuo-Min Tang was not extinguished, however. It suffered temporary oblivion during Sun Yat-Sen's lifetime, but after his death it was resus-

citated in the Western Hills faction. Owing to the political prestige which the Kuo-Min Tang acquired after the Reorganisation, the Right also claimed to be the only true Kuo-Min Tang.

Not all members of the reorganised Kuo-Min Tang, however, were convinced believers in the principles for which the Reorganisation stood. Many joined it because it was fashionable ; others because it was the surest way to political advancement. In other words, the Left Kuo-Min Tang included, besides "Leftists", also "Rightists"; i.e. potential members of the Right. As the Leftists were in power ever since the Reorganisation till Chiang K'ai-Shih's surrender to the Right in 1927, and had all their attention engaged in carrying on the work of the Revolution—the struggle against the Northern Militarists, the breaking of the foreign shackles of China—they had no time to establish, within the organisation, an organisation of their own, such as the Right had done. The result was that they were unable to cope with the counter-revolutionary intrigues on the eve of their success in 1927, and were driven out by a combination of the Western Hills faction and the Kwangsi Militarists, who also managed to cause the desertion of some of their leading members. It was not until the beginning of 1929 that they decided to establish a definite organisation of their own, the "Kuo-Min Tang Reorganisation Party", for the purpose of defending the principles of the 1924 Reorganisation. A secret organisation, with a definite constitution, it comprises not only the leading personalities of the Left, but also the most active members of the rank and file of the Kuo-Min Tang. While definitely a Left organ, the Reorganisation Party must, therefore, not be confused with the Left Kuo-Min Tang, which is practically an all-inclusive organisation and of which the other is only a directing nucleus.

The Left aims, generally, at restoring to the masses of the peasants and workers of China their rightful position in the traditional social hierarchy which, before its dis-

integration by contact with the capitalist West, placed them above the merchants and soldiers. In accordance with the "canonical" books of Modern China—the *San Min Chu I* (Three Principles of the People), the *Programme of National Reconstruction*, and the *Manifesto of the First National Congress*, the *Plans for National Reconstruction* (all mentioned by Sun Yat-Sen in his political testament)—the Left stands for the revolutionary settlement of the question of national liberation, but adopts the "reformist" method in the solution of social and economic questions, as being the most suitable, having regard to the peculiar conditions of China. It therefore stands for the unconditional abolition of the Unequal Treaties and the complete extermination of Militarism, as embodied in the old (Northern) war-lords, and in the new Militarists who have arisen within the Party. In the matter of the Unequal Treaties there has never been seriously any question of sudden abrogation involving armed conflict, but merely of non-acknowledgment, pending their revision by negotiation and agreement, the economic weapon of the boycott to be used only in case of necessity. Only a small minority in the Left, like Teng Yen-Ta, wants a sudden abrogation even at the cost of a disastrous war, but this minority is not of any great consequence. Before revision of the treaties takes place, the customary privileges extorted by foreigners in the past from weak and corrupt governments, but which have no treaty basis—such as the exemption from local Chinese taxes, the usurpation of civil jurisdiction by foreigners over Chinese subjects living in the foreign settlements (which are legally under Chinese sovereignty)—will be cancelled. Expired treaties will only be renewed on the basis of real, not nominal, equality and mutual respect of sovereign rights. Secret diplomacy and the policy of secret bargaining, customary at Peking and revived by the Nanking Government under Chiang K'ai-Shih, will no longer be resorted to, but the Chinese people will be consulted in the matter of all important negotiations. With regard to

the Militarists, the Left realises the danger of putting up one militarist against the other, but aims at the creation of its own revolutionary Party Army with its roots among the people. The Northern Militarists and the new feudalists nominally in the Kuo-Min Tang, are opposed to the association of the soldiers with the common people, for they realise that once the soldiers fraternise with the population and acquire the social sense, instead of forming a caste of their own, they would refuse to be the "running dogs" of the Militarists. While favouring the labour and peasant movements and the active participation of the masses in the affairs of the Party and Government, it is opposed to the violent break-up of the Chinese social structure, for the resulting chaos and complications would leave the condition of the masses only worse than before. To solve the agrarian problem, which is most acute in China, owing to over 80 per cent of the population being farmers, farm rents should, as an immediate measure, be reduced by 25 per cent all over China. Land owned by landlords, i.e. all holdings over 30 or 50 mows according to locality, should be compulsorily acquired by the Government at current market prices, and paid for by Government Bonds. The nationalised land would then be sold or let to the peasants at as cheap rates as possible.

As to the form of government, it upholds the unitary as opposed to the quasi-feudalistic regional principle advocated by the Anarchists of the Right. Opposing the idea of a personal dictatorship or government by a "Strong Man", it stands for the principle of government by a dictatorship of the Party, as a preliminary to the introduction of a democratic regime in the constitutional Stage. Real Party Government, however, requires a democratic centralisation in the organisation of the Kuo-Min Tang, a strict discipline among the Party members, and the subordination of military power to civilian authority.

Representing the interests of the broad masses of the people, the Left draws its membership from the younger

members of the intelligentsia, the subaltern officers in the Army, and the proletarian classes, commanding over 80 percent of the total membership of the Kuo-Min Tang. The exact membership figures of the Kuo-Min Tang are unknown, owing to the "Purification Movement", which was initiated by Chiang K'ai-Shek and the Western Hills faction in April, 1927. The available statistics give for the end of 1926 a total figure of 250,000 members, consisting of 70,000 soldier members, 150,000 Left members, and only 30,000 "Centre" and Right members. The Purification Movement, aiming at the elimination of the Communist and Left members, did not appreciably affect the relative proportions, as only the most conspicuous of the Left members were affected, but no trial of strength had occurred since the Second National Congress in 1926, when out of 278 delegates, 168 belonged to the Left, 65 to the Centre, and 45 to the Right. Among the Left delegates there were also a score of Communist members, representing the 12,000 Communists in China.

The Left, the Communists, and Soviet Russia

A sharp distinction must be made between the Left and the Communists, who are often confused, especially by foreign observers. For a time, from January, 1924, until June, 1927, there was a close co-operation between the Left and the Communist Party, but it is important to realise that the Left at that time included many prominent members who were essentially Rightists, such as Tai Chi-T'ao, Hu Han-Min, together with Chiang K'ai-Shih, T'an Yen-K'ai, T. V. Sung, and a host of others who have no distinct political colour. And even during the period of intimate co-operation which lasted until April, 1927, there had never been a fusion, but merely an entente for certain definite purposes. Outwardly, there is a similarity of aim and methods between the Left and the Chinese Communist Party; they both want to overthrow foreign imperialism and feudal militarism in China through the awakening of the people. The similarity is, however, only

superficial. The anti-imperialism of the Kuo-Min Tang aims at securing for China national liberty and international equality and at assisting other oppressed peoples of the world to secure their emancipation from foreign domination. The Chinese Communist Party, however, aims at the substitution of Red domination for White Imperialism; instead of national self-determination it aims at the supremacy of the Communist International. China, or any other nation, is to be merely a pawn in the game of Moscow,—a pawn whose interests may be sacrificed, whenever communist tactics demand. The Kuo-Min Tang wants to live in peace with all other nations; it is anti-imperialistic in the sense that it desires the abolition of the Unequal Treaties and all other instruments which hamper Chinese national self-expression, but, as its published Manifestoes ever since its Tung Meng Hui days show, it is not anti-foreign as such. The Chinese Communist Party desires to involve China in as many international complications as possible, by inflicting injuries on foreign lives and properties, so as to prepare the atmosphere for a new world war. The Kuo-Min Tang will have none of these complications, being primarily interested in the salvation of the nation, and realising that armed conflict would only result in universal chaos and confusion. It relies for the realisation of its international programme on the awakened conscience of the enlightened West, on the abolition of secrecy inherent in traditional Chinese diplomacy, and on strengthening the nationalist spirit by the peaceful organisation of the masses. While not acknowledging the validity of the existing Unequal Treaties it proposes their total abolition by a proper procedure, similar to the course taken by Turkey in 1923 at the Lausanne Conference, only resorting to extreme measures, such as severance of economic relations in case of necessity. This is made clear in a declaration issued on January 22, 1927, by Eugen Ch'en on behalf of the National Government at Wuhan:

“ Effective protection of foreign lives and properties in

China can no longer rest on foreign bayonets and machine guns, as the 'weapon' of Chinese nationalism—the economic weapon—is thoroughgoing and more powerful than any warlike instrument at the disposal of the foreigner. . . . It is nevertheless the standpoint of the National Government that the liberation of China from the yoke of foreign imperialism should not necessarily take place through an armed conflict between Chinese Nationalism and the Foreign Powers. The National Government would prefer that all unsolved problems between National-Revolutionary China and the Foreign Powers be regulated by negotiation and agreement . . .

"In order to prove that this is no empty assertion, the National Government hereby declares its willingness to negotiate, separately with any of the Powers, on the basis of economic equality and mutual respect of the rights of political and territorial sovereignty, with a view to solving the question of the treaties and other matters.

"In spite of misleading reports, the new *status quo* in the British Concession at Hankow does not, in reality, mean a reversion to the attitude declared above. It categorically denies that the events which have led to the new *status quo*, in particular the wounding of several Chinese by bayonet strokes, two of them severely, were deliberately planned and contrived for the purpose of forcibly occupying the Concession.

"The extension of National-Revolutionary authority to the Concession was caused not so much by the in-march of armed Chinese forces (which took place with British consent), as by :

1. The landing of armed British marines under circumstances which inevitably must act as provocation, and which also brought about a bloody conflict with a Chinese civilian mass; and,
2. By the surrender of authority of the British Municipal Council . . . which led to the establishment of the present National Commission for the administration of the Concession . . ."

With regard to the very aim of the Revolution, there also exists a fundamental difference between the attitude of the Left and the Chinese Communist Party. The Kuo-Min Tang pursues a revolutionary policy because it wants to lead the people to a better political and economic order. The Chinese Communist Party sees in the Chinese Revolution merely a part of the World Revolution ; to the furtherance of the latter the existence and welfare of the Chinese People are merely incidental and secondary. The Left policy of awakening the Chinese masses is to make them understand the intimate relation between the revolutionary policy of the Kuo-Min Tang and national welfare, to secure to them their proper status in the Chinese social system. To the Communists, the awakening of the masses is merely a part of their policy of the intensifying of the class struggle. They deliberately fostered a policy of violent land seizures such as took place in May, 1927, in Hunan and Hupeh and of indiscriminate and senseless strikes, completely disregarding the paralysing effects on the entire economic life of the people, and endangering the very Revolution they professed to serve. For their real aim was not to co-operate with the genuinely revolutionary elements in China in furtherance of the interests of the people, but to work for the supremacy of their own Party which they realised was not possible in an atmosphere of social peace and prosperity. The realisation of the Left that the Chinese Communist Party instead of working for the success of the National Revolution on the basis of the Three People's Principles are actively striving to undermine the whole basis of the revolution, the welfare of the people,—in order to establish a spurious communism which is not only alien to the spirit of the Chinese people but also in contradiction with the domestic policy of the Soviet Government,—finally led to the split between the Left and the Communists and their active persecution.

In spite of the break between the Left and the Communist International, there is no essential change in the policy of the Left towards Soviet Russia as set down by

Sun Yat-Sen in 1924. To quote Wang Ching-Wei in a letter to the author written on September 2, 1929, "Dr Sun's aim was to establish an alliance between China and the nation which had finished its revolutionary work so that they might stand together in the fight against Imperialism. I still uphold this idea. Unfortunately Russia aimed at undermining and disintegrating the Kuo-Min Tang, working through the Chinese Communists. She did not want the Kuo-Min Tang to take charge of Chinese affairs alone. The resolution taken on December 10, 1927, deciding on the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia, was a matter of great regret. But the Kuo-Min Tang was forced to that action, in view of the fact that the Soviet Consulate at Canton had in effect become the military headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, which was aiming at the overthrow of the Kuo-Min Tang. From the revolutionary point of view, a friendly relationship between Russia and China, based on a revolutionary understanding, is greatly desired. But this relationship is only possible if Russia treats China and the Kuo-Min Tang as friends and equals, not as subordinate instruments. Ordinary diplomatic relations, based on ordinary international courtesy and on the principle of armed neutrality, can be resumed at any moment, but such a relationship is not of very great value. There is no particular reason why China should not resume such a relationship with Russia, for there are many Imperialist nations which have treated China badly, and China has nevertheless maintained relations with them. Why should China therefore break relations with Soviet Russia alone?"

Some Personalities of the Left

The leader of the Left is Wang Ching-Wei, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang and of its Councils in 1925-27. From the days of the Tung Meng Hui he was Sun Yat-Sen's most trusted friend and collaborator, being responsible for the most

important Manifestoes appearing under Sun's own name. His disinterestedness and devotion to the revolutionary cause, which made him refuse all offers to ministerial office during Sun's lifetime, and his personal popularity among all sections of the population, marks him out as Sun's successor, and was as such regarded by Sun himself during the latter days of his life. He himself did not, however, press his claims when it came to the choosing of Sun's successor as President of the Party, but proposed instead the putting into commission of Sun's high office. Having lived for a long time in France, and imbued with the ideas of the French Revolution, he is a thoroughgoing constitutionalist, believing in the rule of the majority even if in his opinion the majority has gone wrong. In contrast to Sun Yat-Sen, who always proclaimed his opinions first when presiding at a committee meeting, Wang always senses the opinion of the majority first, and only in case of disagreement tries by persuasion and argument to bring them to his own point of view, accepting defeat in a sportsmanlike way. His chief weakness is his excessive tolerance to political opponents, believing in the fundamental goodness of human nature. He has a slight tendency to compromise within certain limits, although he is not adverse in adopting radical measures, as is shown by his dealings with the Communists and Soviet authorities at Canton. As Wu Chih-Hui and Hu Han-Min, his former friends, are the embodiment of Old China, he is, in spite of his failings, the representative of the new generation in revolutionary China, being easily accessible to the humblest of the rank and file, and always eager to learn about new ideas and discuss new points of view. His wife, Ch'en Pi-Ch'ün, is also a prominent revolutionary in her own right, who married Wang shortly after his release from the Peking Civil Prison in 1911. Owing to his hold on the popular imagination, only second to that of Sun Yat-Sen, he has become the special target of the Communists, who see in him their most dangerous enemy, more dangerous than any reactionary politician or war-lord.

Another person of the Left who has a tremendous influence on the Chinese youth is Ch'en Kung-Po, the deputy-leader of the Left since the beginning of 1928, when Wang went abroad. He is a comparatively young man, unknown before 1920. In October, 1921, while a student in the National University at Peking, he joined the Chinese Communist Party, but resigned from it in June, 1922, disagreeing with their outlook and methods. He accompanied Liao Chung-K'ai and Joffe to Japan, and then proceeded to New York, taking a Ph.D. Course in economics and politics at Columbia University. On his return to China in 1925, just after Sun's death, he joined the Kuo-Min Tang and at once rose to high positions in the Party. He became Commissioner of Labour and Peasantry in the Kwangtung Provincial Government under Liao Chung-K'ai, Chief of the Political Training Department, and was for a time Chancellor of Kwangtung University. He was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee in 1926. Attacked by the Communists as siding with Wang Ching-Wei instead of with Chiang K'ai-Shih, he was, however, replaced by Teng Yen-Ta as the head of the Political Training Department. He served in the Wuhan Government as Commissioner of Labour and Finance. From October till December, 1927, he became jointly responsible with Chang Fa-K'uei for the affairs of Kwangtung. Driven out after the Communists' revolt on December 15, he left for Shanghai, and founded the *Revolutionary Critic*, a weekly paper which had a circulation of 30,000 copies, a stupendous figure for China. It was due to the influence which he wielded through this paper before it was suppressed in February, 1928, that he became the *de facto* leader of the Left in China. First regarded primarily as a man of action and a tactician, he has become still more prominent as a controversialist, being hated by the Right leaders, such as Wu Chih-Hui, even more than his chief Wang Ching-Wei. He was also the founder, with Wang Loh-P'ing, of *Ta Lu University*, Shanghai, which, in spite of great financial diffi-

culties, at once became a serious factor in Chinese education and politics. Thus the Nanking Ministry of Education offered it a Government subsidy and official recognition; so when for obvious reasons the offer was rejected, Chiang K'ai-Shih ordered the University to be closed in May, 1929.

Ch'en Kung-Po, however, is all brilliance. The serious thinker of the Left is Ku Meng-Yü, for a time Professor at the National University of Peking and the real leader of the Peking Students' Movement when Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei was Chancellor. He has served the Party and Government in many capacities, being Minister of Education in the Wuhan Government. He is the political philosopher of the Left, being the Editor of *The Forward March*, a monthly devoted to the discussion of doctrinal problems.

Chiang K'ai-Shih, and many of his most important Ministers, such as Sun Fo, K'ung Hsiang-Hsi, T. V. Sung, had also at some time or other belonged to the Left. The three latter formed part of the Wuhan administration until the formation of the Nanking Special Committee in September, 1927. Sun Fo was then Minister of Communications, K'ung Hsiang-Hsi Minister of Commerce and Industry, T. V. Sung Minister of Finance, in which posts they were highly successful. They owed their position, however, more to the fact of their relationship to Sun Yat-Sen than to their revolutionary convictions. On the formation of the Nanking Government in April, 1927, T. V. Sung resigned his post, being unwilling to side with Wang Ching-Wei against Chiang K'ai-Shih, or vice versa. During the time of the Special Committee he acted as Chiang's emissary to Wang, and with the reconstruction of the Nanking Government in February, 1928, he joined the administration as Minister of Finance in the place of Sun Fo, who had gone abroad with Hu Han-Min. T. V. Sung, especially after the marriage of his sister to Chiang K'ai-Shih, then became completely the tool of Chiang. In this he was different from his sister Madame Sun; he and Madame Sun had opposed the marriage strenuously, but whereas Madame Sun stuck to her political convic-

tions, he allowed them to change because of his new family connection with Chiang. Sun Fo on his return became Minister of Railways, and as such is principally occupied in trying to raise loans from America, ostensibly for industrial reconstruction, in reality to strengthen his own position.

In the Left Madame Sun Yat-Sen and Ch'en Yu-Jen (Eugen Ch'en) occupy a special position, as forming a group by themselves. After the split with the Communist Party in July, 1927, they left, for some unknown reason, together with Borodin for Russia. This move was rather puzzling to their colleagues, as they were known to be anti-Communists, and politically not in agreement with Borodin. They have no relations with the general organ of the Left, which, in view of the position they hold in popular esteem, is rather unfortunate. Madame Sun has since returned to China in May, 1929, to attend the State interment of her late husband, and seems to keep aloof from politics altogether. Eugen Ch'en is still living somewhere in France or Germany, although it seems certain that with the formation of a Left Government in China, he will resume his old post of Foreign Minister, a position in which he has achieved unique distinction.

There is further the group of Teng Yen-Ta, the so-called "Third Party". Teng Yen-Ta considers himself to the Left of the Left Kuo-Min Teng, but to the Right of the Communist Party. His group consists practically of former members of the Communist Party, who had retained the Communist ideology, although disapproving of the tactics of the Third International. Whereas the Left had completely broken with the Communists, the "Third Party" still favours co-operation with them. Having its headquarters in Berlin, its influence in China is negligible.

The "Christian" General

Feng Yü-Hsiang, the head of the Kuo-Min Chün (National People's Army) and known in the West as the

"Christian" General, may also be regarded as belonging to the Left. His association with the Kuo-Min Tang is much longer than is commonly supposed, dating from 1925. Feng is sympathetic to the general outlook of the Left, but being essentially a military man and a common villager of Northern China, he has no clear political conceptions, although possessing a remarkable political sense. Some time in 1917, for instance, he decided to become a Christian, and with him the whole army turned Christian. After his return from Moscow in September, 1926, he discarded his Christianity and turned all his men in one stroke into anti-Christians. At the present moment he uses as his Bible the San Min Chu I of Sun Yat-Sen. He possessed a remarkably good working knowledge of English, but prefers not to disclose this knowledge to foreigners, being afraid to lose the protective screen of the interpreter. He never discloses his intentions whenever a crisis arises, and the uncertainty of his attitude makes him a very difficult person to deal with or to rely upon, although the sincerity of his motives even when suddenly changing sides seems to be unquestionable. In contrast with many of the other armies in China, his troops are well disciplined and are not disliked by the common people. Feng is popular among his rank and file, whose frugal life he shares, eating the same food and wearing the same clothes as the common soldier. For this reason they owe him strict obedience and are willing to submit to hardships which are ordinarily unknown to the average mercenary soldier in China. A comparison of the scales of pay current in Feng's armies and those directly under the Nanking Government shows this. A private soldier under Feng gets from 4 to 10 dollars a month; in Chiang Ka'i-Shih's Army he gets from 10 to 18 dollars. A second-lieutenant or captain under Feng gets 10 dollars a month; in the National Army a second-lieutenant gets 45 dollars, a lieutenant 70 dollars, a captain 100 dollars. From major to colonel under Feng the salary is 20 dollars; in the National Army it is respectively 140, 180 and 240 dollars. The

grades from major-general to army commander under Feng get 30 dollars; in the National Army they get respectively 400, 600 and 800 dollars. Civilian officials of the same military rank under Feng get double the salary of their military colleague, which is still a pittance as compared to the salaries received by the National officials, which are about the same as in the army. There is no smoking, no drinking, no marriage for any officer below the age of 25 or below the rank of major; looting is invariably punished by execution. Obedience and character count for more to Feng than individuality and brilliance; frugality more than a harmonious life, although the latter is probably due to the extreme poverty of the provinces under his control. His soldiers are never idle; if not engaged in military operations, they are at work on road-building, vocational training or the like. Feng, often considered as the Chinese Oliver Cromwell, is, in spite of his radical utterances, the embodiment of the hard-working, conservative, but shrewd Chinese peasant, whose prejudices and outlook he shares.

The Betrayal of Chiang K'ai-Shih

From February, 1928, until April, 1929, the situation in China was dominated by the struggle for power between Chiang K'ai-Shih and the Kwangsi militarists (Li Tsung-Jen, Huang Shao-Hsiung, Li Chi-Tsen and Pai Ch'ung-Hsi, who were in control of the rich provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan and Hupeh). During this period the Left adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Chiang, under the slogan of "Co-operation between Wang and Chiang". The Kwangsi clique aimed at the restoration of the semi-feudal system of the pre-Kuo-Min Tang period and was responsible for the persecution and massacre of thousands of peasants, workers and students during the so-called Purification Movement in April, 1927, and after the Communist revolt of December, 1927; their elimination was, therefore, regarded by the Left as a *sine qua non* to the real unification of China.

The Left was given to understand by Chiang that in case of victory he would adopt the Leftist policy of democratic centralisation in the Party, and Government, which was not possible as long as the Kwangsi group was in power in Central and Southern China. The informal co-operation between the Left and Chiang went so far that for a time at the beginning of 1929 there was the possibility of a reconstruction of the Nanking Government on a Left basis. This would probably have been the best solution of the contemporary crisis, as it would have meant the restoration of Party authority over Governmental machinery which was then under the joint control of Chiang and the Kwangsi group. It would have meant the return of confidence in the National Government among the rank and file of the Kuo-Min Tang members, who were disappointed with both the domestic and foreign policy of the Nanking Government and who could find no method of expression of their political mind under the existing regime.

Unfortunately, Chiang had other ambitions. The return to power of the Left would have meant his relinquishing the post of Chairman of the Party Executive and of the Government, and its resumption by Wang Ching-Wei, his senior in the Party. Chiang aspired to the Presidency of the Party and of the Republic, to the undivided succession of Sun Yat-Sen's heritage, notwithstanding the fact that this heritage had been put into perpetual commission in June, 1925. As a first step to this end he made a matrimonial alliance with Sung Mei Ling, the sister of Madame Sun Yat-Sen, having to turn Christian and to dismiss his third wife in order to do so. For this marriage, which took place in December, 1927, he had hired the biggest hotel of Shanghai, the Majestic, inviting all the available foreign authorities (including the Commander of the British Expeditionary troops at Shanghai) and spending some hundred thousand dollars on the show. He had amassed a huge fortune during the Northern Expedition, which enabled him to buy up the

Central Kuo-Min Tang organisation, the Nanking Administration and, temporarily at least, secured for him the allegiance of several petty Militarists such as Liu Chih and Yang Sen of Szechuan, Ch'en Tiao-Yuan of Anhwei, Han Fu-Chü and Shih Yu-Shan, of Feng Yu-Hsiang's generals. Anticipating the realisation of his presidential ambitions he proceeded, on April 18, 1929, to issue a new postage stamp bearing his picture, an unprecedented step in the Kuo-Min Tang.

Meanwhile, Chiang had found another instrument in Hu Han-Min, the leader of the Right. Hu Han-Min was the political spokesman of the Kwangsi feudalists, but owing to his holding a position at Nanking as Chairman of the so-called Legislative Yuan, he was forced to make terms with Chiang, being afraid for his personal safety. It was realised that a National Congress of the Kuo-Min Tang was long overdue; the Second National Congress was held in 1926, and according to the Party Constitution, Congresses must be held annually, postponement being allowed only in case of emergency. The Northern Expedition was brought to a final close officially in June, 1928, and no further excuse of military necessity was, therefore, possible. But the difficulty was that, in spite of the Purification Movement inaugurated in April, 1927, and the appointment of Party Directors by the Central Party in the place of the elected Executive Committees, the majority of the Party branches were in favour of the return to power of the Left. By an ingenious method of re-registration affected by Hu Han-Min and Ch'en Kuo-Fu, the Chairman of the Organisation Department and a nephew of the late Ch'en Ch'i-Mei, and by disfranchising most of the Party branches, Chiang secured a Congress of "Delegates" in which 285 out of 360 delegates, or nearly 80 per cent, were appointed or "designated", being either Government officials or Chiang's own adherents. A great many of the delegates never had any connection with the branch they were supposed to represent. Many of the elected delegates were further not allowed to attend the

Congress, since they came from branches which were known to have Left sympathies. The "Third National Congress" was thus, in effect, a private secretariat of Chiang K'ai-Shih, who had meanwhile given himself the title of President of the National Government so as to create the impression that he was President of the Chinese Republic.

The "Congress", which met during the latter half of March, 1929, had, therefore, no moral authority whatsoever. Wang Ching-Wei, Ch'en Kung-Po, Ku Meng-Yü and eleven other prominent members of the Party in a Manifesto issued on March 12, 1929, denounced the Congress as illegal and farcical:

"It is most unfortunate that after the Northern Expedition is successfully concluded, the Party should suddenly sink into a state of deplorable decadence. The opportunists and the mandarins have made strong inroads into the Party in the meantime, and entrenched in strategic positions have reaped the benefits of the Revolution. The political power wrested from the Northern Militarists is held by no worthier personalities; the Revolution has effected nothing better than the substitution of one set of tyrants by another set of despots. The wishes, welfare and aspirations of the people do not any longer count; their freedom, life and property are in constant jeopardy. The lives of thousands of our comrades lost in the Revolution, the millions and millions of dollars, the sweat and blood of our poverty-stricken people spent in the Expedition, have only contributed to the welfare of the wily few, well versed in the dubious art of political intrigue. . . .

"Amidst the general disappointment and simmering discontent of the people, we are hoping against hope that the present period may just be an interregnum of temporary relapse, and that with the calling of the Third National Congress the will of the people may have an opportunity of exerting itself again. But the election procedure that has been adopted by the Central Party

Headquarters only indicates the continued employment of the mandarin-militarist tactics in Party affairs. . . . Our Party protested against the Rehabilitation Conference of Tuan Ch'í-Jui, because it was bossed by a handful of mandarins and Militarists. Now that the Third National Congress is called in exactly the same arbitrary manner, how are we going to explain ourselves to the world ?

“The usurping authorities, of course, try to justify their manipulative tactics on the ground that if a free and open election were permitted, the Communists were bound to rush in. This defence is in itself an accusation, for is it not a patent fact that the Communists would never have had a chance to implant themselves among us, if our mandarins and Militarists had not prepared the way for them ? It is a tragic irony that our authorities are adopting the same tactics as those of the Northern Militarists to suppress all popular movements under the pretext of guarding the country from the peril of Communism . . .

“Our hope to restore the Party to its popular basis by the machinery of the Third National Congress is destroyed. For the delegates to the Congress are not the representatives of the people, but merely hirelings in the service of the Central Authorities. We hereby protest on behalf of the members of the Party against this most treasonable act against the Party. We pledge our lives in defence of the Party and the Revolution in their most critical and dangerous stage.”

Not only the Left, but practically everyone not directly interested in the Nanking Administration protested against the manipulation of the Congress. Feng Yü-Hsiang, who was Minister of War from August, 1928, resigned his offices, and withdrew his representatives from Nanking. Even the Kwangsi Militarists protested, but they were actuated by personal motives rather than by questions of principle.

Having in fact made the Central Kuo-Min Tang organisation his private chancery, Chiang K'ai-Shih pro-

ceeded to make a secret alliance with Japan for the purpose of strengthening his position against Feng Yü-Hsiang, his most serious military rival at that time. Japan had, in contravention of international law, occupied, in April, 1928, the province of Shangtung, but after a series of bargaining Japan had agreed, under an agreement in March, 1929, to begin the evacuation of Shangtung on April 17, 1929. Already the Japanese Government had taken steps to this effect, when suddenly, on April 12, Chiang through his Foreign Minister, C. T. Wang, requested them to remain in Shangtung for the time being. The reason given was the inability of the Chinese Government to assume, under the existing circumstances, the responsibility for the protection of foreign lives and properties in Shangtung. This was patently untrue, as Feng Yü-Hsiang had some 40,000 of his best troops ready to assume control of the province. The real reason was that at the Disarmament Conference in January, 1929, Shangtung had been assigned to Feng, but as Chiang was at that time engaged in a military campaign against the Kwangsi group, the occupation of Shangtung by Feng would mean a menace to his rear. The request of a Government to a foreign Power for the prolongation of the occupation of one of its provinces by the latter is, of course, unprecedented in modern history, amounting to a voluntary declaration of moral and political bankruptcy. Chiang, driven by his lust for power, perhaps did not realise that his request meant a confession of inability to govern—a confession which governments have hitherto made only as a result of defeat in war. Yuan Shih-K'ai, Tuan Ch'i-Jui, Chang Tso-Lin, had never resorted to that device, however anti-national they had otherwise been in their policy. Chang Tso-Lin, commonly regarded as a national traitor, even went so far as to protest, in the beginning of 1928, against the despatch, by the British Government, of the Shanghai Defence Force, which he knew would be to his advantage.

Corruption and Reaction

To the casual observer the reconstruction of the National Government at Nanking in October, 1928, its *de jure* recognition by the Great Powers, the entry of Manchuria into the Nanking system, and the successful campaign of Chiang K'ai-Shih against the Kwangsi Militarists bid fair to inaugurate a new era in distracted China. One may point to the series of reforms which were undertaken in every sphere of national life. There were the National Conferences on Education, on Economic Reconstruction, on Financial Rehabilitation, on Military Reorganisation and Disbandment; the establishment of the Budget Commission, of the National Opium Suppression Commission. Externally, the foreign Powers have recognised, by a series of treaties in 1928, China's claim to Tariff Autonomy, while further baits are held out as a reward for good behaviour. Famous American economists, such as Professor Kemmerer and Professor Seligman, famous German staff officers, famous British political experts like Sir Frederick Whyte, have been appointed to advisory posts at Nanking, while two American architects have been engaged at a salary of 200,000 gold dollars per annum to modernise the new capital at Nanking. China, in the eyes of international law, is unified again, and friendly relations have been established with Great Britain and even with her traditional enemy, Japan. The National Revolution seems at last to have obtained its objective, the restoration of China's National Sovereignty and Independence.

A realistic study of the Chinese situation, however, reveals a different and disappointing picture. The treaties concluded in 1928 by T. V. Sung and C. T. Wang are "equal" only in name, not in substance. The Tariff Autonomy is recognised, but an unconditional most-favoured-nation clause inserted in the Tariff Treaties perpetuates the system of bargaining in the matter of the tariff schedules. China is in fact still as far removed from absolute fiscal independence as in 1922 at the time

of the Washington Conferences. Meanwhile, in order to obtain the Japanese consent to the new tariff schedule, which cannot be made operative owing to the most-favoured-nation clause in the newly concluded treaties, the Nanking Government has been obliged to recognise, if only in principle, the unsecured foreign (chiefly Japanese) loans contracted by past military cliques, the repudiation of which, because of their unquestionable nature, is one of the principal planks in the Kuo-Min Tang programme. There is the land clause contained in the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1928 whereby, in the event of Belgium giving up the extraterritorial privileges—which she lost in 1926 under Chang Tso-Lin and which were restored to her by Chiang K'ai-Shih—China would concede to Belgium, and *ipso facto* to other most-favoured-nation Powers, the right to purchase land in the interior of China, on the ground that Chinese subjects already had the right of land ownership in Belgium. This concession to Belgium is of the greatest importance, reversing an established practice in China several thousand years old. It is, however, without any counter-concession on the part of Belgium, and in view of the peculiar economic conditions of the country, may in time reduce China to the status of an economic colony of the Great Powers, to a second Korea, Cuba or Nicaragua. It must be noted that in certain colonial possessions, notably in Java, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the economically backward natives, no one who is not a native, even if belonging to the governing race, is allowed to own land, except in a few specific cases.

In this background it is clear that the mandate of the Nanking Government of December 28, 1929, declaring as from January 1, 1930, the abolition of extraterritoriality in China, has as little connection with the re-establishment of Chinese sovereignty as the "war to end war" with the establishment of world peace and democracy. It is but another step in the direction of tightening the fetters of capitalist Imperialism on China. For extra-

territoriality, except in Shanghai and one or two other Treaty Ports, has in practice become obsolete and non-existent ; it is derogatory to Chinese national dignity and for this reason must be abolished, but actually it is of little practical value to the foreigner. Its formal abolition in the existing circumstances will automatically give the right of landownership to foreigners in China. The foreign capitalist, formerly restricted to the Treaty Ports, exploiting cheap Chinese labour, is now to be allowed to prey upon the peasantry in the interior also. The problem for New China is not the substitution of extraterritoriality by a new, and worse, form of bondage, but the simple and unconditional abolition of all restrictions in the life of the Chinese masses, while giving adequate protection to legitimate foreign interests. And to attain this objective the revision of the treaties concluded by the Nanking oligarchy in 1928-29 is a *sine qua non*.

There is the much-heralded Five-Yuan governmental system, providing for the five independent departments of State (Executive, Legislative, Supervisory, Judicial, Examinatory), and stated by Hu Han-Min, who, with Sun Fo, is its originator, to be "without parallel in the history of the world". On examination this system proves to be only a counter-revolutionary measure devised to meet political exigencies created in September, 1928, by the return of Hu Han-Min and Sun Fo and by the necessity of providing for greater political representation of the Kwangsi group. It has as little to do with Sun Yat-Sen's scheme as contained in the *Programme of National Reconstruction* (the basic constitution of Revolutionary China) as the system devised by Yuan Shih-K'ai in 1913-15 has to do with Republican Democracy. Sun Yat-Sen intended the Five-Yuan system for the last of the three periods of political development, the period of Constitutionalism. In September, 1928, China had barely passed from the phase of military government into the period of tutelage, for which Sun Yat-Sen described government by Party dictatorship. For the

Five-Yuan system is to operate in conjunction with the Four People's Rights (franchise, recall, referendum, initiative), and for this Sun Yat-Sen realised that the Chinese people were not ripe. As early as 1912 he wanted to carry through his idea of government by the Party, and was opposed to the promulgation of a Constitution. The majority of his followers, however, were opportunists and did not understand his ideas. They were clamouring for office, and led by Huang-Hsing and Sun Ch'iao-Jen, they overruled him. Sun Yat-Sen thereupon, in disgust, resigned the Presidency to Yuan Shih-K'ai, but that he was right was proved by the chaos into which China subsequently fell. The introduction of the Five-Yuan system at a time when feudal Militarism in China is not yet completely rooted out is, therefore, merely deliberately repeating the mistakes of 1912, apart from its unconstitutionality in the light of the *Programme of National Reconstruction*.

Corruption and nepotism are so rampant in Nanking that the Nanking oligarchy has become the laughing-stock of all politically informed people. For while the Capital has been removed from Peip'ing (Peking) the spirit prevailing in the new one is the same, as the corrupt mandarinat of Peip'ing has been transferred wholesale to Nanking. The Manchurian Militarists, whose extermination was aimed at by the Northern Expedition, have been admitted into the oligarchy. Pardons are granted freely to political criminals and declared national traitors, such as Liang Shih-Yi, Wellington Koo, Hsü Yuan-Chuan, Wang Keh-Min; officials dismissed by previous National Governments on account of corruption and intriguing, such as Ch'en Chao-Ying, Wu T'ieh-Ch'eng, and even Hu I-Sheng, were reinstated or even promoted. Wei Tao-Ming, an insignificant student of law, was made Minister of Justice solely on the recommendation of Li Shih-Ts'eng, one of the Elder Statesmen. On the other hand, active revolutionaries and honest administrators have no place in the Government. Nearly

all those who were responsible for the success of the Northern Expedition are now out of office or in hiding. Wang King-Ky, formerly Minister to Belgium and one of China's ablest diplomats, was dismissed on account of his opposition to the selling of China's birthright by the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1928. He made place for a relative of C. C. Wu, Fu Ping-Hsiang, whom it took the present writer some half an hour to explain the difference between the Communist Party of Great Britain and His British Majesty's Opposition in Parliament.

Within a fortnight of the inauguration of the National Opium Suppression Commission (on November 24, 1928) a cargo load of opium, said to be sufficient for the whole legitimate opium consumption of China for two years, was discovered at Shanghai in the *Kiangnan*, a river steamer coming from Wuhan, which at the time was under the control of the Kwangsi clique. This opium was to be sold in the French Concession by the Commandant of the Shanghai garrison, who was a Kwangsi nominee, and the proceeds to be turned into arms and munitions. For while Nanking was preparing for the Military Reorganisation and Disbandment Conference, which actually met the following January, the Kwangsi clique was busy preparing for war. The significant thing about the *Kiangnan* case was that the Chief of the Shanghai Police, who had brought the case to the attention of the Nanking Government, instead of being commended for vigilance, was suddenly and summarily dismissed. Public opinion, not without reason, became incensed at the attitude of Chiang K'ai-Shih. Feng Yü-Hsiang, who was then at Nanking, demanded the truth and the punishment of the guilty. A Commission of Inquiry under his own lieutenant, Chang Chi-Kiang, was sent to Shanghai. The case was investigated *in camera*. After a few sittings, however, Chang Chi-Kiang, the Chairman, suddenly resigned, and Feng became silent. The evidence, which was never published, seemed to show that so many people in high office at Nanking and in the

provinces, including Finance Minister Sung, were implicated in some form or another in the affair, that publication of the truth and punishment of the guilty would cause immediately a political and military crisis of the first importance. Scapegoats were, therefore, found.

In the economic sphere the declared aim of the Chinese Revolution is the promotion of the people's welfare. The Manifesto of the First National Congress emphasises the necessity of providing measures for the protection of the interests of the peasants and workers. A major Kuo-Min Tang Conference in October, 1926, gave the peasants and workers the right to form peasant unions and labour organisations, with the right to strike. The former were also allowed to organise volunteer corps for the purpose of self-defence. Land rents in the Kuo-Min Tang territories were reduced by 25 per cent. With the coming into power of the Kwangsi clique in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan and Hupeh, at the beginning of 1928, this land policy was discontinued. Chiang K'ai-Shih, in order to please the landlords in his own provinces, followed suit. In November, 1928, the policy was formally withdrawn in Kiangsi; in April, 1929, in Chekiang, in spite of the vehement protests of the provincial Kuo-Min Tang organisations. The rights to strike and to organise are in abeyance, and active persecution of the trade union leaders is the order of the day. As Chiang K'ai-Shih declared in a press interview in March, 1929, "All peasants and workers under the jurisdiction of the Kuo-Min Tang are enjoying the protection of the Kuo-Min Tang, but at present we do not fear for the oppression of the peasants and workers by the landlords and capitalists, but rather the reverse." In view of this statement it might be inferred that Chiang's policy (for the Nanking Government is Chiang K'ai-Shih and his entourage) is the promotion of the welfare of the business community in China. The facts, however, indicate a different state of affairs. On March 25, 1929, the *Shun Pao*, the leading Shanghai paper, complained about the fact that in Hang-

chow, in Chekiang, the tax on finished silk had been increased from 100,000 dollars per annum under Sun Chuan-Fang, to over 566,800 dollars in 1928, with corresponding increases in other taxes, and the result was that thirty silk factories had gone bankrupt. The Chinese National Chamber of Commerce in the same month published a statement in which it declared that while the onerous *likin* duties had been nominally abolished in five provinces, a Special Consumption Tax, far more onerous and daily increasing in rate and scope, has taken its place, in spite of the increased receipts from the new tariff schedules. "To squeeze is the aim, and to oppress the method. Everywhere people are groaning and suffering in silence," the statement laments. In addition to the new taxes, bonds were issued, which from May, 1927, to December, 1929, amounted to over 400 million dollars, but how the proceeds of those bonds were utilised has always been a public mystery.

The Outlook

In March, 1929, the Kwangsi Militarists openly challenged the authority of the Nanking regime as personified by Chiang K'ai-Shih. Owing to their universal unpopularity and their lack of any defined principles, Chiang was able to inflict upon them a series of decisive defeats in a campaign which lasted only three months. Threatened by Feng Yü-Hsiang in June, 1929, after his victory over the Kwangsi group, he managed to buy over, temporarily, two of Feng's important generals, Han Fu-Chü and Shih Yu-Shan, thus double-crossing Feng and averting a new civil struggle in China. His method of pacifying and unifying China by way of establishing a military dictatorship and by bribing numerous petty mandarins and Militarists seemed to have led to success.

A closer examination of the situation, however, shows how utterly unstable is the position of Chiang, and, therefore, of the Nanking Government. Militarily, Chiang owed his swift success against the Kwangsi group not to

his own military superiority, but to the fact that the Left armies under Chang Fa-K'uei, the famous commander of the Ironsides, Chu Pei-Teh and T'ang Sheng-Chih, were co-operating with him, and had, in fact, done most of the fighting. The Kwangsi Militarists were their bitter enemies ever since December, 1927, and they, therefore, gladly served under Chiang to take their revenge. There was a general antipathy to the Kwangsi group, owing to their repression of popular movements during their period of power, and hence their speedy collapse.

In attempting to overthrow Feng Yü-Hsiang, Chiang tried also to use the Left armies and public opinion against him, but here he failed. The Left forces did not actively support him, and public opinion was sceptical about the sincerity of his motives, not being able to explain away Chiang's open surrender to Japanese Imperialism in April, 1929. He then had the alternatives of either bringing over Yen Hsi-Shan, the so-called Model Governor of Shansi, to his side, or bribing over Feng's forces. Yen's chief desire, however, was to be allowed to govern his province in peace and to be left alone; considering Chiang's doubtful friendship to be of less import than Feng's active enmity, he preferred to ally himself with Feng, adopting a negative policy towards Chiang. He did not want to risk an invasion of his province by the much superior troops of Feng, and be left in the lurch by Chiang. Hence, when Feng announced his intention to go abroad for the sake of peace in China, Yen begged to be allowed to travel with him. The result was, of course, that both remained where they were. Moreover, owing to Yen's support, Feng was able to dictate to Chiang his own conditions of peace, and managed to blackmail Chiang for some three million dollars to pay off the arrears of his troops' wages.

The Left armies were further merely awaiting a suitable opportunity to rise against Chiang. They might have done it already during the campaign against the Kwangsi group, but apart from their desire for revenge, they were

between two fires, having in front of them the Kwangsi troops and at the rear Chiang's own troops.

In the political sphere Chiang's position is still more precarious. People are tired of attempted dictatorships. They have the example of Yuan Shih-K'ai before them, whose monarchical ambitions were responsible for the eighteen years of chaos into which China had been plunged. A distinction must be made between the Central Kuo-Min Tang organisation, which is Chiang's private secretariat, and the Party itself, consisting of the local branches, accepting, on the whole, the direction of the Left. This was manifest when on May 20, 1929, one month after the so-called Third National Congress, fifteen out of the eighteen provincial branches issued a joint declaration, denouncing the illegality of the Congress. Significantly, the majority of the branch officers were formerly Chiang's own supporters.

Feeling himself isolated, Chiang in a desperate attempt to regain his popularity and to divert popular animosity against him, thus resorted to the favourite device of making trouble with a foreign Power. He knew that Chang Hsueh-Liang, his Manchurian confrère, had designs on the Chinese Eastern Railway which, according to the Sino-Russian Agreement of 1924, was under joint Sino-Soviet control and management. When after a Conference at Peip'ing in July, 1929, the understanding between Yen and Feng became apparent, he immediately encouraged Chang to seize the Railway, using the pretext that the Soviet Railway Authorities had been indulging in Communist propaganda. He knew that Russia could not afford a foreign war just for the purpose of defending her economic interests, and he had the example of the Arcos Raid in London before him. In the event of Russia making real trouble, however, the North, i.e. Chang Hsueh-Liang, Yen Hsi-Shan and Feng Yü-Hsiang, would have to face the Russian incursion first. He could further mobilise all the troops of doubtful loyalty, namely those of the Left to the front, leaving him secure

in the South. It would be the North who would suffer first, while he could consolidate his power in the South. He had also hoped to flatter America and Japan by his anti-Soviet move, and perhaps to get financial assistance from them. In this, however, he made a grave error of judgment, as neither America nor Japan could look with equanimity upon the arbitrary seizure of the Railway, even if Red Russia were the sufferer, for their turn might come next. Chiang had, therefore, no alternative but to draw back and yield to the Russian demand of restoring the *status quo ante*, making himself thereby utterly ridiculous and discrediting the entire Chinese people in the eyes of enlightened opinion abroad.

During the actual war between Chiang K'ai-Shih and the Kwangsi Militarists, the civilian leaders of the Left took no part. They had aimed for nearly two years at the overthrow of the Kwangsi reactionaries, but they did not want to give Chiang an opportunity of exploiting the political prestige of the Left to consolidate his own power. They, therefore, kept themselves aloof, and on May 20, 1929, they issued a declaration in the *Public Voice*, the only remaining Left organ in China, of which the following is an extract :

" We have repeatedly declared in the past that the existing feudalistic system of government would ultimately develop into a ceaseless guerrilla warfare between the principal Militarists. Unfortunately, our prophecies have proved correct, for the guerrilla warfare has already started . . .

" In deciding whether the belligerent troops are our enemies or our friends, the masses should be guided by their declarations and their actions. The troops which in their declaration approve of democracy, and in their actions do nothing to obstruct the welfare of the masses, but actively assist the masses in organising themselves politically, socially and economically, are our friends. Otherwise, they are our enemies . . .

" The Militarists regard the present guerrilla warfare as

affording a good opportunity to increase their spheres of influence, while we regard it as a good opportunity to further the democratic cause. But the Party representing the democratic and revolutionary forces must have its independent advocations and actions. It must not rely on any Militarist, nor support one Militarist to overthrow the other, but create its independent democratic and revolutionary army."

In spite of the strict censorship of the Press under Chiang K'ai-Shih, this statement by the Left gained a wide currency among the people and among the rank and file of the Nanking armies. The number of officers who, tired of the incessant warfare caused by the greed of their superiors, had signified their adherence to the Left, grew bigger and bigger. Even among the closest followers of Chiang himself, confidence in him was shaken, as was shown by the attempt on his life, on August 29, 1929, by the most trusted members of his bodyguard, who appeared to have been bribed by Ho Ying-Ch'ing, his right hand ever since the establishment of the Whangpoa Military Academy.

Chiang K'ai-Shih's Government, politically discredited and militarily disunited, attempting to maintain its power by means of a military dictatorship and by risking a senseless foreign war, is bound sooner or later to be overthrown. To co-ordinate the activities against Chiang, a Correspondence Bureau was established by the Central Executive Committee of the Second National Congress, ready to form a new National Government as soon as a stronghold was obtained. On September 17, 1929, Chang Fa-K'uei, acting under instructions of the Correspondence Bureau, thus issued a Manifesto declaring war on Chiang K'ai-Shih. In this he denounced the Third National Congress as illegal; charged Chiang with deliberately provoking the Russian crisis for the furtherance of his own ambitions; demanded the calling of a new Congress based on a free and open election; insisted upon the expulsion of corrupt officials and the restoration

of Wang Ching-Wei and his colleagues to power, and, finally, the renewal of the campaign against Imperialism, both "Red" and "White". This became the sign of the general revolt against Chiang. Chang Fa-K'uei, joined by several Kwangsi generals of Left affiliation, marched southward with a view to capturing the province of Kwangtung and enabling Wang Ching-Wei and his colleagues to form a new Government at Canton, while in the North Feng Yü-Hsiang—who was subsequently joined by T'ang Sheng-Chih and others—carried on the campaign against Wuhan. Han Fu-Chü and Shih Yu-Shan forswore their temporary allegiance to Nanking and put themselves at the disposal of the Left, while Yen Hsi-Shan, in spite of the many tempting offers from Nanking, maintained a benevolent neutrality towards the insurgent forces.

Owing to the superior financial resources and better technical equipment of the Nanking Government, Chang Fa-K'uei's epic drive against Canton in the beginning of December, 1929, ended, contrary to expectations and only after many pitched battles against tremendous odds, in failure. In view of the lack of a proper co-ordination the Northern campaign met with the same fate a few weeks after.

But in spite of this temporary reverse Chiang K'ai-Shih and his Government are doomed. Already his subordinate generals are carrying on all kinds of intrigues to oust him from power. In the attempt to break the resistance of the Left leaders, Chiang K'ai-Shih has successively tried the expedient of bribery and corruption, purging the official Kuo-Min Tang branches, dissolving bona-fide mass organisations, and, finally, the issue of wholesale orders of arrest. Most of the wanted leaders, however, have found refuge in foreign controlled territories and cannot be reached through the ordinary channels. The Hongkong authorities, e.g., in December, 1929, flatly refused their extradition, although, in order to appease the wrath of the Nanking oligarchy,

restrictions were imposed on anti-Chiang propaganda, while anti-Left propaganda was allowed free play. Thus the aid of a notorious kidnapping gang was invoked which, on February 18, 1930, caused the assassination, in the French Concession of Shanghai, of Wang Loh-P'ing, the chief of the Shanghai Headquarters of the Left, and of Po Ching-King, who had great influence among the Whangpoa cadets. That Chiang K'ai-Shih should have had to resort to the dastardly method of assassination clearly indicates the precariousness of his position. The Left, conscious of its revolutionary mission, will never accept defeat, but in the spirit of Sun Yat-Sen it is bound to take the first opportunity to strike again. Chiang's downfall is a matter of universal expectation, and the difficulty of the Left will not be so much the overthrow of Chiang as the lifting of the Party and Nation from the morass into which he has allowed it to fall. As during the Northern Expedition, the Left might again be compelled, by force of circumstances, to rely upon the support of discontented military commanders in the Nanking armies, whose adherence to the Left could not be regarded as other than a matter of expediency. The immediate prospects in China give, therefore, no reason for undue optimism. A new period of civil disturbances is in sight which can only be ended by a decisive victory of the Left. But looking on events in proper historical perspective, there is no cause for despair. For if recent revolutionary history in China has taught us anything, it is the irresistibility of the democratic tide and the power of enlightened public opinion which cannot be exasperated indefinitely with impunity.

The National Revolution is as yet unfinished, but it should be realised that it did not start in earnest until after the Reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang in 1924. Where countries in a more favoured position, such as France and America, had taken about a century to settle down, it is unreasonable to expect that China—as big

as, and with a population more numerous than, Europe—could get over her period of transition in a decade or so. National-Revolutionary propaganda among the peasants, workers and soldiers was only made possible by the spread of popular education which, in spite of nearly two decades of political chaos and practically no Government assistance, increased the literacy average from 1 per cent. in 1910 to 15 per cent. in 1928, rising to 50 per cent. in some provinces. Moral casualties occur in every revolutionary movement, but the meaning of the National Revolution is gradually being realised by the masses, and the betrayal of the Three People's Principles by the mandarins and the militarists will therefore have only a passing effect. Moreover, in China the acknowledged leaders of the people are the intellectuals, the depositaries of revolutionary tradition. The progressive industrialisation of the country is everywhere breaking down the spirit of provincialism and parochialism, and if feudal militarism and foreign privilege still reign supreme in China, the new social and political consciousness among all classes of the people has sounded their death-knell.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

- 221-264.** The Three Kingdoms. Liu Pei founded the first secret society in China.
- 1368.** Foundation of the Ming Dynasty by Chu Hung-Wu.
- 1644.** China submitted to the Manchus: the Ch'ing Dynasty.
- 1842.** August 29. Treaty of Nanking (with Great Britain) ending the First Opium War. Cession of Hongkong. China lost her Tariff Autonomy. The Treaty Ports. Extraterritoriality.
- 1844.** October 24. Treaty of Whampoa (with France). Christian missionaries obtained a footing in China.
- 1850.** Hung Hsiu-Chuan proclaimed the T'ai-P'ing Empire.
- 1858.** June 26. Treaty of Tientsin ending, nominally, the First Missionary and Second Opium Wars. Legalisation of the Opium Trade.
- 1860.** October 6. Destruction of the Summer Palace at Peking by Anglo-French forces.
October 24 and 25. The Conventions of Peking, ratifying the Treaty of Tientsin. Père Delamarre's fraud.
- 1865.** July. Collapse of the T'ai-P'ing Rebellion.
- 1866.** November 12. Birth of Sun Yat-Sen.
- 1879-84.** Sun Yat-Sen in Honolulu.
- 1886.** Sun Yat-Sen a member of the Ko-Lao Hui.
- 1892.** Sun Yat-Sen obtained his medical degree in Hongkong.
- 1894.** Foundation of the *Hsin-Chung Hui*.
Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.
- 1895.** April 17. Treaty of Shimonoseki making possible the erection of foreign factories in China, the products of which to enjoy the same privileges and exemptions in respect of inland transit and internal taxes as imported merchandise.
September 9. Sun Yat-Sen's first attempt on Canton.
- 1896.** October 11-21. Sun Yat-Sen imprisoned in the Chinese Legation in London.
- 1898.** June 11 to September 20. The Hundred Days.
- 1899.** Amalgamation of the Hsin-Chung Hui with several Hung Societies in South China. Sun Yat-Sen elected leader of the combination.
Beginning of the Boxer Movement.
- 1900.** Sun Yat-Sen's second attempt on Canton. Execution of Yamada.
- 1901.** September 7. The Boxer Protocol.
- 1903.** December 3. The *Su Pao* case.
- 1904.** Sun Yat-Sen published, in Honolulu, *The True Solution of the Chinese Question*, advocating the establishment of the Chinese Republic.
- 1905.** September. Foundation of the *Tung-Meng Hui* with Sun Yat-Sen as President.
October 15. Wu Yueh threw a bomb at the Tsai Tso diplomatic mission.

1906. January. First Issue of the *Min Pao*.
The defeat at P'ing-Li: the Special Committee.
- 1907-1909. Insurrections at Ch'aochou, Huichou, Tsin-Lin-Chou, Chen-Nan-Kuan, and Hok'ou.
1907. January 16. Sun Yat-Sen's address on the Three People's Principles at the anniversary of the *Min Pao*.
July. Hsü Hsi-Lin shot the Governor of Anhui province.
Decapitation of Madame Ch'iu Ch'in.
October. Chang T'ai-Yen and Chang Chi's manifesto repudiating Sun Yat-Sen's leadership.
1908. Suspension of the *Min Pao* and closing down of the League's Headquarters at Tokio.
The Rights' Recovery Movement.
1909. Wang Ching-Wei published the last two issues of the *Min Pao*.
1910. March 28. Wang Ching-Wei's attempt on the life of the Prince Regent.
April 16. Wang Ching-Wei arrested and condemned to life imprisonment.
1911. The Insurrection of March 29th (i.e. April 27th); the 72 revolutionary martyrs.
October 10. Outbreak of the Republican Revolution. Fall of Wuch'ang.
November 6. Wang Ching-Wei released.
December 3. Nanking captured by Huang Hsing. The National Convention.
December 20. Opening of the Peace Conference at Shanghai.
December 25. Sun Yat-Sen arrived at Shanghai and offered the Provisional Presidency of the Chinese Republic.
1912. January 1. Sun Yat-Sen assumed office at Nanking. Adoption of the solar calendar.
February 12. The Abdication Edicts.
February 14. Sun Yat-Sen tendered his resignation, recommending Yuan Shih-K'ai as his successor.
February 29. Yuan Shih-K'ai ordered Ts'ao K'un to loot Peking.
March 3. The Tung-Meng Hui reorganised as an open political party.
March 7. The National Convention agreed to retaining Peking as the national Capital.
March 10. Promulgation of the Provisional Constitution.
Yuan Shih-K'ai took the oath of office.
August 15. Murder of Chang Cheng-Wu.
August 23. The Tung Meng Hui amalgamated with five other political groups into the Kuo-Min Tang.
1913. March 21. Assassination of Sung Ch'iao-Jen.
April 27. Signing of the "Reorganisation" Loan Agreement.
July 10. First Punitive Expedition against Yuan Shih-K'ai.
November 4. Yuan Shih-K'ai dissolved the Kuo-Min Tang.
Sun Yat-Sen replied by organising the *Chung-Hua Ko-Min Tang*, the Chinese Revolutionary Party.
1914. May 1. Promulgation of the Constitutional Compact.
1915. January 18. The Twenty-One Demands presented to Yuan Shih-K'ai with a hint at a possible "promotion."
May 7. The Japanese Ultimatum.
May 25. Yuan Shih-K'ai acceded to the Japanese demands.
October 25. Marriage of Sun Yat-Sen to Sung Ch'ing Ling.
December 11. Yuan Shih-K'ai proclaimed himself Emperor.
Second Punitive Expedition against Yuan Shih-K'ai.

1916. March 22. Yuan Shih-K'ai renounced the Throne.
 June 6. Death of Yuan Shih-K'ai.
 Li Yuan-Hung succeeded to the Presidency, restored the 1912 Constitution, and reconvoed the 1913 Parliament.
1917. March 14. Parliament voted the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany.
 May. Eugen Ch'en disclosed Tuan Ch'i-Jui's secret negotiations with the Japanese War Office. The Nishihara Loans.
 May 29. Revolt of the Tuchüns.
 June 13. Li Yuan-Hung dissolved Parliament.
 July 1-12. The Second Manchu Dynasty.
 July 13. Resignation of Li Yuan-Hung. Feng Kuo-Chang President.
 July 25. Special Parliament (Canton) elected Sun Yat-Sen Generalissimo, T'ang Chi-Yao and Lu Yung-T'ing Vice-Generalissimi.
 August 14. The Chi-Pu Tang Parliament at Peking declared war on the Central Powers.
 October 7. Sun Yat-Sen's proclamation declaring Feng Kuo-Chang and his clique traitors to the country. The First Northern Expedition.
1918. May. Special Parliament abolished office of Generalissimo and instituted Directorate. Sun Yat-Sen left Canton for Shanghai.
 September 4. Feng Kuo-Chang replaced by Hsü Shih-Ch'ang.
 November 17. Cessation of hostilities between North and South.
1919. February. Peace Conference at Shanghai.
 May 4. Disappointment over Versailles Treaty. Anti-Japanese Movement.
- 1919-1920. Inauguration of the period of private wars in China. The Anfu oligarchy at Peking.
1920. April. Sun Yat-Sen established a new Government at Canton.
 July 18. Tuan Ch'i-Jui defeated at Paotingfu by the Chihli militarists. Tuan made peace with Sun Yat-Sen. The Triple Alliance.
 October. Sun Yat-Sen defeated Lu Yung-T'ing and regained control over Kwangtung.
 September 27. Karahan renounced the Russian privileges in China.
 November. The Chung-Hua Ko-Min Tang revived and reorganised as *Chung-Kuo Kuo-Min Tang*.
1921. April 6. Special Parliament elected Sun Yat-Sen President of the Chinese Republic.
 August. Lu Yung-T'ing decisively beaten. Reconstruction of Kwangtung province made possible.
1922. June 4. Wu Pei-Fu expelled Hsü Shih-Ch'ang from the Presidency.
 June 6. Sun Yat-Sen denounced Wu Pei-Fu as a common militarist.
 June 11. Wu Pei-Fu reinstated Li Yuan-Hung in the Presidency.
 June 13. Li Yuan-Hung restored the 1913 Parliament.
 June 14. Ts'ai Yuan-P'ei urged Sun Yat-Sen to submit to Li Yuan-Hung and Wu Pei-Fu.
 June 16. Revolt of Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming. Sun Yat-Sen's flight from Canton.
 August 16. Sun Yat-Sen's manifesto explaining the reasons of his defeat.

1923. January 26. Joint Manifesto by Sun Yat-Sen and Joffe. Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming defeated. Sun Yat-Sen regained control of Kwangtung.
 February 7. Wu Pei-Fu's massacre of railwayworkers.
 March. Liao Chung-K'ai reported on his conversations with Joffe.
 June 13. Li Yuan-Hung expelled from the Presidency.
 October 5. Parliament sold the Presidency to Ts'ao K'un.
 October 10. Promulgation of the "Permanent" Constitution. Borodin appointed Adviser to the Kuo-Min Tang.
 December 12. Peking Diplomatic Body issued ultimatum to Sun Yat-Sen. International naval demonstration in Canton Harbour.
1924. January 20-30. The First National Congress. *Reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang*.
 May. Establishment of the Whangpoa Military Academy.
 May 31. Sino-Russian Treaty inaugurating the "equal" relationship between China and Soviet Russia.
 August 10. The "Hav" incident.
 August 26. British ultimatum to Sun Yat-Sen.
 September 5. Sun Yat-Sen declared war on Wu Pei-Fu.
 October 10. Revolt of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps.
 October 22. Defection of Feng Yü-Hsiang from Wu Pei-Fu resulting in the victory of the Triple Alliance and the installation of Tuan Ch'i-jui as Provisional Chief Executive at Peking in the place of Ts'ao K'un.
 November 11. Sun Yat-Sen left Canton for Peking to propose the convocation of a National People's Assembly.
 December 24. Tuan Ch'i-jui decreed the Rehabilitation Conference. Break-up of the Triple Alliance.
1925. February 1. Meeting of the Rehabilitation Conference.
 February 23. Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's attempt on Canton.
 February 24. Wang Ching-Wei asked for Sun Yat-Sen's Last Will.
 March 12. Death of Sun Yat-Sen.
 May 25. Wang Ching-Wei proposed the military, administrative and financial unification of Kwangtung under the Kuo-Min Tang, declaring war on Yang Hsi-Min and Liu Chen-Huan.
 May 30. The Shanghai Shootings. Chinese Nationalism *versus* British Imperialism.
 June 12. Defeat of Yang Hsi-Min and Liu Chen-Huan.
 June 13-30. Plenary Session of the Kuo-Min Tang Central Executive Committee, putting the Presidency of the Kuo-Min Tang into perpetual commission, and accepting the Last Will of Sun Yat-Sen. Establishment of the National Government (Government Council) under the Kuo-Min Tang Executive Committee. The Political and Military Councils. Wang Ching-Wei elected Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and its subordinate Councils.
 June 23. The Shakee Massacre. The Boycott against Hongkong.
 August 20. Assassination of Liao Chung-K'ai. Fall of Hu Han-Min.
 September 20. Hsü Ch'ung-Chih deposed from his chief command.
 October 3. Hsiung K'e-Wu disarmed.
 November 3. The Western Hills Conference.
 November 16. Chiang K'ai-Shih defeated Ch'en Ch'ung-Ming's remnants in the East River district.

1925. December. Chang Fa-K'uei pacified Southern Kwangtung. Kwangtung consolidated and unified.
- December 5. Chiang K'ai-Shih defended the Communists against the Western Hills group.
1926. January 1-19. The Second National Congress. Sun Yat-Sen declared President of the Party in perpetuity. Expulsion of the ringleaders of the Western Hills group.
- January 27. The Political Council adopted Wang Ching-Wei's proposal to declare war on the Northern Militarists.
- February 25. The National Government formally declared war on Wu Pei-Fu and Chang Tso-Lin.
- March 20. Li Chih-Lung arbitrarily arrested by Chiang K'ai-Shih. Wang Ching-Wei relinquished his posts in protest, leaving for France on a rest-cure; his resignation refused by the Political Council.
- April 3. Chiang K'ai-Shih's Manifesto reaffirming the Russo-Communist Alliance.
- May 15. Chiang K'ai-Shih admitted his wrong in the Li Chih-Lung case. The First Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee urged Wang Ching-Wei to resume his posts. The Communists disqualified as Heads of the Departments.
- May 28. Chiang K'ai-Shih appointed Commander-in-Chief for the Northern Expedition.
- July 2. Chiang K'ai-Shih given emergency powers for the duration of the Expedition by the Political Council at the advice of Borodin.
- July 9. Commencement of the Northern Expedition.
- July 17. T'ang Sheng-Chih occupied Changsha for the National Government.
- September 5. Bombardment of Wanhsien.
- October 10. Capture of Wuhan. End of the campaign against Wu Pei-Fu.
- The National Government introduced the consumption taxes, based on the Washington Surtaxes, and called off the Boycott against Hongkong.
- The National Government declared war on Sun Chuan-Fang.
- October 15. Second Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee. Wang Ching-Wei urged to return.
- November 6. Peking Government declared null and void, as from October 27, the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865.
- November 8. Fall of Nanchang, capital Kiangsi province.
- November 10. Removal of the National Government to Wuhan.
- December 2. Capture of Fukien province.
1927. January 4. The National Government assumed control over the British Concession at Hankow.
- January 23. Despatch of the British Expeditionary Forces to Shanghai.
- January 27. Sir Austen Chamberlain submitted the *British Proposals* to the Wuhan and Peking Governments, promising the gradual relinquishment of extraterritoriality, etc.
- January 31. Chang Tso-Lin protested against the despatch of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces.
- February 13. Arrival of the British forces in Shanghai.
- February 18. Fall of Hangchow, capital of Chekiang.
- March 10. Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee—dominated by the Communists and boycotted by Chiang K'ai-Shih—abolished the Chairmanship of the different Councils and instituted the Presidiums. Recon-

- struction of the National Government. Condominium with the Chinese Communist Party.
1927. March 22. Capture of Shanghai.
- March 24. Fall of Nanking.
- March 27. Chiang K'ai-Shih's entry into Shanghai.
- April 1. Wang Ching-Wei arrived at Shanghai.
- April 3. Chiang K'ai-Shih circular telegram announcing Wang Ching-Wei's return and resumption of office.
- April 5. The Wang Ching-Wei-Ch'en Tu-Hsiu Manifesto.
- April 6. Wang Ching-Wei's departure for Wuhan to propose the convocation of the Fourth Plenary Session.
- April 12. Chiang K'ai-Shih effected a coup d'état and inaugurated the *Purification Movement*.
- April 15. Assisted by the "Elder Statesmen," Chiang K'ai-Shih formed a Government at Nanking.
- April 17. Expulsion from the Party of the Nanking rebels.
- May 21. The Changsha (Hunan) riots in protest against the Communist land seizures.
- May 28. T'ang Sheng-Chih and Chang Fa-K'uei defeated Chang Tso-Lin in Honan after a series of bloody battles.
- June 1. Chiang K'ai-Shih captured Hsüchow.
- June 1. M. N. Roy delivered Stalin's telegram to Wang Ching-Wei.
- June 4. The Wuhan leaders conferring with Feng Yü-Hsiang at Chengchow.
- July 15. Wang Ching-Wei formally proposed in the Political Council the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuo-Min Tang. Break with the Third International.
- July 30. The Communist *coup d'état* at Nanchang.
- August 5. Chang Fa-K'uei suppressed the Nanchang revolt. The Chinese Communist Party proscribed.
- August 5. Chiang K'ai-Shih's crushing defeat at Hsüchow.
- August 8. Nanking made peace overtures to Wuhan.
- August 10. Wuhan insisted on its own supremacy and the need for the Fourth Plenary Session.
- August 15. Chiang K'ai-Shih, pressed by the Kwangsi generals, announced his resignation. The Nanking leaders fled to Shanghai.
- August 23. T'an Yen-K'ai conspired with Li Tsung-Jen to overthrow T'ang Sheng-Chih.
- September 1. Sun Chuan-Fang's attack on Nanking repulsed. The Wuhan leaders decided to remove to Nanking.
- September 5. Wang Ching-Wei arrived at Nanking.
- September 12. Sun Fo, in secret collaboration with Hsiü Ch'ung-Chih, proposed the abolition of the Kuo-Min Tang Central Committees and their replacement by a Special Committee to include the Wuhan, Nanking and Western Hills leaders.
- September 15. The formation of the unconstitutional Special Committee at Nanking and the reconstruction of the National Government. The dominance of the Kwangsi and Western Hills cliques.
- September 22. Wang Ching-Wei criticised, before the Wuhan Political Council, the establishment of the Special Committee.
- October 6. Chang Fa-K'uei declared war on the Special Committee.
- October 11. Wuhan and Nanking agree to convene the Fourth Plenary Session on November 1 (Wuhan Agreement).

- 1927.** October 18. Nanking suddenly attacked the Wuhan forces. Chang Fa-K'uei mobilised against the Kwangsi group.
 October 24. Wang Ching-Wei made overtures to Chiang K'ai-Shih to overthrow the Special Committee.
 October 28. Wang Ching-Wei arrived at Canton and secured Li Chi-Tsen's support against the Special Committee.
 November 7. Russian Consul at Canton distributed anti-Kuo-Min Tang handbills.
 November 13. T'ang Sheng-Chih defeated.
 November 15. Wang Ching-Wei and Li Chi-Tsen left for Shanghai.
 November 17. Chang Fa-K'uei disarmed Huang Shao-Hsiung's troops at Canton.
 November 18. Wang Ching-Wei and Chiang K'ai-Shih decided on common action.
 December 1. Chiang K'ai-Shih's (fourth) marriage with Sung Mei Ling.
 December 2-10. The Preliminary Meetings at Shanghai.
 December 10. Wang Ching-Wei relinquished his posts. Chiang K'ai-Shih reappointed Commander-in-Chief. Severance of diplomatic relations with Russia.
 December 11. Communist Insurrection at Canton.
 December 14. Chang Fa-K'uei crushed the Canton rebels.
 December 17. Wang Ching-Wei left Shanghai for France. Informal co-operation between the Left and Chiang K'ai-Shih.
- 1928.** February. Fourth Plenary Session, restoring the Central Executive Committee. Struggle between Kwangsi feudalism and Nanking centralism, the Left maintaining a benevolent neutrality towards Chiang K'ai-Shih.
 April. Renewal of the offensive against Chang Tso-Lin.
 May 3-4. The Tsinan Incident. Clash between the National Revolutionary troops and the Japanese soldiers illegally in occupation of Shangtung. Japanese bombarded Tsinanfu and killed Ts'ai Kung-Hsi, the Provincial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.
 June 5-8. Capture of Peking (Peip'ing) and Tientsin. The Northern Expedition concluded. Nanking the new Capital of China.
 July 25. The Sung-MacMurray Treaty. U.S.A. recognised China's right to tariff-autonomy, safeguarding their interests by an unconditional most-favoured-nation clause.
 August. The Fifth Plenary Session.
 October 4. The Nanking Government promulgated the so-called Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China, introducing the Five-Yuan system, in contravention with Article 19 of the "Programme of National Reconstruction."
 November 22. Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce between China and Belgium. Belgium regained her extra-territorial rights, abolished by the Peking Government in 1926. Belgian subjects "to be amenable to Chinese laws and jurisdiction as soon as the majority of the Powers now possessing extraterritorial privileges in China shall have agreed to relinquish them," after which "the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that Chinese citizens are permitted to live and trade in any part of the territories of Belgium and Luxemburg, will permit Belgian and Luxemburg subjects to enjoy the same rights in China, subject

- to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations."
- November 24. The *Kiangnan* opium scandal.
1929. January 1. Opening of the Disarmament Conference. Manchuria incorporated into the Nanking system.
- February 1. Coming into force of the new Tariff schedule, agreed upon at the Peking Tariff Conference in January, 1926, the Japanese consent to it having been previously secured by the recognition in principle of the unsecured foreign (mainly the Nishihara) loans.
- March 12. Wang Ching-Wei, Ch'en Kung-Po, Ku Meng-Yü and eleven other prominent leaders of the Kuo-Min Tang, constituting themselves as the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang by the authority of the Second National Congress, denounced the so-called Third National Congress which was to be held on March 15th, as illegal and farcical.
- March-May. Revolt of the Kwangsi clique against the Nanking Government.
- April 12. Chiang K'ai-Shih, through Foreign Minister C. T. Wang, requested the Japanese Government to postpone the evacuation of Shantung which was to take place on April 17, for the purpose of preventing Feng Yü-Hsiang from occupying the province, allotted to him at the so-called Disarmament Conference the previous January.
- May 20. Fifteen provincial Kuo-Min Tang branches repudiated the so-called Third National Congress.
- July 2. Conference at Peip'ing between Chiang K'ai-Shih, Chang Hsueh-Liang, Feng Yü-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan, resulting in the Feng Yü-Hsiang-Yen Hsi-Shan entente, and the crisis over the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- August 29. Attempt on Chiang K'ai-Shih's life by members of his bodyguard.
- September 17. Chang Fa-K'uei, acting on instructions of Central Executive Committee of the Second National Congress, declared war on Chiang K'ai-Shih.
- December 28. Mandate of the Nanking Government declaring the abolition, as from January 1, 1930, of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China.
1930. February 18. Assassination of Wang Loh-P'ing, a prominent Kuo-Min Tang leader.

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